Jermaine Hampton v. Jeremy Bean, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 20, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01504
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 JERMAINE HAMPTON1, Case No. 2:24-cv-01504-GMN-EJY

6 Petitioner, v. ORDER 7 JEREMY BEAN2, et al., 8 Respondents. 9 10 Petitioner Jermaine Hampton, a pro se Nevada prisoner, commenced this habeas action 11 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 10), challenging 12 his state court convictions of Robbery, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, and Stop Required on 13 Signal of Police Officer. Also before the Court are Hampton’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 35) 14 and Motion for Bail Pending a Decision (ECF No. 38) as well as Respondents’ Motion to Extend 15 (ECF No. 36). The Court denies the remaining grounds of Hampton’s Petition, denies him a 16 certificate of appealability, denies his Motions, and kindly directs the Clerk of Court to enter 17 judgment accordingly. 18 I. Background 19 a. Factual Background 20 In November 2016, an individual, Quintanar, was robbed at gun point by two men later 21 identified as Hampton and Robert Russell (“Russell”). ECF No. 17-1 at 15. Quintanar was 22 leaving his work, a moving company, and entered his rental car because his car was in the shop. 23 Id. While sitting in his rental car, two individuals in a white Explorer stopped in front of 24 1 The Court notes that on some state district court documents and on the state corrections 25 department’s inmate locator page, Petitioner’s name is spelled Germaine Hampton. 26 2 The state corrections department’s inmate locator page indicates that Hampton is incarcerated at Carlin Conservation Camp. Nethanjah Breitenbach is the current warden for that facility. At the 27 end of this Order, the Court kindly directs the Clerk of Court to substitute Nethanjah Breitenbach 28 for Respondent Jeremy Bean. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 1 Quintanar’s car blocking him in. Id. as 15-16. 2 Russell exited the car, went to the driver side of the rental car, and told Quintanar to open 3 the door while pointing a gun at him. Id. at 16. Quintanar struggled with opening the door. Id. 4 Hampton exited the driver side of the white Explorer, went to the passenger side of the rental car, 5 pointed a gun at Quintanar, and also instructed him to open the door. Id. Hampton and Russell 6 stole several items from Quintanar. Id. After Hampton and Russell left, Quintanar went to the 7 shop next door, began knocking on the door while yelling, and then called 911. Id. at 17. 8 A police officer located the white Explorer in the general area of the crime. Id. at 18. 9 Officers attempted to pull the white Explorer over, but instead of stopping, the vehicle sped up. 10 Id. The pursuit continued through multiple intersections and Hampton ran at least one red light. 11 Id. The chase ended when Hampton stopped at his apartment complex and Russell fled from the 12 car on foot. Id. Hampton did not run from the police, but officers had to forcefully remove him 13 from the car. Id. at 19. After searching the white Explorer, the police located several items 14 belonging to Quintanar. Officers also located a gun near the path that Russell had used to flee 15 the scene. Id. 16 b. Procedural Background 17 Hampton retained attorney Carl Arnold, Esq. (“Arnold”) to represent him. ECF No. 16- 18 48 at 7. Following a motion to withdraw, Arnold no longer represented Hampton, and the state 19 district court appointed another attorney to represent Hampton. Id. The state district court 20 continued the trial date multiple times. In May 2019, during a status hearing, Hampton informed 21 the state district court that he wanted to proceed pro per. Id. at 8. The state district court 22 conducted a Faretta3 canvas and determined that the trial would go forward with Hampton 23 represented by counsel. Id. 24 Following a four-day jury trial, a jury found Hampton guilty of Robbery, Conspiracy to 25 Commit Robbery, and Stop Required on Signal of Police Officer. The state district court 26 sentenced Hampton to an aggregate term of 8 to 21 years. The Nevada Court of Appeals 27

28 3 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 1 affirmed the judgement of conviction on direct appeal. 2 Hampton filed a state post-conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The state 3 district court denied post-conviction relief, but the Nevada Court of Appeals determined that the 4 state district court erred by denying two of Hampton’s claims without first conducting an 5 evidentiary hearing. On remand, the state district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, but 6 nonetheless denied relief. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief. 7 Hampton initiated this federal habeas corpus proceeding. ECF No. 1-1. Respondents 8 moved to dismiss certain grounds, and the Court granted, in part, dismissing Ground 2(B)(2) as 9 duplicative to the extent it alleges a violation of his right to self-representation. ECF No. 28. 10 II. Governing Standards of Review 11 a. Review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 12 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review generally applicable in habeas 13 corpus cases under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”): 14 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 15 was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 16 the claim –

17 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 18 of the United States; or

