Joan E. Quinn v. Avco Corporation

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: November 14, 2023
• Docket: 22-1596
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT __________

No. 22-1596 __________

JOAN E. QUINN, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of James Albert Quinn, Deceased; JAMES ARNOLD QUINN; ELIZABETH QUINN; STEPHANIE PFEILSTICKER; SARAH QUINN; ERIN QUINN,

Appellants

v.

AVCO CORPORATION; LYCOMING ENGINES; CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC.; TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC.; BENDIX CORPORATION; ALLIED SIGNAL, INC.; HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. __________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D. Del. No. 1-15-cv-1005) District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews __________

Argued on March 23, 2023

Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 14, 2023)

Cynthia M. Devers [Argued] Devers Miska Law Two Bala Plaza Suite 300 Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004

Counsel for Appellants Andrea S. Brooks Wilks Law, LLC 4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 200 Wilmington, DE 19805

John S. Bagby, Jr. [Argued] Bagby & Associates, LLC 43 Leopard Road, Suite 301 Paoli, PA 19301

Counsel for Appellee Continental Motors, Inc.

__________

OPINION* __________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

This action arises from a plane accident (“Accident”) that fatally injured the pilot,

James Quinn, and flight instructor, Robert Groh. Appellants challenge the District

Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Continental Motors, Inc.

(“Continental”). Summary judgment was granted on the basis that the 18-year statute of

repose contained in the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), Pub. L.

No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note), barred

Appellants’ claims against Continental. We agree and therefore affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The tragic Accident, which occurred on November 5, 2013, involved a Piper

aircraft (the “Aircraft”) (also known as a Piper Saratoga). The Aircraft was manufactured

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

2 by Piper Aircraft Corporation in 1980 and was delivered to its first purchaser on

November 3, 1980.

As the District Court explained, Appellants contend that “because of a defect in

the magneto, the engine failed to produce enough power, causing the crash.” A1066.

Specifically, Appellants allege the Accident occurred “due to the failure of the engine

caused by the rubbing of the magneto rotor against the pole shoes.” Appellants Br. 4

(citing A322-23). Appellants brought claims against Continental for strict liability,

negligence, breach of warranty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, survival, and

wrongful death.

The engine, which was designed and manufactured by AVCO Corp. and

Lycoming Engines (collectively “Lycoming”), was equipped with a Kelly Aerospace

dual magneto (“Magneto”), which provided electrical energy to the engine’s ignition

system. The Magneto was originally designed by Bendix Corporation. Continental later

acquired the Bendix magneto product line and began manufacturing the magnetos.

Continental rebuilt the Magneto in 2002, and Kelly Aerospace overhauled and

reassembled the Magneto in 2004 and installed it on the Aircraft on or about June 17,

2004.

Appellee filed in the District Court a motion for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, motion for partial summary judgment and a motion to strike sham

declarations. In its motion for summary judgment, Continental argued, among other

things, that Appellants could not prove that the Magneto caused the Accident, and in any

event, that Appellants’ claims are barred by GARA’s 18-year statute of repose.

3 Continental argued that GARA’s statute of repose barred Appellants’ claims because: (1)

the Aircraft was a general aviation aircraft for purposes of GARA; (2) Continental was

being sued in its capacity as a manufacturer of the Magneto; and (3) the Accident

occurred more than 18 years after the delivery of the Aircraft to its first purchaser.

Following a hearing and supplemental briefing, the District Court granted

Continental’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Appellants’ claims were

barred by GARA’s 18-year statute of repose against aircraft manufacturers. The Court

pointed out that the “aircraft was delivered to its first purchaser on November 3, 1980 --

almost 33 years before the Accident,” and therefore “the [18-year] statute of repose for

the aircraft as a whole has run.”1 A1072. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Appellants, since GARA’s rolling provision was not triggered and the 18-

year limitation period began in 1980, the Court entered Judgment in favor of

Continental.2

Following the granting of Continental’s summary judgment motion, Appellants

filed a motion for re-argument. Continental responded to Appellants’ motion for re-

