Jehovah's Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County Hosp.

278 F. Supp. 488

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 20, 1967
• Docket: Civ. 6595
• Status: Published

Opinions

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Before HAMLEY, Circuit Judge, and LINDBERG and BÉEKS, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses, a minority religious group; the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, legal governing agency for the Jehovah’s Witnesses; and individually-named Jehovah’s Witnesses, including minors as well as adults; have brought the above-entitled action on their own behalf and as a class action on behalf of all Jehovah’s Witnesses in the State of Washington. The prayer of the complaint asks that a special three-judge district court be convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284 for the purposes of declaring the legal rights of the plaintiffs and permanently enjoining all defendants, individually and as a class, from administering blood transfusions to plaintiffs in the future, as defendants allegedly have done in the past, in violation of certain constitutional rights of the plaintiffs.

The parties defendant are individually-named Superior Court judges, Juvenile Court employees, hospitals and hospital personnel, and physicians; also physicians named as representatives of a class which includes all medical doctors in the State of Washington who are employed in and paid by public institutions operating directly with funds raised entirely or in part from the taxpayers of the State of Washington, or operating under funds granted to said hospitals by the United States government; physicians named as representatives of a class that includes all medical doctors licensed to practice medicine or surgery in the State of Washington; hospitals named as representatives of a class which includes all hospitals in the State of Washington operated by the state, a county, or by any public hospital district; and hospitals named as representatives of a class which includes all licensed hospitals in the State of Washington excepting the type of “public” hospitals immediately referred to.

The state statute challenged as unconstitutional and giving rise to the request for the special three-judge court is the Juvenile Court Act of the State of Washington, R.C.W. 13.04, and more particularly sections 13.04.010(12) and 13.04.095 of said act. Plaintiffs contend that these particular sections of the act on their face and as applied to the plaintiffs are unconstitutional and invalid. The gist of the plaintiffs’ complaint is that the defendant Superior Court judges pursuant to their authority under the Juvenile Court Act and upon petitions by the defendant doctors or hospital personnel have taken the children of plaintiffs and removed them | from the protection of their parents by having such children declared wards of the court simply because plaintiffs in the exercise of their judgment disagree with the opinions of the defendant physicians and decline to accept blood transfusions for their children.

All defendants have filed and argued motions to dismiss. At the hearing on said motions the court sua sponte raised the question of its jurisdiction to hear the case at bar, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 61 S.Ct. 480, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941), and requested briefs on the jurisdictional issue. After consideration of the briefs the court has concluded to reserve until a hearing on the merits its ruling on the jurisdictional issue as well as other issues raised by the motions to dismiss the Superior Court judges, the physicians, hospitals, and hospital personnel as to the eight cases set forth in the pretrial order No. 1 ¹ and the two cases in the supplemental complaint² wherein court orders were obtained pursuant to R.C.W. 13.04.010(12), declaring the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses wards of the court and permitting blood transfusions to be given to such children.

Before the court for further decision at this time are the motions to dismiss the suit as to the remaining defendants, contentions and issues. The initial issue with respect to these motions is the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court to hear and decide issues related to but in no way directly bearing upon the action challenging on constitutional grounds the application of a state statute.

In pretrial order No. 1 and in the affidavit of Kenneth MacDonald filed for consideration with motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (document 87) plaintiffs delineate four cases³ wherein the constitutional rights of adult Jehovah’s Witnesses are alleged to have been violated, but the contested action was not taken pursuant to the constitutionally-challenged state statute. In the supplemental complaint plaintiffs depict another situation⁴ involving an adult Jehovah’s Witness for whom a guardian was appointed to consent to a blood transfusion which the patient had refused on religious grounds. This alleged violation of constitutional rights likewise did not occur from an act based on the challenged state statute. These additional acts plaintiffs claim are actionable constitutional violations under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1983. The question is whether the three-judge district court may properly hear questions based on violation of the Civil Rights Act.