19 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 20 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 21 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 22 precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “if the state court applies a rule that 23 contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or “if the state court confronts 24 a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 25 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (first quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405- 26 06 (2000), and then citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A state court decision is an 27 unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 1 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the 2 Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 3 case.” Id. at 75. 4 The Supreme Court has instructed that “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks 5 merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the 6 correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing 7 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 8 b. Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 9 In Strickland, the Supreme Court propounded a two-prong test for analysis of ineffective 10 assistance of counsel claims requiring Petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) the counsel’s 11 “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness[;]” and (2) the counsel’s 12 deficient performance prejudices Petitioner such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but 13 for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 14 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Courts considering an ineffective 15 assistance of counsel claim must apply a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 16 the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. It is Petitioner’s burden to 17 show “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 18 guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. Additionally, to establish prejudice under 19 Strickland, it is not enough for Petitioner to “show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 20 the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Rather, errors must be “so serious as to deprive 21 [Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. 22 Where a state court previously adjudicated the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 23 under Strickland, establishing the court’s decision was unreasonable is especially difficult. See 24 Richter, 562 U.S. at 104-05. In Richter, the Supreme Court clarified that Strickland and § 25 2254(d) are each highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so. See 26 id. at 105; see also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 27 marks omitted). The Court further clarified, “[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the question is not 28 whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 1 argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. 2 When evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the performance 3 and prejudice prongs of the Strickland standard partially overlap. See, e.g., Bailey v. Newland, 4 263 F.3d 1022, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 Effective appellate advocacy requires weeding out weaker issues with less likelihood of success. 6 The failure to present a weak issue on appeal neither falls below an objective standard of 7 competence nor causes prejudice to the client for the same reason—because the omitted issue has 8 little or no likelihood of success on appeal. Id. 9 III. Discussion 10 a. Ground 1—Right to Self Representation 11 In Ground 1, Hampton alleges that his right to self-representation was violated when the 12 state district court did not grant his request to represent himself. ECF No. 10 at 3. He asserts that 13 his request was made weeks before trial, and the state district court did not deny the request 14 because of timeliness. ECF No. 41 at 2. He contends that his counsel told him to “shut his 15 fucking mouth,” and they were unable to openly communicate with each other. Id. at 3. 16 i. Additional Background Information 17 Hampton first mentioned that he wanted to represent himself during a calendar call on 18 May 21, 2019, and at that time, trial was scheduled to begin on May 28, 2019. ECF No. 16-17 at 19 14. Following Hampton’s Faretta canvas on May 23, 2019, trial was then rescheduled to begin 20 on June 4, 2019. ECF No. 16-18 at 2, 5, 9. There had been six trial continuances for varying 21 reasons, including Hampton firing and hiring attorneys and to allow his counsel to negotiate an 22 agreement, which was never reached. Id. at 8. At the May 21, 2019, calendar call, Hampton’s 23 attorney, Amanda Gregory (“Gregory”), informed the state district court that she was ready for 24 trial. Id. 25 Hampton informed the state district court that “[t]he attorneys I’ve met all work for the 26 State of Nevada, and have no desire to work vigorously for me or honestly,” and he “kindly 27 ask[ed] the court to dismiss this case, and if not so, [he] will be representing [himself] on this 28 matter, and [he] need[s] some time to do so because [he] wasn’t planning to do that.” ECF No. 1 16-17 at 14. The state district court conducted a Faretta canvas: 2 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hampton, I know we talked about this the other day. Your counsel is ready to go to trial but you're not getting along 3 with your counsel –

4 THE DEFENDANT: Not at all.

5 THE COURT: -- so it's your desire to represent yourself?

6 THE DEFENDANT: It's a forced move, it's not a desire.

7 THE COURT: Okay.

8 THE DEFENDANT: I have to, it's not a desire.

9 THE COURT: You have counsel that’s prepared to proceed to trial; do you prefer to go to trial with counsel or without? 10 THE DEFENDANT: Without. 11 THE COURT: Are you prepared to represent yourself to go forward with 12 trial next week or the week after?

13 THE DEFENDANT: Well actually, I wasn't -- I wasn't expecting to have to represent myself, so no I'm not prepared, but I have been working 14 diligently every day since Tuesday trying to get ready.

15 THE COURT: Okay, well the only way you're allowed to represent yourself under the laws, if you can come in and do that and not necessitate 16 a continuance. You can't come in last minute and represent yourself and get another continuance. 17 18 ECF No. 16-18 at 7-8. 19 ii. State Court Determination 20 The Nevada Court of Appeals held: 21 Hampton first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his oral motion to represent himself. Hampton belatedly made his request after both 22 parties had announced ready for trial. He maintains that the district court did not give him an opportunity to demonstrate that reasonable cause existed for his 23 untimely motion.

24 We review the district court's order denying Hampton the right to represent himself for an abuse of discretion. Guerrina v. State, 134 Nev. 338, 341, 419 P.3d 705, 709 25 (2018). The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the 26 right to self-representation. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975). Yet, the right to self-representation is not absolute because it compels abandonment 27 of another constitutional right-the right to counsel. See id. at 835. A district court must determine if a defendant is competent to waive his or her right to counsel and 28 that he or she has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of this right. Godinez v. 1 request for self-representation if it is untimely, equivocal, or made for the purpose of delay. O'Neill v. State, 123 Nev. 9, 17, 153 P.3d 38, 44 (2007). 2 The Nevada Supreme Court created a two-part test to determine whether a request 3 for self-representation is untimely. Lyons v. State, 106 Nev. 438, 445-46, 796 P.2d 210, 214 (1990), abrogated in part on other grounds by Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 4 330, 341, 22 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2001). Under Lyons, if the request for self- representation can be granted "without need for a continuance, the request should 5 be deemed timely." Id. at 446, 796 P.2d at 214. However, if granting the request would require a continuance, the district court may deny the request as untimely if 6 there is no "reasonable cause to justify [the] late request." Id.

