Jenkins v. Johnson
This text of Jenkins v. Johnson (Jenkins v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 James Arthur JENKINS, Case No.: 21-cv-1653-GPC-AGS 4 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY HABEAS CORPUS 5 v. PETITION (ECF 1) 6 R.C. JOHNSON, Warden, Respondent. 7 8 9 Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus. But his claims are either noncognizable or 10 meritless. 11 BACKGROUND 12 In 2018, petitioner James Arthur Jenkins “stab[bed] and kill[ed]” a homeless man 13 and rifled through his pockets. People v. Jenkins, No. D076664, 2020 WL 4007320, at *2, 14 *4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2020). A jury convicted Jenkins of first-degree murder and 15 attempted robbery, along with weapon and injury enhancements. Id. at *1. He was 16 sentenced to “50 years to life.” Id. 17 On appeal, Jenkins argued that he qualified for mental-health diversion under 18 California Penal Code section 1001.36 due to his “‘long’ history of mental health issues.” 19 (ECF 7-4, at 1.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, reasoning that 20 Jenkins’s criminal proceedings occurred after an amendment to section 1001.36 excluding 21 defendants charged with certain offenses, including murder. Jenkins, 2020 WL 4007320, 22 at *8–9. The Court specifically concluded that he was “statutorily ineligible for mental 23 health diversion because he was charged with murder.” Id. at *9. 24 Jenkins appealed the judgment to the California Supreme Court, claiming that he 25 should have been found eligible under section 1001.36 because he was arrested and 26 charged in 2018, prior to the 2019 amendment. Any other result, he argued, would violate 27 article I, section 7 of the California Constitution as well as the Equal Protection Clause of 28 the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, since other defendants facing 1 the same excluding offenses were found eligible for the program despite being incarcerated 2 before and sentenced after the amendment took effect. (ECF 7-8, at 7.) The California 3 Supreme Court denied review. (See ECF 7-9 (unpublished denial).) 4 DISCUSSION 5 In his federal habeas petition, Jenkins again argues that he is being detained in 6 violation of the California Constitution and federal Equal Protection Clause. (ECF 1, at 6.) 7 This is so, he claims, because he was denied eligibility for section 1001.36 mental-health 8 diversion even though he was arrested and charged prior to the 2019 amendment. (Id.) 9 Jenkins repeats his argument that his sentence violates the federal and state Constitutions 10 because other similarly situated defendants who were incarcerated at or before the effective 11 date of the amended section 1001.36—and were sentenced after the amendment took 12 effect—were nevertheless deemed eligible for mental-health diversion. (ECF 7-8, at 7.) 13 The Court addresses the state and federal constitutional arguments separately. 14 A. California Constitution 15 Jenkins does not explain why his state Constitution claim should be heard in federal 16 court. A federal writ of habeas corpus is only available when a prisoner is held “in custody 17 in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Wilson v. 18 Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). “[I]t is not the province of 19 a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions,” so 20 a challenge to state sentencing laws is not a ground for federal habeas relief. Estelle v. 21 McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991); see Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) 22 (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law . . . .”). Thus, this Court 23 cannot consider Jenkins’s arguments under the California Constitution nor can it consider 24 whether the state courts correctly applied section 1001.36 by its own terms. 25 B. U.S. Constitution 26 The warden insists that Jenkins’s federal arguments fail for similar reasons. He 27 argues that Jenkins should not be allowed to “transform this state-law claim into a federal 28 one simply by labeling it a violation of equal protection.” (See ECF 6-1, at 11.) The Equal 1 Protection Clause “commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction 2 the equal protection of the laws,’” which requires that “all persons similarly situated . . . be 3 treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 4 Petitioners may bring a successful “class of one” Equal Protection challenge when they 5 allege that they have “been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated 6 and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” SeaRiver Mar. Fin. 7 Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. 8 Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). Notwithstanding the merits of Jenkins’s claim, it is 9 cognizable for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (permitting district courts to 10 “entertain” habeas petitioners asserting they are “in custody in violation of the 11 Constitution” or federal law); see also Vaught v. Allison, No. 3:21-CV-0408-CAB-AGS, 12 2021 WL 4428965, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2021) (noting that class-of-one Equal 13 Protection claims are cognizable for § 2254 relief). 14 But Jenkins’s Equal Protection argument collapses on the merits: There is no 15 evidence that his sentencing deprived him of the equal protection of the laws. Jenkins 16 provides no literature, case law, or anything else to suggest a similarly situated criminal 17 defendant in California was found to be eligible for mental-health diversion under section 18 1001.36. In fact, this Court’s own research suggests that California courts uniformly treated 19 other defendants the same way they treated Jenkins. See, e.g., People v. McDaniels, 20 No. D073692, 2019 WL 1941576, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 2, 2019) (denying section 21 1001.36 mental diversion for a pre-amendment murder offense); People v. Burks, No. 22 D074599, 2020 WL 288129, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020) (same); People v. Bell, 23 No. D074669, 2020 WL 7395215, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2020) (same); People v. 24 McShane, 36 Cal. App. 5th 245, 260–61 (2019) (same). As Jenkins provides no evidence 25 to suggest California treats similarly situated defendants differently, Jenkins’s class-of-one 26 Equal Protection claim is meritless. See SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Tippins, 31 F.4th 1110, 27 1123 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding that “a class-of-one [petitioner] must be similarly situated to 28 the proposed comparator in all material respects” to bring an Equal Protection claim). 1 ||C. Certificate of Appealability 2 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires this Court to “issue 3 deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 4 || United States v. Suesue, 584 F. App’x 705, 706 (9th Cir. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. 5 || § 2253(c). The petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 6 || right” for a certificate of appealability to be proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
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