In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-17-00174-CR
JOAQUIN CORONADO, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 154th District Court Lamb County, Texas Trial Court No. DCR-5424-16, Honorable Felix Klein, Presiding
November 25, 2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Appellant, Joaquin Coronado, appeals his conviction for the offense of engaging
in organized criminal activity,1 and sentence to fifty-five years’ incarceration in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. By his appeal, appellant contends
that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court submitted
an erroneous jury charge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(5) (West Supp. 2019). Factual and Procedural Background
In the spring of 2014, a group of individuals worked together to distribute large
amounts of methamphetamine in Lamb County, Texas. An investigation identified
appellant as the leader of this network. In May of 2014, appellant was arrested on an
unrelated warrant. At the time of his arrest, appellant was in possession of a simulated
handgun and magazine, clear plastic baggies, a digital scale, a ledger, and multiple strips
of paper with handwritten contact information on each.
Texas Department of Public Safety Special Agent Ashburn met with appellant after
his arrest. After receiving Miranda warnings, appellant voluntarily gave Ashburn both an
oral and written statement. In both statements, appellant admitted to bringing a large
quantity of “dope” and “drugs” into Lamb County during the months immediately
preceding his arrest. In his oral statement, appellant explained that he had several
individuals, including many of his co-defendants, who would sell the drugs for him and
that he would even institute competitions to encourage his agents to sell more drugs.
Appellant and his agents were so successful selling drugs that appellant stated that he
had to return to his supplier “every day” and that he would purchase a quarter pound of
the drugs every time he resupplied. Appellant was indicted for the offense of engaging in
organized criminal activity.
At trial, the State offered appellant’s statements into evidence, which were
admitted over appellant’s objections. Three co-defendants were called by the State.
Each of the co-defendants corroborated the statements made by appellant in his written
and oral statements, namely that appellant was the head of a methamphetamine
distribution ring. The jury found appellant guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity
2 by delivering a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1 in an amount of 200 grams or
more but less than 400 grams. The jury also assessed appellant’s sentence at fifty-five
years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice. After the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, appellant timely filed
his notice of appeal.
By his appeal, appellant presents two issues. By his first issue, appellant contends
that the evidence presented at his trial is insufficient to support his conviction. By his
second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by submitting a jury charge
which authorized the jury to convict appellant of an offense outside the express language
of Texas Penal Code section 71.02(a). We will review appellant’s second issue first.
Charge Error
By his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court submitted a jury charge
that erroneously authorized the jury to convict him of an offense outside of the express
language of Texas Penal Code section 71.02(a)(5). The State responds that the charge
is not in error as it tracks with the language of section 71.02(a)(5).
In analyzing a claim of charge error, the Court should first determine whether the
submitted charge was erroneous. Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). If the charge was erroneous, the Court must then determine whether
appellant suffered harm due to the error. Id. It is only when we have reached an
assessment of harm that error preservation becomes relevant. Kirsch v. State, 357
S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If error was properly preserved by timely
objection, reversal is required if it is shown that the error caused the defendant some
3 harm. Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Almanza v.
State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc)). If, on the other hand, the
defendant did not properly object to the jury charge, as in the present case, reversal is
only required if the error was so egregious that it denied the defendant a fair and impartial
trial. Id. (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).
The written charge given to the jury by the trial court should distinctly set forth the
law applicable to the case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (West 2007); Vega v.
State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 518-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The application paragraph of the
jury charge, not the abstract portion, authorizes a conviction. Yzaguirre v. State, 394
S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The jury is presumed to have understood and
followed the trial court’s charge absent evidence to the contrary. Crenshaw v. State, 378
S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
In the present case, appellant contends that the trial court erred by submitting a
jury charge that authorized the jury to find appellant guilty of establishing, maintaining, or
participating in a combination to deliver or possess with intent to deliver 200 to 400 grams
of methamphetamine. However, the application paragraph of the trial court’s charge
tracks the language of section 71.02(a)(5). Specifically, the charge informs the jury to
find appellant guilty if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination,
“he delivered a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1 . . . .” Section 71.02(a)(5)
provides that,
A person commits an offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination or as a member of a criminal street gang, the person commits or conspires to commit one or more of the following: (5) unlawful manufacture, delivery, dispensation, or distribution of a controlled substance or dangerous drug, or unlawful
4 possession of a controlled substance or dangerous drug through forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, or deception;
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(5) (emphasis added). Nowhere in the jury charge is
the jury authorized to convict appellant for engaging in organized criminal activity by
committing or conspiring to commit possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to deliver.2 We conclude that the trial court did not err in charging the jury as it did.
