[Cite as Jenkins v. Fields, 2026-Ohio-2545.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
SHARLA JENKINS, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115843 v. :
HELEN FORBES FIELDS, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 2, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-25-122286
Appearances:
Sharla Jenkins, pro se.
Forbes Fields & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Darrel A. Fields; Scott H. Schooler, for appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Sharla Jenkins (“Sharla”) appeals from the trial
court’s October 31, 2025 judgment granting the motion to dismiss of defendant-
appellee Helen Forbes Fields (“Fields”). After a careful review of the facts and
pertinent law, we affirm. Sharla, pro se, filed this action in August 2025. The gravamen of her
complaint related to various alleged wrongdoings of Fields, who served as the
administrator of the estate of Elase Jenkins (“Jenkins”), Sharla’s mother, who died
in November 2015. According to Sharla’s complaint, a probate case was opened
approximately one month after Jenkins’s death. The initial executor of the estate
was removed in June 2016, after which the probate court appointed Fields as the
administrator.
Fields filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to declare Sharla a
vexatious litigator. Fields’s motion to dismiss was made under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on
the grounds that Sharla failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
and that Sharla’s claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Sharla’s claims were barred by the
statute of limitations and under the doctrine of res judicata. Sharla now appeals,
and in her sole assignment of error challenges the trial court’s dismissal of this case.
Initially, we note that Sharla acted pro se in the trial court and
represents herself pro se on appeal. This court has previously recognized:
[A] pro se litigant may face certain difficulties when choosing to represent oneself. Although a pro se litigant may be afforded reasonable latitude, there are limits to a court’s leniency. Henderson v. Henderson, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2012-G-3118, 2013-Ohio-2820, ¶ 22. Pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel. In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 Ohio St.3d 43, 2013-Ohio-5478, 3 N.E.3d 173, ¶ 22.
Saeed v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2017-Ohio-935, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). Thus, we presume Sharla had knowledge of the law, legal procedures,
and appellate process.
Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
motion to dismiss under a de novo standard. Hersh v. Grumer, 2021-Ohio-2582,
¶ 5 (8th Dist.). In a de novo review, this court affords no deference to the trial court’s
decision and independently reviews the record to determine whether the trial court’s
judgment is appropriate. Hollins v. Shaffer, 2009-Ohio-2136, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint . . . . Under a de
novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” NorthPoint
Props. v. Petticord, 2008-Ohio-5996, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). A motion to dismiss under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) “can only be granted when it appears beyond doubt from the
complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief.” Grey v.
Walgreen Co., 2011-Ohio-6167, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.); see also State ex rel. Scott v.
Cleveland, 2006-Ohio-6573, ¶ 26 (A “Civ.R. 12(B)(6) determination cannot rely on
factual allegations or evidence outside the complaint . . . .”). (Emphasis in original.)
Civ.R. 8(A) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief . . . .” Further,
“[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Civ.R. 8(E)(1).
Civ.R. 8(A) must be read in conjunction with the remaining sections of Civ.R. 8, including Civ.R. 8(F), which provides “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.”
Civ.R. 8 is a liberal pleading rule. Bowers Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Chuparkoff, 2010-Ohio-419, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). Under the rule’s liberal pleading
requirements, a plaintiff must merely set forth operative facts in the complaint
“which give fair notice of the action . . . .” Truax v. Arora, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
2059, *5 (9th Dist. Apr. 7, 1993); Bowers Constr. at id. “Any legal theory applicable
to the stated facts will support a recovery.” Truax at id.; Vagas v. Hudson, 2009-
Ohio-6794, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.) (A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss as long as
it “sets forth adequate facts demonstrating a claim for relief.”). If a complaint does
not comply with Civ.R. 8(A), it may be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). See
Doe v. Greenville City Schools, 2022-Ohio-4618, ¶ 7-8.
Sharla’s complaint was 37 pages of text, and a total of 284 pages with
attached exhibits. The complaint did not contain numbered paragraphs, nor clear
pronouncements of the causes of action under which she sought relief. Mostly, the
complaint was Sharla’s recitation of what occurred in the probate court beginning
in 2015 through the court’s adoption of Fields’s amended final account, which
occurred in May 2018.
Liberally construing Sharla’s complaint, we note that near the
conclusion of her complaint, Sharla alleged she “expos[ed] a conspiracy to commit
fraud.” (Complaint, p. 37). According to Sharla, the initial executor started a
conspiracy and the conspiracy ended with Fields. Civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action. Bender v.
