J.D. Irving, Ltd. v. United States

119 F.4th 48

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
• Decided: October 10, 2024
• Docket: 23-1652
• Status: Published

Opinion

Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 1 Filed: 10/10/2024

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

J.D. IRVING, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Defendants-Appellees ______________________

2023-1652 ______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:21-cv-00641-TMR, Judge Timothy M. Reif. ______________________

Decided: October 10, 2024 ______________________

JAY CHARLES CAMPBELL, White & Case LLP, Washing- ton, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by WALTER SPAK.

ERIC LAUFGRABEN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees. Also repre- sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; ELIO GONZALEZ, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, United States De- partment of Commerce, Washington, DC. ______________________ Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 2 Filed: 10/10/2024

Before STOLL and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges, and CECCHI, District Judge. 1 STOLL, Circuit Judge. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) erred in holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the CIT’s residual grant of jurisdiction. J.D. Irving (JDI), a Ca- nadian producer, exporter, and importer of merchandise subject to a January 2018 antidumping duty order on cer- tain softwood lumber products from Canada, appeals the CIT’s dismissal of its case for lack of subject matter juris- diction. Although JDI acknowledged that its action would normally arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), it asserted that the CIT has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1581(i). We determine that jurisdiction under § 1581(c) could have been available to JDI absent binational panel review because (1) the true nature of JDI’s suit is a chal- lenge to the Final Results of a second administrative re- view, and (2) JDI has not met its burden to show that administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. Because jurisdiction under § 1581(i) is strictly limited and may not be invoked when jurisdiction under § 1581(c) could have been available, we affirm the CIT’s dismissal for lack of subject matter juris- diction under § 1581(i).

1 Honorable Claire C. Cecchi, District Judge, United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 3 Filed: 10/10/2024

J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US 3

BACKGROUND I Before addressing the relevant facts and procedural history of this action, we begin with a brief overview of the applicable legal framework. The U.S. Department of Commerce may levy anti- dumping duties on goods “sold in the United States at less than . . . fair value.” Guangdong Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States, 745 F.3d 1194, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1673). Upon the entry of merchandise covered by an antidumping duty order, “an importer must make a cash deposit of estimated duties (cash deposit rate).” Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(3)). Under Commerce’s accounting system, the actual liquidation—i.e., final computation of duties—of en- tries subject to an antidumping duty order may occur years after importation. Id. “Before final liquidation, any inter- ested party may request an administrative review of the antidumping duty order.” Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675). The statute providing for administrative review is 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1). N.M. Garlic Growers Coal. v. United States, 953 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Final Results of an administrative review “shall be the ba- sis for the assessment of . . . antidumping duties on entries of merchandise covered by the determination and for de- posits of estimated duties.” Consol. Bearings, 348 F.3d at 1000 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(C)). Commerce’s implementing regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.212, provides for the calculation of assessment rates. Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d 816, 820 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Absent a request for administrative review, “Commerce liq- uidates the merchandise at the cash deposit rates (i.e., the deposit rates at the time of entry).” Consol. Bearings, 348 F.3d at 1000 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c)(1)(i)). Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 4 Filed: 10/10/2024

Section 1581(c) of Title 28 provides the CIT with exclu- sive jurisdiction over civil actions commenced under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, which governs judicial review of Com- merce’s determinations in antidumping duty proceedings. Rimco Inc. v. United States, 98 F.4th 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2024). Someone wishing to challenge an antidumping duty order may bring suit before the CIT, or, if the “dumped” goods originated in Mexico or Canada, the antidumping or- der may be challenged before a binational panel. Canadian Wheat Bd. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Liquidation of entries may be suspended pending a decision by either the CIT or a binational panel. See id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(5)(C). The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) went into effect on July 1, 2020, superseding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). USMCA Article 10.12, entitled “Review of Final Antidump- ing and Countervailing Duty Determinations,” provides a dispute settlement mechanism for purposes of reviewing antidumping duty determinations issued by the United States, Canada, and Mexico. See United States–Mexico– Canada Agreement, art. 10.12, July 1, 2020, OFF. U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agree- ments/FTA/USMCA/Text/10_Trade_Remedies.pdf [herein- after USMCA]. In pertinent part, USMCA Article 10.12 provides: 1. . . . [E]ach Party [i.e., the United States of Amer- ica, the United Mexican States, and Canada] shall replace judicial review of final antidumping . . . duty determinations with binational panel review. 2. An involved Party may request that a panel re- view, based on the administrative record, a final antidumping . . . duty determination of a compe- tent investigating authority of an importing Party to determine whether such determination was in accordance with the antidumping . . . duty law of Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 5 Filed: 10/10/2024

