Jimmy D. Edwards v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 10, 2018
• Docket: 18A-CR-789
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 10 2018, 11:16 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Dale W. Arnett Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Winchester, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Lee M. Stoy, Jr. Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jimmy D. Edwards, October 10, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-789 v. Appeal from the Randolph Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Peter D. Haviza, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 68D01-1608-F6-568

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 1 of 10 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Jimmy Edwards (Edwards), appeals his conviction for

Count I, sexual battery, a Level 6 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(1)(A); Count II,

battery on a person less than fourteen years old, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-

1(e)(3); Count III, interference with reporting of a crime, a Class A

misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-45-2-5(1); and Count IV, theft, a Class A misdemeanor,

I.C. § 35-42-4-2(a).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE [3] Edwards presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State

presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Edwards’

conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] At around 2:00 a.m. on August 19, 2016, Edwards arrived unannounced at

E.P.’s house looking for a place to sleep. Based on the way Edwards was

acting, E.P. formed the opinion that Edwards was intoxicated. After offering

Edwards a “baby mattress and a blanket” to sleep in the living room, E.P.

returned to her bedroom which she shared with her three-year-old son and laid

in bed. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 115).

[5] After about ten minutes, Edwards walked into E.P.’s bedroom, got on top of

E.P., and proceeded to grab and pull E.P. to the edge of the bed. Edwards

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 2 of 10 asked E.P. what time it was, and at that point, E.P. got out of bed and walked

to the kitchen to show Edwards the clock. While standing in the kitchen,

Edwards attempted to kiss E.P. E.P. pulled away and began walking back to

her bedroom. Edwards stopped E.P. midway in the living room and told E.P.

that she “ain’t [sic] never had a brother like him.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 131). E.P.

shook her head, ignored Edwards’ inappropriate advances, and walked back to

her bedroom and laid in bed. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 134). Edwards followed E.P. to

her bedroom. Once again, Edwards told E.P. that she “ain’t [sic] ever had

nothing like him before.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 134). Edwards thereafter pulled E.P.

to the “foot of [her] bed,” put his hands in the back of E.P.’s shorts and began

pulling them down. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 135). After a brief struggle, Edwards

successfully removed E.P.’s shorts and underwear, and then pinned E.P. on the

ground. At that point, Edwards had “an erection” and he was “trying to hump

[E.P.’s] leg and trying to force it in” her. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 118). E.P. struggled to

free herself from Edwards by kicking, biting, and shouting many times, “No,

don’t do this.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 118). E.P. also yelled for help.

[6] After hearing screams for help, W.P., E.P.’s thirteen-year-old son who was

sleeping in another bedroom, rushed into his mother’s room to help. When

W.P. entered the room, he saw Edwards on top of his mother on the bedroom

floor. W.P. formed the opinion that Edwards was “trying to rape [his] mom.”

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 164). W.P. “tried to get [Edwards] off of [E.P.],” but Edwards

“shoved” W.P. and he “hit the wall.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 164). Due to the

commotion, E.P.’s three-year-old son woke up and began to cry. E.P.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 3 of 10 continued to yell for help, and stated, “are you seriously going to do this to me

in front of my kids[?]” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 151). At that moment, E.P.’s cousin,

William West (West), who was sleeping in another room, entered the room to

help E.P. When West saw Edwards on top of E.P., and also believing that

Edwards was about to rape E.P., he quickly returned to his bedroom and called

911. While West was reporting the crime, Edwards walked into his room, took

West’s cellphone out of West’s hands and ended the 911 call. After taking

West’s cellphone, Edwards put it in his pocket and left E.P.’s house. Once

outside, Edwards tossed West’s cellphone into a bush down the road from

E.P.’s house.

[7] Moments later, Officer Jason Melton (Officer Melton) of the Winchester Police

Department arrived at E.P.’s house. West explained the events to Officer

Melton, and Officer Melton sent out a dispatch through the radio to find

Edwards. Officer Jerry Hammons (Officer Hammons) and another officer

located Edwards about a block away from E.P.’s house. When Officer

Hammons ordered Edwards to stop, the first thing Edwards stated was that “he

didn’t rape” E.P. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 243). Officer Hammons and the other officer

observed that Edwards had “an erection.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 243).

[8] On August 8, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Edwards with

Count I, sexual battery, a Level 6 felony; Count II, battery on a person less than

fourteen years old, a Level 6 felony; Count III, interference with reporting of a

crime, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count IV, theft, a Class A misdemeanor.

On January 24 through January 25, 2018, the trial court conducted a jury trial.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 4 of 10 At the close of the evidence, Edwards was found guilty as charged. On March

7, 2018, at the sentencing hearing, Edwards was sentenced to concurrent terms

of two and one-half years to Counts I and II. As for Counts III and IV, the trial

court imposed concurrent one-year sentences. Count I was to run consecutive

to Counts III and IV, and Edwards’ aggregate sentence is three and one-half

years.

[9] Edwards now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION [10] Edwards claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support all of

his convictions. We will address each contention in turn. When reviewing a

claim of insufficient evidence, it is well established that our court does not

reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Walker v. State, 998

N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013). Instead, we consider all of the evidence, and any

reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to

the verdict. Id. We will uphold the conviction “‘if there is substantial evidence

of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a

reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind.

2004)).

I. Sexual Battery

[11] In charging Edwards with Level 6 felony sexual battery, the State alleged, in

part, that

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 5 of 10 [O]n or about August 19, 2016 [] Jimmy D. Edwards, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of Jimmy D. Edwards, did compel [E.P.] to submit to a touching by imminent threat of force, to-wit: held [E.P.] on the bed and removed her pants, contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided by I.C. [§] 35-42-4-8(a)(l)(A). . .

