Jobes v. City of Bellevue

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUSTIN JOBES, No. 24-6656 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00839-TSZ v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF BELLEVUE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 22, 2026** Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, CLIFTON, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Justin Jobes appeals the grant of summary judgment to

Defendant-Appellee the City of Bellevue (the City). Jobes alleges religious

discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). seq, and the Washington Law Against Discrimination.1 Because the district court

correctly concluded that the City tried to reasonably accommodate Jobes, we affirm.

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review de novo the district court’s grant

or denial of summary judgment.” Alaska R.R. Corp. v. Flying Crown Subdivision

Addition No. 1 & Addition No. 2 Prop. Owners Ass’n, 89 F.4th 792, 798 (9th Cir.

2023). The grant of summary judgment should be upheld if the evidence viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party shows “that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24

(1986); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

To be eligible for summary judgment on an affirmative defense, the party asserting

that defense must “affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could

find other than for the moving party.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d

978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007).

As a threshold matter, Jobes argues that the district court’s issuance of an oral

rather than written order of summary judgment automatically constitutes a reason to

reverse the grant of summary judgment.. This argument is incorrect. We have held

1 The claim under Washington law is guided by federal Title VII caselaw and thus both claims rise or fall together. See Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 325 P.3d 193, 197 (Wash. 2014).

2 24-6656 that a written memorandum is not necessary to grant summary judgment; a reasoned

oral order combined with the order granting summary judgment suffices. See, e.g.,

Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Schimmels, 85 F.3d 416, 421

(9th Cir. 1996).

Turning to the merits, since Jobes made a prima facie claim under Title VII,

the City can rebut that claim via an affirmative defense if it can “show that it initiated

good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee’s religious practices or

that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.”

Petersen v. Snohomish Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2025)

(quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004)).

The City offered Jobes several reasonable accommodations. First, the City

offered Jobes a utilities position, which Jobes rejected. Jobes requested paid medical

leave paid medical leave for stress related to the vaccine mandate, and the City

granted it to him for five months. When Jobes’ medical leave was set to end, the

City offered him three other potential positions—as an Emergency Management

Coordinator, as an LTE Grants Coordinator, and as a Fire Prevention Program

Analyst. None of these jobs required contact with patients, and the Fire Prevention

position allowed Jobes to remain within the City’s Fire Department. Jobes refused

these accommodations. The City contacted Jobes subsequently and offered him a

Fire Prevention Officer position within the Fire Department. Jobes declined this

3 24-6656 accommodation as well. And after Jobes voluntarily resigned and the vaccine

mandate was lifted, the City later contacted Jobes through one of its Fire Chiefs and

advised him there was a pathway for him to return to his old job as a

Firefighter/EMT. Jobes declined this final offer as well.

The record shows that the City repeatedly offered reasonable accommodations

to Jobes which he repeatedly declined. As such, the City carried its burden on the

affirmative defense, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.

See Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1216. Moreover, because this case arises in the exact

same context as Petersen, the City also would have prevailed on its affirmative

defense of undue hardship as the district court concluded. See id. at 1220.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-6656