7 The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hampton's motion to represent himself. Hampton made his request after multiple calendar call dates 8 during which both parties had repeatedly announced ready for trial, and finally made his request only days before trial was scheduled to commence. He expressly 9 told the district court that he would need more time to prepare if he were to represent himself. Hampton's motion thus fails the first prong of Lyons. As for the second 10 prong, Hampton could have justified the late request for a continuance had he demonstrated reasonable cause, yet there is no evidence in the record of such 11 justification. While Hampton did participate in a sealed hearing with counsel that related to his request for self-representation, Hampton failed to provide a transcript 12 of that hearing on appeal. When parts of the record are missing, we presume that the missing portions favor the district court's conclusion. See Greene v. State, 96 13 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980). There is also evidence in the record that Hampton had on-going issues with a parade of rotating trial counsels, and his issues 14 were not new. Thus, Hampton has failed to demonstrate that there was reasonable cause to justify his late request, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in 15 denying the motion to represent himself. 16 ECF No. 17-4 at 3-5. 17 iii. Applicable Legal Standard 18 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to assistance of defense counsel in all 19 criminal prosecutions. U.S. Cost. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment also encompasses the right 20 to self-representation at trial and to refuse the assistance of counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. 21 Because the right to counsel is guaranteed, a defendant's exercise of the right to self- 22 representation necessarily requires a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Sandoval. v. Calderon, 23 241 F.3d 765, 774 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “the right to self-representation does not attach 24 until asserted,” unlike the right to counsel which “attaches unless affirmatively waived”). A 25 waiver of the right to counsel must be unequivocal because that right is “automatic,” and the 26 assistance of counsel must be available whether the defendant has requested such assistance or 27 not. Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 28 387, 404 (1977)). 1 The Ninth Circuit has referred to the right to self-representation as “disfavored” when 2 compared to the important benefits expressly offered by the right to counsel. Sandoval, 241 F.3d 3 at 774. A court may properly deny a defendant's request for self-representation “if the Faretta 4 demand is untimely, equivocal, made for the purpose of delay, or is not knowingly and 5 intelligently made.” Id. 6 A defendant's expression of a preference for counsel over representing himself may 7 suggest that a request is equivocal. See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 884 (9th Cir. 2007) 8 (holding that a petitioner's request for self-representation was equivocal where his “requests for 9 self-representation were concessions that he really did not want to represent himself, but that he 10 felt the court and [defense counsel] were forcing him to do so”). Emotional or impulsive 11 requests for self-representation are also considered to be equivocal. See United States v. 12 Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 622 (th Cir. 2000) (explaining that an “emotional outburst in response 13 to [a] judge's ruling” is equivocal); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888–89 (9th Cir. 1990) 14 (holding that a “request for self-representation that is ‘a momentary caprice or the result of 15 thinking out loud,’ ” such as an “impulsive response to the trial court's denial of [a defendant's] 16 request for substitute counsel,” is an equivocal request). In assessing whether a request was 17 unequivocal, courts should consider the “whole record,” Walker v. Loggins, 608 F.2d 731, 734 18 (9th Cir. 1979), and must “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver” of counsel, 19 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). 20 iv. Analysis 21 The Nevada appellate court’s decision rejecting Ground 1 withstands deferential review 22 under AEDPA. The Supreme Court has established that a request to proceed pro se is timely if 23 made “weeks before trial.” See Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 261 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled 24 on other grounds by Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). See Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 25 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that Faretta “may be read to require a court to grant a 26 Faretta request when the request occurs ‘weeks before trial’”); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 27 873, 884 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Faretta does not articulate a specific time frame pursuant to which a 28 claim for self-representation qualifies as timely. It indicates only that a motion for self- 1 representation made ‘weeks before trial’ is timely.”); Burton v. Davis, 816 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th 2 Cir. 2016) (“[H]ad [the petitioner] asked to represent himself weeks before trial and had the trial 3 court denied his request as untimely, we would conclude that the denial was contrary to Faretta 4 and would issue the writ on that basis.”). 5 Hampton’s request to represent himself, made seven days before trial, accompanied by 6 his admission he would not be prepared to proceed to trial, was made following six trial 7 continuances for varying reasons, including Hampton firing and hiring attorneys. He made his 8 request to represent himself during the May 21, 2019, status hearing where his counsel 9 represented to the state district court that she was trial ready, and at that time, trial was scheduled 10 to begin on May 28, 2019. The state district court conducted the Faretta canvas and following 11 the Faretta canvas, trial was rescheduled to June 4, 2019. Notably, on May 30, 2019, at the final 12 calendar call before trial, trial counsel mentioned she no longer had a contentious relationship 13 with Hampton. Further, Hampton did not mention that he wanted to represent himself during the 14 final calendar call. 15 In light of the record and the circumstances surrounding Hampton’s request to represent 16 himself, the Nevada Court of Appeals’ determination that Hampton’s request to represent 17 himself was untimely was not an unreasonable application of Faretta. 18 b. Ground 2(A)(1)) —Ineffective Assistance re: Conflict of Interest 19 In Ground 2(A)(1), Hampton alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 20 because of a conflict of interest. ECF No. 10 at 11. He asserts that his counsel wanted him to 21 plead guilty, but he wanted to proceed to trial, and this conflict adversely affected their ability to 22 communicate with each other. Id. 23 i. State Court Determination 24 The Nevada Court of Appeals held: 25 Hampton claimed that counsel were ineffective because of a conflict of interest. Specifically, he claimed there was a conflict because counsel failed to communicate 26 with him, did not investigate, and told him to lie on the stand. "Conflict of interest and divided loyalty situations can take many forms, and whether an actual conflict 27 exists must be evaluated on the specific facts of each case. In general, a conflict exists when an attorney is placed in a situation conducive to divided loyalties." 28 Clark v. State, 108 Nev. 324, 326, 831 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1992) (quoting Smith v. 1 "counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests"' and the "conflict of interest adversely affected [the defendant's] lawyer's performance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 2 692 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 348 (1980)).

