UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION
JESUS PADRON ACOSTA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00842-SPC-DNF
WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH DETENTION CENTER,
Respondent, /
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Jesus Padron Acosta’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 13). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition. A. Background Padron Acosta is a native of Cuba who entered the United States on May 17, 1980. He was convicted of robbery and assault in 1987, and an immigration judge ordered him removed on March 21, 1995. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) could not execute the removal order, so it released him under an order of supervision on August 20, 2002. Since then, Padron Acosta has kept his criminal record clean and fully complied with all conditions of supervision. On December 30, 2025, Padron Acosta reported to ICE for a routine check-in, and ICE revoked his release and arrested him. He is currently detained at Alligator Alcatraz. Padron Acosta challenges the legality of his detention under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001). B. Jurisdiction Before addressing the merits of Padron Acosta’s claim, the Court must address its jurisdiction. The government argues two sections of the INA strip
the Court of jurisdiction over this action. It first points to a provision that bars courts from hearing certain claims: Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This jurisdictional bar is narrow. “The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that technically can be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”). “When asking if a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship
and Immigration Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). The government also raises the INA’s “zipper clause,” which states: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court should have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 or title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such question of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The zipper clause only applies to claims requesting review of a removal order. See Madu v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the INA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over a § 2241 challenge to detention of the petitioner pending deportation). Padron Acosta does not challenge the commencement of a proceeding, the adjudication of a case, or the execution of his removal order. Nor does he ask the Court to review the removal order. Rather, Padron Acosta challenges the legality of his detention under a framework devised by the Supreme Court for district courts to apply. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (stating the Court’s limitation on post-removal detention “is subject to federal-court review.”). A decision in Padron Acosta’s favor would not impair ICE’s ability to execute the removal order. The INA does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action.
C. Legality of Detention “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).
The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The
Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus
an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id. The government argues Padron Acosta’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the
removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Padron Acosta
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION
JESUS PADRON ACOSTA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00842-SPC-DNF
WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH DETENTION CENTER,
Respondent, /
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Jesus Padron Acosta’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 13). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition. A. Background Padron Acosta is a native of Cuba who entered the United States on May 17, 1980. He was convicted of robbery and assault in 1987, and an immigration judge ordered him removed on March 21, 1995. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) could not execute the removal order, so it released him under an order of supervision on August 20, 2002. Since then, Padron Acosta has kept his criminal record clean and fully complied with all conditions of supervision. On December 30, 2025, Padron Acosta reported to ICE for a routine check-in, and ICE revoked his release and arrested him. He is currently detained at Alligator Alcatraz. Padron Acosta challenges the legality of his detention under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001). B. Jurisdiction Before addressing the merits of Padron Acosta’s claim, the Court must address its jurisdiction. The government argues two sections of the INA strip
the Court of jurisdiction over this action. It first points to a provision that bars courts from hearing certain claims: Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This jurisdictional bar is narrow. “The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that technically can be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”). “When asking if a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship
and Immigration Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). The government also raises the INA’s “zipper clause,” which states: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court should have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 or title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such question of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The zipper clause only applies to claims requesting review of a removal order. See Madu v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the INA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over a § 2241 challenge to detention of the petitioner pending deportation). Padron Acosta does not challenge the commencement of a proceeding, the adjudication of a case, or the execution of his removal order. Nor does he ask the Court to review the removal order. Rather, Padron Acosta challenges the legality of his detention under a framework devised by the Supreme Court for district courts to apply. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (stating the Court’s limitation on post-removal detention “is subject to federal-court review.”). A decision in Padron Acosta’s favor would not impair ICE’s ability to execute the removal order. The INA does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action.
C. Legality of Detention “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).
The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The
Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus
an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id. The government argues Padron Acosta’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the
removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Padron Acosta
has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government was unable to remove him in 2002 or at any time since, and no change in circumstances suggest removal is more likely now. The burden thus shifts to the respondents, but they make no attempt at rebuttal. D. Conclusion The Court finds no significant likelihood Padron Acosta will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, DHS can detain Padron Acosta to “assur[e] [his] presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Jesus Padron Acosta Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. 1. The respondent shall release Padron Acosta within 24 hours of this Order, and they shall provide him telephone access so he can arrange his transportation from the facility. 2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 9, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SA: FTMP-1 Copies: All Parties of Record