J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US 5

the importing Party. For this purpose, the anti- dumping . . . duty law consists of the relevant stat- utes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial precedents to the extent that a court of the importing Party would rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination of the competent investigating au- thority. ... 4. A request for a panel shall be made in writing to the other involved Party within 30 days following the date of publication of the final determination in question in the official journal of the importing Party. . . . ... 8. The panel may uphold a final determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent with the panel’s decision. . . . 9. The decision of a panel under this Article shall be binding on the involved Parties with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that is before the panel. ... 15. . . . [E]ach Party shall: (a) maintain or amend its statutes or reg- ulations to ensure that existing procedures concerning the refund, with interest, of an- tidumping . . . duties operate to give effect to a final panel decision that a refund is due; ... (c) maintain or amend its statutes or regu- lations to ensure that: Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 6 Filed: 10/10/2024

(i) domestic procedures for judicial review of a final determination may not be commenced until the time for requesting a panel under paragraph 4 has expired . . . . USMCA art. 10.12 ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 15. Section 1516a(g) of Title 19 codifies the binational panel review process set forth in USMCA Article 10.12. Section 1516a(g)(2) provides: (g) Review of . . . antidumping duty determina- tions involving free trade area country merchan- dise ... (2) Exclusive review of determination by binational panels If binational panel review of a determina- tion is requested pursuant to . . . arti- cle 10.12 of the USMCA, then, except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4)-- (A) the determination is not re- viewable under subsection (a), and (B) no court of the United States has power or jurisdiction to review the determination on any question of law or fact by an action in the na- ture of mandamus or otherwise. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2). Section 1581(i) of Title 28 is the CIT’s “residual” grant of jurisdiction that allows the court to take jurisdiction over designated causes of action founded on other provisions of law. See Rimco, 98 F.4th at 1052. It provides: Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 7 Filed: 10/10/2024

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(i)(1) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the [CIT] by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception set forth in subsection (j) of this section, the [CIT] shall have exclusive jurisdic- tion of any civil action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United States providing for-- (A) revenue from imports or tonnage; (B) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue; (C) embargoes or other quantitative re- strictions on the importation of merchan- dise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety; or (D) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in sub- paragraphs (A) through (C) of this para- graph and subsections (a)-(h) of this section. (2) This subsection shall not confer jurisdiction over an antidumping or countervailing duty deter- mination which is reviewable by-- (A) the [CIT] under [19 U.S.C. 1516a(a)]; or (B) a binational panel under [19 U.S.C. 1516a(g)]. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). II In January 2018, Commerce published an antidumping duty order on certain softwood lumber products from Can- ada. On April 1, 2019, Commerce initiated a first Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 8 Filed: 10/10/2024

administrative review (AR 1), which covered entries made between June 30, 2017, and December 31, 2018. On March 10, 2020, Commerce initiated a second administra- tive review (AR 2), which covered entries made between January 1, 2019, and December 31, 2019. Upon publica- tion of the AR 1 Final Results on November 30, 2020, Com- merce assigned to JDI the non-selected companies’ assessment rate of 1.57%. On March 4, 2021, Commerce initiated a third admin- istrative review (AR 3), which covered entries made be- tween January 1, 2020, and December 31, 2020. No party requested that Commerce review JDI’s entries that would have been subject to AR 3. On April 16, 2021, Commerce instructed U.S. Customs and Border Protection: (1) to liq- uidate JDI’s entries that would have been subject to AR 3 at the 1.57% rate then in effect, and (2) to continue to col- lect cash deposits on JDI’s entries at this 1.57% rate. On May 27, 2021, Commerce published its preliminary AR 2 results. Commerce assigned non-selected companies a preliminary rate of 12.05%, which would serve as the as- sessment rate and the cash deposit rate. On July 8, 2021, JDI filed a case brief in AR 2 addressed to the Secretary of Commerce, J.A. 88–89, asserting that “the [antidumping duty] cash deposit rate established for the year-2020 [pe- riod of review] must remain [JDI]’s cash deposit rate going forward (until changed in a review for a subsequent period, e.g., 2021, 2022, 2023).” J.A. 98. On November 23, 2021, Commerce issued the AR 2 Fi- nal Results in an Issues and Decision Memorandum, in which it: (1) addressed the arguments JDI raised in its July 2021 case brief, and (2) amended the non-selected companies’ rate to 11.59%. Commerce explained that alt- hough JDI “is under review in this 2019 review [i.e., AR 2] . . . no review of [JDI]’s 2020 sales is being con- ducted” and “[w]hen an entity is not under review, such as [JDI] in 2020 administrative review [i.e., AR 3], Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 9 Filed: 10/10/2024

J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US 9

[Commerce] do[es] not update its cash deposit rate.” J.A. 175. Accordingly, “consistent with [19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)], [Commerce’s] regulations, and numerous rul- ings by the courts, [Commerce] . . . assigned [JDI] a cash deposit rate based on the non-selected companies’ rate de- termined for these final results [in AR 2].” J.A. 176. Com- merce published the AR 2 Final Results on December 2, 2021. On December 9, 2021, Commerce instructed Cus- toms to collect cash deposits on JDI entries at the 11.59% rate assigned in the AR 2 Final Results. On December 28, 2021, other interested parties re- quested binational panel review of the AR 2 Final Results pursuant to USMCA Article 10.12. Two days later, JDI filed a complaint and commenced an appeal of Commerce’s Cash Deposit Instructions before the CIT. JDI requested that the CIT: (A) Enter judgment in favor of [JDI]; (B) Hold and declare that it was unlawful for Com- merce to issue Cash Deposit Instructions assigning [JDI] the [antidumping duty] cash deposit rate de- termined for Non-Selected Companies in the final results of the 2019 [antidumping duty] review; (C) Order Commerce to instruct [Customs] (1) to reinstate [JDI]’s lawful [antidumping duty] cash deposit rate of 1.57% for imports of subject mer- chandise produced and exported by [JDI] entered on or after December 2, 2021, and (2) to refund [an- tidumping duty] cash deposits provided for such entries in excess of the 1.57% rate; and (D) Grant [JDI] such additional relief as the [CIT] may deem just and proper. J.A. 49. In the complaint, JDI asserted that, although the CIT’s jurisdiction “would normally lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c),” the CIT instead has jurisdiction over its action pursuant to § 1581(i). J.A. 33–34. Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 10 Filed: 10/10/2024

In January 2023, the CIT concluded that it lacked sub- ject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) to hear the action and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss. JDI ap- peals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). DISCUSSION We review the CIT’s dismissal for lack of subject mat- ter jurisdiction and its statutory interpretation de novo as a question of law. Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. United States, 687 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The burden of es- tablishing jurisdiction rests on the party invoking it.” Rimco, 98 F.4th at 1051. I We start our analysis by reviewing our precedent ana- lyzing the CIT’s residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i). In Rimco, our court held the CIT lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i) because jurisdiction would have been available and the remedy adequate under § 1581(c). There, Rimco did not request administrative review of Commerce’s anti- dumping duty or countervailing duty orders. Instead, after Commerce issued liquidation instructions directing Cus- toms to assess entries subject to the orders, Rimco filed a protest challenging Customs’ assessment of antidumping duties and countervailing duties on its imported goods as “‘excessive fines’ in contravention of the Eighth Amend- ment,” which Customs denied. Rimco, 98 F.4th at 1050– 51. Rimco then filed an action before the CIT, seeking ju- dicial review of Customs’ denial of the protest, asserting, in pertinent part, that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction un- der § 1581(i). Id. at 1051. The CIT dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1049. On appeal, we explained that “[w]hether a party may properly invoke § 1581(i) is a two-step inquiry”: (1) “we de- termine whether jurisdiction under a different subsection of § 1581 could have been available”; and if so, (2) “we ask whether the provided remedy would have been manifestly Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 11 Filed: 10/10/2024

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inadequate.” Id. at 1053 (citing Erwin Hymer Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). Starting with the first step, we explained that “[b]ecause the availability of jurisdiction under other subsections of § 1581 depends on the particular type of agency action challenged, we must first determine the true nature of an action.” Id. at 1052–53 (explaining that the “true nature” factual inquiry “requires our court to identify the particu- lar agency action underlying the claimed harm”). Viewing “the totality of Rimco’s allegations,” we agreed with the CIT “that the true nature of Rimco’s action was to chal- lenge Commerce’s [antidumping duty] and [countervailing duty] rate determinations.” Id. at 1053. We explained that “[i]nterested parties,” such as Rimco, are directed to chal- lenge Commerce’s antidumping duty and countervailing duty determinations “via administrative review proceed- ings” and that “[s]ubsequent judicial review of such pro- ceedings is available under the CIT’s § 1581(c) exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. at 1054. Turning to step 2, we explained that because § 1581(c) jurisdiction was available, the CIT’s § 1581(i) residual ju- risdiction was unavailable unless the appellant could show that the remedy afforded by § 1581(c) would be manifestly inadequate. We further explained that a “manifestly inad- equate remedy” is “an exercise in futility, or incapable of producing any result; failing utterly of the desired end through intrinsic defect; useless, ineffectual, vain.” Id. (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). Attempting to frame the § 1581(c) remedy as inadequate, Rimco unsuccessfully ar- gued that Commerce “lacks institutional competence to judge the constitutionality of its own determinations.” Id. We explained that: (1) “Commerce could have removed the constitutional issue by addressing the statutory appropri- ateness of its rate determinations”; and (2) even when Commerce is unable to make constitutional findings, it “will nevertheless serve its immensely useful record-devel- opment and fact-finding functions.” Id. at 1055. Rimco Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 12 Filed: 10/10/2024

