JNY, LP v. Raba-Kistner Consultants, Inc.

311 S.W.3d 584, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 465, 2010 WL 299154
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 27, 2010
Docket08-07-00253-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 311 S.W.3d 584 (JNY, LP v. Raba-Kistner Consultants, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
JNY, LP v. Raba-Kistner Consultants, Inc., 311 S.W.3d 584, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 465, 2010 WL 299154 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

OPINION

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice.

JNY, L.P. and JNY II, L.P., collectively JNY, appeal the trial court’s order dismissing -with prejudice the negligence counterclaims alleged against Raba-Kist-ner Consultants, Inc., and Raba-Kistner-Anderson Consultants, Inc. d/b/a Raba-Kistner Consultants (SW), Inc., collectively Raba-Kistner. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the trial court, Raba-Kistner filed suit against JNY to collect fees for professional services performed at the Jones Apparel Building located at 11891 Alameda, El Paso, Texas. On July 19, 2004, JNY answered and counterclaimed for negligence for failure to adequately inspect and/or test soil conditions in the building pads prior to construction. Raba-Kistner moved to dismiss the counterclaims with prejudice. The trial court found that Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code applied to the counterclaims and ordered JNY to comply with Section 150.002(a) by a date certain. Subsequently, both parties amended their pleadings, and Raba-Kistner again moved to dismiss JNY’s negligence counterclaim for failure to comply with Section 150.002(a). The trial court granted the motion and entered a severance order. This appeal follows.

Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 150.001

In Point of Error One, JNY claims the trial court erred because Section 150.002 is not applicable since Raba-Kistner is not a licensed professional engineer or “design professional” as defined by statute. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 150.001 (Vernon 2005).

Standard of Review

We review a dismissal pursuant to Section 150.002 for an abuse of discretion. Criterium-Farrell Eng’rs v. Owens, 248 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2008, no pet.); see also Palladian Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Nortex Found. Designs, Inc., 165 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); Gomez v. STFG, Inc., No. 04-07-00223-CV, 2007 WL 2846419, at *1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Oct. 3, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). Merely because a trial court may decide a matter within its discretion in a different manner than an appellate court does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Palladian, 165 S.W.3d at 433.

Statutory construction is a question of law which we review de novo. Id. at 436. Once we determine the proper construction, we must then decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the statute. Id. A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992). Our primary objective is to deter mine the Legislature’s intent and give it effect. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003). We must interpret the statute according to its plain meaning. Id. We must read the statute as a whole and not in isolated portions. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003). We read every word, phrase, and expression as if it were deliberately chosen, and we presume the words *586 excluded from the statute are done so purposefully. Gables Realty Ltd. P’ship v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 81 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).

The Origin of Chapter 150

Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code was part of House Bill 4 which was considered and enacted by the Legislature in 2003. Tex.H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). H.B. 4 was a comprehensive civil justice reform bill intended to address and correct problems the Legislature believed impaired fairness and efficiency in the court system. The bill addressed the filing of non-meritorious lawsuits, and the authors’ stated intent was to bring more balance to the civil justice system, reduce litigation costs, and address the role of litigation in society.

The ZOOS Statute

As originally enacted, Chapter 150, entitled “Design Professionals,” applied to registered architects and licensed professional engineers. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 150.001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204, § 20.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2003. Section 150.002 required a certificate of merit in any action for damages alleging professional negligence by a design professional:

[T]he plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of a third-party registered architect or licensed professional engineer competent to testify and practicing in the same area of practice as the defendant, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act, error or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim. The third-party professional engineer or registered architect shall be licensed in this state and actively engaged in the practice of architecture or engineering.

Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 150.002. Failure to provide an affidavit could result in dismissal with prejudice. Id. JNY’s primary argument is that because Raba-Kist-ner is a corporation, it cannot be a “design professional,” as that term is defined:

In this chapter, ‘design professional’ means a registered architect or licensed professional engineer.

Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 150.001.

JNY emphasizes that the term “engineer” is a word of art and is statutorily defined as a person engaged in the practice of engineering in Texas. Tex. Occ.Code Ann. § 1001.002(2)(Vernon 2004). Additionally, Sections 1001.301(a) and 1001.301(e) distinguish a “person” from an entity, (a) A person may not engage in the practice of engineering unless the person holds a license issued under this chapter.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅝
(e) A person, sole proprietorship, firm, partnership, association, or corporation that engages in or offers or attempts to engage in conduct described by this section is conclusively presumed to be engaged in the practice of engineering.

Tex.Occ.Code Ann. §§ 1001.301(a), (e). JNY reasons that the Occupations Code must be read in conjunction with Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code such that only individuals may be licensed as engineers. A corporation cannot satisfy the statutory eligibility requirements for a license, which includes gradation and testing requirements.

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311 S.W.3d 584, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 465, 2010 WL 299154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jny-lp-v-raba-kistner-consultants-inc-texapp-2010.