THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
November 18, 2025
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A1600. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
PADGETT, Judge.
Following a jury trial, Jerico Williams was found guilty of armed robbery, two
counts of aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and two counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime. Williams appeals from the trial court’s
denial of his motion for new trial, as amended. In a single enumeration of error,
Williams claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with direction to the trial
court to enter an order consistent with this opinion. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,1 the evidence revealed
that Williams, accompanied by two other men and a female driver, committed an
armed robbery of a retail store on June 4, 2023. Williams entered the store, armed with
a handgun, and was wearing a black hoodie with red writing. One of his accomplices
wore a black hoodie and approached the cashier during the armed robbery. The third
man wore a red hoodie and stood in the doorway, acting as a lookout. The female
remained in the car, a rented black Ford Bronco, that had a paper drive-out license
plate. The events inside of the store were captured on video.
As Williams brandished the firearm, the second accomplice grabbed the cashier
when she tried to flee the situation and took money from the cash register. The three
men then fled the store, got into the waiting Bronco and fled the scene. Witnesses
advised law enforcement officers as to the Bronco’s direction of travel and officers put
out a BOLO for the Bronco, describing it as having a paper drive-out license plate.
Officers also took screenshots from the surveillance video from within the store and
were able to share the screenshots with other officers once the Bronco was located.
1 See, e.g., Cawthon v. State, 350 Ga. App. 741, 741 n.1 (830 SE2d 270) (2019) (citation omitted). 2 Officers from an adjoining jurisdiction spotted the Bronco stopped at a traffic
signal and coming from the direction of the armed robbery. Without warning to the
other occupants in the car, the accomplice in the red hoodie saw the law enforcement
vehicle and got out of the Bronco while it was stopped at the traffic signal but the
officer did not see the man exit the car. Once the officer was able to turn around and
follow the Bronco, the officer eventually activated his emergency equipment but the
Bronco did not immediately stop. The Bronco took a series of turns, ending up in a
cul-de-sac within a residential neighborhood. After the Bronco stopped, one of the
occupants fled on foot, leaving Williams and his female accomplice in the Bronco. The
officer was able to detain Williams and the female at the location where the vehicle
stopped. A perimeter search resulted in the arrest of the accomplice in the red hoodie
who had previously exited the vehicle at the traffic signal. The accomplice that fled
from the Bronco at the time of the stop was not located. During the process of being
arrested, Williams made a spontaneous statement to the arresting officer indicating
that the female did not have anything to do with “whatever you are charging me
with.”
3 In the vehicle, officers located a black hoodie with red writing in the front
passenger floorboard. Located on top of the hoodie was a loaded handgun. After
initially securing the firearm, officers had the car towed and obtained a search warrant
for the vehicle. In addition to the black hoodie with red writing and the handgun,
officers found a black hoodie, face masks, debit cards belonging to Williams and the
female driver, and other miscellaneous personal property. Officers also took
possession of a cell phone determined to be the property of the female driver and
obtained a separate search warrant for its contents.
Officers learned that the Bronco had been rented in the name of Williams’
father and was due to be returned on the date of the armed robbery. The owner of the
Bronco equipped the vehicle with a GPS tracking device prior to renting the vehicle
to Williams’ father. Review of the information captured by the GPS tracker showed
the Bronco was present at the retail store at the time of the armed robbery. The
accomplice who was wearing the red hoodie and the female driver both testified
during Williams’ trial and established that Williams had sole possession of the gun
used during the armed robbery, that the armed robbery had been planned, and that
Williams told the female to park the Bronco in a manner that would not reveal their
4 license plate to potential surveillance cameras. Additionally, text message exchanges
between Williams and the female revealed that they had planned to conduct a robbery
that evening to obtain the money necessary to pay for the rental vehicle.
Prior to trial, Williams passed a handwritten note to the male accomplice who
eventually testified at trial. The note encouraged the accomplice to provide officers
with a version of events that was untrue. The note was introduced at trial. A jury
found Williams guilty of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, false
imprisonment, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
crime. The trial court imposed a sentence on the counts charging Williams with armed
robbery, false imprisonment and two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime, finding that the remaining counts merged with the armed
robbery. This appeal follows the trial court’s denial of Williams’ motion for new trial,
as amended.
1. In his sole enumeration of error, Williams claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective. Specifically, Williams claims that trial counsel did not adequately
investigate the case and did not interview potential witnesses.
5 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams must show both that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. Roberts v. State, 322 Ga. App. 659, 663 (3) (745 SE2d 850) (2013) (citation
omitted). “[T]his burden — though not impossible to carry — is a heavy one.”
