Jeannine L. Orange, individually and as Trustee for the Orange, Jeannine Louise Trust Estate v. Radifi Credit Union

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedOctober 30, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-01246
StatusUnknown

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Jeannine L. Orange, individually and as Trustee for the Orange, Jeannine Louise Trust Estate v. Radifi Credit Union, (M.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JEANNINE L. ORANGE, individually and as Trustee for the Orange, Jeannine Louise Trust Estate,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:25-cv-1246-MMH-LLL

RADIFI CREDIT UNION,

Defendant. /

O R D E R

THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Plaintiff Jeannine L. Orange initiated the instant action on October 16, 2025, by filing a Complaint for Equitable Relief, Restitution of Deposited Property, Declaratory Judgment, and Damages for Violations of Federal Banking Law, Fiduciary Breach, and Unjust Enrichment (Doc. 1; Complaint) against Defendant Radifi Credit Union. Upon review, the Court finds that the Complaint constitutes an impermissible “shotgun pleading.” In the analysis that follows, the Court will discuss some of the problems with the Complaint and provide Orange with the opportunity to file a corrected complaint consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). Orange should carefully review this Order and consider utilizing the resources available for pro se litigants, cited below, before filing her corrected complaint.1 Failure to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in this Order may result in

the dismissal of this action without further notice. As a preliminary matter, the Court offers some general guidance for Orange as she drafts her corrected complaint. This guidance is not directed at particular deficiencies in the Complaint but instead is intended to be generally

useful for Orange as she navigates the complexities of federal practice. While pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney, Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986), the pro se litigant is still required to “conform to procedural rules.” Riley v. Fairbanks

Capital Corp., 222 F. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)).2 The Rules require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A complaint need not specify in detail

the precise theory giving rise to recovery. All that is required is that the defendant be on notice as to the claim being asserted against him and the

1 All filings with the Court must be made in accordance with the requirements of the Rules and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Local Rules(s)). The Local Rules are available for review at www.flmd.uscourts.gov, and a copy may be obtained by visiting the Clerk’s Office. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online and in state court law libraries. 2 In citing to Riley, the Court notes that “[a]lthough an unpublished opinion is not binding … , it is persuasive authority.” United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”). grounds on which it rests.” Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 964 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Despite Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading

requirement, “a complaint must still contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of a cause of action.” Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). Rules 8 and 10 work together “to require the pleader to present h[er] claims discretely

and succinctly, so that h[er] adversary can discern what [s]he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court can determine that evidence which is relevant

and that which is not.” Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Significantly, a complaint may not run afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s prohibition against shotgun pleading. See generally Weiland v. Palm Beach

Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015) (outlining four broad categories of impermissible shotgun pleadings).3 The Eleventh Circuit has

3 The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the four categories of shotgun complaints as follows: The first [category] is “a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” The second is a complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” The third is a complaint that does not separate “each cause of action or claim for relief” into a different count. And the final type of shotgun pleading is a complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without unequivocally instructed that shotgun pleadings are “altogether unacceptable.” Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Cook v.

Randolph Cnty., 573 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have had much to say about shotgun pleadings, none of which is favorable.” (collecting cases)). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has engaged in a “thirty-year salvo of criticism aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no ceasefire in sight.” Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1321; see, e.g., id. at 1321 n.9 (collecting cases). As the court in Cramer recognized, “[s]hotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiffs or defendants, exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchannelled discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the

court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and resources.” Cramer, 117 F.3d at 1263. As such, when faced with the burden of deciphering a shotgun pleading, it is the trial court’s obligation to strike the pleading on its own initiative and force the plaintiff to replead to the extent possible under Rule 11. See id.

(admonishing district court for not striking shotgun complaint on its own initiative); see also Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 n.10 (“[W]e have also advised that when a defendant fails to [move for a more definite statement], the district court

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23).

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Related

Rosemary C. Riley v. Fairbanks Capital Corporation
222 F. App'x 897 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Fikes v. City of Daphne
79 F.3d 1079 (Eleventh Circuit, 1996)
Cramer v. State of Florida
117 F.3d 1258 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
United States v. Futrell
209 F.3d 1286 (Eleventh Circuit, 2000)
Nicole Loren v. Charles M. Sasser, Jr.
309 F.3d 1296 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Michael Snow v. Directv, Inc.
450 F.3d 1314 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Cook v. Randolph County, Ga.
573 F.3d 1143 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Diane L. Holbrook v. Castle Key Insurance Co.
405 F. App'x 459 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
James Wright v. Lanson Newsome, Warden
795 F.2d 964 (Eleventh Circuit, 1986)
Benny Barmapov v. Guy Amuial
986 F.3d 1321 (Eleventh Circuit, 2021)

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Jeannine L. Orange, individually and as Trustee for the Orange, Jeannine Louise Trust Estate v. Radifi Credit Union, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeannine-l-orange-individually-and-as-trustee-for-the-orange-jeannine-flmd-2025.