3 Hampton did not demonstrate counsel were placed in a situation that was conducive to divided loyalties. Hampton also did not demonstrate that his counsel actively 4 represented conflicting interests. Hampton's claims were thus insufficient to show that his counsel had an actual conflict of interest. Therefore, we conclude the district 5 court did not err by denying this claim without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. 6 7 ECF No. 18-4 at 7-8. 8 ii. Applicable Legal Standard 9 Effective assistance of counsel “includes a right to conflict-free counsel.” United States v. 10 Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995). In order to establish a violation of the Sixth 11 Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an 12 actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 13 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). However, until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented 14 conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim 15 of ineffective assistance. Id. If counsel actively represents multiple defendants with conflicting 16 interests, such that an actual conflict adversely affects counsel's performance, prejudice is 17 presumed. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349–50. However, the Supreme Court has instructed 18 that Cuyler “does not clearly establish, or indeed even support ... expansive application” of that 19 rule to cases outside the context of multiple concurrent representation. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 20 U.S. 162, 175 (2002). The presumption of prejudice only applies in the context of representation 21 of multiple clients because of the “high probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent 22 representation, and the difficulty of proving that prejudice.” Id. 23 iii. Analysis 24 The Nevada appellate court’s rejection of Hampton’s claim was neither contrary to nor an 25 objectively unreasonable application of clearly established law as determined by the United 26 States Supreme Court. As noted by the Nevada Court of Appeals, Hampton failed to 27 demonstrate that trial counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that this adversely 28 affected his trial counsel’s performance. Even if Hampton could show that trial counsel actively 1 represented conflicting interests, his ineffective assistance claim still could not be successful 2 absent a showing that such conflict adversely affected his counsel’s performance. 3 Even though counsel represented to the state district court that she told Hampton that it 4 was “in his best interest to take the deal,” but because “[h]e wants to go to trial, I will prepare for 5 trial and give him the best possible trial that I can give him.” ECF No. 18-33 at 27. Hampton 6 failed to demonstrate a conflict that adversely affected his counsel’s performance considering he 7 received a trial and ultimately, the jury did not convict him of the deadly weapon enhancement. 8 See Mickens, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (“[O]ur role is not to speculate about counsel’s motives 9 or about the plausibility of other litigation strategies.”). Hampton is denied federal habeas relief 10 for Ground 2(A)(1). 11 c. Ground 2(A)(2)—Ineffective Assistance re: Failure to Meet with Hampton 12 In Ground 2(A)(2), Hampton alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for 13 failing to meet with him until after she announced that the defense was trial ready. ECF No 10 at 14 12. He asserts that his counsel did not make a significant effort to communicate with him. Id. at 15 13. Hampton contends that he did not meet with trial counsel until May 29, 2019, and during 16 such meeting, Hampton informed counsel to interview a witness. Id. at 14. Based on that 17 information, counsel requested a trial continuance to conduct an investigation. Id. 18 i. State Court Determination 19 The Nevada Court of Appeals held: 20 Hampton claimed counsel were ineffective for failing to communicate with him prior to trial. Specifically, he claimed counsel failed to respond to letters, did not 21 answer phone calls, and failed to meet with him. He claimed that counsel's failure to communicate caused counsel not to interview alibi, character, and exculpatory 22 witnesses. For the reasons stated above, Hampton failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial had counsel communicated 23 more with him and investigated his alibi. As to the character and exculpatory witnesses, Hampton failed to allege who these witnesses were or what they would 24 have said, and he therefore failed to support this portion of the claim with specific facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 25 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004) (a petitioner claiming counsel did not conduct an adequate investigation must specify what a more thorough investigation would 26 have uncovered). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. 27

