UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JEREMY MCSPARREN, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25-3288 ) JOSHUA MCDONALD et al., ) Defendants. )
ORDER COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge: Before the Court for screening is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Jeremy McSparren, an inmate at Graham Correctional Center. Plaintiff also filed Motions for Counsel (Doc. 5). I. Complaint A. Screening Standard The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing a complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). B. Analysis
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above
a speculative level.” Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Instead, a plausible claim must include ‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In addition to describing the claim, a
plaintiff must also give “some indication . . . of time and place.” Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s pleading identifies nineteen individuals and entities that Plaintiff generally claims either denied him medical treatment for a litany of medical conditions or responded unfavorably to his grievances. Plaintiff also fails to specify dates when these
various violations occurred. The vague or conclusory manner in which Plaintiff presents his allegations do not state plausible claims against the identified Defendants. Although Plaintiff does not need to provide a lengthy account of the circumstances underlying his allegations, he should provide facts that specify the constitutional
violation, when it occurred, and the Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”). Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended pleading. In the interest of efficiency and judicial economy, the Court provides the following guidance.
Plaintiff does not state a § 1983 claim against individuals who merely process or review grievances, absent facts showing their personal involvement. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prison officials who simply processed or reviewed inmate grievances lack personal involvement in the conduct forming the basis of the grievance.”); see also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only persons who
cause or participate in [constitutional] violations are responsible.”). “Section 1983 only permits an individual to sue a ‘person’ who deprives that individual of his or her federally-guaranteed rights under color of state law.” Snyder v. King, 745 F.3d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 2014). Thus, neither the Illinois Department of Corrections nor the Administrative Review Board is considered a person under § 1983. See Fairley v.
Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897, 904 (7th Cir. 2006) (“State agencies are not ‘persons’ under § 1983 . . . .”); see also White v. Knight, 710 F. App’x 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he fact that a building is owned by a corporate entity or a government agency does not make the building a suable person under § 1983.”). Supervisors cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Jones v.
Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Because there is no vicarious liability under Section 1983, [supervisory] defendants [can] be liable only if they personally did something that violated [a plaintiff’s] rights.”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”).
Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Incorporated can be held liable under § 1983 if an unconstitutional act is caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for municipal liability in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), applies to corporations as well).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JEREMY MCSPARREN, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25-3288 ) JOSHUA MCDONALD et al., ) Defendants. )
ORDER COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge: Before the Court for screening is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Jeremy McSparren, an inmate at Graham Correctional Center. Plaintiff also filed Motions for Counsel (Doc. 5). I. Complaint A. Screening Standard The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing a complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). B. Analysis
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above
a speculative level.” Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Instead, a plausible claim must include ‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In addition to describing the claim, a
plaintiff must also give “some indication . . . of time and place.” Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s pleading identifies nineteen individuals and entities that Plaintiff generally claims either denied him medical treatment for a litany of medical conditions or responded unfavorably to his grievances. Plaintiff also fails to specify dates when these
various violations occurred. The vague or conclusory manner in which Plaintiff presents his allegations do not state plausible claims against the identified Defendants. Although Plaintiff does not need to provide a lengthy account of the circumstances underlying his allegations, he should provide facts that specify the constitutional
violation, when it occurred, and the Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”). Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended pleading. In the interest of efficiency and judicial economy, the Court provides the following guidance.
Plaintiff does not state a § 1983 claim against individuals who merely process or review grievances, absent facts showing their personal involvement. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prison officials who simply processed or reviewed inmate grievances lack personal involvement in the conduct forming the basis of the grievance.”); see also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only persons who
cause or participate in [constitutional] violations are responsible.”). “Section 1983 only permits an individual to sue a ‘person’ who deprives that individual of his or her federally-guaranteed rights under color of state law.” Snyder v. King, 745 F.3d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 2014). Thus, neither the Illinois Department of Corrections nor the Administrative Review Board is considered a person under § 1983. See Fairley v.
Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897, 904 (7th Cir. 2006) (“State agencies are not ‘persons’ under § 1983 . . . .”); see also White v. Knight, 710 F. App’x 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he fact that a building is owned by a corporate entity or a government agency does not make the building a suable person under § 1983.”). Supervisors cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Jones v.
Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Because there is no vicarious liability under Section 1983, [supervisory] defendants [can] be liable only if they personally did something that violated [a plaintiff’s] rights.”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”).
Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Incorporated can be held liable under § 1983 if an unconstitutional act is caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for municipal liability in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), applies to corporations as well). “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality
is actually responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphases in original). If Plaintiff believes he can revise his pleading to state a cause of action, he may file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff decides to file an amended
pleading, his amendment must be attached to his motion for leave. The Court does not accept piecemeal amendments. Plaintiff’s amended pleading must stand independently without reference to his initial filing and contain all claims against all defendants. The Court reiterates that Plaintiff’s amendment must specify the constitutional violation, when it occurred, and the Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff
must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”). Any attempt to join unrelated claims and defendants in his amended complaint is not permitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In other words, multiple claims against a single defendant are allowed, but “Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined
with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.” Id. II. Counsel and Status Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask
for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel
or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is denied because he has not satisfied his threshold burden of demonstrating that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is DENIED.
2) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a federal claim.
3) Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days of the entry of this order and in compliance with the Court’s guidance. If Plaintiff does not file an amendment on or before the deadline established or fails to comply with the provided instructions, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s case without prejudice.
ENTERED June 4, 2026.
s/ Colleen R. Lawless _________________________________________ COLLEEN R. LAWLESS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE