COOK, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BUNNING, D.J., joined. MARTIN, J. (pp. 339-52), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINION
COOK, Circuit Judge.
Jimmy Ray and Kenneth Valentine were convicted of conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine powder and crack cocaine. They now raise numerous challenges to their convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Valentines, jointly and severally, make a number of arguments based on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Largely for reasons this court articulated in Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855 (6th Cir.2005), these claims fail. Petitioners also make a number of ineffective-assistance claims, all but one of which lack merit. On that ground, we reverse and hold that Jimmy Ray Valentine is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his trial counsel thwarted his efforts to accept a plea bargain. We affirm the district court on all other grounds.
I. Background
A. Jimmy Ray Valentine
Jimmy Ray was convicted in February 2000 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. His 292-month sentence resulted from the district court’s finding him responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base. Jimmy Ray appealed his sentence, arguing, inter alia, that he should be resen-tenced in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This court rejected that argument and affirmed his conviction, United States v. Valentine, 70 Fed.Appx. 314 (6th Cir.2003), which became final on October 20, 2003.
The following year, Jimmy Ray moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. While his motion was pending in the district court, Jimmy Ray moved for leave to amend his petition to include an argument based on the intervening decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The district court denied him leave to amend, concluding that Blakely did not apply to defendants on collateral review. The district court also denied his ineffective-assistance claims. Jimmy Ray then filed a notice of appeal and applied for a certificate of ap-pealability, which the district court denied. While his application was pending, the Su[328]*328preme Court announced its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), to which Jimmy Ray directed this court’s attention pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 28(j). This court then granted a certifícate of appeala-bility on both his ineffective-assistance arguments and his Booker claim.
B. Kenneth J. Valentine
Kenneth was tried with his brother Jimmy Ray and six other defendants, and was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. Kenneth was sentenced to 292 months, predicated on the district court’s finding that at least 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base were involved in the offense. Kenneth appealed, asserting, inter alia, arguments based on Apprendi and ineffective assistance of counsel. This court rejected his appeal in 2003, Valentine, 70 Fed.Appx. at 314, and his conviction became final on January 26, 2004. Following the Supreme Court’s issuance of Booker, Kenneth filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied. Kenneth then appealed, and this court granted a certificate of appealability, allowing Kenneth to raise his ineffective-assistance and Booker claims.
II. ApprendilBlakely/Booker
A. Procedural Issues
Although Jimmy Ray and Kenneth both rely on Booker to challenge aspects of their sentences, their cases arrive in different procedural postures. The merits of Kenneth’s Booker challenge are properly before us, but Jimmy Ray’s case arrives in the procedural posture of a denied motion for leave to amend. This distinction is irrelevant, however, because the district court based its ruling on the legal conclusion that Jimmy Ray’s proposed amendment to include a Blakely argument would be futile as Blakely was inapplicable on collateral review, a conclusion we review de novo. Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir.2000). The issue in both cases is essentially the same: Kenneth is entitled to relief if Booker is applicable to his case on collateral review, and Jimmy Ray is entitled to amend his petition to include a Booker argument if Booker applies on collateral review. Were Booker applicable to their cases, both Valentines state cognizable Booker claims entitling them to resentenc-ing.
B. Booker Is a New Rule of Criminal Procedure: Jimmy Ray and Kenneth
Jimmy Ray and Kenneth both contend that the district court erred and that Booker applies to their cases on collateral review because Booker did not announce a “new rule” of criminal procedure. Blakely and Booker were mere applications of Ap-prendi, they argue, and not “new rules” for purposes of collateral review of their convictions, which became final after Ap-prendi.
