Joan DeYoung, Stephen DeYoung, M.D., and David DeYoung v. William L. Maynard, Individually and as of the Estate of Judy Page Maynard, and Maynard Properties, L.P.

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided April 14, 2016·No. 01-15-00260-CV·Published

Opinion

Opinion issued April 14, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

executor of the estate of Judy Page Maynard, deceased, and Maynard Properties, L.P. (collectively, Maynard). We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

This Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments and those interlocutory orders specifically authorized by statute. Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 422 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. 2012); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447–48 (Tex. 2011); see Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (West 2015) (authorizing appeals from certain interlocutory orders).

The record reveals that Maynard’s no-evidence grounds for summary judgment encompass only three of the DeYoungs’ four claims; Maynard’s motion did not address their claim for breach of the duty of loyalty and care under Chapter 152 of the Texas Business Organizations Code.1 Maynard also sought summary judgment on all of the DeYoungs’ claims pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) based on the affirmative defense of limitations, but the order appealed from does not contain a ruling on that portion of Maynard’s motion. Further, nothing in the record indicates that the DeYoungs abandoned their Chapter 152 claim or that Maynard had any intent to abandon the limitations defense. A footnote in the notice of appeal states that, “while the Court has indicated that an additional judgment will

1 The DeYoungs’ live pleading was on file before Maynard moved for summary judgment.

be entered in this matter, this notice of appeal is filed in an excess of caution based on plaintiffs’ understanding that the Court considered its February 17, 2015 order to be a final judgment in this matter.”

The trial court’s order, however, does not contain language purporting to dispose of all parties and all claims or otherwise unequivocally express any intent to finally dispose of the entire case. The trial court’s docket entries indicate that it intended to grant summary judgment without specifying grounds and that it intended its judgment to be final, but a docket entry cannot change or enlarge the judgment as entered. Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 110 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex. 1987), cited in In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. 2005). Because the record lacks a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Jane Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bland, Brown, and Lloyd.

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Joan DeYoung, Stephen DeYoung, M.D., and David DeYoung v. William L. Maynard, Individually and as of the Estate of Judy Page Maynard, and Maynard Properties, L.P., (Tex. Ct. App. 2016).

Joan DeYoung, Stephen DeYoung, M.D., and David DeYoung v. William L. Maynard, Individually and as of the Estate of Judy Page Maynard, and Maynard Properties, L.P. (Joan DeYoung, Stephen DeYoung, M.D., and David DeYoung v. William L. Maynard, Individually and as of the Estate of Judy Page Maynard, and Maynard Properties, L.P.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

In Re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc.
167 S.W.3d 827 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)
CMH HOMES v. Perez
340 S.W.3d 444 (Texas Supreme Court, 2011)
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.
39 S.W.3d 191 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co.
110 S.W.2d 561 (Texas Supreme Court, 1937)
Bison Building Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge
422 S.W.3d 582 (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)