Jimmy Andrews v. City of Monroe

425 F.2d 1017, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9606
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 23, 1970
Docket29358
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 425 F.2d 1017 (Jimmy Andrews v. City of Monroe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jimmy Andrews v. City of Monroe, 425 F.2d 1017, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9606 (5th Cir. 1970).

Opinion

DYER, Circuit Judge:

Suffice it to say, without relating the prior history of this school desegregation case, that we are now called upon to review, on plaintiffs-appellants’ motion for summary disposition, an order of the District Court which adopted a plan of desegregation for the City of Monroe School System. We are concerned here only with whether the plan accomplishes the desegregation of students since the plan is not attacked as it relates to the other five particulars of a unitary system.

*1018 See Ellis v. Board o,f Public Instruction (Orange County), 5 Cir. 1970, 423 F.2d 203. 1

The following chart shows a breakdown of the three plans which are before us:

PLAN 1 (SCHOOL BOARD PLAN) PLAN II PLAN III (HEW (COURT PLAN) COMPROMISE PLAN)

SCHOOLS White Negro White Negro White Negro

ELEMENTARY

Barkdull Faulk 201 71 246 65 190 77

Berg Jones 82 210 295 115 82 198

Carver 22 437 • 255 266 229 176

Clara Hall 435 84 255 266 304 204

Clark 0 924 160 458 148 521

Georgia Tucker 241 60 90 260 80 248

Lexington 626 0 590 145 612 55

Lida Benton 235 57 277 85 240 57

Lincoln 0 975 208 603 0 994

Minnie Ruffin 300 6 310 100 226 175

Sallie Humble 474 86 522 175 474 160

Sherrouse 264 84 104 370 264 132

SECONDARY

Jefferson, Jr. 404 113 388 275 402 116

Lee Jr. 540 121 331 450 566 130

Neville Sr. 1,049 160 730 705 836 495

Wossman Sr. 712 201 553 279 439 304

Carroll Jr. 93 946 431 625 487 1,241 *

Carroll Sr. 136 1,027

Plan #1 was devised by two experts who were called in by the School Board and who drew geographical zone lines based solely on the distribution and location of pupils, the capacities of the schools near them, and natural and geographical boundaries. The experts did not know the race of any of the pupils they designated to any school. This plan is said by the Board to accomplish a *1019 “neighborhood” school system. Plan #11 is that which was submitted to the District Court by HEW. It, too, is based upon geographical zoning but in addition relies upon “pairing” of schools within a particular zone to accomplish desegregation.

On February 11, 1970, the District Court entered an order rejecting the HEW plan because “although the HEW plan would presumably create a unitary school system for this School system, the Court has concluded that the educational, administrative and economical unsoundness of certain portions thereof justify the Court in rejecting said plan * *.” The District Court further felt constrained, “because of recent pronouncements of the United States Court of Appeal (sic) for the Fifth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court, to also reject the Board’s plan,” (i. e., Plan #1). Accordingly, the court took elements of both the HEW plan and the School Board plan and devised a plan to “create a racially non-discriminatory unitary school system * * *.” This is Plan #III.

However, on February 24, 1970, before Plan III was implemented, the District Court entered an order which vacated its prior order adopting the compromise plan, and adopted Plan I, the School Board’s plan. The reason given for vacating the prior order and adopting the School Board’s plan was that the intervening decisions of Bivins v. Bibb County Board of Education, 5 Cir. 1970, 424 F.2d 97 and Ellis v. Orange County, supra, convinced the District Court that the School Board's neighborhood school plan was constitutionally permissible.

We cannot agree that Plan #1 is constitutionally sufficient. We note first that the criteria used to draw the zone lines in the Monroe City neighborhood school plan were (1) proximity of students to schools serving their grade level; (2) capacity of such schools; and (3) manmade and natural boundaries such as thoroughfares, railroad tracks, creeks, etc. The presence of the zone lines and of the third criterion precludes the School Board’s plan from coming within the purview of a true “neighborhood system” as defined by Ellis v. Orange County, supra, Orange County held that

[T]he neighborhood system, based on school capacity, must be observed without exception. This will prevent any variance based on traffic conditions * * * or by zone line locations * * *. Variances by arbitrary zone lines, or for reasons of traffic, while reasonable on their face, may destroy the integrity and the stability of the entire assignment plan. If Orange County wishes to maintain a neighborhood assignment system, then it must do so without variances. Each student in the system must be assigned to attend the school nearest his or her home, limited only by the capacity of the school, and then to the next nearest school. Id. at p. 207 of 423 F.2d (Emphasis added).

However, we do not reject the School Board’s plan solely on the ground that it does not fit the Orange County definition of a “neighborhood” system. Even if, as presently constituted, the plan were a true neighborhood plan, we would reject it because it fails to establish a unitary system. Orange County does not say that a “neighborhood” system of student assignment per se is a unitary system. To the contrary, Orange County carefully pointed out:

Under the facts of this case, it happens that the school board’s choice of a neighborhood assignment system is adequate to convert the Orange County school system from a dual to a unitary system. This decision does not preclude the employment of differing assignment methods in other school districts to bring about unitary systems. There are many variables in the student assignment approach necessary to bring about unitary school systems. The answer in each case turns, in the final analysis, as here, on all of the facts including those which are peculiar to the particular system.

Id. at p. 208, n. 7.

*1020 The School Board contends adamantly that a dual system is eliminated by its plan because the zone lines were drawn geographically without regard to the race of the students within those lines. While such a system of student assignment may be less offensive than one which intentionally segregates students, it does not necessarily follow that it creates a unitary system. The Supreme Court has made it clear that school boards cannot avoid their responsibility to create a unitary system simply by resorting to nondiscriminatory, geographical zoning where such zoning would be ineffective:

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Bluebook (online)
425 F.2d 1017, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9606, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jimmy-andrews-v-city-of-monroe-ca5-1970.