Jesus Diaz v. Roseanne Campbell

Ninth Circuit

Jesus Diaz v. Roseanne Campbell

411 F. App'x 975

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 24, 2011

Docket09-15373

StatusUnpublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 411 F. App'x 975 (Jesus Diaz v. Roseanne Campbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jesus Diaz v. Roseanne Campbell, 411 F. App'x 975 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Jesus Ornelas Diaz appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Diaz contends that the district court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. He relies on Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.2006), to argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he did not have access to Spanish language materials or bilingual assistance. However, he fails to sufficiently “demonstrate that during the running of the AEDPA time limitations, he was unable, despite diligent efforts, to procure either legal materials in his own language or translation assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other source” which could constitute grounds for equitable tolling. See Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1068-70 (recognizing “that equitable tolling may be justified if language barriers actually prevent timely filing”) (italics added).

*977 In a related claim, Diaz contends that the statute of limitations did not begin until a state-created impediment was removed. However, the record shows that Diaz was able to file two state habeas petitions. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 1000-1001 (9th Cir.2009) (relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) available only if impediment prevented any filing in any court).

Finally, Diaz contends that he is entitled to gap tolling for the periods between his filings in the state courts. Diaz has failed to demonstrate that he filed his petitions within a reasonable time, such that they were “pending ” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir.2010).

Diaz’s request for an evidentiary hearing and oral arguments are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Jesus Ornelas Diaz appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Diaz contends that the district court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. He relies on Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.2006), to argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he did not have access to Spanish language materials or bilingual assistance. However, he fails to sufficiently “demonstrate that during the running of the AEDPA time limitations, he was unable, despite diligent efforts, to procure either legal materials in his own language or translation assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other source” which could constitute grounds for equitable tolling. See Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1068-70 (recognizing “that equitable tolling may be justified if language barriers actually prevent timely filing”) (italics added).

*977 In a related claim, Diaz contends that the statute of limitations did not begin until a state-created impediment was removed. However, the record shows that Diaz was able to file two state habeas petitions. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 1000-1001 (9th Cir.2009) (relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) available only if impediment prevented any filing in any court).

Finally, Diaz contends that he is entitled to gap tolling for the periods between his filings in the state courts. Diaz has failed to demonstrate that he filed his petitions within a reasonable time, such that they were “pending ” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir.2010).

Diaz’s request for an evidentiary hearing and oral arguments are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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