1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Jerome Major Carter, No. CV-25-02754-PHX-SHD
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Maricopa County Travel Reduction Program, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jerome Carter’s Application for Leave to 16 Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), (Doc. 2.), and Motion to Allow Electronic Filing, 17 (Doc. 3). For the reasons stated below, Carter’s application to proceed IFP and motion to 18 allow electronic filing will be granted, and Carter’s Complaint, (Doc. 1), will be dismissed 19 with leave to amend. 20 I. IFP APPLICATION 21 “There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when 22 someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235 23 (9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges 24 that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234 25 (citing Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 26 Having reviewed the application to proceed IFP, (Doc. 2), the Court finds Carter 27 cannot pay the court costs and still afford necessities. Thus, the motion to proceed IFP will 28 be granted. 1 II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2 Because Carter is proceeding IFP in this case, the Court must screen his Complaint. 3 A. Legal Standard 4 Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court 5 “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the “allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous 6 or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 7 “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines how prisoners 8 can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies to all in forma 9 pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only 10 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma 11 pauperis complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous or malicious. 12 13 Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2005). 14 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim 15 upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a 16 claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 17 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in 18 the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 12(b)(6)”). 20 Hairston v. Juarez, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2023). 21 B. Carter’s Complaint 22 Under Rule 8(a)(2), “a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the 23 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677– 24 78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this does not require “detailed factual 25 allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 26 accusation.” Id. at 678 (quotation marks omitted). To meet this standard, “a complaint 27 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 28 plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This requires “factual content that 1 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 2 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 3 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also id. (“Nor does a 4 complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 5 (citation modified)). Pro se filings must be construed “liberally when evaluating them 6 under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014). 7 Carter alleges that Defendants Maricopa County Travel Reduction Program 8 (“TRP”), Valley Metro Regional Public Transportation Authority, and Michael Wawro 9 (collectively, “Defendants”) violated various federal laws, including Titles VI and VII of 10 the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, 11 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Doc. 1 at 1.) However, it is 12 unclear from the Complaint how Defendants violated these laws, or what factual 13 circumstances gave rise to Carter’s claims. 14 Although Carter states that Defendants “failed to hire [him]; fail[ed] to 15 accommodate [his] disability;” retaliated against and harassed him, denied “digital access,” 16 and engaged in “procedural neglect” and “systemic discrimination against a homeless 17 workforce,” the Complaint contains no factual allegations supporting these conclusory 18 statements. (See id. at 1–9.) Indeed, the only facts alleged in the Complaint involve 19 Defendants’ refusal to recognize “The Anti-Homeless Labour Union Phoenix USATM” (the 20 “Anti-Homeless Union”) as a “federally protected, actively participating entity within 21 multiple [Travel Reduction Program] associated entities.” (See id. at 1–3.) Carter’s chief 22 concern seems to be that Defendants declined to levy civil penalties against the Anti- 23 Homeless Union. (See id. at 4 (alleging that a statement made by the “TRP Supervisor” 24 “asserting that [TRP’s] records indicate that The Anti-Homeless-Labour-Union . . . is not 25 part of [TRP] and, therefore, is not out of compliance or accruing penalties” 26 “fundamentally mischaracterizes the standing, submissions, and equity based engagement 27 of The Anti-Homeless Labour Union”).) 28 1 Carter’s factual allegations present two primary issues. First, the Complaint fails to 2 connect the factual allegations to the federal law Carter alleges Defendants violated. 3 Edwards v. Prestige Fin., 2023 WL 3738442, at *3 & n.4 (D. Ariz. 2023) (reasoning that 4 plaintiffs’ failure to “connect their allegations to the [federal] statutes” under which their 5 claims allegedly arose, warranted dismissal). That Defendants did not recognize the Anti- 6 Homeless Union as a participating organization bears no discernable relationship to 7 Carter’s contention that Defendants did not hire him, denied him reasonable 8 accommodations, and discriminated against him because of his age, disability, or other 9 protected ground, absent further information connecting the events. Carter offers no 10 “factual enhancement” to support his assertions that Defendants violated the federal 11 statutes he invokes. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The allegations in the Complaint thus amount 12 to “naked assertions” that Defendants unlawfully harmed Carter. Id.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Jerome Major Carter, No. CV-25-02754-PHX-SHD