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 144). The Indiana General Assembly has defined

that the crime of sexual battery is committed when

(a) A person who, with intent to arouse or satisfy the person’s own sexual desires or the sexual desires of another person:

(1) touches another person when that person is:

(A) compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force[.]

Ind. Code § 34-42-4-8. After E.P. welcomed Edwards into her home, she gave

Edwards a mattress and a blanket, and she required him to sleep in the living

room. Ten minutes later, Edwards walked into E.P.’s bedroom, got on top of

her, and “grabbed [] and pulled” E.P. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 116). After Edwards

asked E.P. what time it was, E.P. got out of her bed and walked to the kitchen

to show Edwards the clock. While standing in the kitchen, Edwards tried to

kiss E.P. These unwanted advances escalated when Edwards followed E.P.

back to her bedroom. After pulling E.P. to the foot of the bed, Edwards

forcibly removed E.P.’s shorts and underwear. Thereafter, Edwards pinned

E.P. on the ground. E.P. struggled to free herself from Edwards by kicking,

biting, and shouting many times, “No, don’t do this.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 118). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 6 of 10 Notwithstanding E.P.’s pleas, Edwards, who at that moment had “an erection,”

humped E.P.’s leg while “trying to force it in” her. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 118). Officer

Hammons testified that when he located Edwards, he still had “an erection.”

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 243).

[12] Edwards’ many contentions revolved around the fact that E.P.’s testimony was

uncorroborated and conflicted with other evidence. For instance, he claims

that E.P. testified that her “shorts and underwear . . . both ripped. No shorts or

underwear were produced at trial.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). He also argues that

E.P. claimed that she bit his forearm during the struggle, “but there was no

evidence of any injury” offered at his trial. (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). Edwards

adds that E.P. testified that he was wearing long pants when he committed the

offense, however, one of the officers described that he wore shorts. Edwards’

claim otherwise amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 726.

Here, we find that the evidence supports the conclusion that Edwards, acting

with intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires, touched E.P. when she

was compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of

force. See I.C. § 35-42-4-8(a)(1)(A).

II. Battery on Person Less than Fourteen Years Old

[13] Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1 provides, in relevant part, that a “person who

knowingly or intentionally . . . touches another person in a rude, insolent, or

angry manner . . . . commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor.” However, the

offense is a Level 6 felony if the offense is “committed against a person less than

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 7 of 10 fourteen (14) years of age and is committed by a person at least eighteen (18)

years of age.” I.C. § 35-42-2-1(e)(3).

[14] In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for the Level

6 felony battery on a person less than fourteen years old, Edwards argues,

“[g]iven the facts of the case when young [W.P.] was pushing and shoving on

[him] it would not be unreasonable, rude, insolent or angry to push someone

away who was pushing on you. There were no pictures and no evidence of any

injury from the pushing away of [W.P.] by Edwards.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11).

[15] Turing to the facts of the case, thirteen-year-old W.P. testified that after he

heard his mother yell for help, he rushed to her aid. When he got to her

bedroom, he saw Edwards on top of E.P. and he believed that Edwards was

“trying to rape [his] mom.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 164). W.P. “tried to get [Edwards]

off of [E.P.],” but Edwards “shoved” W.P. and he “hit the wall.” (Tr. Vol. II,

p. 164). Based on the evidence, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence

to support Edwards’ conviction for the Level 6 felony battery on W.P.

III. Interference with Reporting of a Crime

[16] To sustain a conviction for interference with reporting of a crime, the State had

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards, with the intent to commit,

conceal, or aid in the commission of a crime, knowingly or intentionally

interfered with or prevented West from using a 911 emergency telephone

system. I.C. § 35-45-2-5 (1).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 8 of 10 [17] Edwards devotes one sentence to this issue in his brief, arguing that “if no

sexual battery or battery had been committed, [he] could not be guilty of

interference with the reporting of the commission of a crime.” (Appellant’s Br.

p. 12). Edwards has waived this claim for not presenting a cogent argument on

appeal. Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) provides in part that the argument

section of the appellant’s brief must “contain the contentions of the appellant on

the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning,” along with citations to the

authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied upon, and a clear showing of

how the issues and contentions in support thereof relate to the particular facts

under review. Edwards did not do so, therefore he waives this argument. See

Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 297 (Ind. 2012).

[18] Waiver notwithstanding, we note that when West entered E.P.’s room and

observed a man on top of E.P., West believed that the man was attempting to

rape E.P. West returned to his bedroom and used his cellphone to call 911.

Edwards followed West into his room, grabbed the cellphone out of West’s

hands, and ended the 911 call. Based on the evidence, we conclude that the

State presented evidence of a probative value from which a reasonable trier of

fact could have found Edwards guilty of interference with reporting of a crime

as a Class A misdemeanor.

IV. Theft

[19] Lastly, to convict Edwards of Class A misdemeanor theft, the State had to

prove Edwards: (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) exerted unauthorized control

over property of another person; (3) with intent to deprive the other person of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 9 of 10 any part of its value or use. I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a). We find that the evidence the

State presented supports Edwards’ theft conviction. After Edwards grabbed

West’s cellphone and ended the 911 call, Edwards put the cellphone in his

pocket. West yelled “give me back my fucking phone you fucker,” but

Edwards refused. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 194). Edwards thereafter left E.P.’s house,

and while outside, he tossed West’s cellphone into a bush down the road. We

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Edwards’ conviction for

Class A misdemeanor theft.

CONCLUSION [20] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to

sustain Edwards’ conviction for sexual battery, battery on a person less than

fourteen years old, interference with the reporting of a crime, and theft.

[21] Affirmed.

[22] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-789 | October 10, 2018 Page 10 of 10