J.C. v. City of Vallejo

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 17, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01879
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J.C. by and through his No. 2:24-cv-01879-JAM-AC 12 Guardian ad Litem Nandi Storm Cain and M.G., by and through 13 her Guardian ad Litem Wendy Whittaker, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 14 DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ Plaintiff(s), MOTION TO DISMISS 15 v. 16 City of Vallejo and Rosendo 17 Mesa, 18 Defendant(s). 19 BACKGROUND 20 This case arises from an interaction between Plaintiffs J.C. 21 and M.G. (“Plaintiffs”) with City of Vallejo police officers 22 23 (“Defendants”) following a motor vehicle stop. Plaintiffs bring 24 this case by and through their guardians ad litem, N.C. and W.W. 25 respectively. On December 16, 2024, the Court issued an order 26 dismissing several of Plaintiffs’ claims with leave to amend. 27 See Order Granting in Part and Denying In Part Defendants’ Motion 28 1 to Dismiss (hereafter, “Order”), ECF No. 29. Plaintiffs 2 subsequently submitted a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) renewing 3 their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, California Civil Code 4 § 52.1, and various common law tort theories. See FAC, ECF No. 5 30. Currently pending before this Court is Defendants’ second 6 motion to dismiss. See Mot., ECF No. 33. Defendants move to 7 8 dismiss all causes of action for failure to state a claim except 9 the alleged Second Cause of Action for excessive force under the 10 Fourth Amendment. Id. Plaintiffs submitted an opposition, 11 Opp’n, ECF No. 38, and Defendants replied, Reply, ECF No. 39. 12 For the reasons provided herein, the Court GRANTS in part and 13 DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 14 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 15 The following relevant facts alleged by Plaintiffs are 16 17 accepted as true for the purposes of Defendants’ motion herein. 18 On July 2, 2023, Plaintiffs M.G. and J.C. were passengers in a 19 vehicle driven by a friend of Plaintiff M.G.’s mother. See FAC ¶ 20 15. City of Vallejo police officers subsequently pulled the 21 vehicle over and an officer ordered the driver out of the car. 22 The driver exited the vehicle and was placed in handcuffs. See 23 FAC ¶ 17. At the same time, Plaintiff M.G., who had originally 24 25 been seated behind the driver’s seat, moved to sit in the 26

27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for March 11, 2025. 1 driver’s seat. See FAC ¶ 18. Once in the driver’s seat, 2 Plaintiff M.G. began protesting and questioning the officers’ 3 level of force. Id. 4 Then, officers yelled instructions at Plaintiff M.G. and 5 Officer Mesa grabbed Plaintiff M.G. and violently pulled her out 6 of the car through a crack in the car window. Id. Plaintiff 7 8 M.G. then landed on the concrete floor with her face and chest 9 first. Id. Plaintiff J.C. witnessed these actions and was also 10 detained. See FAC ¶ 1. As a result of the incident, Plaintiff 11 M.G. sought medical attention at Sutter Antioch where she 12 received the diagnosis of bruising. See FAC ¶ 20. 13 II. OPINION 14 A. Legal Standard 15 A complaint must make a “short and plain statement of the 16 17 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 18 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 19 545 (2007). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency 20 of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 21 can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the 22 plausibility pleading standard set forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 23 570, a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss by alleging 24 25 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 26 its face.” The complaint must contain sufficient “factual 27 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 28 1 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 2 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This “plausibility 3 standard,” however, “asks for more than a sheer possibility that 4 a defendant has acted unlawfully,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and 5 “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 6 with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line 7 8 between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” 9 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 10 At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court must accept all 11 nonconclusory factual allegations of the complaint as true and 12 construe those facts and the reasonable inferences that follow 13 from them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See 14 Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). However, 15 legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual 16 17 allegations, need not be accepted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 18 (2009). In the event dismissal is warranted, it is generally 19 without prejudice, unless it is clear the complaint cannot be 20 saved by any amendment. See Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 21 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 22 B. Judicial Notice 23 In conjunction with their motion, Defendants have requested 24 25 that the Court take judicial notice of certain admissions 26 contained in Plaintiffs’ responsive pleadings. See Defendants’ 27 Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exhibit A, ECF No. 33. 28 1 Specifically, Defendants request judicial notice of an admission 2 contained in Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 3 Dismiss that the car in which Plaintiffs were riding was stopped 4 as a result of being reported stolen. Id. 5 Plaintiffs raise no objection to the Request for Judicial 6 Notice in their papers. Furthermore, it is long established that 7 8 a court can take judicial notice of its own files and records 9 under Rule 201. See Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 112 F. 10 Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015)(citing Molus v. Swan, 2009 11 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (“Courts also may take 12 judicial notice of their own records”); United States v. Author 13 Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir.1986). Thus, Defendants’ 14 Request for Judicial Notice is granted. 15 C. Analysis 16 17 1. Fourth Amendment Seizure Claim 18 Plaintiffs contend Officer Mesa detained and seized M.G. 19 and J.C. unlawfully without reasonable suspicion and that 20 officers lacked probable cause to detain Plaintiffs because they 21 were simply protesting officers’ ill treatment. See Opp’n at 4. 22 However, the factual allegations before the Court do not support 23 Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements that officers lacked 24 25 reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop their vehicle. 26 Rather, Plaintiffs own pleadings indicate that officers did have 27 requisite grounds to initiate the traffic stop. 28 1 As judicially noticed, Plaintiffs admitted in their 2 opposition to Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss that 3 “defendants had a legal duty to use reasonable force when 4 detaining occupants [i.e., Plaintiffs] of a reported stolen 5 vehicle.” See RJN, Ex. A, p. 16. The court may accept such 6 statements of fact as binding judicial admissions. See Gospel 7 8 Missions of America v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 557 9 (9th Cir. 2003); American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 10 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). 11 Under existing caselaw, a stolen vehicle report alone is 12 enough to stop, detain, and arrest the driver. Rohde v. City of 13 Roseburg, 137 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998). This is because 14 reliable information that a vehicle has been stolen provides 15 “probable cause to believe that the driver has committed the 16 17 crime of either stealing the car or knowingly operating a stolen 18 vehicle.” Id. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment allows “an 19 officer making a traffic stop [to] order passengers to get out 20 of the car pending completion of the stop.” Maryland v. Wilson, 21 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997). “[O]nce a police officer has lawfully 22 stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer may, 23 consistent with the Fourth Amendment and despite the absence of 24 25 probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 26 order all occupants of the vehicle to step outside.” Ruvalcaba 27 v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1995). 28 1 Given that Plaintiffs’ vehicle was stopped for a potential 2 felony, the Court finds that the FAC does not contain sufficient 3 “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 4 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 5 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, 6 the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 7 8 Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim. 9 2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim 10 Plaintiffs’ FAC alleges that officers pulled M.G. out of an 11 open car window in retaliation for questioning the level of 12 force being used on the driver. See Opp’n at 5. The FAC also 13 alleges that “Plaintiffs fully complied with all the Defendant 14 officers’ instructions during the stop” and despite this 15 compliance, Officer Mesa pulled M.G. out of the car window. FAC 16 17 ¶ 18. These alleged facts plausibly state a claim for relief 18 under the Rule 12(b) standard. 19 A First Amendment retaliation claim must allege facts 20 showing a plaintiff (1) was “engaged in a constitutionally 21 protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a 22 person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the 23 protected activity and (3) the protected activity was a 24 25 substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.” 26 Capp v. County of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) 27 (cleaned up). In the context of a police interaction, proving 28 1 retaliation requires the Plaintiff to “prove ‘that (1) the 2 officer’s conduct ‘would chill or silence a person of ordinary 3 firmness from future First Amendment activities,’ and (2) the 4 officer’s desire to chill speech was a ‘but-for cause’ of the 5 adverse action.” Lopez v. City of Glendora, 811 Fed. Appx. 6 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 2020). 7 8 While resisting officers’ instructions during a lawful stop 9 is not protected free speech, Plaintiffs allege that they were 10 compliant and posed no threat to the officers. See FAC ¶ 18, 11 34. Even though the FAC reiterates that Plaintiff M.G., who had 12 originally been seated on the rear driver’s side, moved to sit 13 in the driver’s seat, Defendants state that “[w]e cannot know 14 whether her protests or suspicious movement prompted her removal 15 from the vehicle.” See FAC ¶ 18; Mot. at 15. Thus, at this 16 17 stage it is plausible that Officer Mesa pulled M.G. out of the 18 window in retaliation for M.G.’s comments rather than for the 19 safety of the police officers and that this desire to chill 20 M.G.’s comments was a “but-for cause” of the adverse police 21 action. 22 Construing the facts of the FAC in the light most favorable 23 to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that officers could have 24 25 pulled M.G. out of the window despite M.G.’s compliance with 26 officers’ instructions in retaliation for her criticisms alone. 27 Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff 28 1 M.G.’s First Amendment retaliation claim. 2 3. Denial of Medical Care Claim 3 In the FAC, Plaintiffs renew their denial of medical care 4 claim, but without meaningful revision. Similar to their 5 original complaint, the FAC does not allege Plaintiff M.G.’s 6 bruises required medical treatment. See FAC, at ¶¶ 44–49. Nor 7 8 does it allege she requested medical attention at the scene. 9 Id. When M.G. later “sought medical attention,” the only 10 “treatment” she received was a diagnosis of bruising. FAC ¶ 20. 11 The Court previously found these same facts to be insufficient 12 for stating a denial of medical care claim since “bruising is 13 not the typical care that requires medical attention and it is 14 objectively reasonable for officers to not have summoned medical 15 help for a minor injury.” See ECF No. 29 at 10; see also Hopson 16 17 v. Kings County Jail, No. 1:23-cv-01555-EPG (PC), 2024 WL 18 3597037, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2008)(denying inadequate 19 medical care claim where pre-trial detainee did not plead how 20 his bruised ribs could have been alleviated by earlier 21 treatment). 22 “[S]uspects have a Fourth Amendment right to ‘objectively 23 reasonable post arrest medical care’ until the end of the 24 25 seizure.” Estate of Cornejo ex rel. Solis v. City of Los 26 Angeles, 618 F. App'x 917, 920 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Tatum v. 27 City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 28 1 2006)). “This means that officers must ‘seek the necessary 2 medical attention for a detainee when he or she has been injured 3 while being apprehended by either promptly summoning the 4 necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a 5 hospital.’” Id. (quoting Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 6 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986)). Given the lack of injuries, 7 8 it would be objectively unreasonable for M.G. to seek medical 9 attention for simple bruising. Plaintiff M.G.’s Fourth 10 Amendment denial of medical care claim is insufficiently pled 11 and the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss this cause of 12 action. 13 4. California Civil Code Section 52.1 Claim 14 To state a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must allege a 15 defendant acted with a specific intent to deprive the plaintiff 16 17 of constitutional rights. See Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 18 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). A plaintiff must allege facts 19 showing a defendant “intended not only the force, but its 20 unreasonableness, its character as more than necessary under the 21 circumstances.” Id. at 1045 (cleaned up). 22 Plaintiffs allege that Officer Mesa intended to pull M.G. 23 through the driver’s window and that this force exceeded the 24 25 bounds of the Fourth Amendment. FAC ¶ 31, 52. Because 26 Defendants have not moved to dismiss the excessive force claim 27 and Plaintiff M.G. has successfully pled that she was subject to 28 1 excessive force, it follows that Plaintiff M.G. has also 2 sufficiently pled a Bane Act claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss 3 M.G.’s Bane Act claim is denied. 