Jeane Heekyung Noh v. United States of America et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01483
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 JEANE HEEKYUNG NOH, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01483-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 12 v. 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., 14 Defendants. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on four pending motions: (1) Defendant the United 17 States of America’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 33; (2) Defendant Kittitas Valley Healthcare’s 18 motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 351; (3) Plaintiff Jeane Heekyung Noh’s motion for additional time to 19 serve Defendant Kittitas County, Dkt. No. 38; and (4) Noh’s motion for entry of default against 20 Defendant Comprehensive Healthcare, Dkt. No. 45. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 21 grants the United States’ motion to dismiss, dismisses this matter for lack of subject matter 22 jurisdiction, and denies the remaining motions as moot. 23

1 Kittitas Valley Healthcare moves to dismiss based on “failure to submit a tort claim before commencement of this 24 action; (2) failure to effect service of process on Defendant; and (3) failure to state a claim[.]” Id. at 1. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On August 1, 2025, Ms. Noh filed her proposed pro se complaint, Dkt. No. 1, and 3 subsequently paid the filing fee, see August 11, 2025 Docket Entry. The Court dismissed the 4 complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granted Ms. Noh leave to amend some of her

5 claims. Dkt. No. 15 at 5–10. 6 Ms. Noh subsequently filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 21. Her form amended 7 complaint, Dkt. No. 21, and her typed amended complaint, Dkt. No. 21-1, include different 8 Defendants. The form names as Defendants four federal agencies: the Federal Bureau of 9 Investigation (“FBI”), the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Central Intelligence Agency 10 (“CIA”), and the National Security Administration (“NSA”). Dkt. No. 21 at 2–3. The form also 11 includes the United States of America as a defendant in the caption. Id. at 1. Ms. Noh’s typed 12 amended complaint names as Defendants Kittitas County; “John Doe Federal Agents (FBI, CIA, 13 NSA, ODNI, DOJ, DHS, DOD) — Unnamed federal agents acting under color of federal law 14 whose identities will be confirmed through discovery”; Kittitas Valley Healthcare (“KVH”); the

15 International Association for Near-Death Studies (“IANDS”); and Targeted Justice. Dkt. No. 21- 16 1 at 3–4. The Court assumes all of these are Defendants. Ms. Noh asserts that this Court has 17 jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 18 Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Id. at 2. 19 Ms. Noh’s allegations of conspiracies and government surveillance largely repeat the 20 allegations in her original complaint. Compare Dkt. No. 5-1 at 11–32, with Dkt. No. 21-1 at 6–20. 21 She alleges that beginning in 2011, while she was in college, the federal government began 22 surveilling her and targeting her with “‘voice‑to‑skull’ (V2K) auditory harassment and numerous 23 other inexplicable occurrences that [she] initially attributed to the supernatural.” Dkt. No. 21-1 at

24 6–7. According to Ms. Noh, she has been subjected to “[s]urveillance and torture” through various 1 methods including “nanotechnology, electrical stimulation, microwave and acoustic devices, and 2 directed-energy weapons deployed to monitor and manipulate [her] body and environment.” Id. at 3 7. She reported the conduct to the FBI, other federal agencies and officials, and the Kittitas County 4 Sheriff’s Office, but they have not assisted her. Id. at 7–9.

5 Ms. Noh alleges that this harassment and torture is on-going, and federal undercover agents 6 “are responsible for the daily deployment of surveillance nanotechnology and directed-energy 7 weapons against [her],” including engaging in “bodily intrusion, involuntary manipulation of 8 physical functions, and repeated assaults that have caused serious, some permanent injuries[.]” Id. 9 at 4. Ms. Noh further contends that Kittitas County employees have colluded with her medical care 10 providers “in furtherance of the targeting campaign” and in an attempt to have her involuntarily 11 committed. Id. at 2–3, 9. Based on these allegations, Ms. Noh asserts the following claims: 12 • a Fourth Amendment claim against “Kittitas County (through deputies),” KVH, 13 Comprehensive Healthcare, and “federal officials” on the theory that they all “acted 14 jointly to attempt unlawful seizure, involuntary hospitalization, and covert