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Maricopa County Travel Reduction Program, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jerome Carter’s Application for Leave to 16 Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), (Doc. 2.), and Motion to Allow Electronic Filing, 17 (Doc. 3). For the reasons stated below, Carter’s application to proceed IFP and motion to 18 allow electronic filing will be granted, and Carter’s Complaint, (Doc. 1), will be dismissed 19 with leave to amend. 20 I. IFP APPLICATION 21 “There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when 22 someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235 23 (9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges 24 that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234 25 (citing Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 26 Having reviewed the application to proceed IFP, (Doc. 2), the Court finds Carter 27 cannot pay the court costs and still afford necessities. Thus, the motion to proceed IFP will 28 be granted. 1 II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2 Because Carter is proceeding IFP in this case, the Court must screen his Complaint. 3 A. Legal Standard 4 Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court 5 “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the “allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous 6 or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 7 “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines how prisoners 8 can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies to all in forma 9 pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only 10 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma 11 pauperis complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous or malicious. 12 13 Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2005). 14 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim 15 upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a 16 claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 17 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in 18 the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 12(b)(6)”). 20 Hairston v. Juarez, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2023). 21 B. Carter’s Complaint 22 Under Rule 8(a)(2), “a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the 23 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677– 24 78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this does not require “detailed factual 25 allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 26 accusation.” Id. at 678 (quotation marks omitted). To meet this standard, “a complaint 27 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 28 plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This requires “factual content that 1 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 2 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 3 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also id. (“Nor does a 4 complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 5 (citation modified)). Pro se filings must be construed “liberally when evaluating them 6 under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014). 7 Carter alleges that Defendants Maricopa County Travel Reduction Program 8 (“TRP”), Valley Metro Regional Public Transportation Authority, and Michael Wawro 9 (collectively, “Defendants”) violated various federal laws, including Titles VI and VII of 10 the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, 11 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Doc. 1 at 1.) However, it is 12 unclear from the Complaint how Defendants violated these laws, or what factual 13 circumstances gave rise to Carter’s claims. 14 Although Carter states that Defendants “failed to hire [him]; fail[ed] to 15 accommodate [his] disability;” retaliated against and harassed him, denied “digital access,” 16 and engaged in “procedural neglect” and “systemic discrimination against a homeless 17 workforce,” the Complaint contains no factual allegations supporting these conclusory 18 statements. (See id. at 1–9.) Indeed, the only facts alleged in the Complaint involve 19 Defendants’ refusal to recognize “The Anti-Homeless Labour Union Phoenix USATM” (the 20 “Anti-Homeless Union”) as a “federally protected, actively participating entity within 21 multiple [Travel Reduction Program] associated entities.” (See id. at 1–3.) Carter’s chief 22 concern seems to be that Defendants declined to levy civil penalties against the Anti- 23 Homeless Union. (See id. at 4 (alleging that a statement made by the “TRP Supervisor” 24 “asserting that [TRP’s] records indicate that The Anti-Homeless-Labour-Union . . . is not 25 part of [TRP] and, therefore, is not out of compliance or accruing penalties” 26 “fundamentally mischaracterizes the standing, submissions, and equity based engagement 27 of The Anti-Homeless Labour Union”).) 