Jeffries v. Traverlers Property Casualty

District Court, D. Maryland·Decided April 19, 2022·No. 8:21-cv-01128·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND (SOUTHERN DIVISION)

) MONICA JEFFRIES, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Case No. GLS-21-1128 ) TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY, ) ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before this Court is a motion filed by the Plaintiff, Monica Jeffries (the “Plaintiff”), entitled “The Above Matter Was Dismissed in Erro This Matter Should Be Remanded Back to this Court (sic).” (ECF No. 37). For simplicity’s sake, this Court will refer to Plaintiff’s motion as “the Motion.” On March 16, 2022, this Court ordered the Defendant Travelers Property Casualty (“the Defendant”) to file a response, and the Defendant complied. (ECF No. 42). The issues have been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND On May 7, 2021, Pro Se Plaintiff Jeffries, a Maryland resident, filed this action against Travelers Property Casualty. (ECF No. 1). An earlier memorandum opinion issued by this Court outlines the history of this case, which need not be repeated here. (ECF No. 35, pp. 1-2). On January 25, 2022, the Court issued its memorandum opinion and order granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint filed by the Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 35, 36). That memorandum opinion and order clearly articulate the Court’s rationale for dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, namely that Plaintiff failed to persuade this Court that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.). On March 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. (ECF No. 37). Although not clearly articulated, Plaintiff appears to be seeking leave to file a Complaint in order to name new

defendants. As set forth more fully herein, what remains unclear is whether Plaintiff intends for Defendant Travelers to remain in this action. In support of the motion, Plaintiff first invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1447 when asking this court to “remand” her case back to federal court from the District Court of Maryland (“state court”), where she filed suit against the Defendant and others on or about March 4, 2022. (ECF Nos. 3, p.1; 42- 1). Plaintiff further states that she “seeks to open a new case before this Court,” based on “negligence, quantum Merit, unjust enrichment and Bad Faith insurance claim.” (ECF No. 37, pp. 2-3). In essence, Plaintiff contends that this Court does have jurisdiction to entertain her claims, which she now seemingly asserts are not just against Defendant Travelers, but are also against the

following three proposed defendants: “American Properties, LLC,” “Michael Leasing Property Management Company,” and “Properties at Andrews Air Force Base,” the latter of which Plaintiff also refers to as “American Properties at Andrews.” (ECF No. 37, pp. 2-3; ECF No. 37-1, p.1). For simplicity’s sake, the Court will refer to these three proposed defendants as “the New Defendants” and to the prior defendant as “Defendant Travelers.” In support of her motion, Plaintiff generally asserts that diversity of citizenship exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). (Id.). On April 5, 2022, the Defendant filed its response, in which Defendant advances two arguments.1 First, that to the extent that Plaintiff still wishes to pursue a direct action against the Defendant, that action remains precluded due to this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Second, that Plaintiff’s purported amended complaint does not establish that diversity of

citizenship exists. Specifically, for the entity that Plaintiff calls “American Properties at Andrews,” the owner of the Andrews Manor Shopping Center, where the alleged incident occurred, is actually a Maryland limited liability company called “American Properties at Andrews Manor, LLC.” Thus, there is no diversity of citizenship. (ECF No. 42, pp. 1-3). II. DISCUSSION As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s reliance upon 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) to be misplaced. Section 1447(c) has no application to this case. Section 1447(c) is the mechanism by which a case can be remanded from federal court back to state court, if a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (emphasis added). Put another way, if a complaint is originally filed in state court, and then the case is removed to federal court, Section 1447(c) comes into play if a

party requests that the case go back to state court. See 28 U.S.C. §1447(c); see generally Marchese v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 917 F. Supp. 2d 452, 459 (D. Md. 2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for remand is DENIED. Next, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this Court’s earlier decision finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction in her “direct action” case against Defendant Travelers, that request is denied. Any motion to alter or amend this court’s January 25, 2022 judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is untimely, having been filed 22 days after the deadline for filing a motion to amend or alter the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)(a motion to amend must be

1 The Court will construe the response as a request to file a motion to dismiss. filed no later than 28 days after entry of judgment). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Alternatively, Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint2 against Defendant Travelers remains deficient. Where, as here, Plaintiff fails to establish that she has obtained a

judgment against the wrongdoer, no subject matter jurisdiction exists against Defendant Travelers. (See ECF No. 35). Accordingly, any request to file a Second Amended Complaint involving Defendant Travelers is DENIED. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff seeks to file a Complaint only against the New Defendants, this Court’s analysis begins with the civil pleading rules. Specifically, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must “contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of Rule 8(a) is to provide a defendant with “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). It is true that one court is this District has held that “federal pleading rules ‘do not

countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.’” Lewis-Davis v. Baltimore County Public Schools Infants& Toddlers Program, et al., Civ. No. ELJ 20-0423, 2021 WL 1720235, at *7 (Apr. 30, 2021)(quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014)). And, this Court is aware that Plaintiff proceeds here pro se, so this Court will liberally construe her proposed complaint against the New Defendants and “[hold it] to less stringent standards than [pleadings] filed by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, the law is clear that a pro se Plaintiff must still plead a “plausible claim.” Bey v.

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