2 5 Joann Yearwood, 6 Case No. 2:25-cv-01318-JCM-NJK Plaintiff(s), 7 Order v. 8 [Docket No. 29] Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center, LLC, et 9 al., 10 Defendant(s). 11 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to extend the discovery cutoff and 12 subsequent case management deadlines. Docket No. 27. Defendants filed a response in 13 opposition. Docket No. 29. No reply was filed and the deadline for doing so has expired. See 14 Docket No. 28. The Court does not require a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons 15 discussed below, the Court DENIES the motion to extend. 17 A. Procedural Background 18 Plaintiff brought this case alleging various employment-related claims. Docket No. 1. On 19 September 3, 2025, the parties held a Rule 26(f) conference, Docket No. 18 at 2, at which time 20 there was no impediment to proceeding with discovery, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). On September 21 10, 2025, the Court issued a scheduling order with the deadlines the parties had proposed, including 22 a discovery cutoff of March 2, 2026. Docket No. 19. After filing a stipulation that failed to meet 23 the governing standards, see Docket Nos. 23, 24, on February 26, 2026, the parties filed a 24 stipulation to extend case management deadlines. Docket No. 25. On February 27, 2026, the 25 Court concluded that a showing of diligence had not been made, but it allowed an extension given 26 that the request was unopposed and as a one-time courtesy. Docket No. 26. The Court warned 27 therein that it was “not inclined to extend these deadlines further.” Id. 28 1 B. Factual Background 2 Plaintiff took the deposition of Defendants’ manager (Roel Ramos) on January 7, 2026. 3 Docket No. 27-5. Ramos testified at that deposition as to email communication regarding 4 Plaintiff’s leave request. See id. at 4-5. Plaintiff received the certified transcript of the deposition 5 on January 27, 2026. Docket No. 27-2 at ¶ 2. On March 10, 2026 (i.e., more than two months 6 after the deposition and 42 days after receipt of the certified transcript), Plaintiff propounded 7 written discovery. Docket No. 27-3. Defendants objected to the discovery as untimely, given that 8 the rules allow 30 days to respond to discovery and less than 30 days remained in the discovery 9 period. Docket No. 27-4. Plaintiff now seeks to extend the discovery cutoff for the sole purpose 10 of retroactively rendering her discovery requests timely. Docket No. 27. That is the matter before 11 the Court. 13 The motion practice focuses on 18 requests for production that were not served in a timely 14 manner given the current discovery cutoff. Separate and apart from those requests, however, there 15 is no dispute that defense counsel agreed to produce a subset of documents during the earlier 16 deposition. See Docket No. 29 at 3; see also Docket No. 27-5 at 6. The Court generally holds 17 counsel to their discovery agreements, see, e.g., Lux v. Buchanan, 2024 WL 1598805, at *2 (D. 18 Nev. Apr. 12, 2024), and there is no suggestion that it would be untimely for Plaintiff to file a 19 motion to compel this subset of documents at this juncture, cf. Garcia v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 20 332 F.R.D. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 2019). Moreover, the Court need not extend the discovery cutoff to 21 order certain discovery materials be produced. Accordingly, notwithstanding the decision below 22 declining to extend the discovery cutoff, Defendant must produce this subset of documents by 23 April 17, 2026. 24 25 26 27 28 2 A. Standards 3 In addition to Local Rule 26-3, a request to extend unexpired deadlines in the scheduling 4 order is governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 “The Ninth Circuit is 5 protective of this particular rule, as it deems Rule 16 to be an essential tool in controlling heavy 6 trial court dockets.” Williams v. James River Grp. Inc., 627 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1177 n.3 (D. Nev. 7 2022) (quoting Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Rehrig Pac. Co., No. 1:11-cv-01273-LJO-BAM, 2013 8 WL 645741, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013)). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly and 9 emphatically addressed the importance of scheduling orders as tools for district courts to manage 10 their heavy caseloads.” Desio v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 339 F.R.D. 632, 641 (D. Nev. 11 2021) (collecting cases). As articulated in one of those cases: 12 A scheduling order “is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.” The 13 district court’s decision to honor the terms of its binding scheduling order does not simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits 14 of [the] case. Disregard of the order would undermine the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the 15 litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier. 16 Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation 17 omitted).2 “The use of orders establishing a firm discovery cutoff date is commonplace, and has 18 impacts generally helpful to the orderly progress of litigation, so that the enforcement of such an 19 order should come as a surprise to no one.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 20 1 Because the parties frame this dispute as seeking modification of the case management 21 schedule, the Court does likewise herein. The Court notes, however, that the scenario described in which a litigant seeks answers to its written discovery served less than 30 days before the 22 discovery cutoff is generally resolved through the lens of a motion to compel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). In that context, courts have explained that they have discretion to order discovery responses 23 when the lateness is not excessive and have generally exercised that discretion when the discovery is only a few days. See, e.g., Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., 2013 WL 4701192, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 24 30, 2013) (collecting cases). Plaintiff does not provide any legal authority that such relief would be warranted for discovery served more than a week late. 25 2 The Ninth Circuit has at times taken a softer approach to extensions in other contexts, 26 such as briefing schedules. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pics., Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1257-60 (9th Cir. 2010); but see Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159, 1181 (9th Cir. 2022) (distinguishing 27 Ahanchian and affirming denial of request to extend “stringent” briefing schedule). Given the robust body of law specific to the Rule 16 context, the Court does not apply the standards discussed 28 in these other cases. See, e.g., Williams, 627 F. Supp. 3d at 1177 n.3. 1 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 2 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the federal and state 3 systems routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and 4 resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the deadlines are taken seriously by 5 the parties, and the best way to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines”). 6 The governing good cause analysis turns on whether the subject deadlines cannot 7 reasonably be met despite the exercise of diligence. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2 5 Joann Yearwood, 6 Case No. 2:25-cv-01318-JCM-NJK Plaintiff(s), 7 Order v. 8 [Docket No. 29] Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center, LLC, et 9 al., 10 Defendant(s). 11 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to extend the discovery cutoff and 12 subsequent case management deadlines. Docket No. 27. Defendants filed a response in 13 opposition. Docket No. 29. No reply was filed and the deadline for doing so has expired. See 14 Docket No. 28. The Court does not require a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons 15 discussed below, the Court DENIES the motion to extend. 17 A. Procedural Background 18 Plaintiff brought this case alleging various employment-related claims. Docket No. 1. On 19 September 3, 2025, the parties held a Rule 26(f) conference, Docket No. 18 at 2, at which time 20 there was no impediment to proceeding with discovery, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). On September 21 10, 2025, the Court issued a scheduling order with the deadlines the parties had proposed, including 22 a discovery cutoff of March 2, 2026. Docket No. 19. After filing a stipulation that failed to meet 23 the governing standards, see Docket Nos. 23, 24, on February 26, 2026, the parties filed a 24 stipulation to extend case management deadlines. Docket No. 25. On February 27, 2026, the 25 Court concluded that a showing of diligence had not been made, but it allowed an extension given 26 that the request was unopposed and as a one-time courtesy. Docket No. 26. The Court warned 27 therein that it was “not inclined to extend these deadlines further.” Id. 28 1 B. Factual Background 2 Plaintiff took the deposition of Defendants’ manager (Roel Ramos) on January 7, 2026. 3 Docket No. 27-5. Ramos testified at that deposition as to email communication regarding 4 Plaintiff’s leave request. See id. at 4-5. Plaintiff received the certified transcript of the deposition 5 on January 27, 2026. Docket No. 27-2 at ¶ 2. On March 10, 2026 (i.e., more than two months 6 after the deposition and 42 days after receipt of the certified transcript), Plaintiff propounded 7 written discovery. Docket No. 27-3. Defendants objected to the discovery as untimely, given that 8 the rules allow 30 days to respond to discovery and less than 30 days remained in the discovery 9 period. Docket No. 27-4. Plaintiff now seeks to extend the discovery cutoff for the sole purpose 10 of retroactively rendering her discovery requests timely. Docket No. 27. That is the matter before 11 the Court. 13 The motion practice focuses on 18 requests for production that were not served in a timely 14 manner given the current discovery cutoff. Separate and apart from those requests, however, there 15 is no dispute that defense counsel agreed to produce a subset of documents during the earlier 16 deposition. See Docket No. 29 at 3; see also Docket No. 27-5 at 6. The Court generally holds 17 counsel to their discovery agreements, see, e.g., Lux v. Buchanan, 2024 WL 1598805, at *2 (D. 18 Nev. Apr. 12, 2024), and there is no suggestion that it would be untimely for Plaintiff to file a 19 motion to compel this subset of documents at this juncture, cf. Garcia v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 20 332 F.R.D. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 2019). Moreover, the Court need not extend the discovery cutoff to 21 order certain discovery materials be produced. Accordingly, notwithstanding the decision below 22 declining to extend the discovery cutoff, Defendant must produce this subset of documents by 23 April 17, 2026. 24 25 26 27 28 2 A. Standards 3 In addition to Local Rule 26-3, a request to extend unexpired deadlines in the scheduling 4 order is governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 “The Ninth Circuit is 5 protective of this particular rule, as it deems Rule 16 to be an essential tool in controlling heavy 6 trial court dockets.” Williams v. James River Grp. Inc., 627 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1177 n.3 (D. Nev. 7 2022) (quoting Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Rehrig Pac. Co., No. 1:11-cv-01273-LJO-BAM, 2013 8 WL 645741, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013)). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly and 9 emphatically addressed the importance of scheduling orders as tools for district courts to manage 10 their heavy caseloads.” Desio v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 339 F.R.D. 632, 641 (D. Nev. 11 2021) (collecting cases). As articulated in one of those cases: 12 A scheduling order “is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.” The 13 district court’s decision to honor the terms of its binding scheduling order does not simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits 14 of [the] case. Disregard of the order would undermine the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the 15 litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier. 16 Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation 17 omitted).2 “The use of orders establishing a firm discovery cutoff date is commonplace, and has 18 impacts generally helpful to the orderly progress of litigation, so that the enforcement of such an 19 order should come as a surprise to no one.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 20 1 Because the parties frame this dispute as seeking modification of the case management 21 schedule, the Court does likewise herein. The Court notes, however, that the scenario described in which a litigant seeks answers to its written discovery served less than 30 days before the 22 discovery cutoff is generally resolved through the lens of a motion to compel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). In that context, courts have explained that they have discretion to order discovery responses 23 when the lateness is not excessive and have generally exercised that discretion when the discovery is only a few days. See, e.g., Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., 2013 WL 4701192, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 24 30, 2013) (collecting cases). Plaintiff does not provide any legal authority that such relief would be warranted for discovery served more than a week late. 25 2 The Ninth Circuit has at times taken a softer approach to extensions in other contexts, 26 such as briefing schedules. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pics., Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1257-60 (9th Cir. 2010); but see Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159, 1181 (9th Cir. 2022) (distinguishing 27 Ahanchian and affirming denial of request to extend “stringent” briefing schedule). Given the robust body of law specific to the Rule 16 context, the Court does not apply the standards discussed 28 in these other cases. See, e.g., Williams, 627 F. Supp. 3d at 1177 n.3. 1 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 2 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the federal and state 3 systems routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and 4 resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the deadlines are taken seriously by 5 the parties, and the best way to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines”). 6 The governing good cause analysis turns on whether the subject deadlines cannot 7 reasonably be met despite the exercise of diligence. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. “The diligence 8 obligation is ongoing.” Morgal v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 284 F.R.D. 452, 460 (D. 9 Ariz. 2012). “The showing of diligence is measured by the conduct displayed throughout the entire 10 period of time already allowed.” Williams, 627 F. Supp. 3d at 1177. Extensions of case 11 management deadlines are meant to arise from circumstances that could not have been reasonably 12 foreseen at the time those deadlines were set. See Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 13 (E.D.Cal.1999). “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason 14 for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. When diligence has not been shown in support 15 of an extension request, “the inquiry should end.” Id. 16 B. Analysis 17 The requirement to serve discovery at least 30 days before the discovery cutoff is a basic 18 rule that should be known to all civil practitioners in federal court. Plaintiff’s counsel had more 19 than ample time to serve the disputed discovery requests. The deposition from which counsel 20 apparently became aware of the need for this discovery took place nearly three months before the 21 discovery cutoff. Even taking counsel’s position as true that a certified transcript was required 22 before propounding that discovery, which seems like a stretch, the certified transcript was available 23 more than two months before the discovery cutoff. Moreover, it should have been abundantly 24 clear to counsel during this period that time was of the essence to wrap up discovery, both given 25 the fast-approaching cutoff and the Court’s warning that it was not inclined to extend the discovery 26 cutoff further. See, e.g., Docket No. 26. Waiting 42 days from receipt of the certified deposition 27 28 1} transcript to serve this discovery was not diligent. At best, the record shows carelessness, which is not a basis to modify the case management schedule. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to extend. As also explained above in 5] Section II, however, Defendant must produce the identified subset of documents by April 17, 2026. 7 Dated: April 8, 2026 8 Ab Nancy J. K 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 > When diligence is lacking, the good cause inquiry ends. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Plaintiff contends that Defendants would not be prejudiced by a relatively short extension, see, 241 e.g., Docket No. 27 at 5, but an absence of prejudice is insufficient justification to modify case management deadlines when diligence is lacking, see Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Plaintiff also 25! contends that this discovery is “critical” to her case, see Docket No. 27 at 2-3, but the importance of the subject discovery is insufficient justification to modify case management deadlines when 26} diligence is lacking, see, e.g., Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1027. If anything, the purported importance of the discovery begs the question as to why counsel did not seek it in prompt fashion when they 27| had the chance. See Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Sonia Invs., 237 F.R.D. 395, 399 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“the alleged importance of the documents appears inconsistent with the delay in seeking 28] the documents”).