J.M. v. M.M.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 22, 2019
Docket914 WDA 2018
StatusUnpublished

This text of J.M. v. M.M. (J.M. v. M.M.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
J.M. v. M.M., (Pa. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

J-S76015-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

J.M., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v.

M.M.,

Appellee No. 914 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Dated May 25, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No(s): FD-15-005302-001

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2019

J.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the custody order dated May 25, 2018,

that awarded M.M. (“Father”) sole legal custody of A.B. (born in April of 2005),

J.M. (born in April of 2007), and S.M. (born in September of 2009) (collectively

“Children”). The May 25th order also awarded Father primary physical custody

of the Children and partial physical custody to Mother. 1 After review, we

affirm.

The scope and standard of review in custody matters is as follows:

[T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact, nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no competent evidence to support it. ... However, this broad scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the duty or the privilege of making its own independent determination. ... Thus, an appellate court is

____________________________________________

1 Both Mother and Father filed pro se briefs with this Court. J-S76015-18

empowered to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not interfere with those conclusions unless they are unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings; and thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion.

R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Bovard v. Baker, 775 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa. Super. 2001)). Moreover,

on issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we defer to the findings of the trial [court] who has had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of the witnesses.

The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough, and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

R.M.G., Jr., supra at 1237 (internal citations omitted). The test is whether the evidence of record supports the trial court’s conclusions. Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa. Super. 2006).

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Mother raises the following six issues, some of which include numerous

sub-issues, for our review:

1. The [j]udge erred by awarding [Father] sole legal custody when the weight of the evidence under the factors of custody favored Mother, including but not limited to the subparts in paragraph two below.

2. The [j]udge erred by awarding Father primary physical custody when the weight of the evidence under the factors for custody favored Mother, including but not limited to:

a. by finding that Mother discourages a relationship between the Father and [] Children when the parties

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were practicing shared legal custody and [] Children demonstrated strong bonds and positive relationships with both parents; b. by finding that Mother performed most of the parental duties but weighing this factor in favor of Father, anticipating that he is capable of performing the same; c. by first finding that the factor of stability was not pertinent in this case except for later inappropriately weighing the factor against Mother for school absences; d. by giving Father school choice authority under circumstances that made Woodland Hills not in the best interest of [] Children; e. by not considering the well-reasoned preferences of all or any of [] Children about the physical custody schedule; … f. by finding that Mother attempts to turn [] Children away from Father when there was insufficient evidence of the same; g. by finding that, when it come[s] to the question of who is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship for [] Children’s emotional needs, both parties fail but later weighs this factor in favor of Father despite acknowledging that Mother cares for all their needs and that Father denies their needs if he doesn’t have the exact same view as Mother[;] h. by finding that Mother is the heavier source of conflict despite the weight of the evidence favoring a finding against Father and despite finding that Father does not compromise with health care and education providers and fails to provide for [] Children in those areas, those areas being a source of conflict.

3. The judge erred by creating a custody Order that divests Mother [of] her parental role without substantive and sufficient evidence that such is in the best interest of [] Children, including but not limited to:

a. by ordering that Mother is prohibited from bringing any concerns to the attention of [] Children’s school and being prohibited from contacting the school without Father’s authorization;

-3- J-S76015-18

b. by ordering that Mother is prohibited from attending all parent teacher conferences, open houses, and other regularly scheduled school meetings and activities unless authorized by Father and by requiring Mother to leave if there is an issue at one of these events irrespective of the circumstances; c. by ordering that only Father can schedule and attend routine and specialist medical appointments unless Mother is authorized by Father to attend; d. by ordering that Mother cannot speak to any medical or education providers if Mother thinks there is an issue unless Father authorizes the same[,] which is particularly egregious when the [c]ourt found that Mother had the leading role in [] Children’s healthcare and education path; e. by requiring Mother to pay for all activities agreed upon by the parties if Father merely asserts he cannot afford the same; f. by reducing Mother’s physical custody time to five nights every two weeks when the parties equally shared physical custody; g. by instructing Father to give reasonable good faith effort at consideration of Mother’s opinion when Father demonstrated that his choices were against [] Children’s interest simply because Mother asserted the same. Additionally, this provision is too subjective and not enforceable or practical in application for Mother to have any parental role in [] Children’s lives; h. by limiting communication between the Mother and [] Children during Father’s custodial time when Mother and [] Children enjoyed regular contact and doing so despite even Father not wanting communication limited; i. by sacrificing Mother’s holiday time for Father’s need for holiday time without real reason; j. by unlawfully limiting Mother’s ability to contact [] Children’s medical and education providers solely for the purpose of obtaining medical records; k. by failing to recognize and account for the close and bonded relationship of [] Children to their Mother.

4. The [j]udge erroneously premised her Order upon “testimony from all custody related motions” because there is no “testimony” provided in motions court as such is not a fact[-]finding

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proceeding unless the parties were sworn in and proper procedure was followed.

5.

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Related

Ketterer v. Seifert
902 A.2d 533 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
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E.D. v. M.P.
33 A.3d 73 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
C.R.F. v. S.E.F
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Bluebook (online)
J.M. v. M.M., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jm-v-mm-pasuperct-2019.