28 1 Carter’s factual allegations present two primary issues. First, the Complaint fails to 2 connect the factual allegations to the federal law Carter alleges Defendants violated. 3 Edwards v. Prestige Fin., 2023 WL 3738442, at *3 & n.4 (D. Ariz. 2023) (reasoning that 4 plaintiffs’ failure to “connect their allegations to the [federal] statutes” under which their 5 claims allegedly arose, warranted dismissal). That Defendants did not recognize the Anti- 6 Homeless Union as a participating organization bears no discernable relationship to 7 Carter’s contention that Defendants did not hire him, denied him reasonable 8 accommodations, and discriminated against him because of his age, disability, or other 9 protected ground, absent further information connecting the events. Carter offers no 10 “factual enhancement” to support his assertions that Defendants violated the federal 11 statutes he invokes. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The allegations in the Complaint thus amount 12 to “naked assertions” that Defendants unlawfully harmed Carter. Id. 13 Second, to the extent Carter seeks relief from harms suffered by the Anti-Homeless 14 Union, the case must be dismissed. The right to represent oneself pro se is personal to the 15 plaintiff and does not extend to other parties. Simon v. Hartford Live Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 16 664 (9th Cir. 2008). As a pro se plaintiff, Carter cannot bring a suit on behalf of the Anti- 17 Homeless Union. See id.; cf. Tretiak v. Del Papa, 23 F. App’x 676, 677 (9th Cir. 2001) 18 (mem. decision) (per curiam) (holding that pro se plaintiff “cannot maintain a claim on 19 behalf of a corporation, nor may he represent . . . corporations as a pro se plaintiff”). 20 Because Carter “has not provided the Court with any basis upon which to assess [his] 21 claim,” Dowling v. Unknown Party, 2024 WL 3595619, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2024), the 22 Complaint will be dismissed. 23 III. LEAVE TO AMEND 24 Unless the Court determines that a pleading cannot be cured by the allegation of 25 other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before 26 dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 1992) (en 27 banc). A finding that any amendment would be futile justifies dismissal without leave to 28 amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (1995). Here, the Court cannot conclude that 1 amendment would be futile. Carter could allege facts that would state a claim for relief 2 and establish that he has standing to sue. Accordingly, Carter will be granted the 3 opportunity to amend. 4 Carter must note that an amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint. 5 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard 6 Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, after amendment, the original 7 complaint is treated as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action raised 8 in the original complaint is waived if it is not alleged in an amended complaint. See Lacey 9 v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). And any Defendant not 10 renamed in the amended complaint will remain dismissed from this case. See id. 11 IV. MOTION TO ALLOW ELECTRONIC FILING 12 The Court has reviewed Carter’s request to allow electronic filing and will grant the 13 motion subject to the conditions below. 14 Accordingly, 15 IT IS ORDERED that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Carter’s motion to allow electronic filing 17 by a party appearing without an attorney (Doc. 3) in this case only. Carter is required to 18 comply with all rules outlined in the District of Arizona’s Case Management/Electronic 19 Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual, have access to the required 20 equipment and software, have a personal electronic mailbox of sufficient capacity to send 21 and receive electronic notice of case related transmissions, be able to electronically 22 transmit documents to the Court in .pdf, complete the necessary forms to register as a user 23 with the Clerk’s Office within five days of the date of this Order (if not already on file), 24 register as a subscriber to PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) within five 25 days of the date of this Order (if this has not already occurred), and comply with the privacy 26 policy of the Judicial Conference of the United States and the E-Government Act of 2002. 27 Any misuse of the ECF system will result in immediate discontinuation of this 28 privilege and disabling of the password assigned to the party. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed with leave 2|| to amend. Carter has 30 days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint. || Consistent with LRCiv 15.1, Carter shall file, concurrently with any amended complaint, 4|| a notice of filing the amended pleading that attaches a copy of the amended pleading 5 || indicating in what ways it differs from the Complaint. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Carter files an amended complaint, the Clerk 7\| of Court shall not issue a summons until the Court screens the amended complaint and 8 || orders service consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Carter does not file an amended complaint || within 30 days of this Order, the Clerk of Court shall dismiss this action without further 11 |} Order from the Court. 12 Dated this 24th day of October. 13 / 14 / 15 H le Sharad H. Desai 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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