Jesus Israel Aguinaga Trujillo v. Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Texas
• Decided: November 24, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-01266
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JESUS ISRAEL AGUINAGA TRUJILLO,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 5:25-CV-1266-JKP

KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents have filed their response (ECF No. 9), and the Court finds no need to await a reply. The petition is ready for ruling. After reviewing the briefing, provided evidence, and applicable law, the Court grants the petition for the reasons below. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner is in the custody of Respondents (sometimes referred to as “the Government”) at the South Texas ICE Processing Center in Pearsall, Texas, charged with being present in the United States without having been inspected or admitted under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Peti- tioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection many years ago. On September 20, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained him and issued a Notice to Appear. He was placed into full removal proceedings and detained without bond. He was scheduled for a November 13, 2025 hearing before an immigration judge. Respondents have not identified the basis for such hearing. And no party has indicated that Petitioner’s final removal proceedings have concluded or that he has otherwise been released from detention. In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner asserts that his detention violates (1) statutory Amendment, and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act. His primary argument is that his detention violates the plain language of the INA because § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a) that (1) expressly applies to individuals who are charged as inad- missible for having entered the United States without inspection and (2) allows for release on conditional parole or bond. II. LEGAL STANDARD Habeas petitioners must show they are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Villanueva v. Tate, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, No. CV H-25-3364,

2025 WL 2774610, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). They “bear[] the burden of proving that [they are] being held contrary to law; and because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy [this] burden of proof by a preponderance of the evi- dence.” Id. (quoting Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) and citing Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1976)). Courts “considering a habeas petition must ‘de- termine the facts and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243). III. ANALYSIS1 Petitioner argues his continued detention by ICE is based on Respondents’ novel reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which was adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals on Sep-

tember 5, 2025. See In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025).

1 In its analysis of the facts, issues, and arguments presented in this case, the Court notes close similarity to that presented in many recent Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the Western District of Texas, and specifically, the San Antonio Division. The Court finds the reasoning in these similar cases persuasive and finds the ultimate determination based upon this reasoning correct. For that reason, and for the sake of expediency, the Court follows these opinions closely. See, e.g., Acea-Martinez v. Noem, Case No. 5:25-CV-01390-XR (filed Oct. 28, 2025). lows indefinite detention without a bond hearing. Further, given the plain language of § 1225(a)(1), Respondents contend Petitioner cannot dispute that he is an applicant for admission, nor can he plausibly challenge a determination that he is “seeking admission” simply because he is not cur- rently at the border requesting to come into the United States. Respondents also challenge this Court’s jurisdiction. The Court will address the jurisdictional challenges first. A. Challenges to Jurisdiction As a threshold matter, Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e)(3), (g), and (b)(9) pre- clude review of Petitioner’s claims. The Court addresses each section in turn. 1. Section 1252(e)(3)

Respondents first argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) deprives the Court of jurisdiction. With exceptions not relevant here, that provision states: “Judicial review of determinations under sec- tion 1225(b) of this title and its implementation is available in an action instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A). But § 1252(e)(3) only “concerns challenges to the validity of a ‘system,’ and Petitioner does not raise any systemic challenges.” See Rojano Gonzalez v. Sterling, No. 1:25-CV-6080-MHC, 2025 WL 3145764, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2025) (collecting cases); Lala Barros v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-488-KC, 2025 WL 3154059, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025) (quoting Rodrigues v. McAleenan, 435 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (N.D. Tex. 2020)); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 Civ. 6137 (ER), 2025 WL 2630826, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025). Rather, he argues “that Respondents lack statutory

authority to detain him under § 1225(b)(2) because that statute does not apply to an alien in his circumstances.” J.A.M. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-CV-342 (CDL), 2025 WL 3050094, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025). Section 1252(e)(3) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction in such a case. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to com- mence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under [Chapter 12 of Title 8 of the United States Code].” The Supreme Court has emphasized that § 1252(g) “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney general may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti- Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). This provision “does not bar courts from reviewing an alien detention order, because such an order, while intimately related to efforts to deport, is not itself a decision to execute re-

moval orders and thus does not implicate section 1252(g).” Santiago v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-361- KC, 2025 WL 2792588, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512, 516–17 (5th Cir. 2000)). Petitioner does not challenge a decision to commence removal proceedings, adjudicate a case against him, or execute a removal order. He instead specifically challenges the decision, or basis, to detain him. For this reason, § 1252(g) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction under these facts and specific challenge. See Guevara v. Swearingen, No. 25 C 12549, 2025 WL 3158151, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2025). 3. Section 1252(b)(9) Respondents’ arguments under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) fare no better. Section 1252(b)(9)

