Jefferson Cty. v. O'Rorke

394 So. 2d 937
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedFebruary 20, 1981
Docket79-827
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 394 So. 2d 937 (Jefferson Cty. v. O'Rorke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jefferson Cty. v. O'Rorke, 394 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1981).

Opinions

Plaintiffs-Appellees Thomas S. O'Rorke, Marion Bradford, Kidd W. Reid, Jack E. *Page 938 Held and C. Ray Dudley filed an application on September 19, 1979, for rezoning of property which they own in the Blue Lakes Estates (Cahaba Heights area) of Jefferson County, Alabama. The subject property consists of 17 acres, located in the southeast guadrant of the intersection of Interstate Highway 459 and U.S. Highway 280 in southeast Jefferson County. Prior to the application, the property was zoned under two classifications: 11 acres as A-1 (Agriculture); and 6 acres as R-1 (single-family Residential). Appellees' application requested that the property be rezoned to C-P (Commercial Preferred).

A hearing before the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, an advisory commission to the Jefferson County Commission, was scheduled for October 11, 1979. Prior to the hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission, a field and engineering report was submitted to that body on October 8, 1979. The report noted that access to the property would be off Blue Lake Road, that there were no sewage facilities available to the property and that development of the property could adversely affect nearby residential areas because of drainage problems.

A committee report, containing a staff recommendation prepared by three zoning commission staff members, was also submitted to the planning and zoning body prior to the October 11 hearing. While unanimous in their support for the rezoning request, the staff members noted that their position was subject to change in light of information to be presented at subsequent public hearings.

On October 11, 1979, the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission held a hearing on the proposed rezoning. Subsequently, the Commission recommended that Appellees' application be denied.

The Jefferson County Commission reviewed the case on November 13, 1979. At that time, the County Commission had before it the Field and Engineering report, the staff committee report, the recommendation of the Planning and Zoning Commission, letters of opposition to the rezoning from nearby property owners, a traffic study done for Appellees and a report from Environmental Health Consultants, Inc. On November 20, 1979, the three-member Jefferson County Commission denied Appellees' request for rezoning by a vote of two-to-one.

Plaintiffs-Appellees thereafter commenced this action on December 17, 1979, in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. On June 17, 1980, the Circuit Court entered a judgment enjoining Appellants from enforcing any zoning classification on Appellees' land more restrictive than that originally sought by Appellees — C-P (Commercial Preferred). The court further found that the County Commission's actions in denying Appellees' rezoning request were arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.

I. Issues Fairly Debatable
A basic axiom of the law in zoning cases is that a trial court will affirm the decision of a duly constituted municipal body so long as the court finds that decision to be based upon a "fairly debatable" rationale. Aldridge v. Grund, 293 Ala. 333, 302 So.2d 847, cert. den. 421 U.S. 1007, 95 S.Ct. 2411,44 L.Ed.2d 676 (1974); Waters v. City of Birmingham, 282 Ala. 104,209 So.2d 388 (1968).

We concede the ease with which this case might be reviewed through a liberal interpretation of the phrase "fairly debatable." However, we are unable to find refuge in Appellees' contentions by hiding under the "fairly debatable" standard. That an issue is "debatable" answers but half of the dichotomy. It must also be "fairly" debatable. Admittedly, any definition of the term "fairly debatable" will be a subjective one as applied to a given fact situation.

Stating the rule is elementary; applying the rule is more demanding. Appellants strongly urge the existence of a "fairly debatable" issue concerning Appellees' proposed "on site" sewage disposal system. Appellants' position is that the prospective uncertainties concerning the intricate operations of such a multifaceted endeavor lend credence to their assertions. Were this to *Page 939 be the case, Appellees would then be faced with a requirement of specifying to Appellants' satisfaction a scheme so complete and so much in detail as to be unassailable against all inquiry. Obviously, this would be impossible.

At the risk of oversimplification, we see this as a situation where failure by Appellees to implement a manageable "on-site" sewage system will leave them with a multimillion dollar office complex outside the purview of accessibility. Stated another way, if the system performs, the structure is operational. If it doesn't, it's not. The mere inability of Appellees to respond in minute detail to every extreme situation hypothesized by Appellants concerning this sewage system does not raise a "fairly debatable" flag. At any rate, the expert testimony adduced on behalf of the landowners is clear to the conclusion that an adequate and workable "on-site" sewer system can be constructed to accommodate the proposed structure pursuant to prescribed health standards.

As to Appellants' arguments concerning increased traffic flow in the area around Appellees' land as well as the lack of commercial development east of U.S. Highway 280, suffice it to say that we have reviewed their contentions on these issues and find them to be without merit. The preponderance of the evidence of record supports the trial court's de novo finding of the absence of any fairly debatable issue.

A close examination of the facts relating to Appellees' property reveals, among other things, the following: 1) Immediately across U.S. Highway 280 from the property is a tract of land consisting of approximately 232 acres zoned C-1 (Commercial) and scheduled for future use as a regional mall-type shopping center and office complex for Southern Services Company; 2) Diagonally across U.S. Highway 280 and I-459 from the property is a 52-acre tract zoned C-P (Commercial Preferred), upon which South Central Bell is presently constructing its future headquarters for its State of Alabama operations; 3) U.S. Highway 280 is a heavily traveled, four-lane highway which furnishes a principal route from north of the City of Birmingham to the southern part of Jefferson County and the State of Alabama and then to Georgia and Florida; 4) Interstate Highway 459 is currently under construction adjacent to the property and, when completed, will serve as the southern by-pass for the Jefferson County interstate system for highway and local traffic moving in an east-west direction around the City of Birmingham; and 5) The noise and vehicular fumes from U.S. Highway 280 and I-459 (when completed) will be extremely heavy.

The trend of the law across the United States seems to be toward a more practical application of the "fairly debatable" rule. The development of interstate highways and busy thoroughfares has considerably changed the residential character of many areas. With this change has come the realization that "outmoded zoning regulations can become unreasonable, and the zoning authority's failure to suitably amend or modify their ordinances can become arbitrary, in which event courts can and should grant appropriate relief." II Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning, 1125 (2d Ed. 1955).

Whether a zoning authority acted reasonably and fairly or capriciously and arbitrarily is always a matter for the courts to determine. Dugan v. City of Jacksonville,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

City of Hoover v. Covenant Bank
251 So. 3d 50 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 2017)
AMERICAN PETROLEUM EQUIP. AND CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. Fancher
708 So. 2d 129 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1997)
Dyas v. City of Fairhope
596 So. 2d 930 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1992)
Rinaldi v. Zon. Plan. Com., Suffield, No. Cv 87-0331492s (Jul. 6, 1990)
1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 253 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1990)
City of Mobile v. Karagan
476 So. 2d 60 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1985)
City of Birmingham v. Tutwiler Drug Co., Inc.
475 So. 2d 458 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1985)
Longshore v. City of Hoover
454 So. 2d 954 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1984)
Hall v. Jefferson County
450 So. 2d 792 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1984)
Byrd Companies, Inc. v. Jefferson County
445 So. 2d 239 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1983)
Woodard v. City of Decatur
431 So. 2d 1173 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1983)
Karagan v. City of Mobile
420 So. 2d 57 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1982)
City of Homewood v. Caffee
400 So. 2d 375 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1981)
City of Birmingham v. Morris
396 So. 2d 53 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1981)
Jefferson Cty. v. O'Rorke
394 So. 2d 937 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
394 So. 2d 937, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jefferson-cty-v-ororke-ala-1981.