1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMY RYAN, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01516-JES-AHG
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 14 WARDEN OF MCC SAN DIEGO, in his CASE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND or her individual and official capacities; 15 HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
16 ADMINISTRATOR OF MCC SAN [ECF No. 2] DIEGO, in his or her individual and 17 official capacities; and CLINICAL 18 DIRECTOR, responsible medical officials, in their individual and official 19 capacities, 20 Defendants. 21 On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff Jeremy Ryan (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se complaint 22 alleging various causes of action against Defendants. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The same 23 day, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 24 No. 2. After due consideration and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the 25 motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES the case without prejudice. 26 27
28 1 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 Parties instituting a civil action must pay a filing fee of $405 unless they are granted 3 leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A party need not “be absolutely 4 destitute” to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 5 (1948). “Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 6 particularity, definiteness, and certainty.’” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 7 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.3d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). To 8 that end, “[a]n affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that 9 the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. “But, the 10 same even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered 11 to underwrite, at public expense, either frivolous claims or the remonstrances of a suitor 12 who is financially able, in whole or in part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorp, 586 13 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 14 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s renewed IFP motion and finds that Plaintiff is 15 unable to pay fees or post securities required to maintain this action. Plaintiff submitted a 16 renewed application stating that he receives $2,146 per month combined in income and 17 food stamps. ECF No. 9-2 at 1-2. Plaintiff’s monthly expenses total $1,675 per month. The 18 Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 19 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 20 II. Screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 21 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding pro se and IFP. 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if 23 it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 24 if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 25 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 26 A. Standard of Review 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Though plaintiffs need not give 1 “detailed factual allegations,” plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a 2 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 3 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 4 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 5 Adequately pled claims will “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is 6 and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). And courts 7 dismiss complaints that “fail[ ] to provide the individual defendants with proper notice of 8 the claims being asserted against them and ... [do] not afford defendants a fair opportunity 9 to assert ... defenses.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1996). 10 To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires 11 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is 12 liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss 13 v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a 14 defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 15 of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); 16 Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 17 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 18 Plaintiff was held as a pretrial detainee at Metropolitan Correctional Center 19 (“MCC”) San Diego from January 27, 2026, to February 24, 2026. Compl. at 1, 2. Plaintiff 20 alleges that he suffered unconstitutional conditions, including “dangerously cold housing 21 conditions, unsanitary and unhealthy air/ventilation conditions, grossly inadequate 22 bedding, prolonged denial of medical care, and the absence of meaningful psychiatric care 23 and medication access.” Id. at 1. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the cold temperatures were 24 in the 50s, that the vents were not internally cleaned, leaving new inmates sick for months 25 without exception, and that the bedding was undersized and thin. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff 26 alleges that he suffered particular harm from the bedding because he was recovering from 27 a spinal fusion. Id. at 2. He also alleges that there was a months-long delay to see a doctor, 28 that there was no psychiatrist, and that Defendants refused to prescribe psychiatric 1 medication. Id. at 1. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not provide heart 2 medication until two weeks after his incarceration. Id. at 2. 3 C. Legal Analysis 4 Plaintiff has not provided the legal basis for his claims. Because Plaintiff was in 5 federal custody during the relevant period, the Court liberally construes his claims as 6 arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which 7 provides a “federal analog” to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 However, Bivens is much “more limited” 8 in the type of claims that can be raised. Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 109 (2020). Bivens 9 remedies are, at best, strongly disfavored outside the few contexts in which the Supreme 10 Court has previously approved them. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491–92 (2022).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMY RYAN, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01516-JES-AHG
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 14 WARDEN OF MCC SAN DIEGO, in his CASE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND or her individual and official capacities; 15 HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
16 ADMINISTRATOR OF MCC SAN [ECF No. 2] DIEGO, in his or her individual and 17 official capacities; and CLINICAL 18 DIRECTOR, responsible medical officials, in their individual and official 19 capacities, 20 Defendants. 21 On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff Jeremy Ryan (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se complaint 22 alleging various causes of action against Defendants. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The same 23 day, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 24 No. 2. After due consideration and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the 25 motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES the case without prejudice. 26 27
