Jefferson County, Texas v. Kourtney Hadnot

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 29, 2024
• Docket: 09-23-00052-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-23-00052-CV __________________

JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS, Appellant

V.

KOURTNEY HADNOT, Appellee __________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 172nd District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. E-206,357 __________________________________________________________________

OPINION

This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of Jefferson County’s Plea to

the Jurisdiction. Appellee, Kourtney Hadnot, sued the County claiming personal

injuries from a rear-end collision she alleged was caused by the negligence of Deputy

Sheriff Brittney Nguyen who was operating a County vehicle in the course and scope

of her employment. The County filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction asserting it was

entitled to governmental immunity because Deputy Nguyen was on an emergency

call and reacting to an emergency situation at the time of the accident. The trial court

denied the County’s plea, and the County filed this interlocutory appeal. In one issue 1 with several subparts, the County argues the trial court erred in denying its Plea to

the Jurisdiction. We affirm in part and reverse and render in part.

Governmental Immunity

As a political subdivision of the state, Jefferson County is generally entitled

to governmental immunity which shields the County from lawsuits for damages

unless such immunity has been waived. City of Cleveland v. LaFrance, No. 09-20-

00189-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3892, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, June 9,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004);

see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001(3)(B) (defining

“governmental unit” to include counties). The Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”)

contains a waiver of governmental immunity for certain claims falling within the

statute’s parameters. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001. Under the

TTCA, a governmental unit, such as the County, is liable for personal injuries caused

by the wrongful acts or omissions of a governmental employee acting in the scope

of her employment if the injury arises from the operation of a motor vehicle, and the

employee would be personally liable to the claimant under Texas law. Id. §

101.021(1)(A)(B). However, section 101.055(2) indicates the TTCA’s waiver of

immunity “does not apply to a claim arising [] from the action of an employee while

responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action

is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in

2 the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious

indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Id. § 101.055(2). The

County asserts section 101.055(2) applies in this case and that its immunity from

Hadnot’s claim has not been waived under the TTCA.

“Whether governmental immunity has been waived in a given case implicates

subject-matter jurisdiction.” San Jacinto River Auth. v. City of Conroe, 688 S.W.3d

124, 130 (Tex. 2024). “[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of

Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 1999). “A jurisdictional plea may

challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both.” Alamo Heights

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018).

Standards of Review

When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the plaintiff’s pleadings, the trial

court is required to review the pleadings, construe the pleadings liberally in favor of

the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, and determine whether the plaintiff “has

alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the

cause.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.

2004). If the plaintiff has pleaded facts that affirmatively negate jurisdiction, the trial

court may grant the governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction without allowing the

plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227. However, if the pleadings merely fail

3 to allege facts sufficient to affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction, “the issue is one

of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to

amend.” Id.; see also Tex. Tech. Univ. Sys. v. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. 2024).

When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts,

the trial court must consider evidence, “even if the evidence implicates both subject-

matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770-

71. The standard when considering such a plea generally mirrors the standard for

considering a traditional motion for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 166a(c). Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. The trial court reviews the

evidence and determines whether a fact issue exists. Id. at 227. “If the evidence

creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot

grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact

finder.” Id. at 227-28. “However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to

raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the

jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id.

Here, the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction challenges both the sufficiency of

Hadnot’s pleadings and the existence of facts affirmatively establishing jurisdiction.

The trial court denied the County’s plea, and the County filed an interlocutory appeal

pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). “Subject

matter jurisdiction is a question of law. As a result, an appellate court conducts a de

4 novo review of a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction.” City of Cleveland,

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3892, at *16; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. Because the

County’s jurisdictional plea challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings, we must

review Hadnot’s pleadings to determine whether they affirmatively plead facts

which, if true, invoke the court’s jurisdiction. City of Cleveland, 2022 Tex. App.

LEXIS 3892, at *16-20. And, because the County’s plea also challenges the

existence of jurisdictional facts, we must also review the evidence, and our review

mirrors that of our review of a trial court’s determination of a motion for summary

judgment: “all the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to

determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Town of Shady Shores v.

Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). “[W]e take as true all evidence

favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any

doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of Cleveland, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *18

(citing Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; see also

City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 528-29 (Tex. 2022). “However,

we cannot disregard evidence necessary to show context or evidence and inferences

unfavorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could not do so.” Id.

The County’s Challenge to the Sufficiency of Hadnot’s Pleadings

In the first subpart of the County’s only issue on appeal, the County asserts

the trial court erred in denying its Plea to the Jurisdiction because Hadnot’s live

5 pleading fails to allege facts negating the County’s assertion that section 101.055(2)

applies in this case. A plaintiff suing a governmental unit has the burden to plead

facts that, if true, “affirmatively demonstrate that governmental immunity has been

waived and the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Wolf v. City of Port

Arthur, No. 09-20-00236-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3897, at *4 (Tex. App.–

Beaumont, June 9, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Matzen v. McLane, 659

S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. 2021). “As a general matter, a plaintiff initially discharges

this burden by alleging facts that bring a claim within the waiver. But being ‘within’

the waiver entails both…satisfying the provisions that clearly and affirmatively

waive immunity and negating any provisions that create exceptions to, and thus

withdraw, that waiver.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 867 (Tex.

2023) (emphasis in original).

In her Original Petition, Hadnot alleges section 101.0211 waives the County’s

immunity for her claim, because “Nguyen’s negligent operation of a County owned

1Section 101.021 provides:

A governmental unit in the state is liable for: (1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if:

(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and

6 motor vehicle, while in the course and scope of her employment with the County,

caused [Hadnot’s] personal injuries.” The petition alleges Deputy Nguyen failed to

control her speed, failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to pay proper attention,

failed to timely apply her brakes and failed to maintain a clear and reasonable

distance between the County’s vehicle and Hadnot’s, and that the County is liable

for Deputy Nguyen’s alleged negligence. The petition also alleges, “The collision

occurred because of the recklessness and carelessness of Nguyen, causing severe

and permanent injuries to [Hadnot].” The petition does not allege any facts

indicating whether or not Deputy Nguyen was responding to an emergency call or

reacting to an emergency situation.

In its Second Amended Original Answer, the County alleges “the County

retain[s] its governmental immunity[,]” because “Deputy Nguyen was responding to

an emergency situation of a reckless driver driving on the wrong side of the

roadway.”2 It further alleges,

(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law[.]

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021.

2Section 101.055 provides:

This chapter does not apply to a claim arising: ...

7 At the time of the incident that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s suit, Deputy Nguyen was responding to an emergency call. An emergency call had been put out over the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department’s (“JCSO”) radio system. Soon after the emergency call came into the JCSO’s Dispatch Department, Deputy Nguyen got in her JCSO issued squad vehicle to go to the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office to begin her shift. Once in squad vehicle, she checked in with Dispatch to notify them that she was in her vehicle and available for duty. At that time Deputy Nguyen was notified that a driver of a silver in color, Dodge Ram pickup truck was driving recklessly. Deputy Nguyen was notified that the Dodge Ram pickup truck might be in the area of the City of Beaumont where Deputy Nguyen was then located. Deputy Nguyen then went into service and began looking for the Dodge Ram pickup truck. While responding to foregoing emergency call, the incident in question occurred.

On appeal, the County relies on Maspero and Rattray and argues that the trial

court lacks jurisdiction, not because Hadnot’s petition was insufficient at the time it

was filed, but because Hadnot failed to amend her petition to “expressly negate” the

County’s allegations that Deputy Nguyen was responding to an emergency call or

reacting to an emergency situation. However, as the Texas Supreme Court instructed

in Rattray, “Plaintiffs [] need only expressly negate those exceptions that their

allegations plausibly implicate, which will depend on the nature of the dispute.” Id.

(2) from the action of an employee while responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others[.]

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.055. 8 Nothing in Hadnot’s live pleading plausibly implicates the applicability of either of

the emergency exceptions contained in section 101.055(2).

When the County filed its pleading alleging facts which could make section

101.055(2)’s emergency exceptions applicable, Hadnot was not required to deny the

County’s allegations, because they were already regarded as denied pursuant to

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 82. 3 The effect of Rule 82 is to furnish Hadnot with

a general denial sufficient to join issue on the County’s allegations. Wing v. Hous.

