Jeffrey Crosby v. David Shinn

Ninth Circuit

Jeffrey Crosby v. David Shinn

695 F. App'x 275

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 14, 2017

Docket16-55951

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 695 F. App'x 275 (Jeffrey Crosby v. David Shinn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jeffrey Crosby v. David Shinn, 695 F. App'x 275 (9th Cir. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Jeffrey Roy Crosby appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.

Crosby challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding in which he was sanctioned with the disallowance of good conduct time after he was found to have committed the prohibited acts of fighting with another person and possessing a weapon. Crosby maintains that his procedural due process rights were violated during the proceedings and that the evidence supported his statement that he was attacked by another prisoner and only sought to defend himself. The record shows that the disciplinary proceedings complied with the procedural due process requirements delineated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and that “some evidence” supported the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s (“DHO”) decision, see Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). Assuming that Crosby is correct that prisoners have a due process right to present a self-defense claim in prison disciplinary proceedings, the record shows that Crosby was permitted to raise a self-defense claim before the DHO. The DHO considered the claim and rejected it as unsupported. That finding was also supported by “some evidence.” See id.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Crosby’s section 2241 petition; therefore, the dismissal should have been on the merits and with prejudice. See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (section 2241 jurisdiction exists when a federal prisoner “claims that he has been denied good time credits -without due process”), overruled on other grounds by Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). We, therefore, vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition with prejudice.

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Jeffrey Roy Crosby appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.

Crosby challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding in which he was sanctioned with the disallowance of good conduct time after he was found to have committed the prohibited acts of fighting with another person and possessing a weapon. Crosby maintains that his procedural due process rights were violated during the proceedings and that the evidence supported his statement that he was attacked by another prisoner and only sought to defend himself. The record shows that the disciplinary proceedings complied with the procedural due process requirements delineated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and that “some evidence” supported the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s (“DHO”) decision, see Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). Assuming that Crosby is correct that prisoners have a due process right to present a self-defense claim in prison disciplinary proceedings, the record shows that Crosby was permitted to raise a self-defense claim before the DHO. The DHO considered the claim and rejected it as unsupported. That finding was also supported by “some evidence.” See id.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Crosby’s section 2241 petition; therefore, the dismissal should have been on the merits and with prejudice. See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (section 2241 jurisdiction exists when a federal prisoner “claims that he has been denied good time credits -without due process”), overruled on other grounds by Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). We, therefore, vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition with prejudice.

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

695 F. App'x 275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeffrey-crosby-v-david-shinn-ca9-2017.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack