Jesus Tomas Gaspar v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 21-70045
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESUS LAUREANO TOMAS GASPAR, No. 21-70045 Agency No. Petitioner, A074-790-194 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 4, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and KOH, Circuit Judges, and BARKER, District Judge.***

Jesus Laureano Tomas Gaspar, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions

for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his

appeal from the denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ) of his applications for asylum,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable J. Campbell Barker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

Because the BIA conducted its own analysis of the evidence and issued its

own opinion, “[w]e review only the BIA’s opinion, except to the extent that it

expressly adopted portions of the IJ’s decision.” Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976

F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241,

1243 (9th Cir. 2019)). We examine the BIA’s factual findings for substantial

evidence, taking “such findings as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting Farah v. Ashcroft,

348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)).

1. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Petitioner was not credible

because he gave official statements to immigration officers in 2009 and 2019

disclaiming a fear of persecution or torture in Guatemala. Petitioner argues that the

BIA erred because the (1) official immigration forms containing his two prior

statements were inaccurate and unreliable and (2) an adverse credibility finding

was otherwise unsupported by substantial evidence. Neither argument is

persuasive.

“[I]nformation on an authenticated immigration form is presumed to be

reliable in the absence of evidence to the contrary presented by the [petitioner].”

Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Petitioner makes no such

2 21-70045 showing. Aside from whether he asserted a fear of harm about returning to

Guatemala, Petitioner conceded that the information contained in both immigration

forms was entirely accurate. Moreover, the 2019 immigration form containing

Petitioner’s statement has multiple indicia of reliability, including that it shows: the

statement was sworn, Petitioner was asked questions in Spanish, Petitioner was

asked in two separate ways whether he had a fear of return to Guatemala, and

Petitioner reviewed the contemporaneous notes of the interview and signed the

form on the same day that the interview occurred. See Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977

F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2020) (providing that a sufficient indicia of reliability

exists when an interview is “conducted under oath, with contemporaneous notes

containing the questions asked, and transcribed either by a [native language]-

speaking officer or with the aid of an interpreter”).

Whether Petitioner feared that he would be harmed upon return to

Guatemala goes to the heart of Petitioner’s applications for relief. Although

Petitioner attempted to explain his contradictory prior statements, the BIA was not

obligated to accept his explanations. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 961 (9th Cir.

2021). Thus, Petitioner’s prior statements disclaiming such a fear constituted

substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. See id.

3 21-70045 at 960–61 (upholding an adverse credibility finding where petitioner submitted

false information in her applications).

2. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s alternative holding that Petitioner’s applications

for asylum and withholding of removal failed because Petitioner, even if credible,

did not establish a nexus between either his alleged past harm or feared future

harm and a statutorily protected ground. Petitioner challenges the BIA’s

affirmation, arguing that guerilla groups have targeted him and continue to target

him because of either his “defiance,” an imputed political opinion, or membership

in a particular social group.

“For both asylum and withholding claims, a petitioner must prove a causal

nexus between one of [his] statutorily protected characteristics and either [his] past

harm or [his] objectively tenable fear of future harm.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v.

Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). But “[a]n alien’s

desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random

violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v.

Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, we find that substantial record

evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the guerilla groups targeted Petitioner due

4 21-70045 to their desire to “grow the group’s ranks or increase their money through

extortion.”

3. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Petitioner’s application for CAT

protection “for the reasons set forth by the [IJ].” The IJ held that Petitioner’s

application for CAT protection failed because of the adverse credibility finding and

because, even if credible, Petitioner failed to show a likelihood that he would be

tortured in Guatemala either by the government or with its consent or

acquiescence. Petitioner summarily argues that the BIA erred because the IJ’s

determination was contrary to the evidence.

To establish CAT protection, an applicant must show both a clear

probability that he will be tortured in the future and that any harm to him would be

inflicted by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person

acting in an official capacity. Velasquez-Gaspar, 976 F.3d at 1065. We see no error

in the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s conclusion that Petitioner, who relies only on

his statements and country condition evidence, failed to present compelling

evidence as to either of these grounds.

PETITION DENIED.1

1 The stay of removal, Dkt. 1, shall dissolve on the issuance of the mandate. The motion for stay of removal, Dkt. 5, is otherwise denied.

5 21-70045