In most instances, defendants seeking collateral relief may not rely on new rules of criminal procedure announced after their convictions have become final on direct appeal. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the Supreme Court announced a three-step analysis for determining when a new procedural rule will apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. As the Supreme Court explained in Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004) (internal citations omitted):
First, the court must determine when the defendant’s conviction became final. [329]*329Second, it must ascertain the “legal landscape as it then existed,” and ask whether the Constitution, as interpreted by the precedent then existing, compels the rule. That is, the court must decide whether the rule is actually “new.” Finally, if the rule is new, the court must consider whether it falls within either of the two exceptions to nonretroactivity.
The Beard Court further explained that the second step of the Teague analysis asks “whether the [relevant] rule ... was dictated by then-existing precedent— whether, that is, the unlawfulness of [petitioners’] conviction[s] was apparent to all reasonable jurists.” Id. at 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (internal citations omitted). Jimmy Ray’s and Kenneth’s convictions became final after Apprendi and prior to Blakely. Our Humphress decision addressed Book-ers retroactivity, however, and held that Booker does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. 398 F.3d at 860-63. The Valentines attempt to distinguish their case, however, on the ground that Humphress’s conviction became final prior to Apprendi whereas their convictions became final after Apprendi, but before Blakely and Booker.1
But this argument ignores several key facts about the Humphress decision. First, the Humphress court actually decided that Booker was not dictated by Blakely, and therefore Booker created a “new rule” that could not be raised by defendants whose convictions became final at any time prior to Booker's January 12, 2005, issuance. 398 F.3d at 860-62. If Booker was a new rule despite Blakely, it follows that it was a new rule despite Apprendi. Put simply, the timing of Apprendí had no bearing on this court’s decision in Humphress.
Second, the Humphress court pointed out that dissents in Booker made clear that Bookeds result was not preordained by Blakely. See id. at 861 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 334, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that factual distinctions “offer a principled basis” for refusing to extend Blakely and Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines)). The views expressed in dissent, as the Humphress court explained, were indicative of the Booker rule’s “newness”:
Although Justice O’Connor observed that “Washington’s scheme is almost identical to the upward departure regime established by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and implemented in USSG § 5K2.0,” Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the rule in Blakely rendered the Federal Guidelines unconstitutional, as Justice Breyer’s dissent in Booker proves. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 802-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 861 n. 2.
Third, the Humphress court also noted that “the differing interpretations of Blakely announced by the United States Courts of Appeals also indicate that not all reasonable jurists believed that the Booker rule was compelled by Blakely.” Id. at 861. The Humphress court pointed out that this circuit, in United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc), joined the “Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits in holding that Blakely did not compel the conclusion that the Federal Sen-[330]*330teneing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment.” 398 F.3d at 861 (citing United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.2004), United States v. Hammond, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc), and United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir.2004)). The court went on to explain:
Even those Circuits that have applied Blakely's rule to the Federal Guidelines have done so over dissents.... We are mindful of the observation in Beard that “[b]eeause the focus of the inquiry is whether reasonable jurists could differ as to whether precedent compels the sought-for rule, we do not suggest that the mere existence of a dissent suffices to show that the rule is new.” Beard, 124 S.Ct. at 2513 n. 5. We are confident, however, not only that the jurists who authored those majority opinions and dissents are reasonable, but that these opinions and dissents make it manifest that the rule of Booker is new.
Humphress, 398 F.3d at 861-62 (citations omitted).
To the extent that Humphress does not strictly control this issue because of the timing of Humphress’s conviction vis-á-vis Apprendi, its reasoning remains persuasive.2 Moreover, other courts of appeals have considered and rejected the same arguments in cases involving similarly situated petitioners whose convictions became final after Apprendi See, e.g., Never Misses A Shot v. United States, 413 F.3d 781, 782-83 (8th Cir.2005) (petitioner whose conviction became final after Ap-prendi but before Booker could not raise Booker claims because “the ‘new rule’ announced in Booker does not apply to criminal convictions that became final before the rule was announced, and thus does not benefit movants in collateral proceedings”); Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 612-14 (3d Cir.2005) (same); Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 848-49 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that while Blakely interpreted Appren-di it was not compelled by Apprendi and thus petitioner whose conviction became final post-Apprendi but pre-Blakely could not raise Blakely claims on collateral review); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir.2005) (“Booker does not apply retroactively to criminal cases that became final before its release.... Blakely reserved decision about the status of the federal Sentencing Guidelines ... so Booker itself represents the establishment of a new rule about the federal system.”).