28 ECF No. 18-4 at 5. 1 ii. Analysis 2 The Nevada appellate court’s determination that Hampton failed to demonstrate prejudice 3 was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. At trial, the victim testified that Hampton, 4 along with his co-defendant, robbed him at gun point. ECF No. 16-23 at 24-25. Hampton drove 5 the get-away car, but also got out of the car, and pointed a gun at the victim, looked through the 6 victim’s car, and took items from the car. Id. When an officer attempted to pull Hampton and his 7 co-defendant over, they didn’t stop. Id. at 25. Multiple officers identified Hampton as the driver 8 of the vehicle that fled. ECF No. 16-22 at 60, 79, 121-22. 9 Hampton also testified at trial that he picked up the co-defendant, drove the car based on 10 his co-defendant’s instructions, and stopped the car at a location while his co-defendant got out. 11 Id. at 133-35. Hampton testified that he had no idea what his co-defendant was doing because he 12 was facetiming his seven-year-old daughter while his co-defendant asked Hampton to get out of 13 the car and grab a bag from the trunk of the other car. Id. He admitted that he took the bag from 14 the victim’s car and put it in his car. Id. In light of the totality of the evidence, it is not 15 reasonably probable that a different result would have occurred. Accordingly, Hampton is not 16 entitled to habeas relief for Ground 2(A)(2). 17 d. Ground 2(A)(3) and 2(A)(4) —Ineffective Assistance re: Failure to Prepare a 18 Defense and Failure to Interview Witness 19 In Ground 2(A)(3), Hampton alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for 20 failure to prepare a defense. He asserts that his testimony was the only defense. ECF No. 41 at 21 10. Trial counsel testified during the evidentiary hearing that Hampton “doesn’t like our 22 assessment and it’s going to be the same assessment when I met with him. I’m going to tell him 23 there’s a confession. There’s property in your car. There’s an identification. I’m going to tell him 24 the same things, and he’s not going to like it.” ECF No. 18-33 at 37. 25 In Ground 2(A)(4), Hampton alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for 26 failure to interview a witness. ECF No. 10 at 14. He asserts that Hampton asked his counsel to 27 interview a character witness who would testify that Hampton owned a surveillance company, and 28 that Hampton installed cameras in a grocery store. ECF No. 41 at 11. The witness would have 1 testified that Hampton was left alone in the office, while money was on the desk, and that the 2 money remained there. Id. 3 i. State Court Determination 4 The Nevada Court of Appeals held: 5 Hampton claimed counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and prepare a defense. Specifically, he claimed counsel should have investigated his alibi defense 6 that he had a job installing cameras, had access to the job site office and money, and therefore did not have a motive to commit the robbery. [FN1] The alleged 7 evidence would not constitute alibi evidence. That Hampton had the opportunity to commit a different crime did not negate his intention, motive, or ability to commit 8 these crimes. Further, Hampton admitted to being present during the robbery. Therefore, Hampton failed to demonstrate counsel was deficient or a reasonable 9 probability of a different outcome at trial had this evidence been presented. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim without 10 first conducting an evidentiary hearing.

11 [FN1] Hampton attempts to add facts to this claim in his reply brief that were not presented below. Further, Hampton claims in his opening brief that 12 counsel were ineffective for failing to interview and call his codefendant at trial. Hampton did not present these facts and claim below; therefore, we 13 decline to consider them for the first time on appeal. See McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 416 (1999) 14