28 1 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 Parties instituting a civil action must pay a filing fee of $405 unless they are granted 3 leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A party need not “be absolutely 4 destitute” to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 5 (1948). “Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 6 particularity, definiteness, and certainty.’” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 7 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.3d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). To 8 that end, “[a]n affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that 9 the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. “But, the 10 same even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered 11 to underwrite, at public expense, either frivolous claims or the remonstrances of a suitor 12 who is financially able, in whole or in part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorp, 586 13 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 14 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s renewed IFP motion and finds that Plaintiff is 15 unable to pay fees or post securities required to maintain this action. Plaintiff submitted a 16 renewed application stating that he receives $2,146 per month combined in income and 17 food stamps. ECF No. 9-2 at 1-2. Plaintiff’s monthly expenses total $1,675 per month. The 18 Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 19 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 20 II. Screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 21 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding pro se and IFP. 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if 23 it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 24 if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 25 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 26 A. Standard of Review 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Though plaintiffs need not give 1 “detailed factual allegations,” plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a 2 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 3 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 4 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 5 Adequately pled claims will “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is 6 and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). And courts 7 dismiss complaints that “fail[ ] to provide the individual defendants with proper notice of 8 the claims being asserted against them and ... [do] not afford defendants a fair opportunity 9 to assert ... defenses.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1996). 10 To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires 11 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is 12 liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss 13 v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a 14 defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 15 of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); 16 Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 17 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 18 Plaintiff was held as a pretrial detainee at Metropolitan Correctional Center 19 (“MCC”) San Diego from January 27, 2026, to February 24, 2026. Compl. at 1, 2. Plaintiff 20 alleges that he suffered unconstitutional conditions, including “dangerously cold housing 21 conditions, unsanitary and unhealthy air/ventilation conditions, grossly inadequate 22 bedding, prolonged denial of medical care, and the absence of meaningful psychiatric care 23 and medication access.” Id. at 1. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the cold temperatures were 24 in the 50s, that the vents were not internally cleaned, leaving new inmates sick for months 25 without exception, and that the bedding was undersized and thin. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff 26 alleges that he suffered particular harm from the bedding because he was recovering from 27 a spinal fusion. Id. at 2. He also alleges that there was a months-long delay to see a doctor, 28 that there was no psychiatrist, and that Defendants refused to prescribe psychiatric 1 medication. Id. at 1. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not provide heart 2 medication until two weeks after his incarceration. Id. at 2. 3 C. Legal Analysis 4 Plaintiff has not provided the legal basis for his claims. Because Plaintiff was in 5 federal custody during the relevant period, the Court liberally construes his claims as 6 arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which 7 provides a “federal analog” to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 However, Bivens is much “more limited” 8 in the type of claims that can be raised. Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 109 (2020). Bivens 9 remedies are, at best, strongly disfavored outside the few contexts in which the Supreme 10 Court has previously approved them. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491–92 (2022). 11 The only contexts in which the Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens remedy are 12 for claims seeking damages against federal officials arising from: (1) a violation of the 13 Fourth Amendment for allegedly unreasonable searches and seizures in connection with 14 unauthorized electronic surveillance (Bivens, 403 U.S. 388); (2) a violation of the Fifth 15 Amendment’s Due Process Clause for gender discrimination in employment (Davis v. 16 Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)); and (3) a violation under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 17 and Unusual Punishment Clause for failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical 18 treatment to a prisoner (Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)). See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 19 490–91. 20 In deciding whether to find an implied cause of action, the Court first must determine 21 if the case is “meaningfully different from the three cases in which the Court has implied 22 a damages action.” Elgbert, 596 U.S. at 492. If a case presents a new context for a Bivens 23 action, then a damages remedy may only be extended (1) if the plaintiff has no “other 24
25 1 Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983. Section 1983 is limited to wrongful acts taken by state––¬not federal––officers, and as such, they “provide[] . . . no help” to plaintiffs who 26 complain of wrongful acts “taken under the color of federal law.” Lonneker Farms, Inc. v. Klobucher, 804 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1986); see Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We 27 find no evidence in either statute that Congress intended to subject federal agencies to § 1983 and § 1985 liability. To the contrary, §§ 1983 and 1985 impose liability upon a “person,” and a federal agency is not 28 1 adequate alternative remedy” and (2) there are no “special factors” that would cause the 2 court to believe that Congress rather than the courts should authorize a suit for money 3 damages. Id. at 492–93. The Ninth Circuit recently observed that following Egbert, “most 4 claims seeking to expand Bivens are ‘dead on arrival.’” Chambers v. Herrera, 78 F.4th 5 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2023) 6 The Court further notes that a Bivens claim cannot stand against the United States, 7 or any of its departments, offices, or agencies. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 8 “[T]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer,” not the agency. Id. at 485; see also Lanuza 9 v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1029–32 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that a claim for damages based on 10 individualized mistreatment by rank-and-file federal officers is what Bivens was meant to 11 address). 12 1. Plaintiff’s Claims Arise Under New Contexts. 13 Here, Plaintiff’s claims arise from the allegedly unsafe, uncomfortable, and 14 unsanitary conditions of his confinement. Recently, in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth 15 Circuit declined to extend Bivens to an Eighth Amendment claim regarding unsanitary cell 16 conditions in prison because it did not fall within claims authorized by the Supreme Court. 17 Schwarz v. Meinberg, 761 Fed. App’x 732, 733–34 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding cell condition 18 claim presented a “new context” for a Bivens action and identifying the Federal Tort Claims 19 Act as an alternative process available to federal prisoners). Here, Plaintiff’s claim is based 20 on the Due Process Clause because he was a pretrial detainee and as such, it also presents 21 a “new context” under Bivens. See Verros v. Fed. Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-1009, 2026 WL 22 732779, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2026) (collecting cases and finding that Fifth Amendment 23 claims brought by a pretrial detainee constituted a new context). 24 Plaintiff’s claims of inadequate medical and mental healthcare also present a new 25 context due to his status as a pretrial detainee. While Bivens provides a remedy for Eighth 26 Amendment claims of failure to treat a serious medical condition, Petitioner’s claims arise 27 under the Fifth Amendment because he was a pretrial detainee. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 28 16; Schwarz, 761 Fed. App’x at 733-34. Therefore, his claims of inadequate medical and 1 mental healthcare also present a new context. 2 2. Special Factors Caution Against Bivens Availability. 3 Because this case presents new Bivens contexts, the Court must turn to the second 4 part of the inquiry, to determine whether there are special factors indicating the Judiciary 5 is less equipped than Congress to “weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages 6 action to proceed.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 136 7 (2017)). If a proposed claim arises in a new context, courts must conduct a special factors 8 analysis to determine whether to extend a Bivens remedy to that claim. Vega v. United 9 States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2018). However, the Supreme Court makes “clear that 10 a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are ‘special factors counseling hesitation in 11 the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’” Abbasi, 583 U.S. at 136 (quoting Carlson, 12 446 U.S. at 18). One such “hesitation” is “if there is an alternative remedial structure 13 present” which “alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of 14 action.” Id. at 137; see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (holding that 15 courts should refrain from providing new remedies when alternative processes exist). Here, 16 Plaintiff had alternative processes by which to pursue his claims and remedies. For 17 example, he could have sought a remedy under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), or through 19 injunctive remedies. The availability of alternative remedies for Fifth Amendment claims 20 cautions against district courts creating new Bivens remedies. See Stanard v. Dy, 88 F.4th 21 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2023); Bravo v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 684 F. Supp. 3d 112, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 22 2023). 23 For all these reasons, the Court concludes that both Plaintiff’s conditions of 24 confinement claims and inadequate medical treatment claims arise under new contexts and 25 the special factors inquiry cautions against extending Bivens relief. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 26 claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and are dismissed sua sponte 27 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). 28 // 1 C. Leave to Amend 2 District courts “should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless 3 || ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 4 ||amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. 5 || Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988)). Here, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to 6 |}amend his Complaint. If Plaintiff fails to timely amend, the Court will enter a final Order 7 || dismissing the entire action. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If 8 |/a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court 9 ||may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). Plaintiff 10 |/is advised that any amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his 11 complaint; accordingly, any defendant not named and any claims not re-alleged in 12 ||any amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach 13 || Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 14 || amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 15 || (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged 16 |/in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.’’). 17 III. Conclusion 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In 19 Forma Pauperis and sua sponte DISMISSES the complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff 20 file an amended complaint on or before July 2, 2026. If Plaintiff fails to file an 21 |}amended complaint by the deadline, then the Court will dismiss the entire case with 22 || prejudice. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 95 Dated: May 21, 2025 Smet
07 United States District Judge 28