J.C. v. City of Vallejo

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: December 17, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01879
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J.C., by and through his No. 2:24-cv-01879-JAM-AC Guardian ad Litem Nandi Storm 12 Cain and M.G., by and through her Guardian ad Litem Wendy 13 Whittaker, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 14 Plaintiffs, MOTION TO DISMISS 15 v. 16 City of Vallejo, a municipal corporation; and DOES 1-50, 17 inclusive, individually and in their official capacity as 18 police officers for the Vallejo Police Department, 19 Defendants. 20 21 INTRODUCTION OF CASE / PROCEDURAL HISTORY 22 This case arises from an interaction between Plaintiffs J.C. 23 and M.G. (“Plaintiffs”) and City of Vallejo (“Defendant”) police 24 officers following a motor vehicle stop. Plaintiffs bring this 25 case by and through their guardians ad litem, N.C. and W.D. 26 respectively. Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 27 § 1983, California Civil Code § 52.1, and various tort law 28 theories. Currently pending before this Court is Defendant’s 1 Motion to Dismiss. See Mot., ECF No. 17. Plaintiffs submitted 2 an opposition, Opp’n, ECF No. 23, and Defendant replied, Reply, 3 ECF No. 26. For the reasons provided herein, the Court GRANTS in 4 part Defendant’s motion to dismiss.1 5 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 6 The following facts alleged by Plaintiffs are accepted as 7 true for purposes of Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 8 On July 2, 2023, Plaintiffs M.G. and J.C. were passengers in 9 a vehicle driven by a friend of Plaintiff M.G.’s mother. See 10 Compl. ¶ 15. City of Vallejo Police subsequently pulled the 11 vehicle over and an officer ordered the driver out of the car. 12 The driver exited the vehicle and was placed in handcuffs. Id. 13 At the same time, Plaintiff M.G. had originally been seated 14 behind the driver’s seat and moved to sit in the driver’s seat. 15 See Compl. ¶ 17. Once in the driver’s seat, Plaintiff M.G. began 16 protesting and questioning the officers’ level of force. Id. 17 Then, officers yelled instructions at Plaintiff M.G. and one 18 officer grabbed Plaintiff M.G. and violently pulled her out of 19 the car through a crack in the car window. Id. Plaintiff M.G. 20 then landed on the concrete floor with her face and chest first. 21 Plaintiff J.C. witnessed these actions and was also needlessly 22 detained. Id.; Compl. ¶ 1. 23 As a result of the incident, Plaintiff M.G. sought medical 24 attention at Sutter Antioch where she received the diagnosis of 25

26 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 27 scheduled for October 22, 2024. The Parties are advised that once the scheduling order is issued, the fictitiously-named 28 defendants will be dismissed. 1 bruising. See Compl. ¶ 18. 2 II. OPINION 3 A. Legal Standard 4 A complaint must make a “short and plain statement of the 5 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 7 (2007). 8 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 9 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 10 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the plausibility 11 pleading standard set forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 12 (2007), a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss by alleging 13 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 14 its face.” The complaint must contain sufficient “factual 15 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 16 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This “plausibility 18 standard,” however, “asks for more than a sheer possibility that 19 a defendant has acted unlawfully,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 20 (2009), and “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely 21 consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the 22 line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 23 relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 24 At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court must accept all 25 nonconclusory factual allegations of the complaint as true and 26 construe those facts and the reasonable inferences that follow 27 in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Id.; see also 28 Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). However, 1 legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual 2 allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 3 662, 678-79 (2009). In the event dismissal is warranted, it is 4 generally without prejudice, unless it is clear the complaint 5 cannot be saved by any amendment. See Sparling v. Daou, 411 6 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 7 B. Judicial Notice 8 Along with their motion to dismiss, Defendant has requested 9 that the Court take judicial notice of four exhibits that 10 contain law enforcement records pertaining to Plaintiffs’ July 11 2, 2023 incident. See ECF No. 17-1. The records at issue 12 consist of one Vallejo Police Department crime report (“Exhibit 13 A”) and three MP4 audio/video recordings of body worn camera 14 footage (“Exhibits B, C, and D”). Plaintiffs object to this 15 request. See Opp’n, ECF No. 23-1. 16 Defendant heavily relies on Exhibits A, B, C, and D in its 17 motion to dismiss and argues that the Court may take judicial 18 notice of these records under Fed. R. of Evid. Rule 201(b), 19 which provides courts discretion to take judicial notice of 20 facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” and which are “capable 21 of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 22 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 23 201(b). Defendant cites Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of 24 Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2006), 25 asserting that the exhibits it has provided in this case are 26 public government records which can be properly considered. 27 The Court disagrees with Defendant’s theory and 28 justification for judicial notice. As discussed above, Fed. R. 1 Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Ninth Circuit precedent are clear that when 2 the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations are 3 challenged by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “[r]eview is limited 4 to the complaint.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 5 1274 (9th Cir. 1993). All factual allegations set forth in the 6 complaint “are taken as true and construed in the light most 7 favorable to [p]laintiffs.” Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 8 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). As Plaintiffs correctly 9 argue, the Court may not generally consider materials outside 10 the pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage. See Objection at 11 2, ECF No. 17-1; Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 12 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & 13 Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997). 