15 ECF No. 18-4 at 4-5. 16 ii. Analysis 17 The Nevada appellate court’s decision is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application 18 of federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court and is not based on 19 unreasonable determinations of fact in the state court record. 20 The Nevada Court of Appeals’ conclusion that counsel did not render deficient 21 performance was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland. As stated by 22 the Nevada appellate court, Hampton admitted to being present during the robbery even if his 23 version of events was that he had no idea that his co-defendant was robbing the victim. Counsel 24 made the strategic decision to present Hampton’s defense, including the decision not to present 25 Hampton’s proffered character witness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“Strategic choices made 26 after thorough investigation of the law and facts are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic 27 choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 28 reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.”) Even if trial 1 counsel presented additional evidence, such as the proffered character witness testimony, 2 Hampton fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. 3 Accordingly, Hampton is not entitled to habeas relief for Ground 2(A)(3) and 2(A)(4). 4 e. Ground 2(B)(1) —Ineffective Assistance re: Irreconcilable Conflict 5 In Ground 2(B)(1), Hampton alleges trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance based 6 on irreconcilable conflict. ECF No. 10 at 16-17. He asserts that the state district court effectively 7 forced him to proceed to trial even though he had an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney. 8 ECF No. 41 at 12. Respondents argue that Ground 2(B)(1) should be dismissed as unexhausted. 9 ECF No. 40 at 11-12. Although the Nevada appellate court did not specifically provide rationale 10 in denying this claim, Hampton asserted this claim in his opening brief on appeal. 11 i. Standard of Review 12 When a state court rejects a claim on the merits without articulating a specific rationale, 13 AEDPA’s deferential standard of review continues to apply. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 14 92 & 97-100 (2011) (when state court summarily denies a claim without discussion, federal 15 habeas court presumes that the claim was adjudicated on its merits); Johnson v. Williams, 568 16 U.S. 289 (2013) (Harrington presumption applies when the state court’s decision denying relief 17 discusses some claims, but is silent with respect to other claims). In that situation, the federal 18 court must consider the arguments or theories that could have supported the state court’s 19 decision; “and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 20 arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the United States 21 Supreme Court].” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 22 ii. Applicable Legal Standard 23 The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a “meaningful relationship” between a client 24 and his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). The Ninth Circuit has held that 25 forcing a defendant to go to trial with an attorney with whom he has an irreconcilable conflict 26 amounts to constructive denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Brown v. Craven, 424 27 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970). An irreconcilable conflict in violation of the Sixth Amendment 28 occurs only where there is a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and 1 client, and the breakdown prevents effective assistance of counsel. Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 2 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). Disagreements over strategic or tactical decisions do not rise to level 3 of a complete breakdown in communication. Id. 4 To determine whether a conflict rises to the level of “irreconcilable,” a court looks to 5 three factors: 1) the extent of the conflict; 2) the adequacy of the inquiry by the trial court; and 3) 6 the timeliness of the motion for substitution of counsel. United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 7 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1998). A trial court's inquiry regarding counsel's performance on a motion to 8 substitute counsel should be “such necessary inquiry as might ease the defendant's 9 dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern.” United States v. Garcia, 924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir.1991) 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It also should provide a “sufficient basis for 11 reaching an informed decision[ ]” regarding whether to appoint new counsel. United States v. 12 McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1986). 13 The Supreme Court, however, has never held that an irreconcilable conflict with one’s 14 attorney constitutes a per se denial of the right to effective counsel. Although the Court may 15 look to our circuit's precedent to see if we have already held a rule is clearly established, our 16 decisions may not “be used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 17 jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the] Court has not announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 18 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam); see Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 49 (2012) (holding 19 the Sixth Circuit erred in applying its circuit's “multistep test” that bore scant resemblance to the 20 general rules announced by the Supreme Court). Here, Hampton does not cite to any Supreme 21 Court case holding that an irreconcilable conflict between a lawyer and his client constitutes a 22 constructive denial of his right to counsel, with no showing of prejudice required. 