Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11177 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-00509-LMM
JERMAINE PADGETT,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, USP ATLANTA,
Respondent - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(August 14, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jermaine Padgett, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the
district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition arguing that his then- Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 2 of 7
mandatory life and “de-facto life” sentences violate the Eighth Amendment
because they were imposed for a course of conduct that began when he was a
juvenile. Padgett claims that the district court had jurisdiction over his § 2241
petition because it falls under the “saving” clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). He also
argues that the district court should have granted his request to transfer his petition
to the Western District of North Carolina, the court in which he was sentenced.
After careful review, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Padgett’s petition.
I. STANDARDS
We review de novo whether a prisoner may bring a § 2241 petition under the
saving clause of § 2255(e). McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.,
851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert denied sub nom. McCarthan
v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). We review the district court’s denial of a motion
for change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for an abuse of discretion. England
v. ITT Thompson Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988); see also
Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Absent
a clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not reverse a court’s decision to
transfer a case.”).
II. BACKGROUND
In 1994, Padgett was convicted of a number of federal crimes in the Western
District of North Carolina. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for several
2 Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 3 of 7
counts, as well as concurrent twenty-year sentences for two counts, a consecutive
five-year sentence for one count, and consecutive twenty-year sentences for three
counts. Padgett appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. In 2005, Padgett filed a
§ 2255 motion to vacate his sentence in the Western District of North Carolina.
The district court dismissed the motion as time-barred, and the Fourth Circuit
dismissed Padgett’s appeal. See United States v. Padgett, 186 F. App’x 335, 335–
36 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Several years later, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender for
a nonhomicide crime, id. at 74–75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, and Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of a mandatory life without parole sentence
on any juvenile offender, id. at 465, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. Padgett filed the present
§ 2241 petition on February 1, 2018. He argues that his sentence is unlawful after
Graham and Miller because he was effectively sentenced to life imprisonment for
conduct that began when he was seventeen. The magistrate judge recommended
dismissing Padgett’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. Padgett failed to
object to that recommendation, and the district court adopted it.
3 Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 4 of 7
On appeal, Padgett argues that the district court possessed jurisdiction to
consider his petition under the saving clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) because, prior
to the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Graham and Miller his claim was
foreclosed by controlling precedent. Padgett also argues that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his request to construe his § 2241 petition as a
petition for a writ of error coram nobis in order to transfer it to the Western District
of North Carolina, the court in which he was convicted and sentenced.
III. DISCUSSION
Under § 2255, a federal prisoner who seeks to collaterally challenge his
sentence “may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A § 2255 motion is the exclusive
mechanism by which a federal prisoner may seek collateral relief unless he can
satisfy the saving clause at the end of § 2255(e):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
Id. § 2255(e) (emphasis added); McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1081. The applicability of
the saving clause is a threshold jurisdictional issue. Brown v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Low, 817 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, a district court does 4 Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 5 of 7
not possess jurisdiction to consider a § 2241 habeas petition filed by a federal
prisoner unless “the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). It is the petitioner’s burden to
establish that § 2255 did not provide an adequate or effective remedy. McCarthan,
851 F.3d at 1081.
Even if a § 2241 petition falls under § 2255(e)’s saving clause, the § 2241
petition must be filed in the “district wherein the restraint complained of is had.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). In other words, jurisdiction over a § 2241 habeas petition
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Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11177 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-00509-LMM
JERMAINE PADGETT,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, USP ATLANTA,
Respondent - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(August 14, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jermaine Padgett, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the
district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition arguing that his then- Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 2 of 7
mandatory life and “de-facto life” sentences violate the Eighth Amendment
because they were imposed for a course of conduct that began when he was a
juvenile. Padgett claims that the district court had jurisdiction over his § 2241
petition because it falls under the “saving” clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). He also
argues that the district court should have granted his request to transfer his petition
to the Western District of North Carolina, the court in which he was sentenced.
After careful review, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Padgett’s petition.
I. STANDARDS
We review de novo whether a prisoner may bring a § 2241 petition under the
saving clause of § 2255(e). McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.,
851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert denied sub nom. McCarthan
v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). We review the district court’s denial of a motion
for change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for an abuse of discretion. England
v. ITT Thompson Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988); see also
Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Absent
a clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not reverse a court’s decision to
transfer a case.”).
II. BACKGROUND
In 1994, Padgett was convicted of a number of federal crimes in the Western
District of North Carolina. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for several
2 Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 3 of 7
counts, as well as concurrent twenty-year sentences for two counts, a consecutive
five-year sentence for one count, and consecutive twenty-year sentences for three
counts. Padgett appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. In 2005, Padgett filed a
§ 2255 motion to vacate his sentence in the Western District of North Carolina.
The district court dismissed the motion as time-barred, and the Fourth Circuit
dismissed Padgett’s appeal. See United States v. Padgett, 186 F. App’x 335, 335–
36 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Several years later, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender for
a nonhomicide crime, id. at 74–75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, and Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of a mandatory life without parole sentence
on any juvenile offender, id. at 465, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. Padgett filed the present
§ 2241 petition on February 1, 2018. He argues that his sentence is unlawful after
Graham and Miller because he was effectively sentenced to life imprisonment for
conduct that began when he was seventeen. The magistrate judge recommended
dismissing Padgett’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. Padgett failed to
object to that recommendation, and the district court adopted it.
3 Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 4 of 7
On appeal, Padgett argues that the district court possessed jurisdiction to
consider his petition under the saving clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) because, prior
to the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Graham and Miller his claim was
foreclosed by controlling precedent. Padgett also argues that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his request to construe his § 2241 petition as a
petition for a writ of error coram nobis in order to transfer it to the Western District
of North Carolina, the court in which he was convicted and sentenced.
III. DISCUSSION
Under § 2255, a federal prisoner who seeks to collaterally challenge his
sentence “may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A § 2255 motion is the exclusive
mechanism by which a federal prisoner may seek collateral relief unless he can
satisfy the saving clause at the end of § 2255(e):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
Id. § 2255(e) (emphasis added); McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1081. The applicability of
the saving clause is a threshold jurisdictional issue. Brown v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Low, 817 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, a district court does 4 Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 5 of 7
not possess jurisdiction to consider a § 2241 habeas petition filed by a federal
prisoner unless “the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). It is the petitioner’s burden to
establish that § 2255 did not provide an adequate or effective remedy. McCarthan,
851 F.3d at 1081.
Even if a § 2241 petition falls under § 2255(e)’s saving clause, the § 2241
petition must be filed in the “district wherein the restraint complained of is had.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). In other words, jurisdiction over a § 2241 habeas petition
challenging present confinement “lies in only one district: the district of
confinement.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442–43, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2722,
159 L. Ed. 2d 513 (2004). Regarding Padgett’s request to transfer his § 2241
petition, “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have
consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Finally, federal courts have authority to issue a writ of error coram nobis
under the All Writs Act. United States v. Mills, 221 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir.
2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). “A writ of error coram nobis is a remedy
available to vacate a conviction when the petitioner has served his sentence and is
no longer in custody, as is required for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C.
5 Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 6 of 7
§ 2255.” United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
Coram nobis relief is unavailable to a person who is still in custody. United States
v. Garcia, 181 F.3d 1274, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Even assuming arguendo that Padgett’s failure to object to the magistrate
judge’s report (“R&R”) recommending dismissal of his petition is not fatal to his
claims on appeal, the district court committed no error in dismissing his petition.1
Padgett’s claim that his § 2241 petition was authorized under § 2255(e)’s saving
clause due to intervening changes in controlling precedent is foreclosed by our
decision in McCarthan. In McCarthan, we held that a federal prisoner’s § 2241
petition did not satisfy § 2255(e)’s saving clause even though intervening Supreme
Court decisions overturned controlling precedent that previously foreclosed his
claims: “Even if a prisoner’s claim fails under circuit precedent, a motion to vacate
remains an adequate and effective remedy for a prisoner to raise the claim and
attempt to persuade the court to change its precedent, and failing that, to seek
certiorari in the Supreme Court.” McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1099. “We are bound to
follow a prior precedent or en banc holding, except where that holding has been
1 Generally, a party who fails to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in an R&R “waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. But we reserve the right to review any waived challenge on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. Id. Here, there is some question regarding whether Padgett was adequately warned of the consequences for failing to object to the R&R. Thus, we assume arguendo that Padgett has not waived his arguments on appeal. 6 Case: 18-11177 Date Filed: 08/14/2018 Page: 7 of 7
overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by a subsequent en banc or
Supreme Court decision.” Tobinick v. Novella, 884 F.3d 1110, 1118 (11th Cir.
2018) (quoting Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Padgett’s motion to transfer his § 2241 petition to the Western District of North
Carolina or by failing to construe his petition as a petition for writ of error coram
nobis. Padgett is currently confined in Georgia. Thus, the Western District of North
Carolina is not a district in which his § 2241 petition “might have been brought”
under § 1404(a). And Padgett is not eligible for coram nobis relief because he is
presently incarcerated under the challenged sentences. See Garcia, 181 F.3d at
1274. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to construe his
§ 2241 petition as a writ for error coram nobis in order to transfer the petition. For
all of these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Padgett’s petition.
AFFIRMED.