JG & M Properties LLC v. Sarandos

• Court: District Court, E.D. Missouri
• Decided: March 9, 2020
• Docket: 4:20-cv-00084
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION JG & M PROPERTIES LLC, ) Plaintiff, v. No. 4:20-cv-84-JMB

DAVID SARANDOS, et al., □

Defendants. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Presently before this Court is the motion of plaintiff JG & M Properties LLC (“plaintiff”)

to remand this action to St. Charles County Circuit Court pursuant to 28 ULS.C. § 1447. (ECF

No. 13). For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted, and this case will be

remanded. Background .

On January 8, 2020, plaintiff filed a Petition for Unlawful Detainer against David

Sarandos and Annette Sarandos (collectively “defendants”) in the Associate Circuit Division of

the St. Charles County Circuit Court. See JG & M Properties v. David Sarandos et al., No. 2011-

AC00192 (11th Jud. Cir. 2020). In the petition, plaintiff alleged it purchased property that was

previously owned by the defendants and served the defendants a notice to vacate the premises,

but the defendants refused to comply. Plaintiff sought judgment against the defendants for

possession of the premises, plus damages and monthly rent. On January 17, 2020, defendants filed a Notice of Removal in this Court stating simply:

“Notice of Removal US Code 15 USC 1692 Unfair and Deceptive Collection.” (ECF No. 1). On

February 4, 2020 they filed what appears to be an amended removal notice in which they averred

the action was being removed to this Court “under the authority of 28 USC § 1331.” (ECF No. 9

at 2). Neither document contained other statements of the grounds for removal. Defendants also

filed a motion seeking the dismissal of this action. In support, they argued that plaintiff lacks the

attributes necessary to possess the property because plaintiff does not actually exist. Plaintiff filed the instant motion on February 12, 2020, seeking remand pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c). In support, plaintiff argues that federal question jurisdiction is absent because

the state court petition is based solely upon state law, and defendants cannot establish federal

question jurisdiction by asserting a federal defense. Plaintiff also contends there is no basis for

jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship because all parties are Missouri citizens.

Defendants have not responded to the motion, and the time for doing so has passed. Discussion Plaintiff's motion is well taken. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They

possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), If a federal court takes action in a dispute over which

it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, that action is a nullity. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,

341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951). “Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be

removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Ine. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392

(1987). Accordingly, the action must arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or the diversity and amount in controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. §

1332 must be met. Jd; see also Peters v. Union Pacific R. Co., 80 F.3d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1996).

The party seeing removal and opposing remand bears the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction. In re Business Men's Assur. Co. of America, 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993). Doubts concerning federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand. Id.

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-

pleaded-complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar inc.,

482 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added); see also Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation

Systems, Inc., 535 U.S, 826, 830 (2002) (the well-pleaded complaint rule governs whether a case

“arises under” federal law for purposes of determining federal question jurisdiction). Here, review of plaintiff's petition shows it is based solely upon Missouri law. It presents

no federal question, and therefore can provide no basis for federal question jurisdiction. Defendants can be understood to invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 because they have a defense premised upon federal law. However, it is well- settled that a case cannot be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, even if

the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs complaint. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393.

Therefore, if jurisdiction exists at all, it must be predicated upon diversity of citizenship. {n the instant motion and in the state court file, it is indicated that plaintiff is a Missouri limited

liability company with its principal place of business in Missouri, and that the defendants are

also Missouri citizens. Defendants make no attempt to establish otherwise. There is therefore no basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Even if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction

were met, this action would not be removable because both defendants are citizens of Missouri,

where the action was brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(0)@) (actions removable solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined

and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”).

Accordingly, this action will be remanded to St. Charles County Circuit Court.

Defendants’ motion seeking leave to commence this action without payment of the filing fees, and their motion to dismiss, will be denied as moot. Plaintiff has also filed a motion seeking an award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in

seeking remand of this case. Plaintiff argues that the defendants had no objectively reasonable

basis for removal, as federal and state law clearly establish that an unlawful detainer action does

not create federal question jurisdiction, and a case cannot be removed to federal court on the

basis of a federal defense. The motion will be denied, without prejudice. Plaintiff is correct that in remanding this

case, this Court may require payment of attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of the

removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A party’s pro se status does not prevent the Court from awarding attorneys’ fees. However, the Court will give defendants the benefit of the doubt that, as pro se

litigants, they did not know that a case cannot be removed to federal court on the basis of a

federal defense. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (ECF No. 13) is

GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the 11th Judicial

Circuit Court of the County of St. Charles. A separate order of remand will be entered herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (ECF No. 2) and motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4) are DENIED as moot,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for attorneys’ fees (ECF No. 12) is

DENIED without prejudice.

Dated this 9 day of March, 2020.

JOHN AR OSS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE