1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J.E.P.M. (A No. 246 981 062), No. 1:26-cv-0316 WBS CKD P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner, detained by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE), has 18 filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons which 19 follow, the court recommends that the petition be granted. 20 I. Facts 21 Petitioner, a native of Mexico, ECF No. 1-4 at 2, entered the United States on or around 22 May 12, 2023, from Matamoros, Mexico. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Petitioner was detained for 23 approximately 8 hours and then released into Texas subject to the Intensive Supervision 24 Appearance Program (ISAP). Id. Ultimately, petitioner found his way to Stockon and resided 25 with his uncle, aunt, and their two children. Id. at 1 & 2. 26 A term of petitioner’s release was that he check in with ICE officials approximately once 27 a month via a telephone app. Id. at 2. Petitioner claims he consistently complied, or attempted to 28 ///// 1 comply with all reporting requirements, but there were a few occasions, possibly three, where 2 technical difficulties precluded compliance. Id. 3 On October 25, 2025, petitioner appeared as directed at an ICE office in Stockton. Id. at 4 3. Petitioner was arrested and told arrest was due to eleven ISAP violations. Id. It does not 5 appear petitioner was provided with specifics. Petitioner has remained in custody ever since and 6 is currently housed at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center in Bakersfield. Id. 7 Petitioner appeared for a custody redetermination hearing on December 5, 2025. ECF No. 8 10-1. The judge presiding over the hearing found a lack of jurisdiction to consider whether 9 petitioner should be released. Id. 10 It appears the last hearing related to petitioner’s immigration was held February 9, 2026. 11 ECF 1-3 at 2. The current status of proceedings is not clear. 12 Petitioner has been granted permission to work in the United States by the Department of 13 Homeland Security (DHS) through November 12, 2029. ECF No. 1-4 at 2. Prior to arrest, 14 petitioner worked in construction with his uncle. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. 15 Petitioner fears returning to Mexico because, while in Mexico, petitioner was kidnapped 16 and beaten by cartel members. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. 17 Petitioner has no criminal record. Id. at 2. 18 II. Standard for Habeas Relief 19 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual 20 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., 21 Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality 22 of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 23 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 24 petitioner in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 25 Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 26 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 27 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. 28 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 1 III. Violation of Fifth Amendment 2 A. Liberty Interest 3 As indicated above, petitioner was denied a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral 4 arbiter to determine whether he violated any terms of his release. Petitioner claims this violates 5 his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 23-24. Generally speaking, 6 the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the “geographic borders” of the United 7 States. Id. at 693. “Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long 8 been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth 9 Amendments.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). Due process protection applies to non- 10 citizens who have “passed through our gates.” Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 11 212 (1953). Even in the immigration context, government detention is permissible “only ‘in 12 certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification . . . outweighs 13 the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’” Kong v. 14 United States, 62 F.4th 608, 616 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 15 The Supreme Court has found that a protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional 16 release from physical restraint. Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1997). To determine 17 whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts 18 have resolved the issue by comparing the specific conditional release in the case before them with 19 the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey [ v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)].” 20 Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 21 citation omitted). 22 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide 23 range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, 24 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 25 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly 26 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring, 27 the parolee’s “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee 28 has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to 1 the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the 2 parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses a protected interest in 3 “continued liberty.” Id. at 481-84. 4 The regulations authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody into the United 5 States require that the noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 6 would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for 7 any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). Similarly, a noncitizen can be paroled into the 8 United States for “urgent humanitarian reasons” only if the noncitizen presents “neither a security 9 risk, nor a risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J.E.P.M. (A No. 246 981 062), No. 1:26-cv-0316 WBS CKD P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner, detained by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE), has 18 filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons which 19 follow, the court recommends that the petition be granted. 20 I. Facts 21 Petitioner, a native of Mexico, ECF No. 1-4 at 2, entered the United States on or around 22 May 12, 2023, from Matamoros, Mexico. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Petitioner was detained for 23 approximately 8 hours and then released into Texas subject to the Intensive Supervision 24 Appearance Program (ISAP). Id. Ultimately, petitioner found his way to Stockon and resided 25 with his uncle, aunt, and their two children. Id. at 1 & 2. 