Jerome Montel Office, Sr. v. Ken Kennedy, et al.

District Court, S.D. Georgia·Decided February 23, 2026·No. 6:25-cv-00065·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

JEROME MONTEL OFFICE, SR.,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:25-cv-65

v.

KEN KENNEDY, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff filed a Complaint, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc 1. The Court now conducts its frivolity screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety. Because I have recommended dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims, I RECOMMEND the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and DENY Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS1 It appears from the face of the pleading that the events alleged occurred while Plaintiff, an inmate at Rogers State Prison, was on a form of work detail at a local dairy farm. Doc. 1. Plaintiff makes four distinct factual allegations in the Complaint. Id. Plaintiff alleges that, starting on July 1, 2025, Defendant Ken Kennedy, a Georgia Correctional Industries (“GCI”) employee, has “harassed me, cussed me, and threatened me.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff states that

1 All allegations set forth here are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Doc. 1. During frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[t]he complaint’s factual allegations must be accepted as true.” Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017). Defendant Kennedy turned the machine he was operating off and lied about the incident. Id. Plaintiff next alleges that, on August 6, 2025, Defendant Kennedy “tried to make me quit by harassing me all day long.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that, on July 7, 2025, Defendant Kennedy called him a terrorist and accused him of becoming Muslim “for protection.” Id. Finally,

Plaintiff alleges that he has “been subjected to eating in a hot bug infested room every day . . . while the staff eat in a[n] air conditioned break room.” Id. Plaintiff alleges these incidents constitute violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff appears to request the same relief for another inmate named Glen William Whitley, as well. Id. at 6. STANDARD OF REVIEW A federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of all complaints filed by prisoners and plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(a). During the initial screening, the court must identify any cognizable claims in the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Additionally, the court must dismiss the complaint (or any portion of the complaint) that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. The pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). A claim is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Moore v. Bargstedt, 203 F. App’x 321, 323 (11th Cir. 2006). In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To state a claim, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

DISCUSSION I. Plaintiff Does Not State a Claim for Relief Plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment violations, but none of the factual allegations he makes constitute a basis for a constitutional claim. First, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Kennedy threatened and verbally abused him on July 1, 2025, July 7, 2025, and August 6, 2025, do not raise a constitutional issue. “[V]erbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.” Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008); see Unuvar v. City of Key West, 394 F. App’x 628, 630 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that discriminatory statements, even if “repugnant and offensive,” without more, “state no constitutional violation cognizable under Section 1983”) (citing Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir. 2000); then

citing Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1991)). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Kennedy harassed him and potentially verbally abused him but has not alleged circumstances that would create constitutional liability. Plaintiff’s remaining allegation, that he was required to eat in a “hot bug infested room” also does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Conditions of confinement only violate the Constitution if they “involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (2004)). Such a claim involves both an objective component and a subjective component. Objectively, the challenged condition must be “extreme.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289. This means it must pose “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health” or safety. Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that his eating accommodations were hot and bug infested compared to staff, who “eat in an air conditioned break room.” Exposure to vermin or excessive

heat could state a claim in some circumstances, but Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. See Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 F. App’x 738, 747 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that “near-constant exposure” to vermin without access to hygiene stated an Eighth Amendment violation). In addition, the staff’s comparatively comfortable conditions are irrelevant in assessing Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. Comparative discomfort does not create an injury. And outside of this allegation, Plaintiff has made no allegation that he suffered any concrete harm. Compare Miles v. Konvalenka, 791 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding that a mouse discovered in an inmate’s food did not violate the Eighth Amendment when no prisoner actually ate the food) with Groover v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff, 684 F. App’x 782, 786 (11th Cir.

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Jerome Montel Office, Sr. v. Ken Kennedy, et al., (S.D. Ga. 2026).

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