The three-judge district court is a statutory creature with a limited sphere of operation. It is an extraordinary court and technical requirements relating to its jurisdiction are to be strictly construed. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962); Gate Film Club v. Pesce, 236 F.Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y.1964). Section 2281 of title 28 of the United States Code sets out the jurisdictional limitations binding on a three-judge court: 1) an interlocutory or permanent injunction must be sought; 2) the injunction sought must be one to restrain the action of a state officer or administrative agency; 3) the action sought to be enjoined must consist of the enforcement or execution of a state statute; 4) the injunction must be sought on the ground that the state statute is unconstitutional. Moreover, generally a disputed substantial federal question must be presented. See Bartlett & Co., Grain v. State Corp. Comm. of Kansas, 223 F.Supp. 975 (Kan.1963). The statutory requirements for three-judge court jurisdiction are requirements of substance, not of form. See Wilentz v. Sovereign Camp, 306 U.S. 573, 59 S.Ct. 709, 83 L.Ed. 994 (1939).⁵ Thus, it is specifically stated that the questionable action must be taken in the enforcement or execution of a state statute; the acts of the state which are attacked must be based on the constitutionally-challenged statute.

The policy behind the convening of a three-judge court is that a single-judge ought not to be empowered to invalidate a state statute under a federal claim. It is significant that in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 86 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 194 (1965), although in another context, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized the restrictive interpretation to be given to section 2281 cases, overruling the court’s more liberal holding in Kesler v. Dept. of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 82 S.Ct. 807, 7 L.Ed.2d 641 (1962) as to the cases encompassed by the three-judge procedure. In Wick-ham the court notes that “Section 2281 was designed to provide a more responsible forum for the litigation of suits which, if successful, would render void state statutes embodying important state policies.” (382 U.S. 111, 119, 86 S.Ct. 258, 263, emphasis added). Such policy and the limitations of section 2281 must be considered in appraising the additional issues plaintiffs request the three-judge court to determine.

The issue of whether or not conduct of judges, physicians, hospitals, and hospital personnel is actionable under the Civil Rights Act is not germane in determining the jurisdiction of a three-judge court. The fact that a single district court judge would have jurisdiction to hear questions arising under the Civil Rights Act is not determinative of the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court. The claim that constitutional rights have been violated by state action not based upon or taken pursuant to a specific statute is not, under the wording or a reasonable interpretation of the federal statute, sufficient to vest a three-judge court with the authority to consider the claim. As stated previously, the issues properly posed for determination by a three-judge court arise from the enforcement or execution of a state statute, which is claimed to violate constitutional rights. The questions involving the adult Jehovah’s Witnesses were not and are not predicated on R.C.W. 13.04, or on any other constitutionally-challenged state statute. Nor is it answer enough to say that because a three-judge court is considering constitutional questions arising from actions taken pursuant to the enforcement or execution of a challenged state statute, such court has “pendant” jurisdiction to hear closely-related matters. This court does not intend to depart from the traditional, limited construction of three-judge court jurisdiction. The court as a specially convened three-judge court finds no authority to extend its jurisdiction to questions involving the constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses when the alleged constitutional deprivations did not occur from acts taken pursuant to a challenged state statute.

The court therefore dismisses those aspects of the case not based on acts taken in the enforcement or execution of R.C.W. 13.04.010(12) or 13.04.095.

Orders of dismissal in accordance herewith to be submitted by counsel for the various defendants.

ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM DECISION OF JUNE 8,1967

On June 8, 1967 this court entered its memorandum decision directing dismissal of those aspects of the case which involved only actual or threatened blood transfusion of adults, and reserving until trial of the cause the court’s ruling on (1) the jurisdictional issue raised by Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 61 S.Ct. 480, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941), and (2) motions raised by various defendants for dismissal of the action as to some or all of them. Subsequently plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the court’s memorandum decision insofar as it dismissed from the case the adult blood transfusion instances involving plaintiffs, Evonne Sayers and Martha Ridge.

First, as to the jurisdictional issue. Troubled by the effect of the holding of the supreme court in Phillips,1 and cognizant of the technical construction given to three-judge court statutes² this court sua sponte raised the question as to whether the instant case was properly a special three-judge case. Briefs were requested and submitted on the issue. With regard to the latter question, the court finds the present ease distinguishable from the Phillips case and concludes that this is properly a three-judge court case.

There are two patent distinctions between the Phillips case and the one now before us. In Phillips the supreme court stated that it was “significant” that plaintiff did not, in its pleadings, specifically attack the constitutionality of the Oklahoma state constitutional provisions and statutes granting the Governor power to call out the National Guard. (See 312 U.S. at 252, 61 S.Ct. 480). In our case the pleadings expressly challenge the constitutionality of the state statutes. In Phillips the supreme court characterized that suit as “involving a single, unique exercise” of the powers of the Governor’s office. (See 312 U.S. at 253, 61 S.Ct. 480.) In our case plaintiffs complain of ten or more such acts, extending over a considerable period of time and involving three or more counties.

There is no question but that plaintiffs are purporting to attack statutes of the State of Washington, namely two provisions of the state’s Juvenile Court Law, on federal constitutional grounds. The provisions in question, namely RCW 13.-04.010(12) and RCW 13.04.095, are of statewide application.

These statutes are also mandatory in form. RCW 13.04.010(12) provides, among other things, that for the purpose of the act the words “ ‘dependent child’ shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years: * * * (12) [w]ho is grossly and wilfully neglected as to medical care necessary for his well-being.” (Emphasis supplied) This does not appear to leave any room for an exception in the case of a child who is in fact found to be so neglected, but for religious reasons. RCW 13.04.095 provides that when any child shall be found to be delinquent or dependent, within the meaning of this chapter, the court “shall” make such order for the care, custody, or commitment of the child “as the child’s welfare in the interest of the state require.”

It is true that this statute does not expressly require a court to order a medically-neglected child made a ward of the court so that a blood transfusion may be administered. But where the finding of gross and wilful medical neglect is premised upon a finding that a transfusion is necessary to save life there is probably no order other than to require such a transfusion which would discharge the state judge’s mandatory duty, under RCW 13.04.095, to “make such order for the care, custody, or commitment of the child as the child’s welfare in the interest of the state require.”

In more recent litigation courts have held that a three-judge court is required not only where a state statute is challenged as federally unconstitutional on its face, but also “as applied.” Thus, in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426 (2 Cir. 1961) it was held at page 428 that the district judge should have convened a three-judge court where the complaint challenged the federal constitutionality of a state statute “because of the way that statute was being applied.” And when the same case came before the supreme court sub nom. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 1296, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962) that court stated: “We agree with the Court of Appeals that a three-judge court should have been convened in this case.” ³

In essence, plaintiffs’ complaint here is the same: state judges are applying a statewide statute in a federally unconstitutional manner. In view of this, and without regard to the merits of their position,⁴ we think plaintiffs should not be denied a three-judge court under the Phillips doctrine.

Second, as to the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider the court’s memorandum decision insofar as it directs the dismissal from the case of those defendants charged in relation to the blood transfusions authorized to be administered to adult plaintiffs, Evonne Sayers and Martha Ridge. With respect to these plaintiffs⁵ but not in the other adult cases, court orders were obtained authorizing compulsory blood transfusions, contrary to the religious beliefs of the adults. In its decision of June 8, 1967 this court considered and rejected the proposition that it had “pendent” jurisdiction under the three-judge court procedure to determine the questions raised in the adult cases.⁶ Because this court regards the three-judge court statute as a limitation on federal jurisdiction, and to be strictly construed, the court must, for the reasons propounded in its earlier decision as well as that stated in footnote 6 herein, deny the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider.

Assuming, however, that this court does have pendent jurisdiction to consider the merits of the constitutional issues raised by the compulsory transfusion of adults, the court, in the discretionary exercise of its equity powers, ought not to accord declaratory relief for the future predicated on two isolated instances. Only one county (King County), and only one superior court judge (Judge Robert P. Utter) were involved in the incidents involving plaintiffs, Evonne Sayers and Martha Ridge, both of which occurred in 1966. Even assuming that the two described instances involved violations of the constitution, and that an equitable remedy is otherwise available from this three-judge court, plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing as to the probability that incidents of this kind will reoccur.⁷

Third, as to the motions raised by various defendants for dismissal of the action as to some or all of them.⁸ Defendants, Donald E. Brown and Alan Sola, have moved for dismissal of the action as to them on the ground that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking as to them. The only transfusion incident in which these two defendants are involved pertains to Jeffrey Ward Elam, minor son of plaintiffs Adrian and Patricia Elam.

This boy was injured in an automobile accident and defendant doctors Brown and Sola at first declined to begin necessary surgical procedures. They did so because the parents refused on religious grounds to permit a blood transfusion if, in the course of the operation, the doctors decided that this was necessary. However, Judge Phillip Sheridan, a defendant herein, entered an order finding the child a dependent child and authorized a transfusion if Doctors Brown and Sola thought it necessary. The record does not indicate who petitioned the court for such an order. An operation was then performed and the child recovered without the necessity of a transfusion.

Doctors Brown and Sola argue that, under these circumstances they were not acting under color of state law — an essential element under 42 U.S.C. § 1983— and that in any event there was no deprivation of a constitutional right because no transfusion was actually given.

While the parents had consented to an operation it was performed only when the doctors had an order from a state court authorizing a transfusion if the doctors thought it necessary. In our view the doctors were, in these circumstances, acting under color of state law when they performed the operation. While no transfusion was given, the court order was entered and the doctors proceeded with the operation under authority of that order, contrary to the religious objections of the parents.

This was enough to meet the jurisdictional requirement of a claimed deprivation of a constitutional right, whether or not a transfusion was actually given. It should also be noted that Doctors Brown and Sola must remain as defendants for the independent reason that they, among others, are named as representatives of a class of medical doctors. (Pretrial Order No. 2, page 35)

The motion of defendants Brown and Sola for dismissal of the action as to them, because of lack of jurisdiction, is denied.

Pursuant to the June 8,1967 memorandum decision, plaintiffs have made no mention in pretrial order No. 2 (which order contains the admitted and disputed facts as to each instance relied upon by plaintiffs) of the instance of adult transfusion involving plaintiffs Eugene and Jean Alicki and of defendants St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Hospital and Carter Swanson, M.D., who were concerned only with the Alicki incident and, in the case of the hospital, another dismissed incident involving an adult. Similarly, plaintiffs have made no mention in pretrial order No. 2 of the instance of adult transfusion involving plaintiffs Joseph G. and Shirley L. Chabot and defendant John Caputo, M.D., who were concerned only with the Chabot instance. It follows that the action should be dismissed as to the defendants St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Hospital, Carter Swanson, M.D., and John Caputo, M. D., and it is so ordered.

The action may also be regarded as abandoned, and is therefore ordered dismissed as to a number of persons named in the complaint or supplemental complaint as defendants, but as to whom no grievance is stated in pretrial order No. 2. Falling in this category are F. W. Fells, Business Manager of Firlands Sanatorium; Swedish Hospital; Doctor’s Hospital; Group Health Hospital; Everett Clinic, Inc.; Walla Walla General Hospital; Edwin Brockenbrough, M.D.; Jerry De Groot, M.D.; Richard Haugen, M.D.; Fred J. Jarvis, M.D.; Alfred Ma-gar, M.D.; H. F. Newman, M.D.; Thomas W. Skalley, M.D.; Franklin Smith, M. D.; Edward Powers, M.D.; Quay Cut-shall, M.D.; and George Postill.

The other motions denominated motions for dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction are, in actuality, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We deal with the questions raised by these motions as a part of our consideration of the case on its merits.

1 . Retained in the action until a hearing on the merits are the following parties:

Plaintiffs: Norman C. and Carolyn May-dole and Russell Scott Maydole; and

Defendants: Franklin Kells, M.D.; Donald B. Fager, M.D.; Judge Lawrence Leahy.

Plaintiffs: Laurin and Geraldine Seelye and Bradley Scott Seelye; and

Defendants: Robert F. Miller, M.D.; Judge William G. Long.

Plaintiffs: Clifford and Joyce Burnitt and Thomas Allen Burnitt; and

Defendants: University of Washington Hospital; Loren Winterschied; Judge William G. Long.

Plaintiffs: Arian W. and Beatrice Elam and Jeffrey Ward Elam; and

Defendants: Stevens Memorial Hospital, Edmonds, Washington; Donald E. Brown, M.D.; Allen Sola, M.D.; Judge Phillip Sheridan.