1 The Court further pointed out that GARA contains a “rolling” provision: If a “new component, system subassembly or other part which replaced another component, system, subassembly or other part originally in . . . the aircraft” is alleged to have caused the crash, then the statute of repose begins “on the date of completion of the replacement or addition.” A1072 (quoting GARA § 2(a)(2)). However, the District Court concluded that GARA’s rolling provision did not apply here, and Appellants do not challenge that ruling on appeal. 2 Although the District Court also found partial summary judgment in favor of Continental was warranted even if GARA did not bar Appellants’ claims entirely, and the Court also denied Continental’s aforementioned motion to strike sham declarations, those rulings are not on appeal before us.

4 argument, by, among other things, arguing that it was acting in its capacity as a

manufacturer when it rebuilt the Magneto. Continental pointed out that there was no

dispute that only a manufacturer can rebuild a part under the Federal Aviation

Regulations. Therefore, the act of rebuilding a component is an activity that is within the

exclusive province of an aviation manufacturer.

The District Court then granted re-argument on the portions of Count Five of

Appellants’ operative Complaint that alleged negligence “against Continental as a

rebuilder and a seller.” A1175. In particular, the Court granted re-argument on three

issues: (1) whether the phrase “capacity as a manufacturer” includes a manufacturer

acting as a rebuilder or a seller; (2) the status of Appellants’ claims against Continental in

its capacity as a rebuilder; and (3) the status of Appellants’ claims against Continental in

its capacity as a seller. Id. Following further supplemental briefing, the District Court

reaffirmed its conclusion that Appellants’ claims were barred by GARA’s statute of

repose, and the Court reaffirmed its Judgment in favor of Continental and against

Appellants.

Appellants raise the following issue on appeal: “Whether the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment and denying [Appellants’] Motion for Reargument pursuant

to [GARA] for claims made against [Continental] outside of its capacity as a

manufacturer, which are not preempted under GARA, in violation of [Sikkelee v.

Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701, 711 (3d Cir. 2018)].” Appellants Br. 2-3

(emph. added).

5 II. DISCUSSION3

GARA contains a statute of repose that, with certain exceptions, bars suits against

airplane manufacturers brought more than 18 years after the delivery date to an initial

purchaser of the aircraft. Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 165 (3d Cir.

2006) (citing GARA § 2(a)). In particular, GARA provides that

. . . no civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred . . . after the applicable [18-year] limitation period beginning on . . . the date of delivery of the aircraft.

Id. at 165 n.3 (quoting GARA § 2(a)) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note 2(a)) (emph.

added); see id. (citing GARA § 3) (GARA defines “limitation period” as “18 years with

respect to general aviation aircraft and the components, systems, subassemblies, and

other parts of such aircraft.”). “GARA was adopted to limit the ‘long tail of liability’

imposed on manufacturers of general aviation aircraft.” Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive

Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Sikkelee II”) (citing Blazevska v. Raytheon

Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Appellants argue that separate and apart from Continental’s role as a

manufacturer, Continental wears an entirely different hat, as a provider of maintenance

3 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,” applying “the same standards and presumptions as the District Court.” Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 939 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2019).

6 services. They claim it was in that capacity that Continental rebuilt and sold the Magneto

and its component parts in 2002. Therefore, Appellants argue the District Court erred in

finding that Appellants’ claims connected with Continental’s 2002 rebuild and sale are

barred under GARA’s statute of repose, which is a defense only available to

manufacturers operating in their capacity as manufacturers. See, e.g., Appellants Br. 12

(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 40101, note) (“The plain language of GARA affords protection only

to a ‘manufacturer acting in its capacity as a manufacturer.’”). Thus, the determinative

issue here is whether Continental was acting “in its capacity as a manufacturer” when it

rebuilt the Magneto.4

Continental persuasively argues that a defendant is acting “in its capacity as a

manufacturer” when it engages in conduct that is exclusively reserved to aviation

manufacturers. As Continental points out, federal regulations dictate that only a

manufacturer may “[r]ebuild or alter any appliance or part of aircraft, aircraft engines,

propellers, or appliances manufactured by [it] under a Technical Standard Order

Authorization, an FAA-Parts Manufacturer Approval, or Product and Process

Specification issued by the Administrator.” 14 C.F.R. § 43.3(j)(2). Indeed, Appellants

do not dispute that Continental holds Parts Manufacturing Authority to the Magneto, the