We find the views expressed by this court in Humphress and those presented by our sister circuits persuasive. We therefore cannot conclude that “the rule later announced in [Booker ] was dictated by then-existing precedent [such that] the unlawfulness of [petitioners’] conviction was apparent to all reasonable jurists.” Beard, 542 U.S. at 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (second emphasis added). We hold that petitioners whose convictions became final prior to Booker may not rely on Booker’s rule on collateral review.
C. Booker Is Procedural, Not Substantive: Kenneth Only
Kenneth also contends that Apprendi and its progeny have “redefined the substantive law regarding federal narcotics prosecutions.” Kenneth presumably makes this argument because the Teague rule of nonretroactivity does not apply to new substantive rules. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. As we noted [331]*331in Humphress, however, “Without question, this rule is a procedural one,” 398 F.3d at 860 n. 1 (citing Schriro, 542 U.S. at 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519), and Kenneth’s argument fails.
D. Booker Is Not a “Watershed Rule of Criminal Procedure”: Kenneth Only
Teague nonretroactivity contains a second exception for new rules of criminal procedure that are “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Beard, 542 U.S. at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504. This rule, as the Court in Beard pointed out, has “limited scope” and “is clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rales requiring observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. Moreover, the Beard Court explained that “because any qualifying rule would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt [that it is] unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge, it should come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception.” Id.
Kenneth nevertheless argues that the “reasonable doubt rulings in the Apprendi line of cases establish a watershed rule that must be applied retroactively under Teague due to its impact on the truth-finding function of a trial.” But the Supreme Court’s reasonable doubt rulings form the core of Apprendi; they are not a separate strand of principles which have not been analyzed for purposes of this issue. Moreover, this court addressed this issue in Humphress, holding that Booker did not create a watershed rule of criminal procedure. 398 F.3d at 863. This argument fails as well.
E. Application of Equity to Booker Issues: Kenneth Only
In his final Booker argument, Kenneth asks the court to create an equitable rale to allow defendants who raised an Apprendi argument on direct review to raise a Booker argument on collateral review. Teague forecloses such relief.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a § 2255 petition, this court reviews findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. Paulino v. United States, 352 F.3d 1056, 1058 (6th Cir.2003).
B. The Intersection of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Strickland v. Washington
A prisoner who proves that the process leading to his conviction was tainted by an “error of constitutional magnitude” is entitled to relief under § 2255. Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). The Valentines claim they were denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). Their challenges here are therefore governed by the well-known “performance” and “prejudice” standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
[332]*332C. Trial Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Communicate Jimmy Ray’s Desire to Accept a Plea
1. Factual Background
Jimmy Ray claims that he learned in February or March 1999 that the government had offered him a ten-year plea arrangement, but his trial counsel advised him there was “no rush” to accept because he believed the government would make a better offer later in the proceedings. According to Jimmy Ray, however, the government made no additional offers, and he repeatedly told his trial counsel that he would like to accept the government’s ten-year offer. Trial counsel ignored Jimmy Ray’s wishes, he alleges, and took the case to trial in January 2000, where Jimmy Ray was convicted and sentenced to 292 months.
The government disputes Jimmy Ray’s factual allegations, contending (1) that it never offered Jimmy Ray a ten-year plea agreement, and (2) that Jimmy Ray made his own decisions about his trial. The government points to a colloquy at Jimmy Ray’s sentencing hearing in which defense counsel made the following representations to the district court:
And he would have taken a deal, Your Honor, he would have taken a deal in a second had the Government chose to give him a crime that he felt he was guilty of instead of something he wasn’t. He adamantly maintained from day one, “I did not do this. I am no leader. I did not move millions of dollars worth of crack cocaine. I don’t have millions of dollars. I don’t even have thousands of dollars. I didn’t do this.” That’s what he told me time and time again.