Appellant correctly identifies that the indictment in this case improperly alleged that
appellant committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity when he did
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-17-00174-CR
JOAQUIN CORONADO, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 154th District Court Lamb County, Texas Trial Court No. DCR-5424-16, Honorable Felix Klein, Presiding
November 25, 2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Appellant, Joaquin Coronado, appeals his conviction for the offense of engaging
in organized criminal activity,1 and sentence to fifty-five years’ incarceration in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. By his appeal, appellant contends
that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court submitted
an erroneous jury charge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(5) (West Supp. 2019). Factual and Procedural Background
In the spring of 2014, a group of individuals worked together to distribute large
amounts of methamphetamine in Lamb County, Texas. An investigation identified
appellant as the leader of this network. In May of 2014, appellant was arrested on an
unrelated warrant. At the time of his arrest, appellant was in possession of a simulated
handgun and magazine, clear plastic baggies, a digital scale, a ledger, and multiple strips
of paper with handwritten contact information on each.
Texas Department of Public Safety Special Agent Ashburn met with appellant after
his arrest. After receiving Miranda warnings, appellant voluntarily gave Ashburn both an
oral and written statement. In both statements, appellant admitted to bringing a large
quantity of “dope” and “drugs” into Lamb County during the months immediately
preceding his arrest. In his oral statement, appellant explained that he had several
individuals, including many of his co-defendants, who would sell the drugs for him and
that he would even institute competitions to encourage his agents to sell more drugs.
Appellant and his agents were so successful selling drugs that appellant stated that he
had to return to his supplier “every day” and that he would purchase a quarter pound of
the drugs every time he resupplied. Appellant was indicted for the offense of engaging in
organized criminal activity.
At trial, the State offered appellant’s statements into evidence, which were
admitted over appellant’s objections. Three co-defendants were called by the State.
Each of the co-defendants corroborated the statements made by appellant in his written
and oral statements, namely that appellant was the head of a methamphetamine
distribution ring. The jury found appellant guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity
2 by delivering a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1 in an amount of 200 grams or
more but less than 400 grams. The jury also assessed appellant’s sentence at fifty-five
years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice. After the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, appellant timely filed
his notice of appeal.
By his appeal, appellant presents two issues. By his first issue, appellant contends
that the evidence presented at his trial is insufficient to support his conviction. By his
second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by submitting a jury charge
which authorized the jury to convict appellant of an offense outside the express language
of Texas Penal Code section 71.02(a). We will review appellant’s second issue first.
Charge Error
By his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court submitted a jury charge
that erroneously authorized the jury to convict him of an offense outside of the express
language of Texas Penal Code section 71.02(a)(5). The State responds that the charge
is not in error as it tracks with the language of section 71.02(a)(5).
In analyzing a claim of charge error, the Court should first determine whether the
submitted charge was erroneous. Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). If the charge was erroneous, the Court must then determine whether
appellant suffered harm due to the error. Id. It is only when we have reached an
assessment of harm that error preservation becomes relevant. Kirsch v. State, 357
S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If error was properly preserved by timely
objection, reversal is required if it is shown that the error caused the defendant some
3 harm. Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Almanza v.
State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc)). If, on the other hand, the
defendant did not properly object to the jury charge, as in the present case, reversal is
only required if the error was so egregious that it denied the defendant a fair and impartial
trial. Id. (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).
The written charge given to the jury by the trial court should distinctly set forth the
law applicable to the case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (West 2007); Vega v.
State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 518-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The application paragraph of the
jury charge, not the abstract portion, authorizes a conviction. Yzaguirre v. State, 394
S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The jury is presumed to have understood and
followed the trial court’s charge absent evidence to the contrary. Crenshaw v. State, 378
S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
In the present case, appellant contends that the trial court erred by submitting a
jury charge that authorized the jury to find appellant guilty of establishing, maintaining, or
participating in a combination to deliver or possess with intent to deliver 200 to 400 grams
of methamphetamine. However, the application paragraph of the trial court’s charge
tracks the language of section 71.02(a)(5). Specifically, the charge informs the jury to
find appellant guilty if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination,
“he delivered a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1 . . . .” Section 71.02(a)(5)
provides that,
A person commits an offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination or as a member of a criminal street gang, the person commits or conspires to commit one or more of the following: (5) unlawful manufacture, delivery, dispensation, or distribution of a controlled substance or dangerous drug, or unlawful
4 possession of a controlled substance or dangerous drug through forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, or deception;
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(5) (emphasis added). Nowhere in the jury charge is
the jury authorized to convict appellant for engaging in organized criminal activity by
committing or conspiring to commit possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to deliver.2 We conclude that the trial court did not err in charging the jury as it did.
Appellant correctly identifies that the indictment in this case improperly alleged that
appellant committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity when he did
“knowingly deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance in Penalty
Group 1 . . . .” As discussed above, mere possession with intent to deliver is insufficient
to support a charge under section 71.02(a). However, at no time did appellant file a
motion to quash the indictment or object to the indictment. By failing to do so, appellant
waived any objection to this defect in the indictment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 1.14(b) (West 2005) (“If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity
of form or substance in an indictment . . . before the date on which the trial on the merits
commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity
and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding.”).