26 A term of petitioner’s release was that he check in with ICE officials approximately once 27 a month via a telephone app. Id. at 2. Petitioner claims he consistently complied, or attempted to 28 ///// 1 comply with all reporting requirements, but there were a few occasions, possibly three, where 2 technical difficulties precluded compliance. Id. 3 On October 25, 2025, petitioner appeared as directed at an ICE office in Stockton. Id. at 4 3. Petitioner was arrested and told arrest was due to eleven ISAP violations. Id. It does not 5 appear petitioner was provided with specifics. Petitioner has remained in custody ever since and 6 is currently housed at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center in Bakersfield. Id. 7 Petitioner appeared for a custody redetermination hearing on December 5, 2025. ECF No. 8 10-1. The judge presiding over the hearing found a lack of jurisdiction to consider whether 9 petitioner should be released. Id. 10 It appears the last hearing related to petitioner’s immigration was held February 9, 2026. 11 ECF 1-3 at 2. The current status of proceedings is not clear. 12 Petitioner has been granted permission to work in the United States by the Department of 13 Homeland Security (DHS) through November 12, 2029. ECF No. 1-4 at 2. Prior to arrest, 14 petitioner worked in construction with his uncle. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. 15 Petitioner fears returning to Mexico because, while in Mexico, petitioner was kidnapped 16 and beaten by cartel members. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. 17 Petitioner has no criminal record. Id. at 2. 18 II. Standard for Habeas Relief 19 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual 20 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., 21 Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality 22 of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 23 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 24 petitioner in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 25 Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 26 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 27 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. 28 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 1 III. Violation of Fifth Amendment 2 A. Liberty Interest 3 As indicated above, petitioner was denied a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral 4 arbiter to determine whether he violated any terms of his release. Petitioner claims this violates 5 his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 23-24. Generally speaking, 6 the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the “geographic borders” of the United 7 States. Id. at 693. “Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long 8 been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth 9 Amendments.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). Due process protection applies to non- 10 citizens who have “passed through our gates.” Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 11 212 (1953). Even in the immigration context, government detention is permissible “only ‘in 12 certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification . . . outweighs 13 the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’” Kong v. 14 United States, 62 F.4th 608, 616 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 15 The Supreme Court has found that a protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional 16 release from physical restraint. Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1997). To determine 17 whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts 18 have resolved the issue by comparing the specific conditional release in the case before them with 19 the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey [ v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)].” 20 Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 21 citation omitted). 22 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide 23 range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, 24 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 25 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly 26 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring, 27 the parolee’s “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee 28 has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to 1 the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the 2 parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses a protected interest in 3 “continued liberty.” Id. at 481-84. 4 The regulations authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody into the United 5 States require that the noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 6 would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for 7 any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). Similarly, a noncitizen can be paroled into the 8 United States for “urgent humanitarian reasons” only if the noncitizen presents “neither a security 9 risk, nor a risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Release under these regulations “reflects a 10 determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight 11 risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 12 In light of all of the foregoing, the court finds that petitioner’s initial release created a 13 reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his liberty as long as he was not a flight 14 risk or dangerous. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding reliance on 15 governmental representations may establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to a constitutionally- 16 protected interest). “[E]ven when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 17 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody he has a protected 18 liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 19 Cal. 2025). “[T]he government's discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by 20 the requirements of due process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 Respondents argue that petitioner’s re-arrest and detention were mandated by statute 22 because although petitioner was physically admitted into the United States, he remains an 23 “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) not entitled to due process protection. For 24 support, respondents point to DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020) in which the Supreme 25 Court found that an alien arrested inside the United States near the border around the time of his 26 illegal entry, detained, and ordered removed was not a person present in the country and therefore 27 was not entitled to due process protection. 28 ///// 1 While petitioner still may be an “applicant for admission” as that term is defined in 8 2 U.S.C. § 1225(b), he has also been allowed to “pass through our gates,” Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, 3 and is a person within the border of the United States entitled to Due Process under Zadvydas. 4 These facts distinguish him from Supreme Court precedent as to persons: (1) detained at or near 5 the border and never released into the country, i.e. Thuraissigiam; Ekiu v. United States, 142 6 U.S. 651 (1892) (petitioner allowed off ship in San Francisco, but ordered detained at nearby 7 mission) and (2) persons released into the country, but already subject to a final order of removal, 8 i.e. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) (petitioner denied admission at Ellis Island and ordered 9 removed was released to custody of an immigrant aid society while deportation suspended during 10 World War I).1 11 The undersigned rejects the premise that petitioner, who was released into the country, has 12 never been charged with a crime, has not been ordered removed, and has ties to the Stockton 13 community does not possess the most fundamental of rights not to be deprived of life, liberty or 14 property by the executive for any reason the executive sees fit. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 15 U.S. 281, 332 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Freedom from arbitrary detention is as ancient and 16 important a right as any found within the Constitution’s boundaries.”). Denying petitioner due 17 process protection because he is technically an “applicant for admission” as opposed to an 18 “admittee” as those terms are defined in immigration law, “subordinates fact to fiction, [and] 19 disregards the plain meaning of the Due Process Clause, which promises its protection to every 20 person within the United States.” Rincon v. Hyde, No. 15-12633 BEM, 2025 WL 3122784, * 2 21 (Dist. of Mass., November 7, 2025) (internal quotation omitted). “Indeed, to apply the entry 22 fiction doctrine to a case like Petitioner's is to set aside the plain meaning of the Fifth Amendment 23 altogether.” Id. at * 7. 24 ///// 25 ///// 26
27 1 In Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), the Supreme Court found that a petitioner allowed entrance into the U.S. while her admission was under consideration was not entitled to 28 certain statutory protections. The requirements of the Due Process clause were not at issue. 1 B. Process Due 2 Next, the Court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of a 3 protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has “regularly 4 applied Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)], to due process challenges to removal 5 proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); see also 6 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993 (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). 7 “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental 8 interest in the immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations 9 omitted). Under Mathews, the court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) 10 the risk of an erroneous deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 11 335. 12 First, petitioner has a paramount interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom 13 from imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- 14 lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 15 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always 16 been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.). 17 “The risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” without any required process 18 and, in particular, when “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination 19 hearing.” See A.E. v. Andrews, 1:25-cv-0197 KES SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 20 May 16, 2025). Civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is 21 typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight 22 or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 23 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Nothing suggests the officials who decided to detain petitioner 24 made any attempt to determine whether he was dangerous or a risk of flight. 25 As to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest 26 in enforcing immigration laws, but respondents’ interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing 27 is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 28 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 2025). Detention hearings in immigration courts are routine and impose a 1 “minimal cost.” Id. Further, such hearings provide help to ensure ICE officers act within the 2 boundaries of the law which is within ICE’s interest. 3 Considering any person in the United States has a supreme interest in liberty, the 4 likelihood of erroneous deprivation of liberty by ICE without any guardrails and that the DHS 5 already has immigration courts in place to ensure deprivation of liberty is lawful, petitioner is 6 entitled to a bond hearing finding that results in a legal justification for detention. Further, “[a]n 7 essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by 8 notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 9 v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 10 (emphasis added). In criminal cases, parolees released on parole, which does not provide 11 “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 12 parole restrictions,” are entitled to due process, including a pre-deprivation hearing before their 13 parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-86. “Numerous district courts have held that 14 these principles extend to the context of immigration detention.” F.M.V. v. Wofford, 1:25-cv- 15 2381 KES SAB, 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (collecting cases). Nothing in 16 the record before the court suggests there were any “urgent concerns” for detaining petitioner 17 without a hearing and thus “a pre-deprivation hearing [was] required to satisfy due process.” 18 Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2025). 19 IV. Remedy 20 Having found that petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated based 21 on the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing, the undersigned finds that petitioner is entitled to 22 immediate release from custody. A post-deprivation hearing at this juncture is not an adequate 23 remedy as identified above and because it would condone the violation of petitioner’s right to due 24 process in the first instance. See also E.A. T.-B v. Wamsley, No. 25-1192-KKE, 2025 WL 25 2402130, *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025). 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 2 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) be DENIED. 3 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 4 3. Petitioner be released from Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service custody. 5 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 6 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven (7) days 7 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 8 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 9 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 10 || objections shall be served and filed within seven (7) days after service of the objections. The 11 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 12 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 | Dated: April 6, 2026 / ae □□ / a Ly a
15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 | 4 7 jepm03 16.1mm.frs
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