He is not a stupid man, but he is not a brilliant man, but he understands what I told him, “You go to trial and lose, it is life.” I told him that. He will tell you that. He said, “I don’t care, I didn’t do what they say I did.”
According to the government, this statement “establishes that the government never offered a ten-year plea agreement” to Jimmy Ray and that Jimmy Ray “was not kept in the dark on anything and freely made his own decision to go to trial.” The government observes that Jimmy Ray maintained his innocence during his sentencing hearing, apparently implying that he would not have accepted any plea, had one been offered. Moreover, the government points out that Jimmy Ray had ten months in which to complain about his lawyer’s alleged dereliction, but he made no complaints during pretrial proceedings, at trial, or at his sentencing hearing.
Jimmy Ray disputes the government’s characterization of his counsel’s statements at the sentencing hearing and contends that they illustrate his trial counsel’s dishonesty. Jimmy Ray argues that his attorney’s statement “that his client would have taken a deal ‘had the Government chose[n] to give him a crime that he felt he was guilty of instead of something that he wasn’t’ ” can be interpreted as an attempt by his attorney to “conceal his failure to communicate Mr. Valentine’s acceptance of the ten-year plea offer.” Jimmy Ray also accuses the government of dissembling in its interpretation of his attorney’s statement and his own statement at the sentencing hearing, which he maintains should be interpreted in the context of “disputing the Government’s leadership charge,” rather than as general claims of innocence.
2. Analysis
Jimmy Ray highlighted his claim in his § 2255 motion, but the district court denied him an evidentiary hearing on the matter. We need only determine whether Jimmy Ray is entitled to an evidentiary [333]*333hearing to resolve whether the government offered him a plea that his lawyer essentially prevented him from accepting. If Jimmy Ray’s trial counsel prevented him from accepting a plea, his assistance was clearly ineffective and, because the alleged plea agreement offered Jimmy Ray substantially less prison time (120 months rather than his 292-month sentence), he could show sufficient prejudice to satisfy Strickland’s second prong. The district court denied Jimmy Ray’s claim, finding that the “[defendant has not presented specific, credible evidence supporting his claim [on this ground.”] This court reviews that determination for abuse of discretion. Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir.1999).
In reviewing a § 2255 motion in which a factual dispute arises, “the habeas court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the petitioner’s claims.” Turner v. United States, 183 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir.1999). “[T]he burden on the petitioner in a habeas case for establishing an entitlement to an evidentia-ry hearing is relatively light.” Id. More is required, however, than mere assertions of innocence. See id. (“[I]t would be nonsensical to conclude that the petitioner could meet that burden simply by proclaiming his innocence.”). Nevertheless, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is required unless the record conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Arredondo, 178 F.3d at 782 (internal quotations omitted). Stated another way, “no hearing is required if the petitioner’s allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
We conclude, for several reasons, that Jimmy Ray met his burden, and the district court erred in declining to hold a hearing. First, although the government implies that Jimmy Ray’s protestations of innocence discredit his argument that he was willing to accept a plea, this circuit has rejected this reasoning in the past. See Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir.2003) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)) (“Griffin’s repeated declarations of innocence do not prove, as the government claims, that he would not have accepted a guilty plea.”). This court has also explained that “[protestations of innocence throughout trial are properly a factor in the trial court’s analysis, however they do not, by themselves, justify summary denial of relief without an evidentia-ry hearing.” Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir.2003).
Second, the authority relied on by the district court, Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445 (6th Cir.2003), does not support its conclusion that a defendant’s affidavit alone could not present sufficient evidence supporting his request for a hearing. The Moss district court reached its conclusion only after an extensive three-day hearing on the evidence surrounding the defendant’s ineffective-assistance and other claims. Id. at 453.
