Jeffrey S. Amick v. Director of Revenue

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: April 15, 2014
• Docket: SC93742
• Status: Published

Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc

Jeffrey S. Amick, ) ) Appellant, ) ) vs. ) No. SC93742 ) Director of Revenue, ) ) Respondent. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County Honorable Thomas J. Prebil, Judge

Opinion issued April 15, 2014

Jeffrey Amick appeals a judgment dismissing his petition for limited driving

privileges pursuant to section 302.309. 1 Amick asserts that section 302.309.3(6)(b)

violates the equal protection clause because the statute disqualifies individuals with a

felony conviction involving a motor vehicle from obtaining limited driving privileges.

Amick’s equal protection argument is premised on a comparison with section

302.309.3(9), which allows graduates of, or participants in, statutorily authorized DWI

court divisions or programs to obtain such privileges. Amick asserts that the differential

treatment is unconstitutional. It is not. Neither section 302.309.3(6)(b) nor section

302.309.3(9) violates equal protection because allowing DWI court graduates and

participants the opportunity to obtain limited driving privileges while denying the same

1 All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2013. opportunity to non-participants is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in

protecting the public from drunken drivers. The judgment is affirmed.

FACTS

The St. Louis County circuit court convicted Amick of felony driving while

intoxicated. As a result of the felony conviction, the director of revenue suspended

Amick’s driving privileges for a minimum of 10 years beginning in November 2008.

In August 2013, Amick filed a petition for limited driving privileges. The director

filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that Amick’s felony conviction made him statutorily

ineligible for limited driving privileges pursuant to section 302.309.3(6)(b). Amick

denied he was statutorily ineligible. He further alleged that, if his driving privileges were

not reinstated, he would argue on appeal that section 302.309.3 violates the equal

protection clause of the state and federal constitutions. The circuit court determined that

Amick was statutorily ineligible for limited driving privileges pursuant to section

302.309.3(6)(b) due to his felony conviction. The court dismissed Amick’s petition.

Amick appeals. He asserts that section 302.309.3 violates equal protection by

allowing DWI court participants and graduates to obtain reinstatement of limited driving

privileges while denying a similar opportunity to non-participants. As established below,

there is no equal protection violation.

ANALYSIS

There are two steps to an equal protection analysis. State v. Young, 362 S.W.3d

386, 397 (Mo. banc 2012). The first step requires a court to identify the classification at

issue to ascertain the appropriate level of scrutiny. Id. If the challenged law draws a distinction on the basis of a suspect classification, such as race, or curtails the exercise of

a fundamental right, then strict scrutiny applies. Id. If the challenged law makes a

gender-based classification, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny. Comm. for Educ.

Equality v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 496, n.4 (Mo. banc 2009). If there is no suspect

classification or fundamental right at issue, a court will apply rational-basis review to

determine whether the challenged law is rationally related to some legitimate end.

Young, 362 S.W.3d at 397.

The second step of the analysis requires the application of the appropriate level of

scrutiny to the challenged statute. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211 (Mo. banc

2006). Section 302.309.3 does not classify on the basis of race, national origin, gender

or any other arbitrary personal characteristic. The statute limits the driving privilege, but

driving is not a fundamental right. See Williams v. Schaffner, 477 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Mo.

banc 1972) (a driver’s license “is a privilege or a qualified right that is subject to

suspension or revocation as may be provided by law on any ground that would justify a

refusal to issue a license in the first instance ….”); Stewart v. Director of Revenue, 702

S.W.2d 472, 475, n.2 (Mo. banc 1986). Section 302.309.3 does nothing more than

regulate those individuals who are eligible for driving privileges without reference to any

suspect classification or limitation on any fundamental right. Amick’s claim, therefore,

is subject to rational-basis review.

When applying rational-basis review, this Court presumes that a statute has a

rational basis, and the party challenging the statute must overcome this presumption by a

“clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.” Foster v. St. Louis County, 239 S.W.3d

3 599, 602 (Mo. banc 2007) (quoting Fust v. Attorney General for the State of Missouri,

947 S.W.2d 424, 432 (Mo. banc 1997)). Rational-basis review does not question “the

wisdom, social desirability or economic policy underlying a statute,” and a law will be

upheld if it is justified by any set of facts. Comm. for Educ. Equality, 294 S.W.3d at 491

(quoting Mo. Prosecuting Attorneys & Circuit Attorneys Ret. Sys. v. Pemiscot County,

256 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Mo. banc 2008). Instead, rational-basis review requires the

challenger to “show that the law is wholly irrational.” City of St. Louis v. State, 382

S.W.3d 905, 913 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Treadway v. State, 988 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo.

banc 1999)).

The state has a legitimate interest in promoting public safety. This interest

includes the regulation of drivers’ licenses on the basis of convictions for driving while

intoxicated. See, e.g., Williams,477 S.W.2d at 57 (the state, “under its police power …

may revoke an operator’s license after a conviction for operating an automobile while

intoxicated”). In this case, there is a rational relationship between the state’s legitimate

interest in promoting public safety and the decision to permit DWI court graduates and

participants to obtain reinstatement of driving privileges on different terms than non-

participants. The legislature rationally could determine that DWI court participants are

less likely to reoffend and, therefore, pose less of a risk to public safety than offenders

who do not participate. The legislature also rationally could determine that providing an

opportunity for reinstatement of driving privileges could incentivize offenders to obtain

treatment and abstain from driving while intoxicated. The classification drawn in section

4 302.309.3 between DWI court participants and non-participants is rationally related to the

state’s legitimate interest in promoting public safety.

Amick also argues that the state could achieve its public safety goals by

establishing other programs or using alternative means, such as ignition devices that

prevent an intoxicated individual from starting a vehicle. These measures and many

others may be effective. However, “[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative

arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Bert v.

Director of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Mo. banc 1996) (quoting Madden v.

Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)). Amick’s argument that there are alternative means to

achieve the state interest in public safety does not undermine the rationality of allowing

graduates and participants in DWI court programs to obtain limited driving privileges

while denying that opportunity to non-participants. Amick has not established that

section 302.309.3 violates his right to equal protection.

The judgment is affirmed. 2

______________________________________ Richard B. Teitelman, Judge

All concur.

2 Amick also asserts that the statutes discriminate on the basis of poverty because he could not afford to participate in the DWI court program. This argument fails because Amick’s factual assertions are not in the record that was presented to the trial court. This Court reviews the factual record presented to the trial court.