Jeffrey Gray v. D. Runnels

Ninth Circuit

Jeffrey Gray v. D. Runnels

441 F. App'x 420

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 29, 2011

Docket09-15635

StatusUnpublished

This text of 441 F. App'x 420 (Jeffrey Gray v. D. Runnels) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Jeffrey Gray v. D. Runnels, 441 F. App'x 420 (9th Cir. 2011).

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*421 MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Jeffery Dee Gray appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We dismiss.

Gray essentially contends that his lawyer’s prediction that he would be paroled within six to ten years of his 1990 guilty plea was an enforceable part of his plea agreement that was breached by the Board of Prison Terms’s (“Board”) denial of parole in 2001. He also contends that his plea agreement was either void or voidable on principles of state contract law, in light of the state’s shift towards a practice of granting parole in murder cases only rarely. Gray did not seek a certificate of appealability (“COA”) because, at the time of his notice of appeal, it was not yet established as a matter of circuit law that a COA was required in cases challenging the denial of parole. See Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc), overruled, in other respects by Swarthout v. Cooke, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) (per curiam).

In order for a COA to issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), it must be the case that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.... ” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Given the terms of Gray’s unambiguous oral plea agreement, the state court’s decision rejecting his claims was neither contrary to nor an objectively unreasonable application of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). See Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2003) (recognizing federal due process right to enforcement of oral plea agreement but noting that terms of an unambiguous oral agreement may not be contradicted by parol evidence). Moreover, Gray has pointed to no case supporting the proposition that his various arguments grounded in principles of state contract law give rise to a violation of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

DISMISSED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-p.

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*421 MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Jeffery Dee Gray appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We dismiss.

Gray essentially contends that his lawyer’s prediction that he would be paroled within six to ten years of his 1990 guilty plea was an enforceable part of his plea agreement that was breached by the Board of Prison Terms’s (“Board”) denial of parole in 2001. He also contends that his plea agreement was either void or voidable on principles of state contract law, in light of the state’s shift towards a practice of granting parole in murder cases only rarely. Gray did not seek a certificate of appealability (“COA”) because, at the time of his notice of appeal, it was not yet established as a matter of circuit law that a COA was required in cases challenging the denial of parole. See Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc), overruled, in other respects by Swarthout v. Cooke, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) (per curiam).

In order for a COA to issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), it must be the case that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.... ” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Given the terms of Gray’s unambiguous oral plea agreement, the state court’s decision rejecting his claims was neither contrary to nor an objectively unreasonable application of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). See Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2003) (recognizing federal due process right to enforcement of oral plea agreement but noting that terms of an unambiguous oral agreement may not be contradicted by parol evidence). Moreover, Gray has pointed to no case supporting the proposition that his various arguments grounded in principles of state contract law give rise to a violation of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

DISMISSED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-p.

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