Jefferies Funding LLC v. Dasagroup Holdings Corp.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedSeptember 10, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-05639
StatusUnknown

This text of Jefferies Funding LLC v. Dasagroup Holdings Corp. (Jefferies Funding LLC v. Dasagroup Holdings Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jefferies Funding LLC v. Dasagroup Holdings Corp., (N.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 JEFFERIES FUNDING LLC, Case No. 24-cv-05639-TLT (PHK)

9 Plaintiff, ORDER RESOLVING DISPUTE RE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 10 v. FOR CERTAIN DASAGROUP DOCUMENTS 11 DASAGROUP HOLDINGS CORP., et al., Re: Dkt. 125 12 Defendants.

13 14 15 This case has been referred to the undersigned for all discovery purposes. See Dkt. 74. 16 Now pending before the Court is a joint letter brief regarding a dispute between Plaintiff Jefferies 17 Funding (“Jefferies”) and Defendant Dasagroup Holdings (“Dasagroup”) as to whether (a) 18 Dasagroup’s privilege log is adequate and (b) whether certain documents withheld from 19 production as trade secrets should be produced. [Dkt. 125]. The Court has reviewed the Parties’ 20 briefing and exhibits and finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. Civil 21 L.R. 7-1(b). 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 The relevant legal standards for discovery are well-known and summarized 24 herein. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) delineates the scope of discovery in federal civil 25 actions and provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that 26 is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” (emphasis 27 added). Rule 26(b)(5) requires that “[w]hen a party withholds information otherwise discoverable 1 the party must: (i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the documents, 2 communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, 3 without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the 4 claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). 5 “The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between attorneys and 6 clients, which are made for the purpose of giving legal advice.” In re Grand Jury, 23 F.4th 1088, 7 1091 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Sanmina Corp., 968 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir. 8 2020)). The privilege attaches when “(1) legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a 9 professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, 10 (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from 11 disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection be waived.” United States 12 v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 13 1068, 1071 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992)). The privilege protects only communications and not underlying 14 facts. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (holding that a party “may not refuse to 15 disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of 16 such fact into his communication to his attorney”). 17 The attorney-client privilege is “narrowly and strictly construed,” and the party asserting it 18 has the burden of proving that the privilege applies. United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1415 19 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “previously recognized a number of 20 means of sufficiently establishing the privilege, one of which is the privilege log approach.” N re 21 Grand Jury, 974 F.2d at 1071. “The Ninth Circuit has held that a party meets its burden of 22 demonstrating the applicability of the attorney-client privilege by submitting a log that identifies 23 (a) the attorney and client involved, (b) the nature of the document, (c) all persons or entities 24 shown on the document to have received or sent the document, (d) all persons or entities known to 25 have been furnished the document or informed of its substance, and (e) the date the document was 26 generated, prepared, or dated.” Khasin v. Hershey Co., No. 5:12-cv-01862-EJD-PSG, 2014 WL 27 690278, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (citing In re Grand Jury, 974 F.2d at 1071); see also Club 1 court’s determination that challenged privilege log satisfied Rule 26(b)(5) where privilege log 2 “disclosed the nature of the correspondence, the date of sending, the sender and recipient(s), and a 3 brief statement describing the subject of the content.”). 4 The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 5 Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude 6 in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of 7 discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). As part of its 8 inherent discretion and authority, the Court has broad discretion in determining relevancy for 9 discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) 10 (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). A court’s determination as to 11 proportionality of discovery is also within the district court’s discretion. See Jones v. Riot 12 Hospitality Group LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 737–38 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding district court did not abuse 13 discretion on proportionality ruling). Ultimately, “the timing, sequencing and proportionality of 14 discovery is left to the discretion of the Court.” Toro v. Centene Corp., No. 19-cv-05163 LHK 15 (NC), 2020 WL 6108643, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2020). The Court’s discretion extends to 16 crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See 17 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to 18 tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery”). For example, the Court may 19 limit the scope of any discovery method if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably 20 cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 21 burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 22 ANALYSIS 23 I. PRIVILEGE LOG DISPUTE 24 Dasagroup’s privilege log at issue includes, for each row corresponding to a withheld 25 email document, the following fields of information: (a) beginning and ending Bates numbers, (b) 26 Custodian, (c) Sent Date and Sent Time, (d) Email From, (e) Email To, (f) Email CC, (g) Email 27 BCC, (h) Email Subject, (i) File Name, (j) File Author, (k) Privilege Claimed, and (l) Privilege 1 With regard to certain entries for which Dasagroup redacted the “Email Subject” and “File 2 Name” fields, Jefferies argues that Dasagroup’s privilege log is insufficient to establish the 3 assertion of privilege. Id. at 1-2.

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Jefferies Funding LLC v. Dasagroup Holdings Corp., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jefferies-funding-llc-v-dasagroup-holdings-corp-cand-2025.