Mulkey v. State, 366 Ga. App. 427, 437 (4) (883 SE2d 173) (2023) (citation and
punctuation omitted). There is a strong presumption that the performance of trial
counsel falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and the
reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is viewed from the perspective known at the time
of trial and under the unique circumstances of Williams’ case. Roberts, 322 Ga. App.
at 663 (3) (citation omitted). If Williams fails to prove either of the prongs of this
familiar test, we are not required to evaluate the remaining prong. Smith v. State, 373
Ga. App. 33, 45 (3) (907 SE2d 327) (2024) (citation omitted). In reviewing a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we give deference to the trial court’s factual
findings and uphold those findings on appeal unless the factual findings prove to be
clearly erroneous. Id. at 46 (3). However, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions
de novo. Id.
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THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
November 18, 2025
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A1600. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
PADGETT, Judge.
Following a jury trial, Jerico Williams was found guilty of armed robbery, two
counts of aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and two counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime. Williams appeals from the trial court’s
denial of his motion for new trial, as amended. In a single enumeration of error,
Williams claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with direction to the trial
court to enter an order consistent with this opinion. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,1 the evidence revealed
that Williams, accompanied by two other men and a female driver, committed an
armed robbery of a retail store on June 4, 2023. Williams entered the store, armed with
a handgun, and was wearing a black hoodie with red writing. One of his accomplices
wore a black hoodie and approached the cashier during the armed robbery. The third
man wore a red hoodie and stood in the doorway, acting as a lookout. The female
remained in the car, a rented black Ford Bronco, that had a paper drive-out license
plate. The events inside of the store were captured on video.
As Williams brandished the firearm, the second accomplice grabbed the cashier
when she tried to flee the situation and took money from the cash register. The three
men then fled the store, got into the waiting Bronco and fled the scene. Witnesses
advised law enforcement officers as to the Bronco’s direction of travel and officers put
out a BOLO for the Bronco, describing it as having a paper drive-out license plate.
Officers also took screenshots from the surveillance video from within the store and
were able to share the screenshots with other officers once the Bronco was located.
1 See, e.g., Cawthon v. State, 350 Ga. App. 741, 741 n.1 (830 SE2d 270) (2019) (citation omitted). 2 Officers from an adjoining jurisdiction spotted the Bronco stopped at a traffic
signal and coming from the direction of the armed robbery. Without warning to the
other occupants in the car, the accomplice in the red hoodie saw the law enforcement
vehicle and got out of the Bronco while it was stopped at the traffic signal but the
officer did not see the man exit the car. Once the officer was able to turn around and
follow the Bronco, the officer eventually activated his emergency equipment but the
Bronco did not immediately stop. The Bronco took a series of turns, ending up in a
cul-de-sac within a residential neighborhood. After the Bronco stopped, one of the
occupants fled on foot, leaving Williams and his female accomplice in the Bronco. The
officer was able to detain Williams and the female at the location where the vehicle
stopped. A perimeter search resulted in the arrest of the accomplice in the red hoodie
who had previously exited the vehicle at the traffic signal. The accomplice that fled
from the Bronco at the time of the stop was not located. During the process of being
arrested, Williams made a spontaneous statement to the arresting officer indicating
that the female did not have anything to do with “whatever you are charging me
with.”
3 In the vehicle, officers located a black hoodie with red writing in the front
passenger floorboard. Located on top of the hoodie was a loaded handgun. After
initially securing the firearm, officers had the car towed and obtained a search warrant
for the vehicle. In addition to the black hoodie with red writing and the handgun,
officers found a black hoodie, face masks, debit cards belonging to Williams and the
female driver, and other miscellaneous personal property. Officers also took
possession of a cell phone determined to be the property of the female driver and
obtained a separate search warrant for its contents.
Officers learned that the Bronco had been rented in the name of Williams’
father and was due to be returned on the date of the armed robbery. The owner of the
Bronco equipped the vehicle with a GPS tracking device prior to renting the vehicle
to Williams’ father. Review of the information captured by the GPS tracker showed
the Bronco was present at the retail store at the time of the armed robbery. The
accomplice who was wearing the red hoodie and the female driver both testified
during Williams’ trial and established that Williams had sole possession of the gun
used during the armed robbery, that the armed robbery had been planned, and that
Williams told the female to park the Bronco in a manner that would not reveal their
4 license plate to potential surveillance cameras. Additionally, text message exchanges
between Williams and the female revealed that they had planned to conduct a robbery
that evening to obtain the money necessary to pay for the rental vehicle.
Prior to trial, Williams passed a handwritten note to the male accomplice who
eventually testified at trial. The note encouraged the accomplice to provide officers
with a version of events that was untrue. The note was introduced at trial. A jury
found Williams guilty of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, false
imprisonment, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
crime. The trial court imposed a sentence on the counts charging Williams with armed
robbery, false imprisonment and two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime, finding that the remaining counts merged with the armed
robbery. This appeal follows the trial court’s denial of Williams’ motion for new trial,
as amended.
1. In his sole enumeration of error, Williams claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective. Specifically, Williams claims that trial counsel did not adequately
investigate the case and did not interview potential witnesses.
5 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams must show both that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. Roberts v. State, 322 Ga. App. 659, 663 (3) (745 SE2d 850) (2013) (citation
omitted). “[T]his burden — though not impossible to carry — is a heavy one.”
Mulkey v. State, 366 Ga. App. 427, 437 (4) (883 SE2d 173) (2023) (citation and
punctuation omitted). There is a strong presumption that the performance of trial
counsel falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and the
reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is viewed from the perspective known at the time
of trial and under the unique circumstances of Williams’ case. Roberts, 322 Ga. App.
at 663 (3) (citation omitted). If Williams fails to prove either of the prongs of this
familiar test, we are not required to evaluate the remaining prong. Smith v. State, 373
Ga. App. 33, 45 (3) (907 SE2d 327) (2024) (citation omitted). In reviewing a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we give deference to the trial court’s factual
findings and uphold those findings on appeal unless the factual findings prove to be
clearly erroneous. Id. at 46 (3). However, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions
de novo. Id.
6 Trial counsel testified as Williams’ sole witness during the hearing on the
amended motion for new trial. Trial counsel is an experienced lawyer, having
represented clients charged with criminal offenses for over 30 years and having tried
over 100 criminal jury trials to verdict. When counsel initially met with Williams,
Williams alleged that he and the female driver of the Bronco were working as ride
share drivers and that they met the men who actually committed the armed robbery
while performing that service. Trial counsel attempted to interview the female driver
and the other male accomplice who both ultimately testified for the State. Both of
those individuals refused to speak with Williams’ trial counsel. There was no evidence
presented to suggest that there were any other potential witnesses identified by
Williams who would have any relevant knowledge about Williams’ claims. Williams
did not testify at the hearing on the amended motion for new trial.
Georgia law is clear that when trial counsel attempts to interview potential
witnesses and those witnesses refuse the request, trial counsel is not deficient merely
because the witnesses refuse to be interviewed. White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 390-391
(6) (a) (903 SE2d 891) (2024); Atkinson v. State, 301 Ga. 518, 527 (6) (i) (801 SE2d
7 833) (2017). Because Williams failed to establish deficient conduct, we need not reach
the issue of prejudice. Smith, 373 Ga. App. at 47 (3) (citation omitted).2
We conclude, as did the trial court, that Williams has failed to establish that trial
counsel was deficient, and thus he cannot sustain his claim that trial counsel was
ineffective.
2. Although not raised by Williams, upon review of the record, the trial court’s
sentencing on the two counts of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony
warrants our consideration. It is within this Court’s discretion to review a merger
error where the trial court has convicted and sentenced a defendant for a crime that
should have been merged, which error thereby results in an illegal and void judgment
of conviction and sentence as to that count which should have merged. See, e.g.,
Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017); Ray v. State, 359 Ga. App.
637, 641 n.19 (3) (859 SE2d 793) (2021). The unit of prosecution analysis applies
because Williams was found guilty of two counts of the same crime.
2 While we need not address the issue of prejudice, we note that the State’s case was extremely strong, greatly diminishing any probability that additional investigation by trial counsel would have yielded a different outcome of the trial. See Miller v. State, 293 Ga. 638, 640 (2) (748 SE2d 893) (2013). 8 Here, the trial court sentenced Williams to five years, to be served
consecutively, on each of the two counts of possession of a firearm during commission
of a felony, with the predicate felonies being armed robbery and aggravated assault
committed against the cashier of the retail establishment. However, because the
predicate offenses arose from the same conduct against the same victim with the same
firearm, the convictions and sentences on the two counts of possession of a firearm
during commission of a felony should have merged into a single count.3 See OCGA
§ 16-1-7 (a) (1) (“When the same conduct of an accused may establish the commission
of more than one crime, the accused may be prosecuted for each crime. He may not,
however, be convicted of more than one crime if . . . [o]ne crime is included in the
other[.]”); Brooks v. State, 369 Ga. App. 450, 460 (4) (b) (892 SE2d 400) (2023)
(“Our Supreme Court has held that ‘[w]here multiple crimes are committed together
during the course of one continuous crime spree, a defendant may be convicted once
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as to every individual
victim of the crime spree as provided under OCGA § 16-11-106(b)(1) . . . .’”) (citation
omitted). Therefore, we must vacate the convictions entered on the two counts of
3 Indeed, as noted above, the trial court properly merged the underlying two counts of aggravated assault with the armed robbery count at sentencing. 9 possession of a firearm during commission of a felony only and remand the case to the
trial court for resentencing on a single count.
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded with direction.
Doyle, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.