JERRETT WILLIAMS GRAHAM, Individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF RAJAH MALIK GRAHAM v. ORLANDO LODGE NO. 1079, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC. D/B/A ORLANDO FLORIDA ELKS LODGE 1079, and TAJH WILLIAMS, Individually

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 6D2024-2136
• Status: Published

Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________

Case No. 6D2024-2136 Lower Tribunal No. 2022-CA-008381-O _____________________________

JERRETT WILLIAMS GRAHAM, individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF RAJAH MALIK GRAHAM,

Appellant,

v.

ORLANDO LODGE NO. 1079, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a ORLANDO FLORIDA ELKS LODGE #1079, and TAJH WILLIAMS,

Appellees.

_____________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County. Patricia L. Strowbridge, Judge.

April 24, 2026

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (“The court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). See generally McCain

v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992) (“[F]oreseeability relates to

duty and proximate causation in different ways and to different ends. The duty element of negligence focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably

created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a general threat of harm to others. The

proximate causation element, on the other hand, is concerned with whether and to

what extent the defendant’s conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the

specific injury that actually occurred.” (citations omitted)); Fritsch v. Rocky Bayou

Country Club, Inc., 799 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (“Under Florida law,

to state a cause of action for negligence in a wrongful death action, Appellant is

required to allege 1) that Appellee owed a legal duty to the decedent; 2) that Appellee

breached that duty; 3) that the breach was a legal or proximate cause of the

decedent’s death; and 4) that Appellant suffered damages as a result of the breach.”

(citations omitted)).

TRAVER, C.J., concurs. NARDELLA, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion. PRATT, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion. _____________________________________

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED ______________________________________

NARDELLA, J., concurring and concurring specially.

As the Supreme Court of Michigan recognized in MacDonald v. PKT, Inc.,

628 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Mich. 2001), criminal activity is by nature irrational and

unpredictable. To say a particular criminal act is “foreseeable” is often just a

description of the inevitable risk present almost everywhere, a risk that even 2 police—trained and equipped to anticipate—are unable to universally mitigate. Id.

In this appeal, Appellant urges that the tall task of crime prevention be passed on to

the landlord, accompanied by culpability for the ultimate failure to prevent the harm

that visited the invitee.

While this case did not present a close call, in future cases our Court will need

to articulate a rule of law for when an act of criminal violence is reasonably

foreseeable and thus a duty owed. In striking that balance, I am mindful that if duty

is allowed to grow beyond reasonable responsibility, then business owners will

essentially be held vicariously liable for criminal actors they cannot control. See

generally Reichenbach v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 401 So. 2d 1366, 1368–69 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1981) (Cowart, J., concurring specially) (“No reasonable standard of care

should require one to be ever on guard, ever present, ready and able, to prevent an

unforeseeable personal criminal attack upon another.” (citing William L. Prosser,

The Law of Torts, 282 n.97 (4th ed. 1971))).

Which brings us to the question this Court must answer in the future—when

is it reasonable to impose such a duty upon business owners? As in Michigan, other

sister states have wrestled with this issue already. For example, in Virginia, a more

stringent “imminent probability” standard applies, requiring a level of criminal

activity that would have led a reasonable business owner to conclude that its invitees

were in imminent danger of criminal assault. Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc.,

3 540 S.E.2d 129, 133 (Va. 2001). Virginia additionally considers “the magnitude of

the burden of guarding against” the harm and the consequences of placing the burden

on the business owner. Id. Similarly, New York and California courts also consider

the burden of avoiding risk as part of the reasonableness analysis. Florman v. City

of New York, 293 A.D.2d 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Torres v. State, 818 N.Y.S.2d

902 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2006); Ericson v. Fed. Express Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2008).

