Jenkins v. Officer S (Downstate)

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided February 3, 2020·No. 7:19-cv-10728·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DARELL NAUTIQUE JENKINS, Plaintiff, 19-CV-10728 (CM) -against- ORDER TO AMEND OFFICER S. (DOWNSTATE); JOHN DOE (INMATE), Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Mid-State Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights at Downstate Correctional Facility.1 By order dated January 16, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis IFP).2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

1 Plaintiff initially filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. On November 5, 2019, that court transferred this action to the Southern District of New York. (ECF No. 4.) 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

2 BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the complaint. On January 17, 2018, while Plaintiff was in line waiting to eat in Downstate Correctional Facility, he was slashed from behind by an unidentified inmate. After Officer S. saw the assault, he only stepped between Plaintiff and the John Doe inmate. Officer S. “[d]idn’t even go for the inmate that slashed [Plaintiff], which

makes [Plaintiff] believe that [Officer S.] had a role in arranging the attack.” (ECF No. 1, 5.) Plaintiff brings this action against Officer S. and the John Doe inmate. He asserts that the correction officer failed to protect him from harm, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. DISCUSSION A. Failure-to-Protect Claim Prison officials are required to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners, including protecting prisoners from harm caused by other prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997). To state a cognizable § 1983 failure-to-protect claim, a prisoner must show that: (1) he is

incarcerated under conditions “posing a substantial risk of serious harm”; and (2) prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to his safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; see Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996). A plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by showing that a correction officer “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[A] prison official has sufficient culpable intent if he has

3 knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial serious risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to reasonable measures to abate the harm.” Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620 (citation omitted). The mere negligence of a correctional official is not a basis for a claim of a federal constitutional violation under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986);

Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986). Plaintiff asserts that Officer S. failed to protect him from being slashed by a John Doe inmate. He also expresses his belief that Officer S. had a role in the attack. But Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that Officer S. either took part in planning the attack or otherwise knew of it beforehand and failed to take reasonable measure to protect Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s speculation alone is not sufficient. Because it is not clear that granting Plaintiff leave to amend would be futile, the Court grants him leave to amend his complaint to detail his failure-to-protect claim. Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts suggesting that Officer S. was deliberately indifferent because he knew of a specific serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety and took no action to prevent it.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Jenkins v. Officer S (Downstate), (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Jenkins v. Officer S (Downstate) (Jenkins v. Officer S (Downstate)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Daniels v. Williams
474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Davidson v. Cannon
474 U.S. 344 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Bennie Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc.
877 F.2d 170 (Second Circuit, 1989)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)