Jeremy Clay Thompson v. State of Arkansas
This text of Jeremy Clay Thompson v. State of Arkansas (Jeremy Clay Thompson v. State of Arkansas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 320 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-25-349
JEREMY CLAY THOMPSON Opinion Delivered May 20, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SALINE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 63CR-22-637]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE BRENT DILLON APPELLEE HOUSTON, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
Jeremy Clay Thompson returns to this court with an appeal of the Saline County
Circuit Court’s order denying his Rule 37 petition. We affirmed his conviction on direct
appeal in Thompson v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 474, 699 S.W.3d 178. We set out the facts in
more detail there. Briefly, Thompson’s jury trial was set to begin the morning of 10 May
2023. Thompson was present as the court drew names for twelve prospective jurors. Before
voir dire began, Thompson’s appointed lawyer moved for a continuance at his request to
retain private counsel. The circuit court said no. Thompson stayed through jury selection
but left the courthouse during a brief recess before the picked jury was sworn. He could
not be found or haled back. The trial “progress[ed] to a verdict” in his absence. Ark. Code
Ann. § 16-89-103(a)(2)(A)(i) (Repl. 2005). The jury returned a guilty verdict and
recommended sentence the same day, but the court did not impose sentence until May 18.
We held that Thompson had not preserved his arguments for direct appeal. Thompson filed a Rule 37 petition alleging his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance in two respects. He renews both arguments on appeal. The circuit court denied
the petition without a hearing; we affirm.
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.3(a) states that
[i]f the petition [for postconviction relief] and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the trial court shall make written findings to that effect, specifying any parts of the files, or records that are relied upon to sustain the court’s findings.
If the court concludes from that paper record that a petitioner is entitled to no relief, no
evidentiary hearing is needed. Mancia v. State, 2015 Ark. 115, 459 S.W.3d 259. But it must
provide sufficient written findings to illustrate that the petitioner’s claims are meritless. Ark.
R. Crim. P. 37.3(a). We review the decision to deny postconviction relief for clear error.
Mancia, supra.
Thompson argues counsel should have objected to holding the trial without him
because the jury had not been sworn, so jeopardy had not yet attached. See Crist v. Bretz,
437 U.S. 28 (1978). He concludes that, as a result, the circuit court did not yet have
discretion under section 103(a)(2)(A) to proceed with trial. He argues the circuit court then
violated section 103(a)(2)(B) by rendering judgment in his absence.
Under this statute, unless the death penalty is sought:
(a)(1) If the indictment is for a felony, the defendant must be present during the trial.
(2)(A)(i) If he or she escapes from custody after the trial has commenced or is present at the beginning of the trial and then causes himself or herself to be unable to appear at trial or if on bail shall absent himself or herself during the trial, the trial may either be stopped or progress to a verdict at the discretion of the court.
2 ....
(B) However, judgment shall not be rendered until the presence of the defendant is obtained.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-103.
The foundation for Thompson’s first argument is his assumption that, in a jury trial,
“trial has [not] commenced” and the “beginning of the trial” has not occurred under section
103(a)(2)(A)(i) until the jury is sworn—the point when jeopardy attaches under the Fifth
Amendment. Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 839 (2014). But double jeopardy is just
one constitutional right in play at a criminal trial. Other rights related to a defendant’s
presence attach sooner. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that “[f]or
every purpose . . . involved in the requirement that the defendant shall be personally present
at the trial, where the indictment is for a felony, the trial commences at least from the time
when the work of impaneling the jury begins.” Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578 (1884) (emphasis
added).
The statute is addressed to a defendant’s right to be personally present. If the point
a jury trial commences under section 103(a)(2)(A)(i) is a question of law, the answer is in
Hopt, not the double-jeopardy cases: trial commences when the work of impaneling the
jury begins. That would be curtains for Thompson’s first point on appeal. Except for the
jurors’ oath, the work of impaneling the jury was done before he left the courtroom.
If “commencement” is a fact question instead, the analysis is different, but the result
is the same. In Johnson v. State, 270 Ark. 247, 604 S.W.2d 927 (1980), our supreme court
rejected a virtually identical argument under this statute, then codified as Ark. Stat. § 43-
2101 (Repl. 1977). The court treated it as asking whether, on that record, the defendant’s
3 departure was a voluntary waiver of the right to be present. He had crawfished during a
recess between a suppression hearing in his case and his scheduled bench trial. Reviewing
for clear error in a direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s finding that
“the trial had commenced at the time [the defendant] voluntarily absented himself.” Id. at
251, 604 S.W.2d at 939. It emphasized that the matter “was specifically set for trial[,]” not
a pretrial hearing, and had been set for months. Id. at 250–51, 604 S.W.2d at 928–29. The
court noted that the defendant had expressed to counsel the morning of the trial that he was
not satisfied with the judge and asked counsel to get him disqualified. Id. at 250, 604 S.W.2d
at 929. Later decisions from both appellate courts have also treated this like a fact question
about waiver. Reece v. State, 325 Ark. 465, 928 S.W.2d 334 (1996); Parrish v. State, 65 Ark.
App. 66, 984 S.W.2d 460 (1999); see also Ridling v. State, 348 Ark. 213, 72 S.W.3d 466
(2002).
On these facts, the result is the same. Thompson’s 10 May 2023 jury trial had been
set since 19 December 2022. He signed the order that set it. He showed up that day and
pressed to postpone the trial so he could retain private counsel. The circuit court said no
and picked a jury. Before the fateful recess, the court told the parties, “Once we come back
from the break, we will swear the jury. I’ll give the opening instruction and we’ll
commence.” The court asked if all would be ready. Thompson’s counsel and the
prosecutor said yes. The train was leaving the station, destination: verdict. Thompson
decided to stay on the platform and wave (and waive) it goodbye. The circuit court did
not clearly err by finding Thompson’s trial had already commenced under section
103(a)(2)(A)(i) by then.
4 Thompson’s argument that the circuit court violated the requirement that “judgment
shall not be rendered until the presence of the defendant is obtained[,]” Ark. Code Ann. §
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