Jeralyn D. Pierre v. Alex H. Porter

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 2, 2026
• Docket: A-3491-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3491-24

JERALYN D. PIERRE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALEX H. PORTER,

Defendant-Respondent. ________________________

Submitted April 28, 2026 – Decided July 2, 2026

Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FD-12-1241-20.

Jeralyn D. Pierre, self-represented appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

In this non-dissolution matter, plaintiff Jeralyn D. Pierre appeals from two

Family Part orders: (1) May 28, 2025, modifying the parties' July 22, 2020 consent order; and (2) July 18, 2025, granting reconsideration in part. Following

a summary proceeding, the family court changed the parenting exchange

location, allowed defendant to claim the parties' child as a dependent on his

income taxes in alternating years, and amended their holiday parenting schedule.

The court denied all other relief. On reconsideration, the court modified the

location of the parenting exchange and allowed defendant to claim the child as

a dependent on his income taxes provided, he was current on his child support

at the end of the tax year.

Having reviewed the record and applicable legal principles, we reverse

and remand the matter so that the family court can make the required findings

of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 1:7-4.

I.

We glean the factual and procedural history from the record. Plaintiff and

defendant have one child born in 2020. In a July 22, 2020 consent order, the

parties resolved custody and parenting time issues. The parties agreed to share

legal custody, with plaintiff being designated as the parent of primary residence

and defendant being the parent of alternate residence. They also agreed that

defendant would have parenting time with the child "every other weekend from

Friday at 7:00 p.m. through [] Sunday at 7:00 p.m.," and defendant would "pick

A-3491-24 2 up the child at [plaintiff's aunt's] house on Friday and . . . meet at the

Cheesequake service area [(k/n/a the Jon Bon Jovi service area)] off the Garden

State Parkway on Sunday for drop off." The consent order did not address who

would claim the child as a dependent for income tax purposes.

On March 28, 2022, the family court issued an order amending, in part,

the consent order to permit defendant to have parenting time "every other

weekend from Friday p.m. until Monday a.m.," and directing defendant to pick

up the child from day care on Friday afternoons and drop him off at day care on

Monday mornings. In 2023, defendant relocated within New Jersey but farther

away from where plaintiff resided.

In June 2024, plaintiff filed an order to show cause addressing a variety

of parenting challenges between the parties, most of which were denied as non-

emergent. However, in its June 28, 2024 order, the family court granted

plaintiff's request to move the parenting time exchanges to inside the local police

station. It also directed the parties to use the Sayreville police headquarters for

their exchanges because the Jon Bon Jovi rest stop was closed.

A-3491-24 3 In March 2025, defendant filed an FD 1 application seeking to change the

parenting exchange location from the police station to the Judy Blume service

area off the Garden State Parkway for holiday exchanges or when the child's

school was closed. Defendant also sought permission to claim the child as a

dependent on his income taxes "every odd year" and to add New Year's Eve

"and/or" New Year's Day to the parties' holiday schedule. Plaintiff filed a cross-

application, opposing a change in location of parenting exchanges and seeking

the following relief: (1) use of Our Family Wizard for all communication

between the parties; (2) "withheld parenting time be made up by deducting equal

time from the withholding parent's future time;" (3) prohibiting "third-party

individuals []from contacting [plaintiff] regarding [child] except in verified

emergencies;" and (4) "[t]hat holiday scheduling and make-up time rules be

clarified in the order." Plaintiff did not oppose the addition of New Year's Eve

and Day to the parties' holiday parenting schedule. She requested, however, that

her birthday also be added to the holiday parenting schedule.

1 FD docket refers to a non-dissolution matter which is "presumed to be summary and non-complex." R. 5:5-7(c). However, the court in its discretion may place the case on a complex track. Ibid.; see also J.G. v. J.H., 457 N.J. Super. 365, 370 n.3 (App. Div. 2019). A-3491-24 4 On May 28, 2025, the family court conducted a summary hearing on the

parties' applications. After hearing from the parties, the court stated:

What we're going to do is I'm not going to make you wait around for an order. I'm going to take a look — take a look at my notes. I'm going to have an order uploaded that you guys have by the end of the day, by the close of business today, addressing my ruling on the applications that are before me. Okay?

Without a statement of reasons, the court issued the May 28 order

directing the parenting "exchanges on holidays and whenever the parties' son's

school is closed shall take place in the [p]arking [l]ot for [b]uilding 1 . . . Red

Bank" off of the Garden State Parkway; permitting defendant to claim the child

as a dependent on his income taxes every other year; and amending the parenting

schedule to include New Year's Eve and Day as an additional holiday. "All other

relief" was denied.

