Jenkins v. Rhode Island State

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 25, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-0795
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GARY V. JENKINS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-795 (RCL) ) ) RHODE ISLAND STATE ) DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the defendant United Parcel Service Store’s (“UPS”)

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 14. The plaintiff, Gary V. Jenkins, proceeding pro se, did not file an

opposition despite being advised to do so by this Court. See Fox-Neal Order, ECF No. 15. The

Court recognizes that, under Local Civil Rule 7(b), it may treat the motion as conceded. However,

for the benefit of the parties, the Court will address the merits below. For the reasons herein,

UPS’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, in the

alternative, failure to state a claim. Because the Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

the remaining defendants and Mr. Jenkins has likewise failed to state a claim against them, the

Court DISMISSES all claims against the remaining defendants sua sponte.

Gary V. Jenkins, a resident of Jonesboro, Georgia sued the State of Rhode Island, Governor

Daniel McKee, the State of Rhode Island Department of Health, and UPS on March 19, 2024, for

a variety of alleged violations of law. See Compl. at 1. The complaint is limited in its details, but

appears to allege injuries related to federal criminal statutes pertaining to bribery as well as civil

violations potentially related to union activity. See Compl. at 1. Mr. Jenkins also alleges that

1 “treasonable acts have occurred” but does not indicate by whom or what conduct was specifically

treasonable. See id. In support of his claim, Mr. Jenkins submitted an addendum containing a

receipt that shows a purchase from UPS and Staples, in addition to what appears to be notifications

sent to a phone indicating a delivery of a shipment from UPS. See id. The amount in controversy

for Mr. Jenkins’ complaint is $15,000. Id. Defendant UPS filed the instant motion to dismiss,

alleging that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and Mr. Jenkins has failed to state a claim.

See ECF 14. Mr. Jenkins was advised to respond, see Fox-Neal Order, ECF No. 15, but never

filed an opposition. The motion is ripe for this Court’s review.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth

generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented, id. § 1331, or the parties are of diverse citizenship

and the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs,” id. § 1332(a). A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts that bring

the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such facts warrants

dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Mr. Jenkins has failed to show subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity because

his request for relief is only $15,000. Compl. at 1. This fails to meet the statutory minimum of

$75,000 and therefore, even if Mr. Jenkins and the defendants are of diverse citizenship, there can

be no finding of diversity jurisdiction by this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In his complaint, Mr.

Jenkins does allege that “treasonable acts have occurred” and cites a slew of federal statutes, which

could potentially be a federal question that could give this Court jurisdiction over that claim. But

2 as explained below, due to his failure to state the claim with the requisite detail, the motion to

dismiss will be granted for defendants.

II. Failure to State a Claim

Mr. Jenkins fails to state a claim in his pleading because he does not provide enough detail

to survive a FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Under FRCP 8(a), all that is required of a

complaint is a “‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitle to relief,’

in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must additionally be “more than labels and conclusions” or mere

recitation of the elements of a crime. Id. When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court will take

all allegations of material fact by the non-moving party to be true and construe those facts in the

most favorable manner to the non-moving party. See Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d

672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In addition, because Mr. Jenkins is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings that have been drafted by a lawyer. See Abdelfattah

v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2015). That lower standard still

requires that the Court be able to infer “more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based on

the facts asserted by the pro se litigant. Id (internal citation omitted).

Even with the benefit of a less stringent standard and taking all factual allegations to be

true, Mr. Jenkins fails to sufficiently state a claim. Mr. Jenkins’ complaint seems to revolve around

allegations that Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, an insurance provider, made payments

to the defendants he listed. See Compl. at 1. Mr. Jenkins then appears to reference IAFF Local

850, presumably his union, and alleges that there was a failure to provide him fair representation.

Id. He goes on to references federal statutes, makes a passing reference to treasonable conduct, 3 and lists some evidence of making a purchase at a Staples and a UPS. Id. But he does not allege

what acts were done by which parties or any factual basis for his claims or injuries. Id. He does

not connect the evidence he submitted to the claims he listed. Id. He does not assert what the

alleged treasonable conduct was, who did it, or how it was done. Id. And he does not assert how

the actions of the UPS, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, or IAFF Local 850 are

connected in any way. Id. In other words, Mr. Jenkins has submitted a “confused and rambling

narrative of charges and conclusion concerning numerous persons, [and] organizations . . . [that]

does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp.

3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (Lamberth, J.) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

While Mr. Jenkins cites to countless federal statutes including 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 152, 210,

601, 1035, 2384, and 241 he does not connect those statutes to any actions by the defendants he

filed his complaint against. Id. Most of the statutes Mr. Jenkins cites are criminal and do not have

applicability to the civil action that Mr. Jenkins is bringing. Id. Moreover, the statute Mr. Jenkins

refers to under “CIVIL CHARGES” in his complaint bears no connection to any allegations he

puts forth and does not create enough of an indication of potential misconduct to allow his action

to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. Mr. Jenkins simply fails to assert anything that allows this

Court to infer any possibility of misconduct by the defendants. Consequently, this case is

dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 14] is GRANTED; and it

is further

ORDERED all outstanding motions on the docket filed by Mr. Jenkins are hereby

DISMISSED AS MOOT; and it is further 4