Jensen v. United States Tennis Association

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 28, 2023
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01905
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Adrienne Jensen, No. CV-22-01905-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 United States Tennis Association,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Defendant United States Tennis Association (“Defendant”) has filed a Motion to 16 Dismiss Plaintiff Adriene Jensen’s (“Plaintiff”) claim with prejudice and a Motion to 17 Transfer Venue to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. (Docs. 5; 6).1 18 The Court must now decide whether Defendant’s res judicata claim, as brought in its Rule 19 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, is meritorious and precludes Plaintiff’s action before this 20 Court. If not, the Court must decide whether this case should be transferred back to the 21 District Court of Kansas. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 This case concerns Defendant’s alleged negligence. Plaintiff alleges Defendant 24 breached its “duty to protect [Plaintiff] and all other minor members from sexual abuse, 25

26 1 Both motions are briefed (Docs. 15; 16; 20; 21). Both parties requested oral argument on the Motion to Transfer. (See Docs. 16; 21). Only Defendant requested oral argument on 27 the Motion to Dismiss. (See Doc. 20). The Court will deny the requests for oral argument, finding the issues to be fully briefed and oral argument to be unnecessary. See Fed. R. Civ. 28 P. 78(b) (court may decide motions without oral hearings); LRCiv 7.2(f) (same). 1 battery, harassment, and exploitation by its adult members, including [Plaintiff’s coach].”2 2 (Doc. 1-3 at ¶¶ 64–65). Plaintiff claims this breach occurred because Defendant lacked 3 “policies and procedures” and “training and resources” that would have better protected 4 Plaintiff and other minor members. (Id. at ¶ 65). Specific to Arizona, Plaintiff alleges 5 Defendant’s negligence resulted in her former coach sexually assaulting her in a Scottsdale 6 hotel room when she was 15 years old. (Id. at ¶¶ 49–61). 7 A case involving these same parties was filed and litigated in the U.S. District Court 8 for the District of Kansas (“District of Kansas”).3 (See Docs. 6-3; 6-5). There, Plaintiff 9 argued that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the USTA’s actions,” her coach sexually 10 assaulted and emotionally abused her over several years. (Doc. 6-5 at ¶ 142). After 11 considering the parties arguments over statute of limitations, the court granted Defendant’s 12 motion for summary judgment because “[t]he claims . . . are clearly time barred” under 13 Nevada and Kansas law. (Doc. 6-3 at 12–13). 14 Here, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice, contending 15 the Kansas case clearly bars Plaintiff’s claim under the doctrine of res judicata. (See Doc. 16 5 at 2–3). Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues her “claims related to the abuse that she 17 endured in Arizona . . . remain ripe.” (Doc. 15 at 2). Plaintiff further contends that 18 Supreme Court precedent “clearly establishes that the doctrine of res judicata does not 19 apply” here. (Id.) 20 If Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss fails, Defendant seeks to transfer the case back to 21 the District of Kansas because “Plaintiff has already sued USTA on the same claims and 22 facts asserted in the Arizona Action” in the Kansas federal court. (Doc. 6 at 3). Therefore, 23 Defendant argues the District of Kansas is the best court to address any remaining 24 grievances. (Id. at 3–4). Plaintiff counters that “we’re not in Kansas anymore. That case 25 is over. [Plaintiff] lost. This is a new case based most significantly on the sexual abuse she 26 2 The former tennis coach, Haultain, was “sentenced to 78 months imprisonment and 27 deported.” (Doc. 6-3 at 3).

28 3 The Kansas case involved a second defendant, Kansas City Racquet Club, who is not included in this case. 1 suffered in Arizona.” (Doc. 16 at 5). 2 II. LEGAL STANDARD: RES JUDICATA VIA 12(B)(6) MOTION 3 A motion to dismiss, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), requires this 4 Court to evaluate the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claim. Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 5 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). The test requires that Plaintiff present “enough facts to state a claim 6 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 7 These facts must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 8 liable for the misconduct alleged” with “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 9 acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In short, the test requires 10 “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. 11 Defendant, however, is using Rule 12(b)(6) to assert its res judicata claim, rather 12 than to contest the plausibility of Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Although “affirmative 13 defenses like res judicata must be raised in a responsive pleading, [] the Ninth Circuit has 14 held that a party may raise a res judicata defense by motion rather than by answer where 15 the merits of the defense can be determined on the face of the complaint.” Bracy v. 16 Phoenix, 2016 WL 1365968, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 6, 2016) (citing Guam Inv. Co. v. Cent. 17 Bldg., Inc., 288 F.2d 19, 24 (9th Cir. 1961)). 18 The Court may also take judicial notice of other federal or state court proceedings 19 “if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States ex rel. 20 Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) 21 (quoting St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979)); 22 Fed. R. Evid. 201. Such notice does not “convert[] the motion to dismiss into a motion for 23 summary judgment.” Fifer v. City of Phoenix, 2011 WL 4708807, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 24 2011) (citing United States v. Richie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003); Borneo, Inc., 25 971 F.2d at 248). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 This Court must decide whether Plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred by the 28 doctrine of res judicata. If so, the Court must grant Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion to 1 Dismiss. If not, the Court will evaluate Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the 2 District of Kansas. 3 A. Res Judicata 4 “The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue 5 preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.’” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 6 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). “Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses 7 ‘successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises 8 the same issues as the earlier suit.’” Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 9 748 (2001)). Res judicata doctrine seeks to “protect against ‘the expense and vexation 10 attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on judicial 11 action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.’” Id. (quoting Montana v. 12 United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979)) (alterations in original). 13 Under Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., “federal common law governs 14 the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity.” 531 U.S. 15 497, 508 (2001). Federal common law also requires courts to determine the preclusive 16 effect of the prior decision by reference to the law of the state where the original rendering 17 federal diversity court sits. Id. “[A]ny other rule would produce the sort of ‘forum- 18 shopping . . . and . . . inequitable administration of the laws’ that Erie seeks to avoid[.]” 19 Id. at 508–09 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). 20 1. Supreme Court’s Semtek Ruling 21 Plaintiff first argues res judicata does not apply here because the Supreme Court’s 22 Semtek decision controls. (Doc. 15 at 5). Plaintiff contends Semtek holds a statute of 23 limitations judgment is not a judgment on the merits because such a judgment “do[es] not 24 pass upon the substantive merits of a claim.” (Id. at 3–4 (quoting Semtek, 531 U.S. at 502)). 25 Although Semtek guides this decision, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s proposed application. 26 The Ninth Circuit is instructive. It found that “[w]hen it is necessary for a federal 27 district court with diversity jurisdiction to determine the preclusive effect of a prior 28 decision by a different federal district court sitting in diversity, the second court must apply 1 preclusion principles according to the law of the initial court’s state.” Daewoo Elecs. Am. 2 Inc. v. Opta Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). Under this rule, 3 this Court must apply Missouri law—the law the District of Kansas used. 4 First, this Court is sitting in diversity. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction 5 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 when: (1) there is a complete diversity of citizenship among the 6 parties, i.e., no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant; and (2) the amount 7 in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff is a resident of Tennessee, 8 while Defendant is a New York corporation with its principal headquarters in White Plains, 9 New York. (Doc. 5-1 at ¶¶ 3–4). The amount in controversy—$300,000 or more—exceeds 10 $75,000.00. (Doc. 5-1 at ¶¶ 2, 70). 11 Second, the previous federal court—the District of Kansas—was sitting in diversity. 12 (See Docs. 5-4 at 5; 5-5 at 2; 5-6 at 1, 8). However, the District of Kansas court applied 13 Missouri law in the previous decision because that action “was transferred . . . from the 14 Western District of Missouri under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” (Doc. 5-4 at 5). The District of 15 Kansas court was therefore required to apply “the law of the transferor court’s forum state.” 16 (Id. (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964)). 17 Here, under Semtek and Daewoo, “the law of the initial court’s state” is Kansas. 