Nat’l Bank, 413 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1967, writ

ref’d n.r.e.); see also generally Unifund CCR Partners v. Watson, 337 S.W.3d 922,

925 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). We decline to hold that Hadnot was

required to amend her live pleading to allege Deputy Nguyen was not responding to

an emergency when Rule 82 requires us to regard Hadnot’s live pleading as generally

denying the County’s allegation that Deputy Nguyen was responding to an

emergency. Our standard of review requires us to construe Hadnot’s pleadings

liberally and to consider her intent. Hadnot’s intent to deny the County’s emergency

allegations is made clear in her Response to Defendant Jefferson County’s Plea to

the Jurisdiction, wherein she repeatedly argues “Deputy Nguyen was NOT

3“The plaintiff need not deny any special matter of defense pleaded by the

defendant, but the same shall be regarded as denied unless expressly admitted.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 82.

9 responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation.” But even if

Maspero and Rattray could be interpreted as requiring Hadnot to amend her live

pleading, her failure to do so would be a mere pleading defect, and the trial court

would have been required to give her the opportunity to replead.4 Miranda, 133

S.W.3d at 226-27.

Without citing Rule 82, our sister court has held that when a plaintiff’s live

pleading does not plausibly implicate the applicability of the emergency exceptions

contained in section 101.055(2), the plaintiff has met its burden to plead

jurisdictional facts, and neither Maspero nor Rattray requires the plaintiff to

expressly deny the governmental unit’s allegation that its employee was reacting to

an emergency. City of Hous. v. Cruz, No. 01-22-00647-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS

9656, at *18-19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

We agree to the extent that a general denial of the governmental unit’s allegations

allows “[b]oth sides [to] develop and introduce evidence to support their

contentions.” Id. at *22 (quoting Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 868). However, to the extent

a plaintiff wishes to go beyond a general denial and establish that section 101.055(2)

is inapplicable either because the employee was not “in compliance with the laws

4We note that the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction was filed after the pleading

deadline but before the dispositive motion deadline in the trial court’s Docket Control Order, and Hadnot’s Response to Defendant Jefferson County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction includes a request for leave to amend. 10 and ordinances applicable to emergency action,” or because the employee acted

“with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others,” the

plaintiff may need to affirmatively allege such facts, because a general denial may

not support the admission of the additional evidence necessary to establish either of

these exceptions. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.055(2).

Hadnot’s live pleading does not assert Deputy Nguyen was violating laws or

ordinances relating to emergencies, but it does assert the collision was caused by

Deputy Nguyen’s “recklessness and carelessness.” However, even when construed

liberally and looking to Hadnot’s intent, the allegation of recklessness is conclusory,

because Hadnot’s petition does not allege any facts amounting to recklessness.

“[R]ecklessness reflects more than a ‘momentary judgment lapse’ and instead

‘requires a showing that the driver committed an act he knew or should have known

posed a high degree of risk of serious injury.’” Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 531 (quoting

Perez v. Webb County, 511 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet.

denied)). Hadnot’s conclusory allegation of “recklessness” does not suffice to meet

her burden to plead facts sufficient to invoke the “reckless disregard” exception

contained in section 101.055(2). Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d

653, 660 (Tex. 2007) (“[C]onclusory allegations of gross negligence are not

sufficient to meet the standard imposed by the recreational use statute[.]”). However,

Hadnot’s conclusory allegation of “recklessness” is a mere pleading defect and

11 would not have justified the granting of the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, even

in part, without allowing Hadnot an opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at

226-27.

We overrule the County’s challenge to Hadnot’s pleadings.

The County’s Challenge to the Existence of Jurisdictional Facts

The County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction argues, “The County has established, as

a matter of law, that, at the time of the incident in question, Deputy Nguyen was on

an emergency call and reacting to an emergency situation and, as such, the County

has retained its immunity as to Plaintiff’s claims.” The exhibits attached to the

County’s plea include the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report and transcripts of the

depositions of Deputy Nguyen and Major Donta Miller, along with the exhibits

attached to those transcripts. Hadnot filed a Response in which she argues, “Deputy

Nguyen was NOT responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency

situation,” and “[b]ased on the evidence, a fact issue exists as to whether Deputy

Nguyen’s operation of the vehicle was reckless, as alleged in Plaintiffs Petition.”