Plaintiff filed for reconsideration. On July 18, 2025, the family court,

"having considered [] [p]laintiff's papers in support of the motion," 2 granted

reconsideration in part, changing the exchange location to the Holmdel State

Police barracks. The court further amended the May 28 order, permitting

2 It appears that the court decided plaintiff's reconsideration application "on the papers" without holding a summary hearing or permitting oral argument. The record does not contain a transcript of a hearing on July 18, 2025. A-3491-24 5 defendant "to claim the parties' son as a dependent on his income taxes every

other year ONLY if at the end of [the] preceding year . . . [d]efendant is current

on his child support obligation AND has no child support arrears." We denied

plaintiff's request to stay the order.

On appeal, plaintiff contends the family court erred in (1) disregarding her

comprehensive parenting plan; (2) revising the parenting time exchange location

instead of maintaining a neutral exchange site; (3) failing to address allegations

of coercive control and emotional harm; (4) denying her "tie-breaking medical

authority" request and trauma-informed therapy for the child; (5) allowing

defendant to claim the child as a dependent on his income taxes; and (6)

reassigning the matter to a different family court judge. Plaintiff asserts that the

modifications to the consent order disproportionately burden her, do not ensure

the child's safety and stability, and were made without adequate factual findings

and legal conclusions as required by Rule 1:7-4(a) and N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.

II.

"We review the [family court's] findings in accordance with a deferential

standard of review, recognizing the court's 'special jurisdiction and expertise in

family matters.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016)

(quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). As such, we defer to the

A-3491-24 6 family court's factual findings and decision unless such decision constitutes an

abuse of discretion because "they are so manifestly unsupported by or

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to

offend the interests of justice." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)

(quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs.

Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974))) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We also review a court's decision on whether to grant or deny a motion

for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion. Ranch v.

Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (citing Kornbleuth v. Westover,

241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020)). "An abuse of discretion arises when a decision is

made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established

policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC

Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Flagg

v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (citation omitted)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

"In custody cases, it is well settled that the court's primary consideration

is the best interests of the child[]." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105

(App. Div. 2007) (citing Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317 (1997)); see

also Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 322 (2017) (citations omitted) ("A

A-3491-24 7 custody arrangement adopted by the trial court, whether based on the parties'

agreement or imposed by the court, is subject to modification based on a

showing of changed circumstances, with the court determining custody in

accordance with the best interests standard of N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.") "The court must

focus on the 'safety, happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare' of the

children." Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105 (citations omitted) (quoting Fantony v.

Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956)).

In every case, the trial court is required to make specific findings of fact

and conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). See Shulas v. Estabrook,

385 N.J. Super. 91, 96 (App. Div. 2006). A court's "[f]ailure to perform that

duty 'constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate

court.'" Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs.

v. Bd. of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)); see also Gnall,

222 N.J. at 428. Even though the scope of our review is generally limited in

family cases, where inadequate findings of fact are made, or where issues are

not addressed or the court's reasoning was not explained, we are constrained to

remand for further proceedings. Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 443 (App.

Div. 2015) (citing Ducey v. Ducey, 424 N.J. Super. 68, 74 (App. Div. 2012)).

A-3491-24 8 In the present case, the family court did not make findings of fact and set

forth its conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4(a) in support of its May

28 or July 18 orders. Rather, the court simply issued the orders without

explaining its reasons for the relief granted or denied.

In considering a request to modify the parties' consent order, the court was

required to consider the request to change the location of the parenting exchange

location in the context of whether defendant, as the moving party, had

demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the

child such that the child's best interests would be served by a modification in the

current arrangement. See Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157-59 (1980). The court,

however, did not explain its findings or reasoning for deciding that the child's

best interests were served by changing the parenting exchange location.

Nor did the family court provide any rationale for permitting defendant to

claim the child as a dependent on his income taxes as stated in the May 28 order,

or for its amendment in the July 18 order, requiring defendant to be current on

his child support obligation before being permitted to claim the child as a

dependent on his income taxes. Although the court reconsidered the prior order

in light of plaintiff's contentions, the court provided no findings of fact or legal

A-3491-24 9 conclusions in granting this relief. With respect to plaintiff's remaining relief,

the court simply denied all other relief without explanation.

The family court's lack of sufficient findings of fact as to the parties

requested relief as required by Rule 1:7-4(a) prevents us from conducting a full

review of plaintiff's contentions. Thus, we are constrained to remand the matter

for further proceedings. The matter is remanded to the family court to amplify

its findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the relief sought by the parties

in their respective applications. We offer no opinion on how the parties'

applications should be resolved.

Because we remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion, we need not address plaintiff's remaining contentions with the

exception of plaintiff's request that the matter be reassigned to a different judge.

We are not persuaded that the court that issued these orders is precluded from

rendering a fair and unbiased judgment. R. 1:12-1(g). The record shows that

the court maintained an open mind and revised its prior order after plaintiff

sought reconsideration. Thus, we decline to direct that a different court address

this matter on remand.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-3491-24 10