Jean Prillman v. George Parsons

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJune 10, 2025
Docket24-2960
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jean Prillman v. George Parsons (Jean Prillman v. George Parsons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jean Prillman v. George Parsons, (3d Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2960 __________

JEAN PRILLMAN, Appellant

v.

GEORGE PARSONS, GM3B; VICTOR KOSZI, OM; ANEL VARGAS, HR; HEATHER LANZA, HR; JEREMY SCHMICK, OM; ROBERT WORRALL, Supervisor ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 5:24-cv-00605) District Judge: Honorable John M. Gallagher ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 27, 2025 Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed June 10, 2025) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Jean Prillman appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of her amended

complaint. We will affirm.

Prillman was terminated from her employment for gambling while at work.

Prillman’s amended complaint alleged that she was falsely accused of gambling and that

her employer wrongfully terminated her in violation of her civil rights. She expressly

stated that she was not suing for discrimination. She alleged that when she was

terminated, she had to borrow money to keep her apartment, and she was initially denied

unemployment benefits and did not receive compensation until after an appeal.

On the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court liberally construed

Prillman’s complaint as alleging a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim—that the

defendants deprived her of a liberty interest in her reputation. It concluded that the claim

failed because Prillman made no allegations supporting a plausible inference that the

defendants made stigmatizing statements publicly.1 The District Court dismissed any

federal claims that Prillman purported to bring with prejudice and dismissed any state law

claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Prillman appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over

the District Court’s dismissal. See St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen.

Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2020).

Because Prillman is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe her filings. See

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But pro se litigants still must

1 The District Court assumed for the purpose of its analysis that the defendants were state actors. 2 “abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,

Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). To present an issue for review, a litigant’s

opening brief must include, among other things, a statement of the issues, the legal

argument explaining why the district court decided the issues incorrectly, and the facts

and legal authorities supporting that argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). Thus, an

appellant’s failure to raise an issue in her opening brief, even when proceeding pro se,

renders it forfeited. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002)

(per curiam).

Here, Prillman’s brief does not address the District Court’s reasoning at all, much

less explain why its disposition was erroneous. Instead, Prillman re-asserts that she did

not gamble at work, and she requests that this Court examine evidence that she claims

will prove her innocence. She notes that she has already presented the evidence in her

state unemployment proceedings, and that the unemployment hearing referee found that

she was not gambling. But that Prillman was not gambling at work does not change the

fact that she failed to state a federal claim for relief in her amended complaint. Prillman

alleged no facts suggesting that the defendants made false statements about her publicly

such that she could sufficiently state a “stigma-plus” claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006);

Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1223-24 (3d Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Prillman’s motions to

reschedule oral argument, compel the appellee to submit footage, and submit pictures and

documents as evidence are denied.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Matthew Chabal, Jr. v. Ronald Reagan
841 F.2d 1216 (Third Circuit, 1988)
Kelley Mala v. Crown Bay Marina
704 F.3d 239 (Third Circuit, 2013)

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Jean Prillman v. George Parsons, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jean-prillman-v-george-parsons-ca3-2025.