“could have sought . . . administrative review to suffi- ciently challenge” Commerce’s antidumping duty and countervailing duty determinations, and, had Rimco been “dissatisfied with Commerce’s administrative review de- termination, it could have rightfully sought judicial review on the record under the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. We thus held that the “statutory process outlined by Con- gress in § 1581(c) . . . is neither unworkable, nor futile.” Id. In Consolidated Bearings, on the other hand, we held that “no other subsection of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 was or could have been a basis for jurisdiction” and, thus, the CIT had correctly found jurisdiction under § 1581(i). Consol. Bear- ings, 348 F.3d at 999. There, the appellant brought suit in the CIT: (1) to challenge liquidation instructions from 1998, by which Commerce directed Customs to liquidate all entries of antifriction bearings from Germany that had not been liquidated by the instructions from 1997; and (2) to compel Commerce to apply the antidumping rates in the June 1997 amended final results to the appellant’s entries of antifriction bearings from Germany. Id. at 1001. The appellant did not challenge or object to the final results; rather, it sought “application of those final results.” Id. at 1002. We explained that, because the appellant was “not challenging the final results,” § 1581(c) could not have been a source of jurisdiction. Id. (acknowledging that, had the appellant brought the action to challenge the final results of the administrative review, the argument that § 1581(c) jurisdiction could have been available might have more merit). Because no other subsection of § 1581 was or could have been a basis for jurisdiction, we did not reach step 2— whether the remedy would have been “manifestly inade- quate.” See id. II Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that the CIT did not err in holding that it lacked subject matter ju- risdiction under § 1581(i) because: (1) § 1581(c) Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 13 Filed: 10/10/2024

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jurisdiction could have been available to JDI, and (2) JDI has not met its burden to show that the alternative remedy (administrative review and binational panel review) would be manifestly inadequate. See Rimco, 98 F.4th at 1052. JDI argues that the “true nature” of its action is a chal- lenge to Commerce’s “administration and enforcement” of the AR 2 Final Results, as opposed to a challenge to the Final Results themselves. Appellant’s Br. 24. We are not persuaded. Similar to Rimco, we view the “true nature” of JDI’s suit as a challenge to the AR 2 Final Results. The “partic- ular agency action underlying [JDI’s] claimed harm” is Commerce’s assignment of a cash deposit rate higher than 1.57% in the AR 2 preliminary results and Final Results. Rimco, 98 F.4th at 1052. Commerce explained in its No- vember 23, 2021 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the AR 2 Final Results that it “will assign [JDI] a cash deposit rate based on the final results of this administrative review [i.e., AR 2].” J.A. 175. JDI confirmed on December 21, 2021, that “[t]he title of the final determination” for which it intended to commence judicial review is “Certain Soft- wood Lumber Products From Canada: Final Results of An- tidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2019” published on December 2, 2021—not Commerce’s instructions from December 9, 2021. J.A. 110. Accordingly, the proper source of the CIT’s jurisdiction over JDI’s action would have been § 1581(c). See Consol. Bearings, 348 F.3d at 1002 (“Subsection (c) grants the [CIT] jurisdiction over actions brought under [19 U.S.C. § 1516a], which includes challenges to the final results of an administrative review by a participant in that review.”). In fact, JDI conceded in its complaint that the CIT’s jurisdiction “would normally lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).” J.A. 34. During oral argument, JDI nonetheless asserted that § 1581(c) jurisdiction was unavailable because “the final re- sults of the 2019 review [i.e., AR 2] were taken to a USMCA Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 14 Filed: 10/10/2024