15 surveillance.” Id. at 2. 16 • a First Amendment claim based on “Retaliation and Suppression of Petitioning (§ 1983 17 and Bivens),” against Kittitas County, KVH, Comprehensive Healthcare, IANDS, 18 Targeted Justice, and “federal officials.” Id. Ms. Noh avers that these Defendants 19 “retaliated against [her] protected speech and petitioning activity through false charges, 20 disinformation, and directed-energy attacks.” Id. 21 • a Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging that Defendants Kittitas County, KVH, and 22 Comprehensive Healthcare “deprived [her] of liberty and bodily autonomy through 23 attempted involuntary commitment and medical manipulation.” Id. at 3.

24 1 • a Fifth Amendment Bivens claim asserting that “Federal actors imposed punishment 2 without trial, coordinated false accusations, and obstructed medical care.” Id. 3 • an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment against “Federal 4 officials,” Kittitas County, KVH, Comprehensive Healthcare, IANDS, and Targeted

5 Justice for “jointly subject[ing her] to torture, bodily intrusion, and retaliatory harm 6 absent lawful conviction.” Id. 7 • a civil conspiracy claim “(§ 1983 and Bivens)” against Kittitas County, KVH, 8 Comprehensive Healthcare, IANDS, Targeted Justice, and “federal officials” based on 9 a theory that they “acted in concert to surveil, harass, intimidate, and retaliate against 10 [her], depriving her of constitutional rights.” Id. 11 • a “Monell Liability” claim against Kittitas County on the theory that “Deputies acted 12 pursuant to a policy or custom of collaborating with healthcare providers to suppress 13 [her] testimony and discredit her reports.” Id. 14 She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive relief, and “[s]uch

15 other relief as the Court deems just and proper.” Id. at 27. 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 18 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they “possess only that power 19 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 20 377 (1994). This means that the Court can only hear certain types of cases, Home Depot U.S.A., 21 Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 437–38 (2019), including those that present a federal question 22 “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court 23 must dismiss the action if it “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction” over

24 a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing it. 1 See United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 600 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010). “Absent a 2 substantial federal question,” a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and claims that are 3 “wholly insubstantial” or “obviously frivolous” are insufficient to “raise a substantial federal 4 question for jurisdictional purposes.” Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45–46 (2015); see also

5 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946). In addition, the “mere mention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 6 and particular constitutional provisions does not establish jurisdiction where the complaint on its 7 face discloses the absence of an essential element of such a claim.” Taylor v. Lai, No. C13-1425- 8 JLR, 2013 WL 6000068, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2013) (citation omitted). 9 B. Noh’s Claims Against the United States Do Not Establish Subject Matter Jurisdiction 10 The United States argues that Ms. Noh’s claims against all federal defendants should be 11 dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 33 at 3. The United States contends that 12 Ms. Noh’s “allegations of a years-long government conspiracy to surveil, distress, and discredit 13 her are too insubstantial to support jurisdiction,” and that “the Bivens claims she tries to assert are 14 foreclosed by binding precedent regardless.” Id. at 3–4. The United States also requests that the

15 Court dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice “because at this point Noh has demonstrated 16 that there is no conceivable further amendment that would allow her to state a plausible claim 17 based on the fantastical conspiracies she alleges here.” Id. at 4. Ms. Noh has not responded to the 18 United States’ motion to dismiss, which the Court construes as an admission that it has merit. See 19 LCR 7(b)(2). Regardless of that admission, the Court has “an independent obligation to determine 20 whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists[.]” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 21 Ms. Noh has asserted several of her claims against unnamed “federal officials” without 22 identifying any specific federal government employee. Dkt. No. 21-1 at 2–3. Such “Doe pleading” 23 is “not favored.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, her general

24 pleading against all “federal agents and operatives” collectively, Dkt. No. 21-1 at 4, constitutes 1 improper “shotgun pleading” because it is “conclusory and vague” and “asserts multiple claims 2 against multiple defendants without identifying who did what.” Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 3 F.4th 1265, 1291 (9th Cir. 2026). 4 The problems with Ms. Noh’s amended complaint extend beyond pleading deficiencies.