provides: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and appli- cation of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus . . . or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review Section 1252(b)(9) “does not present a jurisdictional bar where those bringing suit are not asking for review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (cleaned up); accord Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). This provision “does not . . . ‘sweep within its scope claims with only a remote or attenuated connection to the removal of an alien’ . . . [or] preclude review of claims that ‘cannot be raised efficaciously within the administrative proceedings’ already available.” Duron v. Johnson, 898 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007)). Courts have found that “certain claims are excluded from the sweep of section 1252(b)(9) by virtue of legislative intent and judicial precedent.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11. For example, chal-

lenging a decision to deny a bond hearing does not present circumstances that manifest a jurisdic- tional bar under § 1252(b)(9). Preap, 586 U.S. at 402. And the provision’s “legislative history indicates that Congress intended to create an exception for claims ‘independent’ of removal.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11. Notably, § 1252(b) merely sets forth nine applicable requirements “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).” Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 399 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting introductory text of § 1252(b)). The circumstances of this case do not place any order of removal at issue. “Contrary to the government’s position, the mere fact that a noncitizen is detained does not deprive district courts of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9).” Id. As stated by the Supreme

Court: “The question is not whether detention is an action taken to remove an alien but whether the legal questions in this case arise from such an action.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 n.3 (2018) (plurality op.) (emphasis in original); accord Ozturk, 136 F.4th at 399 (recognizing that “the discussion of § 1252(b)(9) in Jennings is not part of the plurality opinion of the Court,” 1252(b)(9) bars jurisdiction over habeas challenges to detention” and that part “in fact rejected the government’s ‘expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)’”). Petitioner specifically challenges Respondents’ legal authority to subject him to mandatory detention under § 1225, instead of detention with a bond hearing under § 1226(a). This specific challenge does not constitute “a review [of] an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.” Beltran v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2650, 2025 WL 3078837, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). Thus, § 1252(b)(9) provides no jurisdictional bar in this case. In addition, Petitioner does not have the opportunity to “efficaciously” present his claims

“‘within the administrative proceedings’ already available.” Duron, 898 F.3d 647 (quoting Agui- lar, 510 F.3d at 11). Under these procedural facts, the core of this dispute is whether Petitioner can be detained with no bond hearing, that is, with no administrative opportunity to contest his deten- tion pending a removal determination. If § 1252(b)(9) precluded this habeas petition, Petitioner’s detention would be effectively unreviewable, especially considering the BIA’s novel position that immigration judges lack authority to entertain bond requests. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 293; In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 220. “By the time a final order of removal was eventually entered, the allegedly [illegal] detention would have already taken place. And of course, it is pos- sible that no such order would ever be entered in a particular case, depriving that detainee of any meaningful chance for judicial review.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 293.

4. Conclusion Regarding Jurisdiction For the reasons stated, the Court concludes Respondents’ jurisdictional challenges fail, and the Court has jurisdiction to consider the arguments presented in the instant habeas petition. The question to be determined in this habeas petition is whether § 1225(b)(2) applies to all noncitizens who, like Petitioner, are already in the country but entered without inspection. If so, § 1225(b)(2) makes detention mandatory for Petitioner. If not, § 1226(a) applies, thereby making her detention discretionary. “Overwhelmingly, courts have rejected the interpretation offered by Respondents that § 1225(b)(2) requires the detention of all noncitizens living in the country who are ‘inadmissible’ because they entered the United States without inspection.” Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). In the aftermath of In re Yajure Hurtado, this specific issue has been heavily litigated in

courts across the country, generally resulting in a rejection of Respondents’ broad interpretation of § 1225(b)(2). See, e.g., Mboup v. Field Off. Dir. of N.J. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 2:25- CV-16882 (MEF), 2025 WL 3062791, at *1 & n.3 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025) (collecting cases); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (same). These opinions rejecting Respondents’ interpretation rely on several rationales, from statutory language and context to legislative history and longstanding agency practice. See Rodri- guez v. Bostock, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 & n.3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (collecting cases). The Court finds these opinions generally persuasive and, following the reasoning in this majority determination of this specific issue, this Court also concludes the same and rejects Respondents’ broad interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) under

the facts in this case. Specifically, this Court finds the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of relevant statutes reveal the flaw in Respondents’ interpretation. In pertinent part, § 1225(b)(2)(A) states, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not ceedings under § 1229a. Under the clear terms of this provision, three conditions are necessary to invoke mandatory detention: (1) the noncitizen must be “an applicant for admission”; (2) the noncitizen must be “seeking admission”; and (3) “the examining immigration officer” must deter- mine that the noncitizen “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” See, e.g., Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025). The term “applicant for admission” includes a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). With respect to a noncitizen, “‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean . . . the lawful entry of [such person] into the United States after inspection and