binational panel.” Oral Arg. at 1:59–2:11, https://oralargu- ments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=23-1652_0606202 4.mp3. We reject JDI’s attempt to use § 1581(i) to make an end run around the binational panel’s exclusive review. In- deed, § 1581(i)(2)(B) expressly prohibits JDI’s assertion, stating that the subsection “shall not confer jurisdiction over an antidumping or countervailing duty determination which is reviewable by . . . a binational panel under [19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)].” Allowing the CIT to exercise con- current jurisdiction with a binational panel “would strongly [and impermissibly] discourage the use of the [bi- national] panel system to challenge antidumping duties and make that procedure far less effective and useful than it was intended and expected to be.” Canadian Wheat, 641 F.3d at 1351. USMCA Article 10.12 explicitly provides that the United States, Mexico, and Canada “shall . . . maintain or amend [their] statutes or regulations to ensure that . . . domestic procedures for judicial review of a final determination may not be commenced until the time for re- questing a panel under paragraph 4 [i.e., 30 days following the publication date of the final determination] has ex- pired.” USMCA art. 10.12 ¶¶ 4, 15(c)(i). Section 1516a also provides that, “[f]or a determination with respect to which binational panel review has commenced,” a CIT ac- tion “may not be commenced” until “the day after the date as of which” the binational panel “has dismissed binational panel review of the determination for lack of jurisdiction.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(5)(C); see also id. § 1516a(g)(12) (providing for the “[t]ransfer of final determinations for ju- dicial review upon suspension of article 10.12 of the USMCA” (emphasis added)). It is clear from the USMCA and statutory language that when an antidumping duty determination is reviewable by a binational panel, judicial review by the CIT is unavailable unless and until the time for requesting a panel has expired or the panel has dis- missed its review for lack of jurisdiction (or, the operation of USMCA Article 10.12 has been suspended). Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 15 Filed: 10/10/2024

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JDI next asserts that the CIT has jurisdiction under § 1581(i) because neither binational panel review nor the administrative review process can provide adequate relief. Again, we disagree. Binational panels have the authority to review a final antidumping determination and determine whether it “was in accordance with” the importing country’s anti- dumping duty law, which “consists of the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial precedents to the extent that a court of the im- porting [country] would rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination.” USMCA art. 10.12 ¶ 2. And if the panel remands the determination (instead of upholding it), the administering authority—i.e., Commerce—“shall, within the period specified by the panel . . . , take action not inconsistent with the decision of the panel.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A) (emphases added); see also USMCA art. 10.12 ¶ 8. Accordingly, here, if the binational panel holds that Commerce’s AR 2 Final Results are not in ac- cordance with U.S. antidumping duty law and remands, Commerce must take action consistent with the panel’s de- cision, which is “binding on the involved Parties.” USMCA art. 10.12 ¶ 9. In Canadian Wheat, a NAFTA binational panel found that the record lacked substantial evidence that the “dumping” at issue had materially injured the domestic wheat industry and remanded the case to the International Trade Commission for further consideration. Canadian Wheat, 641 F.3d at 1347. On remand, the Commission found that the domestic industry was not “materially in- jured” by the importation of the Canadian wheat, which the NAFTA panel then affirmed. Id. Commerce then revoked the antidumping duty order, while entries were still “sus- pended and unliquidated.” See id. at 1347–49. We ex- plained that “[o]nce the NAFTA panel had finally determined that the unliquidated antidumping duty order was invalid . . . Commerce had no valid basis for retaining Case: 23-1652 Document: 37 Page: 16 Filed: 10/10/2024

the unliquidated duties that the Canadians had deposited pursuant to that order.” Id. at 1349–50 (“One would expect that, after an antidumping duty order has been finally in- validated [by a binational panel], Commerce thereafter would refuse to enforce it.”). Accordingly, here, if the bi- national panel invalidates the AR 2 Final Results, Com- merce would not assess JDI’s suspended and unliquidated entries at AR 2’s final 11.59% rate, and JDI would receive appropriate refunds for deposits made at that higher rate. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(5)(C) (providing for the suspen- sion of liquidation); USMCA art. 10.12 ¶ 15(a) (a binational panel may enter a final decision that a refund is due). Ac- cordingly, we reject JDI’s argument that binational panel review and administrative review would be manifestly in- adequate. JDI nonetheless argues that USMCA panel review of the AR 2 Final Results would be manifestly inadequate be- cause such panels lack equitable or injunctive power. Alt- hough a remand by the binational panel differs from an injunction, the inquiry here is not whether the provided remedy would have been equal to JDI’s desired remedy; ra- ther, it is whether the provided remedy would have been manifestly inadequate. E.g., Rimco, 98 F.4th at 1054. Be- cause JDI has not shown that administrative review and USMCA panel review would be manifestly inadequate, § 1581(i) jurisdiction is improper. CONCLUSION We have considered JDI’s other arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Court of International Trade did not err in dis- missing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. AFFIRMED