Logan, 2016-Ohio-5317, ¶ 78 (4th Dist.). That means that, under Ohio law, “[a]n
underlying unlawful act is required before a civil conspiracy claim can succeed.”
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 475 (1998). In addition to
demonstrating an underlying unlawful act was committed, in order to maintain a
claim of civil conspiracy in Ohio a plaintiff is required to demonstrate that a
malicious combination of two or more persons caused injury to the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s property. Syed v. Poulos, 2013-Ohio-5739, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing Kenty
v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1995).
The underlying unlawful act Sharla claims occurred in this case was
fraud. The prima facie elements of fraud are: (1) a representation or, where there is
a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact; (2) which is material to the transaction at
hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and
recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred; (4) with
the intent of misleading another into relying upon it; (5) justifiable reliance upon
the representation or concealment; and (6) a resulting injury proximately caused by
the reliance. Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St.3d 54, 55 (1987), citing
Burr v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 23 Ohio St.3d 69 (1986), paragraph two of the syllabus,
and Cohen v. Lamko, Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d 167 (1984).
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[Cite as Jenkins v. Fields, 2026-Ohio-2545.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
SHARLA JENKINS, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115843 v. :
HELEN FORBES FIELDS, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 2, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-25-122286
Appearances:
Sharla Jenkins, pro se.
Forbes Fields & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Darrel A. Fields; Scott H. Schooler, for appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Sharla Jenkins (“Sharla”) appeals from the trial
court’s October 31, 2025 judgment granting the motion to dismiss of defendant-
appellee Helen Forbes Fields (“Fields”). After a careful review of the facts and
pertinent law, we affirm. Sharla, pro se, filed this action in August 2025. The gravamen of her
complaint related to various alleged wrongdoings of Fields, who served as the
administrator of the estate of Elase Jenkins (“Jenkins”), Sharla’s mother, who died
in November 2015. According to Sharla’s complaint, a probate case was opened
approximately one month after Jenkins’s death. The initial executor of the estate
was removed in June 2016, after which the probate court appointed Fields as the
administrator.
Fields filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to declare Sharla a
vexatious litigator. Fields’s motion to dismiss was made under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on
the grounds that Sharla failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
and that Sharla’s claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Sharla’s claims were barred by the
statute of limitations and under the doctrine of res judicata. Sharla now appeals,
and in her sole assignment of error challenges the trial court’s dismissal of this case.
Initially, we note that Sharla acted pro se in the trial court and
represents herself pro se on appeal. This court has previously recognized:
[A] pro se litigant may face certain difficulties when choosing to represent oneself. Although a pro se litigant may be afforded reasonable latitude, there are limits to a court’s leniency. Henderson v. Henderson, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2012-G-3118, 2013-Ohio-2820, ¶ 22. Pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel. In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 Ohio St.3d 43, 2013-Ohio-5478, 3 N.E.3d 173, ¶ 22.
Saeed v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2017-Ohio-935, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). Thus, we presume Sharla had knowledge of the law, legal procedures,
and appellate process.
Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
motion to dismiss under a de novo standard. Hersh v. Grumer, 2021-Ohio-2582,
¶ 5 (8th Dist.). In a de novo review, this court affords no deference to the trial court’s
decision and independently reviews the record to determine whether the trial court’s
judgment is appropriate. Hollins v. Shaffer, 2009-Ohio-2136, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint . . . . Under a de
novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” NorthPoint
Props. v. Petticord, 2008-Ohio-5996, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). A motion to dismiss under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) “can only be granted when it appears beyond doubt from the
complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief.” Grey v.
Walgreen Co., 2011-Ohio-6167, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.); see also State ex rel. Scott v.
Cleveland, 2006-Ohio-6573, ¶ 26 (A “Civ.R. 12(B)(6) determination cannot rely on
factual allegations or evidence outside the complaint . . . .”). (Emphasis in original.)
Civ.R. 8(A) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief . . . .” Further,
“[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Civ.R. 8(E)(1).
Civ.R. 8(A) must be read in conjunction with the remaining sections of Civ.R. 8, including Civ.R. 8(F), which provides “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.”
