UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JENIFER ALEXANDRA ROMERO BLANCO,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:26-cv-2173-WWB-SJH
WARDEN, FLAGLER COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Respondents. ___________________________________
ORDER
Petitioner initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1 at 2). Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is currently detaining Petitioner at the Flagler County Jail. (Id. at 1). Petitioner seemingly argues that her mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is unlawful and she is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. (See generally id.). Federal Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 4) with exhibits (Doc. 4-1). According to Federal Respondents, Petitioner is under a final order of removal, and thus her detention falls under the guise of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Doc. 4 at 2–5). They also argue that any Zadvydas claim is premature. (Id. at 4–5). The record shows that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. (Doc. 4-1 at 13–14). As such, § 1225 in inapplicable as Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231; and any challenge to the duration of her detention is subject to the purviews of Zadvydas. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that indefinite detention of aliens raises serious constitutional concerns. Once an order of removal is final, ICE should make every effort to remove the alien within a reasonable time. 533 U.S. at 701. The Court also concluded that six months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation. Id. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90
days thereafter.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). The “removal period” begins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date on which the order of removal becomes administratively final; (2) “[i]f the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order”; or (3) “[i]f the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a)-(f) (outlining the procedural circumstances that render a removal order final). The Attorney General must detain an alien during his removal period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).
After that six-month period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the Government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. The Court notes that district courts are split as to when the six-month period begins. Some courts have determined that each period of detention restarts the removal- period clock. See, e.g., Da Wu v. Ripa, No. 3:25-cv-1254 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2026); Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-cv-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (rejecting a petitioner’s argument “that his detention should be counted in the aggregate based upon
his prior detentions”); Liu v. Carter, No. 25-3036, 2025 WL 1207089, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2025) (“[T]he removal-period clock restarts when an alien subject to a removal order is again detained by ICE.”); Leybinsky v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 10 CIV. 5137, 2013 WL 132544, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013) (collecting cases), vacated as moot, 553 F. App’x 108 (2d Cir. 2014). Other courts have considered the aggregate of all periods of a petitioner’s detention/re-detention following an order of removal, regardless of any intervening periods of release (i.e., parole, bond, supervision). See, e.g., Jaranow v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-02396, 2026 WL 35864, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2026) (collecting cases from the Ninth Circuit that “have found that the six-month period of detention need
not be consecutive to reach the limit established in Zadvydas”); Patel v. Bondi, No. CV 25-16218, 2025 WL 3294353, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2025) (finding that the court must “consider the entire period of [the p]etitioner’s detention”—not just the length of the current detention). This Court believes that aggregating any possible past period of detention is not appropriate, and thus irrelevant to today’s ruling. Indeed, if the Court were to find otherwise, that approach would present a perpetual “get-out-of-jail-free” card to any detainee whose cumulative prior detention exceeds six months. See Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of United States, No. 4:14-CV-42, 2018 WL 1321576, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018). Moreover, “adjudicating the constitutionality of every re-detention would obstruct an area that is in the discretion of the Attorney General—effectuating removals.” Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8. Thus, this Court considers only the current detention when determining whether the presumptively reasonable six-month period has passed. To that end, while it is unclear if and when ICE detained Petitioner for any period before her present detention,
that fact is immaterial to the Court’s analysis. Here, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed on March 9, 2026. (Doc. 4-1 at 13–14). She did not seek an appeal of the order, so Petitioner’s removal order became final on that same day. The record shows that the Largo Police Department arrested Petitioner on May 15, 2026, and ICE took Petitioner into custody on June 18, 2026. (Doc. 4-1 at 2). At the time Petitioner filed the Petition on August 17, 2026, she had been in post-removal-order ICE custody for 60 days (excluding the date on which the Petition was filed). Thus, any claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe and is dismissed without prejudice as premature. Likewise, because Petitioner is within her removal period, she is not entitled to a bond hearing as
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JENIFER ALEXANDRA ROMERO BLANCO,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:26-cv-2173-WWB-SJH
WARDEN, FLAGLER COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Respondents. ___________________________________
ORDER
Petitioner initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1 at 2). Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is currently detaining Petitioner at the Flagler County Jail. (Id. at 1). Petitioner seemingly argues that her mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is unlawful and she is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. (See generally id.). Federal Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 4) with exhibits (Doc. 4-1). According to Federal Respondents, Petitioner is under a final order of removal, and thus her detention falls under the guise of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Doc. 4 at 2–5). They also argue that any Zadvydas claim is premature. (Id. at 4–5). The record shows that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. (Doc. 4-1 at 13–14). As such, § 1225 in inapplicable as Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231; and any challenge to the duration of her detention is subject to the purviews of Zadvydas. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that indefinite detention of aliens raises serious constitutional concerns. Once an order of removal is final, ICE should make every effort to remove the alien within a reasonable time. 533 U.S. at 701. The Court also concluded that six months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation. Id. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90
days thereafter.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). The “removal period” begins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date on which the order of removal becomes administratively final; (2) “[i]f the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order”; or (3) “[i]f the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a)-(f) (outlining the procedural circumstances that render a removal order final). The Attorney General must detain an alien during his removal period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).
After that six-month period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the Government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. The Court notes that district courts are split as to when the six-month period begins. Some courts have determined that each period of detention restarts the removal- period clock. See, e.g., Da Wu v. Ripa, No. 3:25-cv-1254 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2026); Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-cv-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (rejecting a petitioner’s argument “that his detention should be counted in the aggregate based upon
his prior detentions”); Liu v. Carter, No. 25-3036, 2025 WL 1207089, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2025) (“[T]he removal-period clock restarts when an alien subject to a removal order is again detained by ICE.”); Leybinsky v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 10 CIV. 5137, 2013 WL 132544, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013) (collecting cases), vacated as moot, 553 F. App’x 108 (2d Cir. 2014). Other courts have considered the aggregate of all periods of a petitioner’s detention/re-detention following an order of removal, regardless of any intervening periods of release (i.e., parole, bond, supervision). See, e.g., Jaranow v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-02396, 2026 WL 35864, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2026) (collecting cases from the Ninth Circuit that “have found that the six-month period of detention need
not be consecutive to reach the limit established in Zadvydas”); Patel v. Bondi, No. CV 25-16218, 2025 WL 3294353, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2025) (finding that the court must “consider the entire period of [the p]etitioner’s detention”—not just the length of the current detention). This Court believes that aggregating any possible past period of detention is not appropriate, and thus irrelevant to today’s ruling. Indeed, if the Court were to find otherwise, that approach would present a perpetual “get-out-of-jail-free” card to any detainee whose cumulative prior detention exceeds six months. See Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of United States, No. 4:14-CV-42, 2018 WL 1321576, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018). Moreover, “adjudicating the constitutionality of every re-detention would obstruct an area that is in the discretion of the Attorney General—effectuating removals.” Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8. Thus, this Court considers only the current detention when determining whether the presumptively reasonable six-month period has passed. To that end, while it is unclear if and when ICE detained Petitioner for any period before her present detention,
that fact is immaterial to the Court’s analysis. Here, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed on March 9, 2026. (Doc. 4-1 at 13–14). She did not seek an appeal of the order, so Petitioner’s removal order became final on that same day. The record shows that the Largo Police Department arrested Petitioner on May 15, 2026, and ICE took Petitioner into custody on June 18, 2026. (Doc. 4-1 at 2). At the time Petitioner filed the Petition on August 17, 2026, she had been in post-removal-order ICE custody for 60 days (excluding the date on which the Petition was filed). Thus, any claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe and is dismissed without prejudice as premature. Likewise, because Petitioner is within her removal period, she is not entitled to a bond hearing as
her detention is mandatory. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Finally, to the extent Petitioner seeks to raise a freestanding procedural or substantive due process claim, the Court notes that when the Supreme Court confronted the constitutional perils of indefinite immigration detention in Zadvydas, it did not instruct lower courts to start weighing the process afforded to the detainee. It set a timer. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. So, until that timer goes off, Zadvydas itself seemingly supplies the constitutional metric. Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). “In other words, the Zadvydas standard is due process: a § 1231 detainee who fails the Zadvydas test fails to prove a due process violation.” Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 760 (4th Cir. 2024). Thus, any independent due process claim fails. Accordingly, itis ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows: 1. The Petition (Doc. 1) and this case are DISMISSED without prejudice. 2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on September 3, 2026.
WENDY W. B UNITED STAVES T JUDG
Jax-7 C: Jenifer Alexandra Romer Blanco, A245700062 Counsel of record