Jeronimo-Jeronimo v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-3504
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 4 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOISES JERONIMO-JERONIMO, No. 23-3504 Agency No. Petitioner, A097-469-576 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 2, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Moises Jeronimo-Jeronimo, a purported native and citizen of

Guatemala, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order

affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his application for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). Where, as here, the BIA cites Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872

(BIA 1994), in its decision and does not disagree with the IJ’s decision, we review

the IJ’s order as if it were the BIA’s. Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135 (9th

Cir. 2021) (en banc). We review de novo questions of law. Gutierrez-Alm v.

Garland, 62 F.4th 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2023). We review the BIA’s factual findings

for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th

Cir. 2017) (en banc). The substantial evidence standard is deferential, requiring

reversal when, based on the record evidence, “any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

1. The agency’s adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence.

The REAL ID Act requires that credibility determinations be made based on the

“totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Relevant factors include but are not limited to “demeanor,

candor, or responsiveness of the applicant,” “consistency between the applicant’s

. . . written and oral statements,” “the internal consistency of each such statement,”

and “any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” Id. “There is no bright-

line rule under which some number of inconsistencies requires sustaining or

rejecting an adverse credibility determination—our review will always require

assessing the totality of the circumstances.” Alam, 11 F.4th at 1137.

2 23-3504 Here, the agency offered twelve factual reasons for its adverse credibility

determination. Jeronimo-Jeronimo challenges three of the reasons the agency relied

on, contending that those three reasons are unsupported by the record. Because

Petitioner does not challenge the other reasons on which the agency relied in

determining his testimony was not credible, he forfeits review of these reasons. See

Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1024 (9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that

the petitioner must “specifically and distinctly” raise an argument to avoid

forfeiture) (citation omitted).

The agency’s unchallenged factual bases include numerous inconsistencies

between Jeronimo-Jeronimo’s statements, his multiple false statements about his

identity and criminal history, and discrepancies in his birth and medical certificates.

These factors are sufficient to constitute substantial evidence supporting the adverse

credibility determination. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2021)

(discussing the role of factual inconsistencies in an adverse credibility

determination); Greenwood v. Garland, 36 F.4th 1232, 1237 (9th Cir. 2022)

(affirming denial of motion to reopen where the petitioner did not address the IJ’s

finding that he had not established his true identity). We need not determine whether

the three reasons that Jeronimo-Jeronimo does challenge are supported by the record.

2. Jeronimo-Jeronimo has not shown that “he is more likely than not to be

3 23-3504 tortured” if removed to Guatemala. Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1149,

1156 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2011)).

“An adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to CAT

protection.” See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather,

“country conditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief under the

Convention.” Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001). However, an

adverse credibility finding may be dispositive where a petitioner’s basis for CAT is

the same claim that the IJ found not to be credible. Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d

924, 928 (9th Cir. 2020). Country conditions evidence is typically insufficient where

the IJ finds that the petitioner has not even credibly established his identity. See id.;

Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that petitioner had

not credibly established identity and upholding denial of CAT claim on that basis).

Here, the IJ was supported by substantial evidence in finding that Jeronimo-

Jeronimo had not credibly established his identity as a native and citizen of

Guatemala, and denial on that basis was proper. Jeronimo-Jeronimo’s argument that

his country conditions evidence demonstrates his eligibility for CAT relief relies on

the contention that he is a Guatemalan business owner, but he has not credibly shown

that he is a member of that group. Absent his credible testimony, the evidence in the

record does not enable Jeronimo-Jeronimo to meet his burden under CAT.

PETITION DENIED.

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