Like Michigan, Virginia, and California, our sister courts within this state

have considered negligent security cases under principles of premises liability rather

than the auspices of ordinary negligence. Nicholson v. Stonybrook Apartments, LLC,

154 So. 3d 490, 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). And under those principles our sister

courts have affirmed summary judgments when the landowner neither created the

dangerous condition nor had greater knowledge of its existence. Ruiz v. Wendy’s

Trucking, LLC, 357 So. 3d 292, 301–02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). But it invites the

question if other considerations, like the obvious danger doctrine, should shield the

landlord from culpability and what the scope of application of the other

considerations should be. But see Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. Perez-Melendez, 855 So. 2d

624, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (suggesting that open and obvious danger doctrine

does not relieve landowner of satisfying initial duty to keep premises in reasonably

safe condition).

4 To date, our sister courts are not uniform in their approach to negligent

security cases. See, e.g., Wilton H. Strickland, Premises Liability: A Notable Rift in

the Law of Foreseeable Crimes, 83 Fla. B.J. 20, 20 (2009) (“The law surrounding

premises liability in Florida is more unsettled than most attorneys (and even judges)

tend to suspect, particularly with regard to third-party crimes.”); Wilton H.

Strickland, Premises Liability Revisited: The Law of Foreseeable Crimes Becomes

Clearer and Murkier, 88 Fla. B.J. 8, 8 (2014) (“Practitioners should remain alert to

the differing standards governing foreseeability of crimes and not be lulled into

thinking Florida law is uniform on this important issue.”). A fuller clarification of

this area of law, including a deeper exploration into how our sister states have

articulated the common law, how our sister courts have sought to strike a balance

between reasonable foreseeability and duty owed within the bounds of current

Florida Supreme Court precedent, and what approach the Sixth District should take

within the constraints of vertical stare decisis, will have to wait upon the presentment

of more complicated facts in a future case.

But as Judge Mize recently stated, this bench, in the absence of a binding

holding from the Florida Supreme Court, “will always endeavor to decide the issue

correctly under the law, with due respect to our sister courts but never deference.”

Ruffenach v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Ameriquest Mortg. Sec. Inc.,

Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-R8, No. 6D2023-1482, 2026

5 WL 785140, at *12 (Fla. 6th DCA Mar. 20, 2026) (Mize, J., concurring specially).

Practitioners should also remember that even in the presence of a binding Florida

Supreme Court holding, this Court may pass upon and certify questions of great

public importance to the Florida Supreme Court. See Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

And as always, should the Legislature wish to weigh in and clarify this area of law—

which no doubt implicates questions of policy—it may do so. See generally Ch.

768, Laws of Fla. (containing Florida’s “negligence” statute); Clay Elec. Co-op.,

Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003) (“The principle of ‘duty’ is linked

to the concept of foreseeability and may arise from four general sources: ‘(1)

legislative enactments or administration regulations; (2) judicial interpretations of

such enactments or regulations; (3) other judicial precedent; and (4) a duty arising

from the general facts of the case.’” (quoting McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So.

2d 500, 503 n.2 (Fla. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 (1965))));

Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 354 (Fla. 2002) (acknowledging that “‘[d]uty’ is

not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those

considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is

entitled to protection [or not]” (alterations in original) (quoting Rupp v. Bryant, 417

So. 2d 658, 667 (Fla. 1982))).

______________________________________

6 PRATT, J., concurring and concurring specially.

Judge Nardella’s special concurrence is thoughtful and persuasive. I

encourage lawyers and litigants alike to read it. I also encourage commentators—as

well as our sister courts within this state—to explore the issues she has identified.

Jonathan A. Martin and John S. Mills, of Bishop, Page & Mills, PLLC, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Charles M-P “Chip” George, of the Law Offices of Charles M-P George, Coral Gables, and Matthew R. Olmsted and Shannon M. Arsenault, of Chartwell Law, Deerfield Beach, for Appellee, Orlando Lodge No. 1079, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America, Inc., d/b/a Orlando Florida Elks Lodge #1079.

No Appearance for Appellee, Tajh Williams.