Civ.R. 8 is a liberal pleading rule. Bowers Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Chuparkoff, 2010-Ohio-419, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). Under the rule’s liberal pleading
requirements, a plaintiff must merely set forth operative facts in the complaint
“which give fair notice of the action . . . .” Truax v. Arora, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
2059, *5 (9th Dist. Apr. 7, 1993); Bowers Constr. at id. “Any legal theory applicable
to the stated facts will support a recovery.” Truax at id.; Vagas v. Hudson, 2009-
Ohio-6794, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.) (A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss as long as
it “sets forth adequate facts demonstrating a claim for relief.”). If a complaint does
not comply with Civ.R. 8(A), it may be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). See
Doe v. Greenville City Schools, 2022-Ohio-4618, ¶ 7-8.
Sharla’s complaint was 37 pages of text, and a total of 284 pages with
attached exhibits. The complaint did not contain numbered paragraphs, nor clear
pronouncements of the causes of action under which she sought relief. Mostly, the
complaint was Sharla’s recitation of what occurred in the probate court beginning
in 2015 through the court’s adoption of Fields’s amended final account, which
occurred in May 2018.
Liberally construing Sharla’s complaint, we note that near the
conclusion of her complaint, Sharla alleged she “expos[ed] a conspiracy to commit
fraud.” (Complaint, p. 37). According to Sharla, the initial executor started a
conspiracy and the conspiracy ended with Fields. Civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action. Bender v.
Logan, 2016-Ohio-5317, ¶ 78 (4th Dist.). That means that, under Ohio law, “[a]n
underlying unlawful act is required before a civil conspiracy claim can succeed.”
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 475 (1998). In addition to
demonstrating an underlying unlawful act was committed, in order to maintain a
claim of civil conspiracy in Ohio a plaintiff is required to demonstrate that a
malicious combination of two or more persons caused injury to the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s property. Syed v. Poulos, 2013-Ohio-5739, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing Kenty
v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1995).
The underlying unlawful act Sharla claims occurred in this case was
fraud. The prima facie elements of fraud are: (1) a representation or, where there is
a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact; (2) which is material to the transaction at
hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and
recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred; (4) with
the intent of misleading another into relying upon it; (5) justifiable reliance upon
the representation or concealment; and (6) a resulting injury proximately caused by
the reliance. Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St.3d 54, 55 (1987), citing
Burr v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 23 Ohio St.3d 69 (1986), paragraph two of the syllabus,
and Cohen v. Lamko, Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d 167 (1984).
Even construing Sharla’s allegations in her favor, she failed to allege
any supported facts to establish a fraud claim against Fields. See Morrow v.
Reminger & Reminger Co. LPA, 2009-Ohio-2665 ¶ 7 (10th Dist.) (A court need not accept as true any unsupported and conclusory legal propositions advanced in a
complaint.). Based on our de novo review and viewing the allegations in the
complaint in favor of Sharla, including the documents incorporated by reference and
attached to the complaint, we find that the complaint against Fields failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Throughout her complaint, Sharla
expresses her dissatisfaction with the way in which Jenkins’s estate was
administered in the Cuyahoga County Probate Court. However, she does not
identify any false representation or concealment of fact made knowingly or
recklessly by Fields on which Sharla justifiably relied to her detriment. The trial
court did not err in granting Fields’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.
Regarding the dismissal on the ground of res judicata, we note that
“[r]es judicata is an affirmative defense. Civ.R. 8(C). It is not included in the list of
defenses that may be raised in a Civ.R. 12(B) motion to dismiss.” Jefferson v.
Bunting, 2014-Ohio-3074, ¶ 10; see also State ex rel. Freeman v. Morris, 62 Ohio
St.3d 107, 109 (1991) (“[T]he defense of res judicata may not be raised by motion to
dismiss under Civ.R. 12 (B).”). “The Freeman rule is consistent with the general
proposition that courts cannot rely on evidence or allegations outside the complaint
to decide a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.” Jefferson at ¶ 11. Thus, res judicata
was not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint. However, the dismissal was proper on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1 Thus, Sharla’s sole
assignment of error is without merit and hereby overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
1 “Our judicial system relies on the principle of party presentation, and courts
should ordinarily decide cases based on issues raised by the parties.” Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-4989, ¶ 15, citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008). Fields’s motion to dismiss was based, in part, on failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for the reasons stated herein dismissal on that ground was proper. Fields did not raise the statute of limitations as a ground for dismissal and, therefore, we decline to consider it.