Plaintiffs: James and Plelen Lawrence and Heidi Jo Lawrence; and

Defendants: University of Washington Hospital; Lloyd Nyhus, M.D.; Carl B. Erickson; Judge Theodore S. Turner.

Plaintiffs: Jack and Hazel Pen and Michael Pen; and

Defendants: Robert A. Aldrich; Warren Guntheroth; John Allen; Judge William G. Long.

Plaintiffs: Olite and Azell Smith and. Jeanetter Smith; and

Defendants: King County Hospital Unit No. 1 (Harborview); Robert F. Miller, M.D.; Judge Robert F. Utter.

Plaintiffs: Richard and Bernice Brock-man and Sharilyn Brockman; and

Defendants: J. D. Klein, M.D.; Judge Thomas G. Jordan.

2 . Also retained are the following parties:

Plaintiffs: Neil and Patsy Nichol and Geri Lynn Nichol; and

Defendants: Lester Sauvage, M.D.; Jack Docter, M.D.; Children’s Orthopedic Hospital and Medical Center; Judge Robert F. Utter.

Plaintiffs: Gene and Donna Hardy and Loren Hardy; and

Defendants: Quay Cutshall, M.D.; Children’s Orthopedic Hospital and Medical Center; Judge Walter T. McGovern.

3 . The cases involve plaintiffs, Eugene and Jean Alicki; plaintiffs, Joseph G. and Shirley L. Chabot; plaintiffs, Richard D. ■ and Doris Jean Russell; plaintiff, Evonne Sayers.

4 . The case involves plaintiff, Martha Ridge.

5 . The Supreme Court in Wilentz was applying the predecessor to section 2281; the court was asked to decide whether the suit brought met the statutory prerequisites — that is, was it a suit for an injunction “restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of any statute of a State by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute, or in the enforcement or execution of an order made by an administrative board or commission”? (306 U.S. at 579, 59 S.Ct. at 713.) In deciding that the case before it was not the kind of case encompassed by the statute, the court noted that the statute sharply and specifically defined the class of cases for the extraordinary three-judge procedure and jurisdiction could not be extended to include cases not satisfying the stated limitations.

1 . In Phillips, the Grand River Dam Authority, a state agency, was empowered to construct the Grand River Dam and to borrow money and accept grants from the United States for such purposes. Construction of the project was begun, using money borrowed and grants accepted from the United States. During the construction, state roads were flooded and attempts by the Governor to recover from the state agency on claims resulting from the flooding of the roads were unsuccessful. The Governor later declared martial law in an area surrounding a part of the damsite and ordered the State Adjutant General to occupy it. Acting in conjunction with other state officials the Governor then obtained in a state court an ex parte order restraining further work on the dam by the Grand River Dam Authority. At this point the United States commenced an action in the federal district court to enjoin the Governor and other state officials from interfering with the Grand River Dam construction project. A three-judge district court was convened and an injunction in favor of the United States was issued by the special court. On appeal, the supreme court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking, held that this was not the proper case for convening a three-judge court because the jurisdictional prerequisites had not been met.

2 . See Memorandum Decision of June 8, 1967, pages 491-494. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) the supreme court upheld the power of a federal trial judge to enjoin the Minnesota attorney general from enforcing a railroad rate statute found to violate due process. The effect of the decision was to bring acts of state officers within the scope of federal judicial review and to subject the states to the restrictions of the federal constitution in situations where they might otherwise ignore it. See Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts (1963), page 160. The doctrine led to the nullification of state legislative attempts to cope with the increasing needs of a burgeoning industrial society when a single federal judge would issue an injunction invalidating a particular state regulatory statute. Limitations on federal jurisdiction in such circumstances were essential to preserve the proper alloeation of power between the United States and the several states, which is at the heart of a federal system. Exhaustion of state remedies before challenging the state action in a federal forum was one limitation. The creation of the three-judge court procedure to handle constitutional attacks on state statutes was another. It was the belief in Congress that there would be less public resentment where the enforcement or operation of the state statute attacked on federal constitutional grounds was stayed by a court of three judges, at least one of whom was a circuit court judge, and the decision of such court was directly appealable to the supreme court.

3 . See also, Kesler v. Dept. of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 157, 82 S.Ct. 807, 7 L.Ed.2d 641, overruled on other grounds in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 86 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 194 (1965) ; Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486, 489, 62 S.Ct. 1122, 86 L.Ed. 1616 (1942); Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 361, 60 S.Ct. 947, 84 L.Ed. 1249 (1940); “The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,” David P. Currie, 32 Univ. of Chicago Law Review, 1, 43. But see Maison v. Confederated Tribes, etc. (9 Cir. 1963) 314 F.2d 169, 170, footnote 1.

4 . With respect to the merits of the case, see the court’s opinion filed herewith.

5 . Both Evonne Sayers and Martha Ridge were suffering from vaginal bleeding. Each had refused blood transfusions and had in fact signed a written document releasing the hospital and doctor from any liability for any injury to her arising from a failure to give her a blood transfusion. Each woman is the mother of five children. In the Ridge instance the court appointed a guardian on the petition of the hospital without giving any notice to her of the proceeding involving her. In fact, Mrs. Ridge first heard of the matter on a radio news broadcast the day after the order had been entered. The court appointed a guardian over Mrs. Sayers on the petition of the patient’s mother despite the patient’s refusal and the refusal of her husband to consent to the blood transfusions. In each case the consent was given by the guardian. In the Ridge instance no transfusion was actually given. In the Sayers instance, a blood transfusion was given.

In the Ridge case, the court noted:

“The interest of the state in preserving the life of the mother for the benefit of the minor children of the ward outweighs the constitutional prohibition against interfering with the free exercise of her religious beliefs.” (Pretrial order No. 2, page 29b).

In the Sayers case the court noted:

“The Constitutional right to the free practice of religion is not absolute but must be balanced against other rights, such as the right of children of tender years to have a good and loving parent. * * * The medical control of one’s body is not absolute but relative when there are minor children dependent upon the survival of the adult.” (Pretrial order No. 2, pages 32 and 33).

6 . In support of their motion for reconsideration of the two adult cases, plaintiffs cite Louisville and Nashville Railroad v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 34 S.Ct. 48, 58 L.Ed. 229 (1913); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53 S.Ct. 190, 77 L.Ed. 275 (1932); and Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 80 S.Ct. 568, 4 L.Ed.2d 568 (1960). While these cases upon casual examination appear to support plaintiffs’ contention of pendent jurisdiction of this court to consider the adult cases of Sayers and Ridge, a careful consideration of the cases (including the district court opinion in Constantin v. Smith, D.C., 57 F.2d 227) indicates that the supreme court in using language such as :

“The jurisdiction of the District Court so constituted (three-judge district court) * * * extends to every question involved, whether of state or federal law, and enables the court to rest its judgment on the decision of such of the questions as in its opinion effectively dispose of the case.” (Sterling v. Constantin, supra, 287 U.S. pages 393-394, 53 S.Ct. page 193).

was not referring to issues or claims that did not arise directly or indirectly because of action taken by virtue of the state statute under attack. In other words, as indicated by the court in the Florida Lime case, 362 U.S. pages 80 and 84, 80 S.Ct. 568, a three-judge district court has jurisdiction over all-claims —state or federal — raised against the Statute, but no jurisdiction over related matters not in some way challenging the statute.

While the Sayers and Ridge cases involve Jehovah’s Witnesses against whom court orders were entered authorizing blood transfusions over their objections on religious grounds, neither the court orders nor any other action of the defendants were related to or involved the Juvenile Court Law here under attack. Because this court so construes its authority under section 2281, it must for the reasons stated in its June 8, 1967 Memorandum Decision, pages 3 to 6, deny the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider the court’s dismissal of plaintiffs, Evonne Sayers and Martha Ridge.

Furthermore, the court having decided on the merits that plaintiffs are entitled to no relief under their principal action attacking the state statute, there would be no occasion to exercise pendent jurisdiction with respect to plaintiffs’ adult cases.

7 . In this connection, see the court’s Opinion filed herewith, dated November 20, 1967.

8 . The unopposed motions of defendants, Bert DeGroot, M.D., Robert Olson, M.D., and John P. Mucklestone, that the action be dismissed as to them were granted before the. trial commenced. During the trial the court granted the motion to dismiss defendants, Everett General Hospital, Alfred Muller and James P. Hunter on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over said parties.