Jeremy J. Godwin v. The State of California and The Representatives; Warden of R. J. Donovan; Gavin Newsom, the Governor of California; Jodi Miller

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03102
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMY J. GODWIN, Case No. 3:25-cv-03102-RBM-MMP CDCR #AS-4717, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. (1) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 14 TO PROCEED IN FORMA THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND 15 PAUPERIS, THE REPRESENTATIVES; WARDEN of

16 R. J. Donovan; GAVIN NEWSOM, the (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION Governor of California; JODI MILLER, 17 FOR FAILING TO Assistant District Attorney; Superior Court STATE A CLAIM AND AS 18 Judge CHRISTOPHER PLOURD; State FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT Appointed Attorney JASON AMAVISCA; 19 TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and R. ACEVEDO, Acting Warden,

20 Defendants. (3) DENYING MOTION FOR 21 SERVICE AS MOOT

22 [Doc. 4] 23 24 25 Plaintiff Jeremy James Godwin, a state inmate incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 26 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, proceeding pro se, filed this civil 27 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff has paid the full $405 civil 28 filing fee and has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1 § 1915(a). (Doc. 1-2 at 1; Doc. 2.) He has also filed a Motion for service of the Complaint 2 by the United States Marshal. (Doc. 4.) 3 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 4 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 5 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 6 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 7 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 9 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 10 prepay the entire fee only if they are granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). A prisoner 12 seeking leave to proceed IFP must, in addition to showing an inability to pay the entire fee 13 up front, submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional 14 equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 15 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 16 Although Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate, (Doc. at 3), he has also prepaid 17 the entire $405.00 filing fee. (See Doc. 1-2 at 1.) Because Plaintiff prepaid the full $405 18 filing fee, he has not shown the indigence required to proceed IFP. See O’Loughlin v. Doe, 19 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990) (the right to proceed in forma pauperis is not absolute); 20 Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963) (proceeding in forma pauperis is a 21 matter within the sound discretion of the trial court in civil actions). Accordingly, 22 Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP is DENIED as moot. 23 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 24 A. Standard of Review 25 The Court must conduct an initial review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 26 which “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as practicable after 27 docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 28 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)). “‘On review, the court shall 2 . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,’ if it ‘(1) is frivolous, malicious, 3 or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from 4 a defendant who is immune from such relief.’” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., 5 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 6 Screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 7 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm 8 v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). “The Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires a 9 complaint to ‘contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 10 that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 11 There must be more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formalistic recitation of the 12 elements of a cause of action,” to plausibly state a claim, because “[t]hreadbare recitals of 13 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” 14 to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 15 “Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 16 color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 17 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show 18 both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 19 and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 20 Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 21 B. Discussion 22 Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(b)(1) because it is clear from the face of his pleading that his claims are barred 24 by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), seek relief from defendants who are immune, 25 and are duplicative of those raised and dismissed in a prior § 1983 civil rights action he 26 filed in this Court which was also dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. 27 /// 28 /// 1 1. Plaintiff’s Allegations 2 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Imperial County Assistant District Attorney Jody Miller 3 presented false evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. 4 Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1971), during his criminal prosecution in Imperial County Superior 5 Court Case No. JCF25781, and that as a result he was denied a fair trial and is now falsely 6 imprisoned. (See Doc. 1 at 3, 5–8.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Governor Newsom “signed 7 into law the Unconstitutional laws known as ‘Generic Time Frame Evidence’ that allows 8 D.A. to hide Brady material.” (Id. at 3.) He alleges that Defendant Acevedo, the current 9 Acting RJD Warden, is “currently holding me against my will under False Incarceration 10 by use of Falsified Evidence and Unlawful/Unconstitutional laws.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 11 that Defendant Superior Court Judge Christopher Plourd “[a]cted as a prosecutor while 12 sitting on the bench in my case, failed to acknowledge the witness tampering and 13 investigate it.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his state appointed attorney Defendant 14 Jason Amavisca rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by intentionally ignoring and 15 failing “to expose the D.A. witnesses’ blatant falsifying of evidence and failed to call the 16 D.A. on its use.” (Id.) The remainder of the Complaint argues that the false and withheld 17 evidence, when coupled with the Defendants’ actions, would call into question the validity 18 of his conviction in Imperial County Superior Court Case No. JCF25781, and seeks release 19 from custody and damages.1 (Id. at 5–8.) Plaintiff filed a habeas petition in this Court 20

