JFDB, LTD v. Victaulic Company

• Court: District Court, S.D. Ohio
• Decided: February 16, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-00206
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

JFDB, LTD.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:22-cv-206

vs.

VICTAULIC COMPANY, District Judge Michael J. Newman Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr. Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER: (1) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S FIRST MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 4); AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 9) ______________________________________________________________________________

This is a civil case, premised on diversity jurisdiction, in which Plaintiff seeks relief under Ohio products liability law. See Doc. No. 3. It is before the Court on Defendant Victaulic Company’s two Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Doc. Nos. 4, 9. Plaintiff responded to both motions (Doc. Nos. 5, 11), and Defendant replied (Doc. No. 14). Thus, the motion is ripe for review. I. Rule 12(b)(6), like all other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint and permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint will not suffice if it offers only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In considering whether the facial plausibility standard is met, the Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, accepting as true all allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 344 (6th Cir. 2017). II. As to Defendant’s first motion, Plaintiff amended its complaint in response. See Doc. No. 6. Accordingly, that motion is now moot, and it is denied on that basis. See Crawford v. Tilley,

15 F.4th 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2021). As to the second motion, having carefully and thoroughly considered the pleadings and briefing in support of, and in opposition to, Defendant’s second motion, along with the procedural posture of this case, the efficient and appropriate way forward is to permit discovery to occur and consider the parties’ arguments on summary judgment, not earlier at the motion-to-dismiss phase of litigation. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 514 (6th Cir. 2021); cf. Holbrook v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 533 F. App’x 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2013). Proceeding in this manner will ensure that the Court reviews these arguments only after appropriate discovery has been completed and will guarantee that the Court’s consideration of the parties’ arguments is not premature. Cf. Humphreys v. Bank of Am., 557 F. App’x 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2014); Grose v. Caruso, 284 F. App’x 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2008) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Nuchols v. Berrong, 141 F. App’x 451, 453 (6th Cir. 2005); LRL Prop. v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1113–14 (6th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J., dissenting).

III. Thus, the Court: (1) DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s first motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 4); and (2) DENIES Defendant’s second motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 9). The Court anticipates reviewing both parties’ arguments on summary judgment after the completion of discovery. IT IS SO ORDERED. February 16, 2023 s/Michael J. Newman Hon. Michael J. Newman United States District Judge