Attached to Hadnot’s Response are the Crash Report and Deputy Nguyen’s

deposition transcript and exhibits. Neither party objected to the other party’s

evidence.

Deputy Nguyen was scheduled to work the night shift beginning at 6:00 p.m

on January 2. Earlier that day, Deputy Nguyen was off-duty and at an apartment

12 complex on Major Drive that is not far from the intersection of Major Drive and

State Highway 105 where the collision occurred. In her deposition, Deputy Nguyen

explained that she had a police radio on her belt which allowed her to overhear radio

traffic between the dispatcher and other officers, and the dispatcher reported that

someone had called in and reported seeing a reckless driver on the wrong side of the

roadway, eastbound on SH 105. When Deputy Nguyen left the parking lot of the

apartment complex, she called the police dispatcher and informed the Sheriff’s

Office that she was “calling in to service.” In a statement Deputy Nguyen provided

the Sheriff’s Office the day the collision occurred, she stated, in part:

I was en-route to the intersection of Major Drive/Hwy 105 in the City of Beaumont to assist other units attempting to locate a reckless driver driving on the wrong side of the roadway. I was at a complete stop in the right[-]hand turn lane of traffic on Major Dr., when I observed a vehicle matching the description of the reckless driver to my left. I looked forward due to traffic moving and took my foot off the brakes. ... The vehicle [in front of me] proceeded to move forward but braked. I did not see the driver of the vehicle hit her brakes due to the heavy rainfall. My unit struck the rear of the [vehicle I was behind].

According to Nguyen’s deposition testimony, she knew when she left the

apartment complex that Deputy Brenda Mosby had been dispatched to investigate

the citizen’s report and that State Trooper Kimberly Ousman was also involved in

responding to the report. However, Deputy Nguyen explained that since she was in

the general area where the reckless driver had been reported to have been, she

13 reported that she was “en route” to be there as a “backup” because she knew “Deputy

Mosby was still a little ways out.”

Deputy Nguyen testified that she considered the dispatcher’s call to have been

an emergency call, and she was responding because she had called into service and

had a duty to act. She further explained that once she called that she was “en route,”

she was “technically dispatched” to the call, although dispatch did not tell her to

respond. Deputy Nguyen agreed that she did not speed down Major Drive to get to

Highway 105, nor did she activate the siren or emergency lights on her squad car to

engage in the search for the reckless driver. Deputy Nguyen explained that when she

arrived at the intersection of Major Drive and SH 105, she had planned to turn right

and pull onto the shoulder to try to intercept the reckless driver if it continued

eastbound on SH 105. According to Deputy Nguyen,

I’m at a complete stop on Major Drive in the turn lane. I am at a complete stop, and I see a vehicle matching the description turning southbound on Major Drive from 105. As I see that, I turn my head back around to see if traffic is clear, and Ms. Hadnot had moved; she started moving her vehicle, so I take my foot off the brake to make sure it’s clear so I could go. And while I’m doing that, because I’m not looking in front of me because I assume she already completely went, I’m about to go because traffic is clear. I didn’t see her hit her brakes, so therefore I tapped the back end of her vehicle.

Deputy Nguyen conceded the potentially matching vehicle was not weaving or

giving any indication of inattentiveness or impairment, but she also testified that had

the accident not occurred, she would have turned around and followed the vehicle to

14 see whether there were any indications of reckless driving. Deputy Nguyen did not

tell dispatch about seeing the potentially matching vehicle at the intersection

“because we don’t have to call in everything right at the second we see it[,]” and she

testified she could not recall if she told Trooper Ousman or Deputy Mosby after the

accident, because at that point, the vehicle was “long gone.”

According to the Crash Report prepared by State Trooper Ousman, Hadnot’s

vehicle “was sitting stationary on Major Drive facing northeast attempting to turn

right onto SH-105.” Deputy Nguyen was operating “a police car[,] in the course of

[her] patrol duties[,]…traveling northeast on Major Drive behind [Hadnot’s

vehicle].” Deputy Nguyen “failed to control [her] speed and struck” Hadnot’s

vehicle from behind. The Crash Report form contains a section allowing the

investigating officer to check a box and provide an explanation if the accident

involves a police, fire or EMS vehicle “on emergency.” Trooper Ousman did not

check the box or provide an explanation, and although her narrative mentions the

fact Deputy Nguyen was on duty, it does not indicate she was responding to an

emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation.