21 22 1 The Court takes judicial notice of People v. Godwin, No. D064909, 2015 WL 2393851, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 2015), affirming Plaintiff’s conviction of various sex offenses 23 arising from his molestation of a minor in Imperial County Superior Court Case No. 24 JCF25781. See United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (a court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both 25 within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation 26 to matters at issue.”) On direct appeal, Plaintiff argued there was insufficient evidence of duress or that one of the alleged counts occurred, and claimed the trial court erred by 27 (1) allowing admission of the details of his prior sex offense conviction; (2) denying his 28 mistrial motion based on stricken testimony that he fit the profile of a child molester; and 1 challenging the validity of that conviction which was denied on multiple non-Brady related 2 grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Godwin v. Davey, Case No. 3:16-cv-02650- 3 BAS-KSC, 2017 WL 5636280, at *14–29 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2017), report and 4 recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 985462 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2018), certificate of 5 appealability denied, No. 18-55236, 2019 WL 913181, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2019), cert. 6 denied, 587 U.S. 1052 (2019). Plaintiff’s subsequently-filed action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7 § 1983 also alleging Brady violations during criminal proceedings in Imperial County 8 Superior Court Case No. JCF25781 was dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Godwin 9 v. Loera, et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-2001-LAB-BLM, 2021 WL 2333253, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 10 June 7, 2021). 11 2. Heck Bar 12 Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim against any Defendant based on allegations 13 regarding his criminal proceedings. Claims related to the “circumstances” of a prisoner’s 14 confinement are brought in a civil rights action, while constitutional challenges to the 15 validity or duration of a prisoner’s confinement must be raised in a petition for federal 16 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) 17 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 18 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The Court has long held that habeas is the 19 exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, 20 and such claims may not be brought in a [civil rights] action.”) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 21 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005); see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81–82 (“[A] state prisoner’s 22 § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages 23 or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to 24 conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily 25 demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”). A claim based on “harm 26 27 (3) denying his post-trial request for disclosure of juror identifying information. Godwin, 28 2015 WL 2393851, at *1. 1 caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” is 2 not cognizable outside of the habeas context unless Plaintiff “prove[s] that the conviction 3 or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 4 invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question 5 by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 6 486–87 (1994). 7 Thus, Plaintiff may not seek relief based on claims he has been unlawfully convicted, 8 sentenced, and/or incarcerated in a civil rights action without first showing his conviction 9 has been invalidated. Id.; see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) 10 (“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within ‘the 11 heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a [civil rights] action is a proper remedy for a state 12 prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but 13 not to the fact or length of his custody.’”) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498–99). Because 14 Plaintiff does not allege and cannot show the conviction which forms the basis of his 15 alleged Brady claims has already been invalidated, the Court finds his complaint fails to 16 state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted and is subject to sua sponte dismissal 17 without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486– 18 87; see also Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding § 1983 19 Brady challenge to conviction “cannot be pursued until the conviction or sentence has been 20 invalidated.”). 21 3. Immunity 22 In addition, Defendant Superior Court Judge Plourd is immune from actions arising 23 from the discharge of his official duties as alleged by Plaintiff here. See Mireles v. Waco, 24 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an 25 immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.”); Moore v. Urquhart, 26 899 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Section 1983 . . . provides judicial officers immunity 27 from injunctive relief even when the common law would not.”) This immunity applies 28 “however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it 1 may have proved to the plaintiff.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985). 2 “Grave procedural errors or acts in excess of judicial authority do not deprive a judge of 3 this immunity.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, 4 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Judge Plourd. 5 Plaintiff’s claims against Deputy District Attorney Miller are barred by the doctrine 6 of quasi-judicial immunity. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity 7 from liability for damages under § 1983 when the alleged wrongful acts were committed 8 by a prosecutor in the performance of an integral part of the criminal judicial process as 9 alleged by Plaintiff here. See Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) 10 (quasi-judicial absolute immunity applies to attorneys general for conduct related to their 11 state litigation duties in civil suits); Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 843 12 (9th Cir. 2016) (state prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit “when performing 13 functions ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’”) (quoting 14 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 15 against Deputy District Attorney Miller. 16 Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against Defendant state appointed attorney 17 Amavisca. A public attorney “does not act under color of state law when performing a 18 lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk 19 Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Miranda v. Clark Cnty., 319 F.3d 465, 468 20 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[The appointed attorney] was, no doubt, paid by government funds and 21 hired by a government agency. Nevertheless, his function was to represent his client, not 22 the interests of the state or county.”); Garnier v. Clarke, 332 Fed. App’x 416 (9th Cir. 23 2009) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claims against 24 appointed counsel). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against his state appointed 25 attorney Amavisca. 26 4. Res Judicata 27 In addition, the doctrine of res judicata bars a party from re-litigating claims that 28 were raised or could have been raised in a prior action. Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health 1 Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001). Res judicata precludes a subsequent suit 2 when there is: “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity 3 between the parties.” Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 4 2005)(quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 322 F.3d 5 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Court may consider the res judicata effect of a prior 6 proceeding sua sponte. See Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1992). 7 Here, the Court finds that even if Plaintiff’s current § 1983 suit were not barred by 8 Heck or immunity, he still may not relitigate the Brady violations referenced in his 9 amended complaint because he raised the same claims in a previously-filed civil rights 10 action pursuant to § 1983. See Godwin, 2021 WL 2333253, at *1–2 (Plaintiff’s action 11 alleging “members of the Imperial County District Attorney’s Office and Sheriff’s 12 Department failed to turn over exculpatory evidence to Plaintiff during [his] criminal 13 prosecution” in Case No. JCF25781 was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 14 § 1983 relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1)). 15 Thus, because the Brady claims raised in this action are the same as those alleged in 16 Case No. 3:20-cv-02001-LAB-BLM, a § 1983 suit which resulted in a final judgment on 17 the merits, and there is privity between the parties in both cases, see Headwaters Inc., 399 18 F.3d at 1052, the Court finds Plaintiff’s reassertion of those claims in this newly-filed 19 § 1983 action is precluded by res judicata principles. See Save Bull Trout v. Williams, 51 20 F.4th 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a judgment on 21 the merits for purposes of claim preclusion”). 22 5. Leave to Amend 23 Finally, while the Court generally grants unrepresented litigants leave to amend, it 24 is not required if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 25 cured by amendment.” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal 26 citations omitted). It is absolutely clear that leave to amend in this case would be futile 27 because Plaintiff’s claims are and have previously been found to be barred by Heck, 28 because he seeks relief against defendants who are immune, and because the claims have 1 || previously been dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals 2 the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of 3 |}amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal without leave to amend); Bell v. Allison, No. 4 || 20-16880, 2022 WL 4077119, at *1 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Because [plaintiffs] claim is 5 ||squarely foreclosed by Heck, amendment would be futile.”); Cornejo v. Minglana, Case 6 || No. 23-cv-05383-JSW, 2025 WL 870415, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2025) (denying leave 7 amend claims barred by res judicata as futile); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 8 (“There is no abuse of discretion where a district court dismisses under § 1915[] a 9 complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.”)(citations omitted). 10 C. Motion for service 11 Because this action is dismissed without further leave to amend, Plaintiff's Motion 12 || for service of the Complaint by the United States Marshal (Doc. 4) is DENIED as moot. 13 Ht. CONCLUSION 14 Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to 15 || proceed IFP as moot, DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Service as moot, DISMISSES this 16 action based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be 17 || granted and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), CERTIFIES that an IFP 18 || appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and DIRECTS 19 Clerk of Court to enter a judgment of dismissal and close the file. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: March 30, 2026 Re a ? L > 22 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 -9- VAL .. NI1INA DDO □□□□