Third, the conclusions the government draws from Jimmy Ray’s counsel’s statement at his sentencing hearing are unsupported by the record. From the statement, “he would have taken a deal ... had the Government chosen to give him a crime that he felt he was guilty of,” the government draws the conclusion that “the Government never offered a ten-year plea agreement to the Defendant.” But the government’s reasoning is flawed. Taking the statement at face value, it proves only that Jimmy Ray was never offered a plea to a “crime that he felt he was guilty of,” not that he was never offered a plea at all. The government’s assertion may be cor[334]*334rect, but it does not follow from the colloquy it quotes. Furthermore, it is strange that the government claims it never offered Jimmy Ray a plea, but then relies on an ambiguous statement by Jimmy Ray’s counsel to prove this claim in its brief, rather than an affidavit from Jimmy Ray’s trial counsel or its own trial attorneys who litigated the matter.
The defendant’s burden to show his right to a hearing is significantly lower than his burden to show he is entitled to § 2255 relief. See Turner, 183 F.3d at 477. Here, Jimmy Ray offers more than a mere assertion of his innocence; he presents a factual narrative of the events that is neither contradicted by the record nor “inherently incredible.” His claim may prove false at the evidentiary hearing, but it is impossible to assess its veracity based on this record alone. The purpose of the hearing, however, is to allow the court to make these factual determinations based on more than a defendant’s affidavit and the contrary representations of the government. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s judgment on this issue and remand for an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
D. Jury Communication/Denial of Counsel: Jimmy Ray Only
Jimmy Ray alleges he was denied counsel during a critical stage of his trial. The relevant facts are as follows. The jury began deliberating at approximately 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, February 10, 2000. The next morning, when the jury reconvened to continue its deliberations, the court sent it the following message:
Dear jury, there is no time limit nor is there any hurry in your deliberations. However, I must catch a plane today at 1:30. Therefore, if you do not have a verdict by 12:00, I will discharge you until Tuesday morning at 8:30, February the 15th, 2000.
The court did not contact the defendants’ attorneys prior to delivering its message. During the morning, however, the court gave defense counsel an opportunity to submit a substitute note, which he declined. Court was reconvened later that morning after the jury delivered a note to the court indicating that it had reached a verdict on all but one defendant, and had deliberated about that defendant for six hours. Defense attorney Mitchell objected to the note, arguing that “it had the potential of creating a verdict before the verdict’s time.” The court overruled the objection. The district court asked if the note made the jury feel rushed in reaching its verdicts, and the jury also answered “No.” The jury then delivered its verdicts with respect to all defendants but one, and reconvened the following Tuesday to continue deliberations.
In his brief, Jimmy Ray frames this scenario as a Sixth Amendment “denial of counsel” claim, rather than an instance of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel (his § 2255 petition argued both theories). Because the court gave its message to the jury after trying and failing to gather the defendants’ lawyers, it is difficult for counsel to be considered ineffective. Thus, if Jimmy Ray is entitled to relief under this claim, it would be because he was denied counsel, not because counsel was ineffective.
Jimmy Ray invokes the principle that “denial of counsel during a critical stage of a judicial proceeding mandates a presumption of prejudice.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000); see also United States v. Cranio, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Stated another way, denial of counsel is considered a [335]*335“structural error,” which entitles a defendant to a new trial without showing prejudice under Strickland’s second prong— prejudice is presumed because the error makes “the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Jimmy Ray must show that the district court’s communication with the jury constituted a “critical stage” of the trial, recently defined by the Supreme Court as “a step of a criminal proceeding, such as an arraignment, that [holds] significant consequences for the accused.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Because this court has held that certain instances of jury “re-instruction” and the reading of supplemental instructions to the jury qualify as “critical stages,” see, e.g., Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir.2003); French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir.2003), Jimmy Ray labels the district court’s note an “instruction” given outside the presence of counsel. We reject this characterization. Cases in which this court has found denial of counsel at a critical stage invariably involve a court instructing the jury about the substantive elements of an offense or giving a deadlocked jury further instructions about how to proceed. See, e.g., Caver, 349 F.3d at 349 n. 6 (counsel was absent when the jury was re-instructed “on certain elements of the offense after they had deliberated”); French, 332 F.3d at 430 (judge gave an improvised deadlocked jury instruction, later complained of as coercive, after hearing that the jury had reached a third impasse).
In this case, however, the note conveyed only scheduling information, with the caveat that jury need not hurry its deliberations — arguably not an “instruction” at all. The Tenth Circuit addressed a factually similar situation in United States v. McMurry, 818 F.2d 24 (10th Cir.1987), where the defendant challenged a statement the trial judge made to the jury in the absence of his counsel as an improper Allen charge. After several hours of deliberations, the trial judge told the jury “that he had to catch a plane in several hours and that if it had not finished deliberating by then he would call a recess over the weekend and allow deliberations to continue the following week.” Id. at 26-27. Although the procedural posture and claims at issue in McMurry differ from this case, the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion is informative:
The statement was simply not an instruction at all.... The statement was made after the jury had deliberated about four hours on a Thursday and three hours on Friday. The judge had called the jury into the courtroom to discuss lunch arrangements. We must view this as no more than an explanation about the schedule for lunch and for subsequent deliberations. With the weekend having arrived it was necessary to give the jury a schedule for the balance of the day and the next week. The jury was entitled to such an explanation for its plans. It had nothing whatever to do with the length of deliberations but was, again, a needed schedule. The explanation can in no way be considered as an instruction.
Id. We view the district court’s message in the same way, as not fitting within the category of jury instruction or re-instruction that demands the presence of counsel.
And though a coercive instruction could be characterized as a “critical stage,” which holds “significant consequences for the accused,” Cone, 535 U.S. at 695-96, 122 S.Ct. 1843, we have held similar statements not coercive. See United States v. Markey, 693 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir.1982); see also Gibson v. United States, 271 F.3d 247, 258 (6th Cir.2001), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Ratliff, 63 Fed.Appx. 192 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished opinion).
[336]*336“In evaluating for coercive effect a judge’s statement to the jury, this Court must consider the statement in context, assessing it under the totality of the circumstances.” Gibson, 271 F.3d at 258. In Markey, the defendant contended that the district judge “ ‘coerced’ the jury into reaching a speedy verdict [because the judge commented,] at the conclusion of trial, that the courthouse would be available the following morning (Christmas Eve) if the jury was unable to reach a consensus that afternoon.” 693 F.2d at 594. The Markey defendant’s coercion charge mirrors Jimmy Ray’s: The court’s message in both cases informed the jury that if it did not reach a verdict by a certain time, it would have to return to deliberate at a supposedly undesirable time, a holiday in Markey and several days later in Jimmy Ray’s case. The court in Markey found that “the trial judge’s charge was not ‘likely to give the jury the impression that it was more important to be quick than to be thoughtful.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.1975)). Viewing this situation with the lens Markey provides, we are confident the message did not coerce the jury into reaching its verdict, its quickness notwithstanding. This court has repeatedly held that “the jury’s speed in reaching a verdict is irrelevant to whether an instruction was coercive.” Ratliff, 63 Fed.Appx. at 195-96 (citing United States v. Giacal-one, 588 F.2d 1158, 1168 (6th Cir.1978)); United States v. Tines, 70 F.3d 891, 896 (6th Cir.1995). Therefore, we deny his petition for relief on these grounds.
E. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel/ Batson: Jimmy Ray and Kenneth
Jimmy Ray and Kenneth claim their appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the district court’s decision to allow the government’s peremptory challenge to a prospective juror, Carl Pratt. During jury selection, defense counsel objected under Batson, explaining that only two members of the panel were “people of color” and that one was already excused for cause. Defense counsel stated: “There is one other person and that’s Mr. Pratt. I’d say that he is a black man. I don’t know for sure, but he certainly looks like a black man to me. And he has been summarily excused by the prosecution.”