4 5. Assault and Battery Claims 5 Plaintiffs M.G. and J.C. aggregate their assault and battery 6 claims under one heading. See FAC ¶¶ 57–59. Battery “is any 7 8 intentional, unlawful and harmful contact by one person with the 9 person of another.” Ashcraft v. King, 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 611 10 (1991). “[A] prima facie battery is not established unless and 11 until plaintiff proves unreasonable force was used.” Pernell v. 12 City of Los Angeles, 650 F. Supp. 3d 910, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2022) 13 (quoting Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1273 14 (1998)). To allege an assault claim, one must allege: “(1) 15 defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive 16 17 contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or 18 offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she was about 19 to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably 20 appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the 21 threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (4) 22 plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a 23 substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.” So v. Shin, 212 24 25 Cal. App. 4th 652, 668–69 (2013). Given that M.G. alleges 26 harmful contact when she was pulled through a window and 27 Defendants have not moved to dismiss M.G.’s attendant excessive 28 1 force claim, the Court finds that M.G. has sufficiently pled a 2 plausible claim for assault and battery. 3 On the other hand, Plaintiff J.C. has failed to state a 4 claim under this cause of action. In the FAC, J.C. does not 5 allege that harmful contact occurred or that officers threatened 6 him with harmful contact. Rather, the FAC states only that J.C. 7 8 “feared being imminently harmed by Defendant Mesa in the same 9 manner that Defendant Mesa harmed Plaintiff M.G.” FAC ¶ 59. 10 This is insufficient to trigger an assault or battery claim. 11 Importantly, there is no indication that J.C. was touched by 12 officers or in immediate apprehension of physical contact. Most 13 importantly, the FAC indicates that the window at issue was the 14 “driver’s side window” and J.C. remained in the backseat. FAC ¶ 15 58. The FAC fails to allege facts showing J.C. reasonably 16 17 believed Officer Mesa would imminently pull him through the open 18 front window of the car while he was seated in the back. FAC, ¶¶ 19 18, 59. The FAC merely presents J.C. as a passenger witnessing 20 events and provides only conclusory statements to allege the 21 elements of assault. These allegations do not sufficiently 22 amount to assault or battery. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. 23 For these reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to 24 25 dismiss J.C.’s assault and battery claims and denies Defendants’ 26 motion to dismiss M.G.’s assault and battery claims. 27 /// 28 1 6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims 2 “A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 3 distress exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct 4 by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 5 disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) 6 the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; 7 8 and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress 9 by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 10 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 (2009) (citations and internal quotation 11 marks omitted). 12 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ IIED claims fail because 13 the FAC fails to show extreme or outrageous conduct and officers 14 used a reasonable level of force. Tillotson v. City of San 15 Francisco, 739 F. App’x 887, 889 (9th Cir. 2018). In their 16 17 opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Officer Mesa’s conduct of 18 grabbing M.G.’s forearms and pulling her through a crack in the 19 window constituted extreme and outrageous conduct that led to 20 emotional distress. Construing the facts in the light most 21 favorable to the Plaintiffs, it is plausible that Officer Mesa’s 22 actions could be considered extreme and outrageous by a 23 reasonable jury. Additionally, Plaintiffs M.G. and J.C. allege 24 25 that they experienced “fear, trauma, anxiety, stress, 26 depression, humiliation, and emotional distress” following the 27 incident. FAC ¶ 58, 59. Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly stated 28 1 a claim for relief under a theory of IIED and the Court denies 2 Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. 3 7. Negligence / Negligent Infliction of Emotional 4 Distress (“NIED”) Claims 5 Plaintiffs J.C. and M.G. also plead claims for negligence 6 and Plaintiff J.C. pleads a claim for negligent infliction of 7 8 emotional distress. Defendants correctly point out that there 9 is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional 10 distress. See Campos v. City of Merced, 709 F.Supp.2d 944, 966 11 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 12 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (1993)). Rather, the tort is negligence. 13 Id. Thus, Plaintiff J.C.’s claim for NIED is dismissed. 14 As for Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, the elements of a 15 negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of 16 17 care, breach of that duty, and that the breach is the proximate 18 cause of the resulting injury. Ladd v. County of San Mateo, 12 19 Cal.4th 913, 917–18 (1996); Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 20 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339 (1998). Plaintiffs hedge their 21 negligence claim on the duty to use reasonable force. See Opp’n 22 at 8. In the context of a lawful police encounter, “police 23 officers have a duty not to use excessive force.” Knapps v. 24 25 City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1164 (citing Munoz v. 26 City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1101 (2004)). While 27 Plaintiff M.G. has plausibly stated a negligence claim to the 28 1 extent that it is predicated on her excessive force claim, the 2 same cannot be said for J.C., who does not allege an excessive 3 force claim or any facts demonstrating a breach of legal duty by 4 police officers. Thus, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to 5 dismiss J.C.’s negligence and NIED claims and denies the motion 6 to dismiss as to M.G.’s negligence claim. 