5 “[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they 6 are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, 7 obviously frivolous, plainly unsubstantial, or no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 8 U.S. 528, 537 (1974) (citation modified). That is, “[u]nder the substantiality doctrine, the district 9 court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the question presented is too insubstantial to consider.” 10 Smith-Bey v. Hamlin, No. 23-55788, 2025 WL 671115, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2025) (quoting Cook 11 v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Shapiro, 577 U.S. at 44– 12 45. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Ms. Noh’s complaint for lack of subject matter 13 jurisdiction if she raises only “wholly insubstantial” federal claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 14 Other courts have dismissed allegations like Ms. Noh’s government conspiracy and

15 surveillance theories as too insubstantial to confer subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Zeiny v. 16 United States, No. 17-cv-07023-HRL, 2018 WL 1367389, at *1, 3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018) 17 (dismissing under the substantiality doctrine claims that the CIA retaliated against plaintiff by 18 implanting transmitters in his ears), aff’d, No. 18-15634, 2018 WL 3407714 (9th Cir. June 26, 19 2018); Feng v. Tripp, No. 24-cv-07539-JST, 2025 WL 1616638, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2025) 20 (dismissing under the substantiality doctrine claims that the FBI stalked plaintiff, “falsified 21 medical records to make her seem delusional,” and “sho[t] radiation into her eyes, throat, abdomen, 22 and kidneys”); Ticktin v. CIA, No. CV 08-998-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 976517, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 23 9, 2009) (collecting cases and explaining that allegations of government targeting and harassment

24 “are the type of insubstantial and frivolous conspiracy theory claims that are routinely dismissed 1 under the substantiality doctrine pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)”); see also Detar v. United 2 States Gov’t, 174 F. Supp. 3d 566, 567–78, 570 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing claim under 3 substantiality doctrine where plaintiff alleged government implanted electrical device in his body 4 and tried to frame him as mentally ill). Here too, the substantiality doctrine forecloses Ms. Noh’s

5 far-fetched claims against federal government actors. 6 C. Noh’s Section 1983 Claim Does Not Establish Subject Matter Jurisdiction 7 “Section 1983 provides a cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 8 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 9 Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To establish liability under Section 10 1983, “a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws 11 of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of 12 state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Chudacoff 13 v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Graham v. Connor, 14 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely

15 provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred” (citation modified)). 16 A local government entity “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by 17 its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 18 (1978). That is, “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior 19 theory.” Id. at 691. Instead, to state a Monell claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff 20 must demonstrate that an “official policy, custom, or pattern” of the government entity was “the 21 actionable cause of the claimed injury.” Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Harper v. City of Los 22 Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008)). “In particular, municipalities may be liable 23 under § 1983 for constitutional injuries pursuant to (1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice

24 or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final 1 policymaker.” Williams v. City of Sparks, 112 F.4th 635, 646 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Horton ex 2 rel. Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019)). “A plaintiff must show 3 deliberate action attributable to the municipality that directly caused a deprivation of federal 4 rights.” Id. (citation modified).