The district court then requested a response from Assistant United States Attorney Brian Delaney. Delaney responded with surprise, apparently because he and none of the people sitting with him thought that Pratt “was a black man.” The court then stated, “Your non-discriminatory reason for challenging him is because you did not know that he was an ethic [sic] minority; is that a fair statement?” Delaney responded, “That’s true, but we had reasons why we dismissed him that had nothing to do with race.” Delaney provided four reasons:
[1] He is only 46 years old and he shows that he is retired. That kind of concerns me, someone who isn’t working and involved in the community. [2] Another concern was that instead of getting workmen’s comp if it was a back injury he had, he didn’t even get any, it makes me wonder about the suspicious circumstances that might have surrounded his leaving work. Usually people who are legitimately injured get compensation for that loss, rightfully, and he did not, which makes me subject to think that perhaps there was something missing there. He said he had resigned from his employment. Just [337]*337suspicious circumstances. I mean, it’s not illegal to do it, but it makes me wonder about the person. [3] He failed to place in the upper-hand left corner or right corner the city from which he lived. [4] I did notice, it’s just my own feelings, that he had an earring that we could notice in his left ear. I tend to kick some people off, males that have earrings, just because sometimes a lot of law enforcement officers wear them, but just as an idea of whether someone is conservative or not. That’s somewhat unusual. That’s the only male on the panel that’s wearing an earring. And whether that is a good reason or not, it was one of the reasons.
The district court responded, correctly, that “it doesn’t have to be a good reason, it has to be a non-discriminatory reason.” He then gave defense counsel an opportunity to respond. Defense counsel responded to Delaney’s worker’s compensation reason by pointing out that
Mr. Pratt told this court why he did not bother to get worker’s comp. He said his wife had died last year and that he was getting over that and working through all that. There is nothing unusual about that. If Mr. Delaney is telling you that’s his reason, I think it’s not a good reason. I realize it’s probably a non-discriminatory reason, but it’s not a very good reason.
Defense counsel also discussed the earring: “[t]he fact he has an earring, I can’t believe that’s a reason the government goes around getting rid of people.” Defense counsel continued, explaining that he is “looking for black people on my juries, especially when I look around and see eight black defendants sitting behind eight white lawyers. There ought to be black people on juries and I don’t believe that this is a valid reason for peremptory challenging this juror. I think they have expressed discriminatory reasons for getting rid of this.” The court then asked, “What was the discriminatory reason they expressed?” Defense counsel responded, “The earring seems,” to which the court replied, “White people wear earrings.” Defense counsel then attempted again to articulate a rationale for his feeling that prosecutors challenged Pratt for a discriminatory reason:
I can’t express it, other than to say that what they’ve expressed is inadequate. It doesn’t explain to me why they got rid of Mr. Pratt. There is no reason that I can see, other than the fact I think he is black and that’s why they got rid of him. That’s my belief.
The court concluded as follows:
As far as Mr. Pratt is concerned, the Court’s observations are that his race was unclear. He didn’t put anything on his card, nor did he say that he was or was not a member of some race. Like Mr. Mitchell, I believe him to be a black man. But that’s how I look at things. I have to accept the word of Mr. Lennon and Mr. Delaney and Mr. DiBrito when they tell me they did not think so. And for that reason the motion is denied.
The district court then offered defense counsel the opportunity to “cross-examine or examine people from the clerk’s office who selected this jury” to give defense counsel the chance to investigate why there were only two black people on the panel. Defense counsel declined this opportunity. Before bringing the jury back into the courtroom, the court stated, “Mr. Delaney, I’ll give you a chance to reconsider on Pratt. I think he was black. I’m not going to honor the objection. But if you, now having been told he is black, want to invite him back on the jury, you may.” Delaney responded, “I don’t agree with the assertion that he is black. I mean, I don’t understand that, Your Hon- [338]*338or, by saying now that he is black. I mean, I can only say.” The court then said,
I’ll let you in on a little tip. When I asked the question about are any of you black, he nodded affirmatively. He’s the only person who did. I said, I don’t think any of you are African-American, but I don’t know. He clearly indicated he was an African-American. Clearly. But you had to be looking to see it. If you weren’t looking, you didn’t see it.