23 iii. Analysis 24 The Nevada appellate court could have found that the state court record does not support 25 a finding of a complete breakdown in Hampton’s relationship with trial counsel and, that in light 26 of the evidence presented at trial, Hampton failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. 27 Although there appears to have been communication issues between Hampton and his trial 28 counsel, their relationship appeared less contentious by the time trial started. ECF No. 18-34. 1 Hampton’s disagreements with counsel over strategy do not constitute an “irreconcilable 2 conflict.” Stenson, 504 F.3d at 886. In addition, the state district court conducted meaningful 3 inquiries into Hampton’s timely motions. ECF Nos. 16-18, 18-33. 4 Further, based on the evidence presented at trial, Hampton fails to demonstrate prejudice. 5 Given that the Nevada appellate court could reasonably so find, a conclusion that Hampton has 6 not demonstrated an ineffective assistance of counsel violation clearly would neither be contrary 7 to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland. Accordingly, the Nevada Court of Appeals’ 8 decision rejecting Ground 2(B)(1) was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 9 established federal law. Accordingly, Hampton is not entitled to habeas relief for Ground 10 2(B)(1). f. Ground 2(B)(3) —Trial Court Error Denying Hampton’s Motion to Substitute 11 Counsel 12 In Ground 2(B)(3), Hampton alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 13 substitute counsel. ECF No. 10 at 16. Respondents renew their argument that Ground 2(B)(3) 14 should be dismissed as unexhausted because Hampton made no argument regarding a motion to 15 substitute counsel in his opening brief other than the statement that “[t]he trial court was well 16 aware of these conflict issues and failed to appoint separate counsel for trial.” ECF No. 17-42 at 17 32. In addition, other than a motion to substitute appellate counsel, Hampton did not file any 18 motions to substitute trial counsel, and his claim relates to substitution of trial counsel. ECF No. 19 10 at 23. 20 The Court finds that Ground 2(B)(3) is unexhausted and is dismissed as such. Ground 21 2(B)(3) was not fairly presented to the state appellate court. Because Respondents filed a motion 22 to dismiss Ground 2(B)(3) as unexhausted, Hampton had an opportunity to and did respond to 23 the exhaustion issue at such time. The Court now modifies its order denying, in part, 24 Respondents’ motion to dismiss regarding the exhaustion issue for Ground 2(B)(3) as stated 25 herein. See City of Los Angeles, Habor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th 26 Cir. 2001) (“As long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then it possesses the 27 inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen 28 by it to be sufficient.”). 1 g. Ground 2(C)—Ineffective Assistance re: Appellate Counsel’s Failure to 2 Provide Transcripts 3 In Ground 2(c), Hampton alleges that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance 4 for failure to provide sealed transcripts on appeal. ECF No. 10 at 24. On appeal, Hampton 5 alleged that the state district court erred by denying him his right to represent himself. His 6 appellate counsel, however, failed to attach a transcript of a hearing demonstrating the conflict 7 between Hampton and his trial counsel. ECF No. 41 at 13. Hampton contends that had appellate 8 counsel included the transcripts, the outcome on direct appeal would have been different. Id. at 9 14. 10 i. State Court Determination 11 The Nevada Court of Appeals held: 12 Hampton argues the district court erred by denying his claim that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to provide an adequate record on appeal. … 13 Hampton claimed that counsel failed to provide a transcript that would have 14 supported his appellate claim that the district court erred by denying him his right to represent himself pursuant to Faretta. Specifically, he claimed the transcript 15 would have supported his claim that reasonable cause existed for his untimely request to represent himself. Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to 16 represent themselves so long as the waiver of the right to counsel is intelligent and voluntary. See O'Neill v. State, 123 Nev. 9, 17, 153 P .3d 38, 43 (2007). "Upon 17 invocation of the right to self-representation, the district court should conduct a Faretta canvass to ensure the waiver of the right to counsel is made knowingly, 18 voluntarily, and intelligently." Sims v. State, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 55, 541 P.3d 130, 133 (2023). "A district court may ... deny a defendant's request for self- 19 representation where the request is untimely, the request is equivocal, the request is made solely for the purpose of delay, the defendant abuses his right by disrupting 20 the judicial process, or the defendant is incompetent to waive his right to counsel." O'Neill, 123 Nev. at 17, 153 P.3d at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 21 Nevada Supreme Court created a test to determine whether a request for self- representation is untimely. See Lyons v. State, 106 Nev. 438, 445-46, 796 P.2d 210, 22 214 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 341, 22 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2001). The district court may "deny a request for self- 23 representation on the ground of untimeliness alone, if the request is not made within a reasonable time before commencement of trial or hearing and there is no showing 24 of reasonable cause for the lateness of the request." Id.

