Jerry Lynn Young v. Neal B. Biggers, Jr.

816 F.2d 216

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: July 2, 1987
• Docket: 86-4132
• Status: Published

Opinions

GEE, Circuit Judge:

Jerry Young appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. We affirm, bound by a previous panel’s holding that Mississippi’s one-year statute of limitations applies retroactively to suits of this type.

Appellant Young’s present action ends a series of legal battles, in both federal and state fora, which resulted from the appellant’s armed robbery of the (Elvis) Presley Heights branch of the Bank of Mississippi in Tupelo, Mississippi. A state court convicted Young of armed robbery in 1980 and sentenced him to 30 years in prison. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in September 1982. Young v. State, 420 So.2d 1055 (Miss.1982). After that ruling, Young sought federal habeas relief. Although he succeeded at the district court level, on appeal, we denied habeas relief. Young v. Herring, 777 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.1985). He filed the present action in June 1985.¹

The events surrounding the bank robbery provide the basis for Young’s allegations of § 1983 liability. In connection with the bank robbery, the police recovered $5,240 from Young’s mother-in-law’s house. Young claimed that it was his money. He assigned his interest in the money to two lawyers, who filed an action for replevin in state court in 1982. The state court determined that the money belonged to the bank. Young alleges a grand conspiracy to deprive him of his liberty (circumstances leading to his present incarceration) and his property (circumstances surrounding the deprivation of his $5,300).² He names just about everybody he can as part of this conspiracy: his lawyer, the judge, the prosecutor, and a juror at his criminal trial; two members of the Tupelo police and a county sheriff; bank personnel; and the judge in the state court replevin matter.

The district court held that the statute of limitations barred Young’s suit. Young v. Biggers, 630 F.Supp. 590 (N.D.Miss.1986). The law is now clear that the one-year statute of limitations of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-35 applies to all § 1983 actions brought in Mississippi. Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.1985), cert denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1378, 89 L.Ed.2d 603 (1986). Gates followed the Supreme Court’s direction, voiced in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), to select a statute of limitations that governs personal injury actions for all § 1983 suits. For suits brought in Mississippi, we chose the one-year statute for most common-law intentional torts rather than the six-year catchall statute.

The only question then, is whether to apply Gates retroactively to Young’s claim. Young contends that at the time he filed his suit Mississippi’s six-year statute applied to suits against law enforcement officials. He styles his action as such a suit and asserts therefore that it would be unfair to apply Gates retroactively to his suit. The district court analyised this question within the framework provided by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), and decided to apply Gates retroactively. Although we disagree with the district court’s analysis of the Chevron factors, we affirm its decision on other grounds. See Bickford v. International Speedway Corp., 654 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir.1981).

A week before the district court issued its decision in this case, a panel of this circuit applied Gates retroactively in a case involving a § 1983 suit against state law enforcement officials. Shelby v. McAdory, 781 F.2d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.1986). Shelby is indistinguishable from this case. We cannot overrule another panel absent an overriding Supreme Court decision or a change in statutory law. Girard v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir.1986). Accordingly, this action was time-barred one year from the date when Young knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action. The state court convicted Young in December 1980. His arrest and the confiscation of the money took place before then. Young had one year from that date to file a § 1983 action. This complaint was filed in June 1985. Therefore it is untimely.

AFFIRMED.

1 . Young had previously filed a § 1983 action in federal court in 1982. The district court viewed the suit as a habeas petition and dismissed it without prejudice because Young had not yet exhausted his state court remedies.

2 . Young uses the figure of $5,300 in his complaint which we take as a rounded figure of the $5,240 recovered by the bank. At oral argument, Young’s appointed counsel admitted the two figures represented the same money.