7 8 8. False Imprisonment Claims 9 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to plead the elements 10 of a false imprisonment claim. The Court agrees. To claim false 11 imprisonment, one must allege “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional 12 confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for 13 an appreciable period of time, however brief.” Lyons v. Fire Ins. 14 Exchange, 161 Cal. App. 4th 880, 888 (2008). As judicially noticed, 15 this police interaction occurred within the context of an 16 17 investigation for a stolen vehicle. See Section II.B. Thus, the 18 Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs are unable to state a 19 claim that officers lacked “lawful privilege” to stop the vehicle 20 and investigate. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion 21 to dismiss the false imprisonment cause of action. 22 9. Vicarious Liability for the City of Vallejo 23 Defendants incorrectly argue that to maintain the City of 24 25 Vallejo as a named defendant Plaintiffs must prove a Monell 26 claim. See Mot. at 13. In California, public employees are 27 subject to common law claims, see Cal. Gov't Code § 820(a), and 28 1 public entities are statutorily liable for the unlawful acts and 2 omissions of its employees, id. § 815.2(a). As it stands, the 3 FAC does not contain a Monell cause of action, nor does it make 4 any factual allegations regarding any existing city policy or 5 custom. Thus, the City of Vallejo remains a named Defendant as 6 a result of the common law and Bane Act claims, not under 7 8 Monell. 9 10. Leave to Amend 10 A court granting a motion to dismiss a claim must decide 11 whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be given 12 where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on 13 the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing 14 party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of 15 [the] amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 16 17 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 18 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be 19 considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). 20 Here, the Court finds that subsequent amendments would 21 prove futile because the asserted claims are not supported by 22 existing precedents or caselaw and Plaintiffs have not pled 23 additional facts that would make the dismissed claims viable. 24 25 Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once and the 26 FAC did not substantially revise the relevant facts. Because 27 Plaintiffs are not able to cure the defects in their FAC by 28 1 adding more specificity, the Court declines to grant Plaintiffs 2 further leave to amend. Thus, the Fourth Amendment unlawful 3 seizure claim, Fourth Amendment denial of medical care claim, 4 assault and battery claims for J.C., NIED claim, negligence 5 claim for J.C., and false imprisonment claims are dismissed with 6 prejudice. 7 8 III. ORDER 9 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 10 Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the Fourth Amendment unlawful 11 seizure claim (First Cause of Action), Fourth Amendment denial of 12 medical care claim (Fourth Cause of Action), assault/battery 13 claims for J.C. (Sixth Cause of Action), negligence claim for 14 J.C. (Eighth Cause of Action), negligent infliction of emotional 15 distress claim (Ninth Cause of Action), and the false 16 17 imprisonment claim (Tenth Cause of Action) with prejudice. The 18 Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the First 19 Amendment retaliation claim (Third Cause of Action), Bane Act 20 claim (Fifth Cause of Action), assault/battery claims for M.G. 21 (Sixth Cause of Action), intentional infliction of emotional 22 distress claims (Seventh Cause of Action), and negligence claim 23 for M.G. (Eighth Cause of Action). 24 25 In sum, Plaintiff M.G. has the following remaining claims: 26 Fourth Amendment excessive force (Second Cause of Action), First 27 Amendment retaliation (Third Cause of Action) Bane Act (Fifth 28 ee Om EERO OO III IIE EE IIE IRIE II IO ISIS EIS ED ae

1 Cause of Action), assault/battery (Sixth Cause of Action), 2 intentional infliction of emotional distress (Seventh Cause of 3 Action), and negligence (Eighth Cause of Action); and Plaintiff J.C. has the following remaining claim: intentional infliction of emotional distress (Seventh Cause of Action).

5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 | pated: April 16, 2025 9 A h 7 Yond 11 Oke ace Memes qilwsce □□□□ SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18