One of the exhibits attached to Deputy Nguyen’s deposition was Jefferson

County Sheriff’s Office’s Communications Event Report which indicates the

dispatcher assigned “Priority: 4” to the citizen’s report of the reckless driver. Deputy

Nguyen agreed there are four priority levels, and Priority 4 is the lowest level.

15 According to Deputy Nguyen, cattle on the side of the road is another example of a

Priority 4 event. Deputy Nguyen agreed that a Priority 4 event, whether it be a

reckless driver or cattle on the road or on the side of the road, is not a situation

requiring immediate police presence. On the other hand, Deputy Nguyen explained

that the priority level assigned by the dispatcher is not communicated to the deputies

in the field.

After the collision occurred, Deputy Nguyen and Hadnot drove their vehicles

to a gas station near the intersection so they would be off the roadway. The evidence

before the trial court indicates that law enforcement never located the reckless driver

or the vehicle.

Major Donta Miller, with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, testified by

deposition in response to a notice requesting that Jefferson County designate a

corporate representative to testify about its policies, procedures, guidelines, rules,

directives, and requirements about emergencies, including those involving a county

employee like Deputy Nguyen. Major Miller testified, “The reckless driver was an

emergency situation.” She also testified that it was the County’s position that Deputy

Nguyen was responding to an emergency call, because “[s]he got a call to a reckless

driver. That call -- a car going down the wrong side of the road [is] deemed an

emergency.” Major Miller explained, “Deputy Nguyen deemed that it was an

emergency call when she heard it come on her radio.” According to Major Miller,

16 “We have to try to get this car located” because a car on the wrong side of the road

can cause “death and destruction.”

The TTCA does not define “emergency call” nor “emergency situation.” See

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001. Yet courts, including this Court, have

interpreted the terms broadly. See City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667,

672-73 (Tex. 2006); City of San Antonio v. Smith, 562 S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2018, pet. denied); Quested v. City of Houston, 440 S.W.3d 275, 284-

85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Jefferson Cnty. v. Hudson, No.

09-11-00168-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6986, at *9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug.

25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). For instance, in Hudson, we explained that as

commonly used, the term “emergency” “refers to unforeseen circumstances that call

for immediate action[,]” and we accepted that as the probable meaning for the term.

Hudson, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6986, at *9. According to the Texas Supreme Court,

the TTCA’s emergency exception should be interpreted broadly to avoid excluding

“emergencies the Legislature might have intended to include.” Hartman, 201

S.W.3d at 673.

There is some evidence from which a jury could find that Deputy Nguyen was

responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation. Deputy

Nguyen and Major Miller both testified as much and explained the rationale for the

County’s position. However, there is also evidence from which a factfinder could

17 reasonably infer that Deputy Nguyen was not responding or reacting to an

emergency at the time of the collision. Neither the Crash Report nor Deputy

Nguyen’s contemporaneous description of the incident indicate that Deputy Nguyen

was responding to an emergency. See City of Hous. v. Gonzales, 682 S.W.3d 921,

928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“[t]he crash report is one of

two contemporaneous documents that addressed whether [the officer] was

responding to an emergency, and as this court is not the fact-finder, we

cannot simply disregard evidence that the trial court could have credited[]”).

The evidence available to the trial court also includes the facts that the

dispatcher did not specifically assign Deputy Nguyen to respond to the citizen’s

report of the reckless driver, and that Deputy Nguyen knew that Deputy Mosby and

Trooper Ousman were already involved before Deputy Nguyen advised the

dispatcher that she was “en route.” Although the dispatcher did not communicate to

the deputies in the field that the citizen’s report had been classified as a Priority 4

call, Deputy Nguyen conceded that Priority 4 is the lowest level of priority and does

not require an immediate police presence.