Concluding that there is no error in the jury charge and that appellant waived any
error in the indictment, we overrule appellant’s second issue.
2 We do note that the charge includes two lesser-included offenses that are based on possession of a controlled substance. However, neither of these offenses authorize the jury to convict appellant for engaging in organized criminal activity based on simple possession.
5 Sufficiency of the Evidence
By his first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the
jury’s finding that appellant committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal
activity by delivering a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1, in an amount of 200 or
more grams but less than 400 grams.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); see Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in
character, weight, and amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of
the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a
conviction.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917 (Cochran, J., concurring). We remain mindful
that “[t]here is no higher burden of proof in any trial, criminal or civil, and there is no higher
standard of appellate review than the standard mandated by Jackson.” Id. When
reviewing all the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is
whether the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906-07 n.26 (discussing
Judge Cochran’s dissenting opinion in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 448-50 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006), as outlining the proper application of a single evidentiary standard of
review). “[T]he reviewing court is required to defer to the jury's credibility and weight
determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the
weight to be given their testimony.” Id. at 899 (emphasis in original).
6 To prove that appellant was guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity, the
State was required to prove that appellant, with an intent to establish, maintain, or
participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination, committed or conspired to
commit delivery of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1, specifically
methamphetamine, in an amount of 200 or more grams but less than 400 grams. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(5); Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018). A combination is defined as three or more persons collaborating to carry on
criminal activities, regardless of whether the persons know one another or whether
membership in the combination changes over time. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.01(a)
(West 2011). To prove that a combination existed, the State had to prove an agreement
to act together in a continuing course of activity. Ledet v. State, 177 S.W.3d 213, 218
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). To prove the necessary intent, the State
must show that appellant committed the predicate offense with the specific intent to
participate in a criminal activity with a combination of persons and to participate in the
profits of the combination. McGee v. State, 909 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995,
pet. ref’d). Intent may be inferred from acts, words, and conduct of the accused as well
as the circumstances in which appellant’s actions occurred. DeLeon v. State, 77 S.W.3d
300, 312 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref’d). It is not enough for appellant just to be
aware of the existence of the combination, he must also have known of the combination’s
intended criminal activity. McGee, 909 S.W.2d at 518.
“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless
corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense
committed . . . .” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (West 2005). In reviewing the
7 sufficiency of the evidence corroborating an accomplice witness’s testimony, we must
exclude the testimony of the accomplice from consideration and examine the remaining
evidence to determine whether this evidence tends to connect the defendant to the
commission of the offense. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(en banc).
Appellant specifically challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the
testimony of the accomplice witnesses. The non-accomplice witness evidence need not
be sufficient to support conviction for the charged offense; rather, it must be sufficient to
“tend to connect” appellant to the commission of the offense. See id. Here, in appellant’s
oral statement, he admits that he purchased as much as a quarter pound of
methamphetamine daily which he would deliver to a combination of people in Lamb
County during the period alleged by the State. Appellant stated that he would “pass”
these drugs to his distributors. He described the enterprise as a “business.” Appellant
specifically discussed delivering drugs to multiple persons, including the accomplice
witnesses. In addition, the physical evidence found in the vehicle appellant was driving
when he was arrested, including a simulated handgun and magazine, clear plastic
baggies, a digital scale, a ledger, and multiple strips of paper with handwritten contact
information on each, tends to connect appellant to the offense of delivering drugs. Since
appellant’s issue is couched in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the
testimony of the accomplice witnesses, we conclude that the non-accomplice evidence is
more than sufficient to tend to connect appellant to the offense alleged in the jury charge.
However, even if we construe appellant’s issue as challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence to support his conviction generally, we conclude that the evidence is
8 sufficient. Again, to prove appellant guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity, the
State had to prove that appellant, with an intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a
combination or in the profits of a combination, committed or conspired to commit delivery
of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1, specifically methamphetamine, in an
amount of 200 or more grams but less than 400 grams. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 71.02(a)(5). Appellant’s intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination to
commit delivery of methamphetamine in an amount of 200 or more grams but less than
400 grams in the spring of 2014 is established by appellant’s statement alone. Appellant
admitted to organizing a “business” with many individuals to sell methamphetamine in
Lamb County. For an extended period of time during the applicable period, appellant
admitted that he would acquire a quarter pound of methamphetamine, approximately 113
grams, every day which he would deliver to his distributors to sell. Consequently, we
conclude that a rational jury could have found appellant guilty of each essential element
of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912.
Finding the evidence to be sufficient to corroborate the accomplice witnesses’
testimony and to support appellant’s conviction, we overrule appellant’s first issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Judy C. Parker Justice Do not publish.