18 Nevertheless, due to the transfer from Missouri to Kansas, the District of Kansas court 19 applied Missouri law. This Court will follow suit and apply Missouri law to determine the 20 preclusive nature of the District of Kansas’ previous decision. 21 2. Missouri Res Judicata Law 22 Missouri res judicata law requires four “identities” for a second cause of action to 23 be barred: “(1) identity of the things sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity 24 of the persons or parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality or status of the person 25 for or against whom the claim is made.” Lauber–Clayton, L.L.C. v. Novus Props. Co., 407 26 S.W.3d 612, 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Spath v. Norris, 281 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Mo. 27 Ct. App. 2009)). “Res judicata also requires an adjudication on the merits.” Romeo v. 28 Jones, 86 S.W.3d 428, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Vilsick v. Standard Insulations, 1 Inc., 926 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)); see also Robin Farms, Inc. v. Beeler, 991 2 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] final judgment on the merits must have been 3 rendered involving the same claim or issue sought to be precluded in the cause in 4 question.”). 5 a. Identity of things sued for 6 The first identity asks whether the item sued for “in the prior proceeding[] is the 7 same as the thing sued for in the subsequent proceeding.” Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, 447 8 S.W.3d 680, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). Both actions primarily focus on monetary damages, 9 but Plaintiff also requested injunctive relief in the District of Kansas case. (Compare Doc. 10 5-5 at 16, with Doc. 5-1 at ¶¶ 70–72). Here, Plaintiff only requests monetary damages. 11 (See Doc. 5-1 at ¶¶ 70–72). The Court thus finds the first identity is met, namely Plaintiff 12 sued for monetary damages both here and in the previous action. 13 b. Identity of the cause of action 14 The second identity requires courts to determine whether both actions “arose out of 15 the same act, contract, transaction, or series of transactions.” Commonwealth Land Title 16 Ins. Co. v. Miceli, 480 S.W.3d 354, 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Chesterfield Village, 17 Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Mo. 2002)). The “identity of the cause of 18 action [is] ‘the underlying facts combined with the law, giving a party a right to a remedy 19 of one form or another based thereon.’” Xiaoyan Gu, 447 S.W.3d at 689–90 (quoting 20 Williams v. Fin. Plaza, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 175, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)). 21 Both this suit and the District of Kansas suit allege a negligence claim against 22 Defendant. (See Docs. 5-1 at ¶¶ 63–69; 5-5 at ¶¶ 137–42). Both this Complaint and the 23 District of Kansas complaint allege Defendant had a duty to protect minor members from 24 abusive behavior by member coaches, that Defendant breached that duty in several ways, 25 and Plaintiff was greatly harmed by Defendant’s negligence. (Docs. 5-1 at ¶¶ 64–68; 5-5 26 at ¶¶ 139–42). 27 In making this claim, both suits discuss a series of harmful events perpetuated by 28 Plaintiff’s former tennis coach: (1) “groom[ing] and manipulat[ion]” of Plaintiff beginning 1 when she started competitively training and competing in the Kansas City area; (2) 2 inappropriate and nonconsensual behavior toward Plaintiff while traveling to a tournament 3 in Las Vegas, Nevada, while at a tournament in Alabama, and while traveling through St. 4 Louis, Missouri; and (3) Plaintiff being sexually assaulted in a Scottsdale hotel room during 5 an Arizona tournament. (See Docs. 5-1 at ¶¶ 40–61; 5-5 at ¶¶ 51–79, 81–83, 99–125). 6 Here, Plaintiff highlights the Arizona-related allegations and harmful events. (See 7 Doc. 15 at 3 (“[Plaintiff] was sexually abused by her coach in her hotel room when they 8 were both in Scottsdale, Arizona for a USTA Tournament, and her sole claim for relief 9 against USTA sounds in negligence for failure to have appropriate policies, procedures, 10 training, and resources.”). Both this Complaint and the District of Kansas complaint stem 11 from and allege the same “series of transactions” that would potentially provide Plaintiff 12 with “a right to a remedy” for her negligence claim. Specifically, both complaints allege 13 and detail the disturbing situation in Scottsdale, Arizona, and Defendant’s alleged breach 14 enabling such a situation to occur. 15 Although Plaintiff focuses on Arizona in her briefing, the Complaint does not allege 16 major differences from the previous District of Kansas complaint. There are no Arizona- 17 specific allegations against Defendant that were not present in the previous complaint. The 18 Court therefore finds this identity to be met—both actions involve the same “series of 19 transactions” and contain no major distinctions between the negligence claims. 20 c. Identity of parties 21 The third identity requires courts to decide “whether the identity of the person and 22 parties in the prior adjudication is the same as the identity of the person and parties in the 23 subsequent action.” Xiaoyan Gu, 447 S.W.3d at 690. “[R]es judicata applies to the parties 24 and their privies, meaning that the party in the instant action need not have actually been a 25 party in the prior action.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Besides previous-defendant 26 Kansas City Racquet Club, both actions involve Plaintiff Adrienne Jensen and Defendant 27 United States Tennis Association. (Docs. 5-5 at ¶¶ 2–4; 5-1 at ¶¶ 3–4). The Court finds 28 this identity to be met. 1 d. Identity of the quality or status of the person 2 The fourth identity asks whether “the identity of the ‘quality of the person’ for or 3 against whom the claim is made is the same in both suits.” Xiaoyan Gu, 447 S.W.3d at 4 692. Missouri courts have found this identity where “the status in which the [defendant] 5 was sued was the same in both actions.” Jordan v. Kansas City, 929 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Mo. 6 Ct. App. 1996). 7 Here, Defendant is the named defendant in both this case and the District of Kansas 8 action. (Docs. 5-1 at ¶ 4; 5-5 at ¶ 2). Defendant is being sued for the same claim in both: 9 negligence. (Docs. 5-1 at ¶¶ 63–69; 5-5 at ¶¶ 137–42). Defendant’s alleged capacity is 10 identical in both actions—that is, Defendant, as the overarching national tennis association, 11 breached its duty to protect Plaintiff and other minor members. (See Docs. 5-1 at ¶¶ 63– 12 69; 5-5 at ¶¶ 137–42). The Court accordingly finds the fourth identity to be met. 13 The Court finds that all four “identities” are met. Nevertheless, Missouri law also 14 requires this Court to determine whether the prior District of Kansas decision was an 15 adjudication “on the merits.” 16 e. Adjudication on the merits 17 Under Missouri law, “[t]he dismissal of an action based upon the running ‘of the 18 statute of limitations is a final adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata.’” 19 Lomax v. Sewell, 50 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Jordan, 929 S.W.2d 20 at 886); see also Snelling v. Kenny, 491 S.W.3d 606, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming 21 that dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is a final adjudication on the merits). 22 Plaintiff’s District of Kansas action was dismissed because the applicable statutes of 23 limitations for negligence had run. (Doc. 5-4 at 5, 12–13). The final order specifically 24 states: “the uncontroverted facts demonstrate that plaintiff’s negligence claims are barred 25 by the statute of limitations.” (Id. at 5). The Court, as dictated by Missouri law, thus finds 26 the District of Kansas action to be “a final adjudication on the merits.” 27 The Supreme Court’s Semtek ruling, along with subsequent Ninth Circuit 28 interpretation, requires this Court to apply Missouri preclusion law here. In so doing, the 1 Court must find Plaintiff’s current negligence action against Defendant barred by the 2 doctrine of res judicata. All four required “identities” exist here, and the prior District of 3 Kansas adjudication was a final adjudication on the merits.4 4 B. Plaintiff’s Fairness Argument 5 Last, Plaintiff argues it is unfair to apply res judicata because Arizona’s negligence 6 statute of limitations is more generous than Missouri’s. Plaintiff cites to Forsythe v. United 7 States to support this proposition. 502 F. App’x 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2012). There, the court 8 stated that “in this circuit, res judicata applies to a previous dismissal based on statute-of- 9 limitations grounds unless the effect of the bar would be unfair.” Id. (citing In re Marino, 10 181 F.3d 1142, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 1999). Although the Court acknowledges the gravity of 11 Plaintiff’s claims, it nevertheless finds “[t]he application of res judicata in this situation 12 may appear to be harsh, but it is not unfair.” Marin v. HEW, Health Care Fin. Agency, 769 13 F.2d 590, 593 (9th Cir. 1985). 14 As discussed, Semtek directs this Court to follow Missouri preclusion law. The 15 Forsythe decision is neither published nor binding precedent on this Court,5 although its 16 proposition stems from other Ninth Circuit decisions. See, e.g., Zhang v. Dep’t of Lab. & 17 Immigr., 331 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); Marin, 769 F.2d at 593. These precedential 18 decisions, however, do not aid Plaintiff’s unfairness argument. (See Doc. 20 at 9–13). This 19 is because Plaintiff has already accepted the District of Kansas court’s rejection of her

20 4 Kansas law would similarly preclude this action under res judicata grounds. Kansas law holds “[r]es judicata (claim preclusion) prevents relitigation of previously litigated claims 21 and consist of the following four elements: (1) same claim; (2) same parties; (3) claims were or could have been raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits.” Winston v. State 22 Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 49 P.3d 1274, 1285 (Kan. 2002). Kansas law dictates “that any dismissal is a judgment on the merits unless it is a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, 23 for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60–219.” Netwig v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1284 (D. Kan. 2003). In so ruling, the Netwig 24 decision quoted the Kansas Court of Appeals: “dismissal based upon the statute of limitations operates as an adjudication upon the merits.” Moore v. Luther, 35 P.3d 277, 25 279 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Vorhees v. Baltazar, 153 P.3d 1227 (Kan. 2007). The Court notes the only potential difference between Kansas and 26 Missouri law is Kansas’ third element. However, Plaintiff only raises one claim against Defendant in both the action here and the previous District of Kansas action: negligence. 27 Thus, the result would be the same if the Court applied Kansas law, rather than Missouri law. 28 5 See 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (citation of unpublished opinions). claims. See Marin, 769 F.2d at 594 (“Because [Plaintiff] accepted the court’s final rejection of [her] claims in one instance without appealing, [she] can claim no fairness 3 || requirement that [she] be allowed to continue to litigate the same claims in a different courtroom.”). Plaintiff did not appeal the District of Kansas action. (See Docs. 15 at 8-9; |} 20 at 10). While it may appear harsh, the Court must reject Plaintiff's contention that 6 || dismissal is unfair. 7\| IV. CONCLUSION 8 The Court therefore grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) under Rule 9|| 12(b)(6) because Missouri res judicata law precludes Plaintiffs claim. Because the Motion 10 || to Dismiss is granted, the Court need not address and will accordingly deny Defendant’s 11 || Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 6). 12 Accordingly, 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant United States Tennis Association’s || Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is granted with prejudice. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the 16|| United States District Court for the District of Kansas (Doc. 6) is denied as moot. 17 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate this action. 18 Dated this 27th day of April, 2023. 19 20 oC. . fe 21 norable' Diang4. Hurtetewa 02 United States District Fudge 23 24 25 26 27 28

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