25 The district court held an evidentiary hearing where only one of Hampton's counsel testified. When asked why they did not include the sealed transcript, counsel 26 testified, "I don't have an explanation," and then speculated that "we did not think it was necessary." It was counsel's responsibility to provide "any ... portions of the 27 record essential to determination of issues raised in [the appeal]." NRAP 30(b)(3). Counsel's failure to provide this court on direct appeal with a copy of the transcript 28 from a sealed hearing resulted in this court having to presume that the missing 1 there was no reasonable cause to excuse the untimely request. Hampton v. State, No. 79683-COA, 2020 WL 6955398, *2 (Nev. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2020) (Order of 2 Affirmance). The transcript that was not provided would have aided this court in determining the Faretta issue raised on appeal. Therefore, we conclude that 3 counsels' performance was objectively unreasonable.

4 However, we conclude that Hampton failed to demonstrate his claim had a reasonable probability of success on appeal had counsel provided the transcript to 5 this court. Hampton claimed that he had reasonable cause for the lateness of his request to represent himself because of irreconcilable differences with his counsel. 6 After reviewing the transcripts and holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Hampton failed to demonstrate that he had reasonable cause to justify 7 the late request to represent himself because the differences appeared to be resolved after the sealed hearing. This finding is supported by the record. The record shows 8 that at the end of the sealed hearing, counsel and Hampton agreed to meet and discuss his case and the district court set a status check to see whether Hampton 9 and counsel were able to work out their differences. At the hearing a week later, counsel stated they had met with Hampton and ultimately did further investigation. 10 Hampton did not renew his request to represent himself or otherwise indicate the differences were not resolved. Accordingly, we conclude that Hampton failed to 11 demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, and the district court did not err by denying this claim. 12 13 ECF No. 19-23 at 2-5. 14 ii. Analysis 15 The Nevada Court of Appeals’ determination that Hampton failed to demonstrate 16 prejudice was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. As stated by the Nevada Court of 17 Appeals, following the postconviction evidentiary hearing wherein the state district court 18 reviewed the transcripts, the state district court found that Hampton’s request to represent 19 himself was untimely and his differences with counsel, nonetheless, appeared to have been 20 resolved after the hearing. The Nevada appellate court reasonably determined that Hampton fails 21 to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome on appeal had appellate counsel 22 attached the transcripts in support of his appellate claim. Hampton is denied habeas relief for 23 Ground 2(C). 24 h. Ground 3—Violation of Right to Fair Trial and Impartial Judge 25 In Ground 3, Hampton alleges that the state district court judge was biased towards him. 26 ECF No. 41 at 15. He asserts that the trial judge during his trial, put on lip balm, looked to her 27 right, rested her face in her hand, yawned, and coughed during his testimony. ECF No. 10 at 27- 28 30. During other witness’s testimony, however, the trial judge remained “neutral, disinterested, 1 and dignified.” Id. at 28. During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Hampton’s trial counsel 2 testified that she observed the state district court judge “move around a little bit more in her 3 chair,” when Hampton took the stand to testify, and that “at one point she did put on lip balm and 4 looked over to her right.” ECF No. 18-34 at 100. Hampton argues that the trial judge failed to 5 maintain decorum and acted inappropriately during his testimony. 6 i. State Court Determination 7 The Nevada Court of Appeals held: 8 Finally, Hampton claims the district court judge should have recused herself from his case because of bias. Hampton claims the district court judge was biased 9 because she stated that the sentence was appropriate in this case and that she would have imposed an even more severe sentence if possible. "[R]emarks of a judge 10 made in the context of a court proceeding are not considered indicative of improper bias or prejudice unless they show that the judge has closed his or her mind to the 11 presentation of all of the evidence." Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998). This statement was made in explanation of the district 12 court's conclusion that Hampton failed to demonstrate prejudice from the sentencing court's consideration of his use of a deadly weapon during the robbery. 13 Further, Hampton failed to demonstrate this remark showed the district court judge had closed her mind to all of the evidence. Therefore, we conclude Hampton failed 14 to demonstrate that the district court was biased and that he is entitled to relief on this claim. 15 16 ECF No. 18-4 at 11-12. 17 ii. Applicable Legal Standard 18 “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 19 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Fairness “requires an absence of actual bias,” but it is “endeavored to 20 prevent even the probability of unfairness.” Id. This “most basic tenet of our judicial system 21 helps to ensure both the litigants’ and the public's confidence that each case has been adjudicated 22 by a neural and detached arbiter.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 788 (9th Cir. 2014). “[W]hen a 23 defendant's right to have his case tried by an impartial judge is compromised, there is structural 24 error that requires automatic reversal.” Greenway, v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011). 25 “[T]he floor established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a ... judge with no 26 actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” Bracy v. 27 Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997). Actual bias is shown if the judge “has a direct, personal, 28 substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.” Tumey v. Ohio, 1 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). But a due process violation occurs whenever “the probability of 2 actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” 3 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). To this end, the Supreme “Court has asked whether, 4 ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses 5 such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment.’” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 6 883-84 (2009) (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47); see also Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 7 8 (2016) (explaining that the Court ask “whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average judge in 8 his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias’ ” 9 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881)). Indeed, “[e]very procedure which would offer a possible 10 temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the 11 defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state 12 and the accused denies the latter due process of law.” Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. 13 iii. Analysis 14 The Nevada Court of Appeals reasonably determined that Hampton was not entitled to 15 relief. Here, Hampton does not argue that there was an extrajudicial source of actual prejudice. 16 The trial judge’s alleged actions do not rise to the level of demonstrating risk of actual bias or 17 prejudgment. The trial judge’s alleged actions do not indicate the sort of bias that could arguably 18 amount to a constitutional violation. See Martinez v. Ryan, 926 F.3d 1215, 1226 (9th Cir. 2019) 19 (“The Supreme Court, for its part, has recognized an appearance of impropriety in only a few 20 cases in which the judge had a direct pecuniary interest in the case, was involved in a 21 controversy with a litigant, or was part of the accusatory process.”). The Nevada Court of 22 Appeals’ ruling was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 23 law. Hampton is denied habeas relief for Ground 3. 24 IV. Certificate of Appealability 25 This is a final order adverse to Hampton. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 26 Cases requires the Court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Therefore, the 27 Court has sua sponte evaluated the claims within the petition for suitability for the issuance of a 28 COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Turner, 281 F.3d at 864-65. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), 1 a COA may issue only when the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 2 constitutional right.” With respect to claims rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must 3 demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 4 claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For procedural 5 rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate (1) whether the petition states a 6 valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and (2) whether this Court’s procedural ruling 7 was correct. Id. Applying these standards, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability is 8 unwarranted. 9 V. Hampton’s Motions 10 In his Motion to Compel, Hampton highlighted to the Court that he filed a response to 11 Respondents’ Motion to Extend because the Court did not cite to his response in its order 12 granting Respondents’ Motion. ECF Nos. 30, 33, 35. Hampton’s Motion to Compel is denied as 13 moot. 14 Hampton requests bail pending the Court’s decision. ECF No. 38. Federal Rule of 15 Appellate Procedure 23 “does not appear to contemplate a release on bail pending an initial 16 decision in district court.” In re Roe, 257 F.3d 107, 1080 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). As such, there are 17 no federal rules of statutes addressing this Court’s authority to grant or release pending a 18 decision on the merits of a federal habeas petition. Further, the Ninth Circuit has specifically not 19 resolved the issue of “whether a district court has the authority to grant bail pending a decision 20 on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition.” Id. at 1079-80. As the Court nonetheless denies 21 his habeas petition herein, Hampton’s Motion for Release on Bail is denied. 22 VI. Respondents’ Motion to Extend 23 Respondents’ Motion to Extend time to file their Answer is granted nunc pro tunc. ECF 24 No. 36. 25 VII. Conclusion 26 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Jermaine Hampton’s Petition for Writ of 27 Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 10) is denied. 28 /// ] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 35) and 2 || Motion for Bail Pending a Decision (ECF No. 38) are denied. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents’ Motion to Extend Time (ECF No. 36) 4 || is granted nunc pro tunc. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is denied. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court kindly directs the Clerk of Court to substitute 7 || Nethanjah Breitenbach for Respondent Jeremy Bean, enter judgment, and close this case. 8 DATED: □ January 20, 2026 jf, 10 GLOR A M. NAVARRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28