5 Ms. Noh contends that Kittitas County violated her Fourth Amendment rights through an 6 unlawful seizure, her First Amendment rights by retaliating against her for “petitioning,” and her 7 Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. Dkt. No. 21-1 at 2–3. Her First Amendment claim 8 seems to be based on her allegation that after she filed a claim for damages against Kittitas County 9 on November 26, 2024, the Kittitas County Prosecutor’s Office “filed a false reporting charge 10 against [her] on December 5, 2024[.]” Id. at 10. 11 Ms. Noh also contends that KCSO Sergeant Corbett “discussed with a nurse the use of 12 nanotechnology on Plaintiff” when he escorted her to the hospital in September 2024. Id. at 9. She 13 further alleges that Sergeant Corbett accepted a false report from Ms. Noh’s neighbor about her 14 and warned her about a possible future arrest. Id. According to Ms. Noh, local and federal law

15 enforcement officials colluded with medical personnel “in furtherance of the targeting campaign.” 16 Id. Ms. Noh also avers that on September 10, 2024, “after [she] made a 9‑1‑1 call to report directed- 17 energy attacks, KCSO deputies Joe Tirey and Logan Garcia attempted to forcibly remove Plaintiff 18 from her home and commit her to a mental ward without lawful process[.]” Id. at 10. 19 Ms. Noh alleges that Kittitas County Deputies “acted pursuant to a policy or custom of 20 collaborating with healthcare providers to suppress [her] testimony and discredit her reports.” Id. 21 at 3. However, she does not identify any such policy or custom, and “random acts or isolated events 22 [are] insufficient to establish custom,” Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 23 Oyenik v. Corizon Health, Inc., 696 F. App'x. 792, 794 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that “one or two

24 incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy”). Nor does Ms. Noh explain how such a 1 policy or custom—if one did exist—was the “moving force” behind her alleged constitutional 2 violations. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Ms. Noh has therefore failed to state a claim against Kittitas 3 County under Section 1983. 4 Finally, Ms. Noh’s amended complaint does not establish subject matter jurisdiction over

5 her constitutional claims against the private entities—KVH, Comprehensive Healthcare, IANDS, 6 and Targeted Justice—because she has not plausibly alleged that those entities were acting under 7 color of state law for purposes of a Section 1983 claim. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) 8 (a plaintiff must allege that the alleged constitutional violation was committed by a person acting 9 under the color of state law). Ms. Noh only alleges in very conclusory terms that the private entities 10 were acting “under color of law.” Dkt. No. 21-1 at 2; see also id. at 22 (“Defendants, acting under 11 color of law, conducted or facilitated unreasonable searches of Plaintiff’s person, home, and effects 12 through covert technological means, including surveillance nanotechnology and directed-energy 13 monitoring, along with regular physical trespasses into her home while Plaintiff was away.”). 14 Accordingly, her insubstantial Section 1983 claim does not establish subject matter jurisdiction.

15 See, e.g., Taylor, 2013 WL 6000068, at *3. 16 D. The Court Denies Further Leave to Amend 17 The Court is mindful that “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the 18 defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity 19 to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrs., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 20 1995). While courts liberally provide pro se plaintiffs leave to amend, Cato v. United States, 70 21 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 22 1990) (courts have a “duty to ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the 23 merits of their claim due to ignorance of technical procedural requirements”), that is not limitless.

24 Denying leave to amend is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to correct the deficiencies outlined 1 by the district court in dismissing her original complaint. Gimbel v. California, 308 F. App'x 123, 2 124 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 3 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where 4 plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” (citation modified)).

5 Here, Ms. Noh has failed to cure the deficiencies explained by the Court when dismissing 6 her original complaint. See Dkt. No. 15. Further leave to amend may be denied due to “repeated 7 failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed[.]” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 8 182 (1962). In addition, Ms. Noh has not explained what further amendments she would make if 9 given the chance. See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) 10 (concluding that amendment would be futile where plaintiffs already filed an amended complaint 11 containing the same defects as their original complaint and failed to state what additional facts 12 they would plead if given leave to amend). Therefore, the Court does not grant her further leave to 13 amend. 14 III. CONCLUSION

15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the United States’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 16 No. 33, DISMISSES this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 17 DENIES the remaining motions as moot, Dkt. Nos. 35, 38, 45. 18 Dated this 23rd day of April, 2026. 19 A 20 Lauren King United States District Judge 21 22 23 24