Deputy Nguyen testified that she did not exceed the speed limit after she left

the apartment complex on Major Drive on her way to the intersection of Major Drive

and SH 105, and she did not activate the siren nor the emergency lights on her squad

car. See Collins v. City of Houston, No. 14-13-00533-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS

18 7239, at *17-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (an

issue of material fact existed as to whether a law enforcement officer was responding

to an emergency where the evidence showed dispatch did not designate the 911 call

in question as an emergency, and the officer did not activate the siren on his police

vehicle while responding to the 911 call). According to Deputy Nguyen, she saw a

vehicle possibly matching the description of the one being driven recklessly, and

while she was looking for somewhere to turn around so she could follow the vehicle,

she took her foot off the brake and her vehicle struck the back of Hadnot’s vehicle.

But Deputy Nguyen testified the potentially matching vehicle was not weaving, and

she did not see anything to indicate it was being driven by an inattentive or impaired

driver, and she could not recall informing the dispatcher, Deputy Mosby, or Trooper

Ousman about having seen the potentially matching vehicle.

We agree with the trial court’s implicit conclusion that the evidence creates a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Deputy Nguyen was

responding to an emergency call and whether she was reacting to an emergency

situation. However, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether

Deputy Nguyen was driving with reckless disregard for the safety of others. As the

Texas Supreme Court has explained,

driving with reckless disregard involves more than a momentary judgment lapse. It requires a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, exhibiting conscious indifference while having subjective awareness of an extreme risk. In other words, to drive with 19 reckless disregard, the driver must commit an act he knew or should have known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury to others.

City of Hous. v. Green, 672 S.W.3d 27, 30 (Tex. 2023) (internal quotations omitted).

Hadnot argues that if Deputy Nguyen was responding to an emergency she

did so recklessly because she “knew the Hadnot vehicle was in front of her before

she rear ended it.” Hadnot cites excerpts from Deputy Nguyen’s deposition where

she acknowledged the presence of Hadnot’s vehicle in front of her while she was

stopped in the turn lane from Major Drive onto SH 105. But Hadnot did not produce

any evidence Deputy Nguyen knew Hadnot’s vehicle was still stopped in front of

her when she began to move forward. To the contrary, the evidence indicates Deputy

Nguyen saw Hadnot’s vehicle begin to move forward before Deputy Nguyen looked

over her shoulder, and assumed, albeit mistakenly, that Hadnot “already completely

went.” Deputy Nguyen testified as follows:

[W]e were both at a stop, and I saw Hadnot start moving forward once traffic was clear for her to move. I put my foot off the brake, and I looked over the left of my shoulder to make sure traffic was clear for me to drive as well. And while doing so, she most -- she hit her brakes again, and I tapped her as we were making that curve in the yield sign.

Evidence that Deputy Nguyen looked over her shoulder in an attempt to avoid

colliding with other vehicles does not support an inference that she did not care about

the safety of others. See Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 532 (evidence that officer slowed

down at intersections during high-speed chase “demonstrated intent to minimize

potential harm[]” and did “not raise the inference” of reckless disregard). Deputy 20 Nguyen’s decision to take her foot off the brake and look over her shoulder upon

seeing Hadnot’s vehicle moving forward may or may not support an inference that

she failed to act as a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar

circumstances, but Hadnot did not provide the trial court any evidence that Deputy

Nguyen’s doing so posed a high degree of risk of serious injury, nor that Deputy

Nguyen knew or should have known that it did. Even viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to Hadnot and indulging all inferences in her favor, there is no

evidence Nguyen acted with reckless disregard.

Because the evidence does not permit a factfinder to decide that Deputy

Nguyen responded to an emergency by driving with reckless disregard for the safety

of others, Hadnot failed to affirmatively establish the trial court’s jurisdiction over

that part of her claim. We sustain the last subpart of the County’s sole issue. But

because the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether

Deputy Nguyen was responding to an emergency call and whether she was reacting

to an emergency situation, Hadnot has met her jurisdictional burden with respect to

the remainder of her claim, and we overrule the other subparts of the County’s sole

issue.

21 Conclusion

We reverse, in part, and render judgment dismissing Hadnot’s claim only to

the extent it is based on reckless disregard. In all other respects, the trial court’s order

denying the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.

KENT CHAMBERS Justice

Submitted on August 21, 2023 Opinion Delivered August 29, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.