authorization by an immigration officer.” Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Because Petitioner is present in the United States but does not satisfy the definitions within § 1101(a)(13)(A), he is an “applicant for admission.” “Under th[e] statutory definition, ‘admission’ is the lawful entry of an alien after inspection, something quite different, obviously, from post-entry adjustment of status.” Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 2008). But, under the facts particular to Petitioner’s detention, he was not seeking “admission,” as that term is defined by § 1101(a)(13)(A), in that he was not seeking entry, much less “lawful entry . . . after inspection” and authorization. See Martinez, 519 F.3d at 544. Respondents’ interpretation “would render the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in § 1225(b)(2)(A) mere surplusage.” Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *6. Because Petitioner is not “seeking admission,” ICE may not detain him

under § 1225(b)(2). Furthermore, in Jennings, the Supreme Court discussed the relationship between § 1225 and § 1226: “In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the ceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” 583 U.S. at 289. Even if this statement might be considered as dicta, courts in the Fifth Circuit “are generally bound by Supreme Court dicta, especially when it is recent and detailed.” McRorey v. Garland, 99 F.4th 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 448 (5th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024)); accord Siders v. City of Brandon, 123 F.4th 293, 304 (5th Cir. 2024). Regardless, this Court finds Jennings instructive. Based upon this interpretation of “seeking admission,” the Court concludes § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens “seeking admission,” and § 1226 applies to noncitizens such as Petitioner who are “already in the country.” Consequently, Respondents may not detain Petitioner pursuant

to § 1225(b)(2). Based upon this showing, Petitioner has satisfied his burden of proving he is being held contrary to law by a preponderance of the evidence. See Villanueva v. Tate, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, No. CV H-25-3364, 2025 WL 2774610, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025); Bruce v. Es- telle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1976). Because Petitioner cannot be detained under § 1225(b)(2), further detention is permissible only if there is a valid source of lawful detention. However, Respondents do not assert any other basis for detaining Petitioner. Absent an assertion by Respondents that they are detaining Petitioner under § 1226, the Court has no need to consider whether § 1226 is a valid basis for Petitioner’s current detention. See Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 223 n.23 (D. Mass. 2025). The same can be said regarding potential detention under § 1225(b)(1).2 In addition, the Court will not

2 While § 1225(b)(1) provides for detention when the detainee is in expedited removal proceedings, Petitioner here is undisputedly in full, rather than expedited, removal proceedings. Respondents have conceded in other cases that a noncitizen cannot simultaneously be in both full and expedited removal proceedings. See Patel v. Tindall, No. 3:25- CV-373-RGJ, 2025 WL 2823607, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2025) (collecting cases). Thus, even if § 1225(b)(1) could apply, as a general matter, to Petitioner, and Respondents asserted it as a basis for detention, Petitioner is not subject to expedited removal proceedings and, therefore, is not subject to § 1225(b)(1)’s detention provisions. Respondents cannot detain Petitioner in connection with expedited removal proceedings that do not exist. Although Petitioner asserts a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act and seeks at- torney fees in her petition, the Court treats the instant action solely as a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner did not pay the required filing fee for any non-habeas claims. “The pay- ment of the $5 habeas filing fee relegates this action to habeas relief only. One cannot pay the minimal habeas fee and pursue non-habeas relief.” Ndudzi v. Castro, No. SA-20-CV-0492-JKP, 2020 WL 3317107, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 18, 2020). Moreover, from the filed petition, it appears that Petitioner only seeks habeas relief in this case. Furthermore, even though Petitioner appears to pursue non-habeas claims in this case, the Court has no need to reach them. “When a filing contains both habeas and non-habeas claims, ‘the district court should separate the claims and

decide the [non-habeas] claims’ separately from the habeas ones given the differences between the two types of claims.” Id. at *3 (quoting Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). But, as here, when a case has proceeded entirely as a habeas action to final resolution, there is no need to determine the substance or procedural viability of any non-habeas claim given the dispositive determination on the primary habeas issue presented. Additionally, because fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), are not available in habeas corpus proceedings like this one, see Barco v. Witte, 65 F.4th 782, 785 (5th Cir. 2023), the Court denies any request for fees in this case. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court must conclude Petitioner’s de- tention is unlawful, and habeas relief is proper.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). It is ORDERED that: 1. Respondents are DIRECTED to RELEASE Petitioner Jesus Israel Aguinaga Trujillo (A# 221-370-112) from custody, under appropriate conditions of release, to a public place by no later than 12:00 p.m. on November 25, 2025. 2. Respondents must NOTIFY Petitioner’s counsel of the exact location and exact time of his release as soon as practicable and no less than two hours before his release. 3. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of Petitioner under this present detention is PROHIBITED. 4. If Petitioner is re-detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, all applicable procedures must be followed, including that she be afforded a bond hearing. 5. The parties shall FILE a Joint Status report no later than 6:00 p.m. November 25, 2025, confirming that Petitioner has been released. A final judgment will be issued separately. IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of November 2025. » oom ee pane TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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