Delaney responded, “I can only say for the record I didn’t see it, it never even crossed my mind, Your Honor.” The court said, “Again, I’m inviting you to invite him back, but I’m not requiring you to.” Delaney responded, “I would still, I mean, peremptory challenge I have non-discriminatory purpose for doing it and I’m going to stand by that.” The court replied, “And I upheld it. Bring the jury back without Mr. Pratt. Tell him he is excused.”
Defendants raising claims of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel must meet Strickland’s two-prong test. McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 699 (6th Cir.2004). In the appellate context, the court must first assess the strength of the claim appellate counsel failed to raise. “Counsel’s failure to raise an issue on appeal could only be ineffective assistance if there is a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue would have changed the result of the appeal.” Id. As the court in McFarland explained, “[i]f there is a reasonable probability that [the defendant] would have prevailed on appeal had the claim been raised, we can then consider whether the claim’s merit was so compelling that appellate counsel’s failure to raise it amounted to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Id. at 700. In order to assess the effectiveness of Jimmy Ray’s and Kenneth’s appellate counsel, then, the court must first consider whether a Batson claim on appeal had a reasonable probability of success. Applying this court’s precedent to the facts in the record, a Batson claim had little probability of success.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In assessing Batson claims, we employ a three-step analysis: “Under Batson, a defendant must first establish a prima facie case showing that the prosecution exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race. If the defendant satisfies this requirement, the prosecution must articulate a race-neutral explanation for the challenges. The trial court must then decide if the defendant has carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142 (6th Cir.1996) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712).
In assessing the prosecutor’s articulated reasons, the Supreme Court has provided, and the district correctly recognized, that “[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.... [T]he issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). Our review of the district court’s resolution of the ultimate issue— whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination — is limited: “[b]ecause this determination turns largely on the evaluation of credibility, reviewing courts give the findings of the district court great deference.” United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 586 (6th Cir.1999) [339]*339(citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712). “We may reverse that finding of fact only where we find clear error." United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court counseled in Purkett, “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769.
Although the district court in this case could have provided a more precise analysis of the issue, the record reveals no clear error in the court’s finding that there was no discrimination. The prosecutor articulated several reasons, none of which contained discriminatory undertones or implications. The district court considered the government’s reasons and provided defense counsel the opportunity to meet his burden by showing a discriminatory implication in Delaney’s statements, but defense counsel did not meet his burden and instead merely said that he had a “belief’ that the government’s reasons were discriminatory. This “belief’ does not meet defense counsel’s “ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation[, which] rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Id. The district court ultimately denied the objection, stating that Pratt’s race was unclear and he “had to accept the word” of the prosecutors that they were unaware of Pratt’s race and thus did not strike him for that reason. In other words, the district judge found Delaney’s explanation credible, and this kind of determination is given “great deference.” Harris, 192 F.3d at 586 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712). Therefore, the district court’s Bat-son ruling was not clear error.3 Given this conclusion, Jimmy Ray’s and Kenneth’s in effective-assistanee-of-appellate-counsel claims must also fail, as they cannot show that their appellate counsel failed to include an issue that had a reasonable probability of changing the result of the appeal. See McFarland, 356 F.3d at 699.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s denial of Jimmy Ray’s and Kenneth’s challenges based on Booker, and their ineffective-assistance claims, but we reverse the district court’s decision denying Jimmy Ray an evidentiary hearing on whether his trial counsel denied him the opportunity to accept a plea bargain and remand to the district court for a hearing on this issue.