FAA regulations state that rebuilding a part is an activity that is within the exclusive

province of an aviation manufacturer, and rebuilding dual magnetos is an activity that is

4 There is no dispute that the Aircraft was a general aviation aircraft for purposes of GARA, and that the aircraft was delivered to its first purchaser more than 18 years before the Accident.

7 exclusively reserved to manufacturers, such as Continental. Therefore, in producing the

rebuilt Magneto, Continental was acting in its capacity as a manufacturer because it was

engaging in conduct that was exclusively reserved to manufacturers by the Federal

Aviation Regulations.

Appellants argue on appeal that GARA’s plain language affords protection only to

a manufacturer acting in its capacity as a manufacturer and there is no mention of

rebuilders or sellers of aircraft parts. Their argument continues that had Congress wanted

to shield rebuilders and sellers, it could have included them. However, as the District

Court pointed out, “[i]f only manufacturers can rebuild aircraft parts, then it was

unnecessary for Congress to separately reference ‘rebuilders’ in the statute. All

‘rebuilders’ are ‘manufacturers.’” A1210 n.3.

Contending that GARA’s plain language is not clear as to its application here,

Appellants further argue that we may look to GARA’s legislative history. They claim

that “the legislative history is clear that manufacturers are not immunized by performing

activities outside of manufacturing (such as maintenance services and part sales).”

Appellants Br. 13 (emph. added). Initially, we note that GARA does not say merely that

manufacturers are immunized by performing “manufacturing,” as Appellants seem to

contend. Rather, GARA sets forth limitations on civil actions brought for damages

against a manufacturer “in its capacity as a manufacturer.” Here, Continental was acting

in its capacity as a manufacturer in producing the rebuilt Magneto, as only the

manufacturer may rebuild the Magneto under the FAA regulations.

In support of Appellants’ position, they point to H.R. REP. 103-525(II):

8 The [limitation regarding a manufacturer in its capacity as a manufacturer] is intended to insure that parties who happen to be manufacturers of an aircraft or a component part are not immunized from liability they may be subject to in some other capacity. For example, in the event a party who happened to be a manufacturer committed some negligent act as a mechanic of an aircraft or as a pilot, and such act was a proximate cause of an accident, the victims would not be barred from bringing a civil suit for damages against that party in its capacity as a mechanic.

See Appellants Br. 13 (quoting HR. REP. 103-525(II)) (emph. added by Appellants)

(bold added). However, here, the challenged performance was Continental providing the

rebuilt Magneto, an activity that is exclusively reserved to Continental as a manufacturer,

and such activity was performed “in its capacity as a manufacturer.” It did not just

“happen to be [a] manufacturer[].” In this case, the rebuilding of the Magneto was

performed by Continental because it was the manufacturer, i.e., in its capacity as a

manufacturer.

Appellants cite Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 2018)

(“Sikkelee III”), in support of their position, but Sikkelee III is distinguishable from the

appeal before us and does not support Appellants’ position. The issue in Sikkelee III did

not involve application of the statute of repose, but rather, addressed the application of

the conflict-preemption defense under the doctrine of impossibility-preemption as to

federal and state law. Id. at 709. Perhaps most significantly, regarding the application of

the Sikkelee line of cases to this appeal, is the recognition and clarification in Sikkelee II

that “where GARA’s statute of repose has run . . . state law claims [are] preempted.”

9 Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 697. As explained above, in this case the statute of repose had

expired by the time of the Accident and Appellants claims are barred.

The District Court correctly interpreted GARA’s plain language to determine that

Appellants’ claims are barred by GARA’s 18-year statute of repose. Continental was

acting “in its capacity as a manufacturer” when it rebuilt the Magneto in 2002.

Accordingly, we affirm.