14 If “defendants are permitted to present their own version 15 of the facts at the pleading stage — and district courts accept 16 those facts as uncontroverted and true — it becomes near 17 impossible for even the most aggrieved plaintiff to demonstrate 18 a sufficiently ‘plausible’ claim for relief.” Khoja v. Orexigen 19 Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Such undermining 21 of the usual pleading burdens is not the purpose of judicial 22 notice. Id. When “matters outside the pleading are presented 23 to and not excluded by the court,” the 12(b)(6) motion converts 24 into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Kohja, 25 899 F.3d at 998. 26 Additionally, unlike the ordinances which were publicly 27 accessible via the internet in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, the 28 Court does not find that a police report and body worn camera 1 footage are within the same category of readily available public 2 government records discussed in that case. Instead, Defendant’s 3 records seek to contradict the allegations in Plaintiffs’ 4 Complaint and cannot be considered for their substance at this 5 stage. While Defendant’s exhibits may be considered during 6 later stages of litigation, the Court finds that judicial notice 7 of Defendant’s exhibits is premature and declines to take 8 judicial notice of the content of these exhibits for purposes of 9 this motion. Thus, the Court determines that considering the 10 police report and body worn camera footage is inappropriate at 11 this stage. It follows that the Court has not relied on 12 Defendant’s exhibits or the arguments pertaining to them in 13 deciding this motion. 14 C. Analysis 15 1. Fourth Amendment Seizure 16 Under Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997), police 17 officers, as a matter of course, may order passengers of a 18 lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. If officers possess a 19 concern for their safety, they may also handcuff and move all 20 occupants of the vehicle. See Rohde v. City of Roseburg, 137 21 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Allen v. City of Los 22 Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendant also 23 points out that officers may “despite the absence of probable 24 cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, order all 25 occupants of the vehicle to step outside.” Ruvalcaba v. City of 26 Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1995). 27 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs do not set forth any 28 allegations regarding the original stop and detention of the 1 driver. See Compl. They do not plead that the driver was 2 stopped and arrested unlawfully. Nor do they allege that they 3 did not know why they were being stopped or whether they fully 4 complied with officers’ instructions during the stop. Indeed, 5 Plaintiffs provide mere conclusory statements that police 6 officers seized passengers without probable cause and reasonable 7 suspicion. See Compl. ¶ 30. 8 Because the constitutionality of a passenger’s detention is 9 predicated upon the initial stop of the driver, the Complaint 10 has provided insufficient factual content to assert a viable 11 Fourth Amendment unconstitutional seizure claim. With no 12 information about the original circumstances surrounding the 13 vehicle stop, there are not enough factual allegations in the 14 Complaint to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. As such, the 15 Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this claim with 16 leave to amend. 17 2. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force 18 Plaintiff asserts an excessive force claim due to the 19 manner she was extracted from the stopped vehicle. While 20 Plaintiff does not identify the specific police officer who 21 committed this action, it is plausible that at least one 22 individual officer exercised unlawful force while effectuating 23 Plaintiff M.G.’s arrest. 24 Plaintiff M.G. alleges that after she moved from the “rear 25 driver’s side” to the driver’s seat and protested officers’ 26 actions, one officer grabbed Plaintiff M.G. and pulled her out 27 of the car through a crack in the car window. See Compl. ¶ 17. 28 This action caused Plaintiff M.G. to land on the floor and 1 receive bruising. Id. The Complaint also alleges that 2 Plaintiff M.G. “posed no threat” to officers and that this use 3 of force was unnecessary because she was “completely calm, 4 cooperative, and unresisting during the incident.” See Compl. 5 ¶¶ 36-37. While Defendant disputes this depiction of the 6 incident and argues that officers used reasonable force because 7 M.G. was noncompliant, the Court cannot consider these arguments 8 because they rely on exhibits outside of the Complaint. See 9 Mot. at 14. 10 Under the Fourth Amendment, excessive force claims are 11 assessed under a reasonableness test. See Graham v. Connor, 490 12 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). The reasonableness inquiry is an 13 objective inquiry that asks “whether the officers’ actions are 14 ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 15 confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 16 motivation.” Graham, 460 U.S. at 397. Because the Court must 17 take the Complaint at face value and construe the facts in the 18 light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court determines 19 that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that officers’ level of 20 force was unreasonable since M.G. was fully compliant and posed 21 no threat. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss 22 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. 23 3. First Amendment Retaliation 24 Plaintiff M.G. alleges that officers used excessive force 25 against Plaintiff in retaliation for protesting police action. 26 See Compl. ¶¶ 43-46. However, Plaintiff M.G.’s allegations are 27 insufficient to state a claim because according to the 28 Complaint, she was not engaged in protected speech activity 1 prior to the police encounter. 2 To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff 3 must plausibly allege that she “(1) was engaged in a 4 constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant's actions 5 would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to 6 engage in the protected activity and (3) the protected activity 7 was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s 8 conduct.” Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th 9 Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). As Defendant argues, Plaintiff M.G.’s 10 retaliation claim is conclusory and she does not plead all of 11 the required elements. 12 The Complaint alleges that after officers pulled the 13 vehicle over and arrested the driver, M.G. protested the “level 14 of force” used by officers. See Compl. ¶ 17. Thus, Plaintiff 15 M.G.’s “protest” occurred in the context of an already 16 effectuated vehicle seizure. Contrary to what Plaintiff 17 alleges, resisting police actions during a lawful stop is not 18 protest within the meaning protected by the First Amendment. 19 Unlike the Plaintiff in Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 20 1378 (9th Cir. 1990), M.G. was not engaged in protected free 21 speech activity prior to being detained – her resistance 22 occurred after the vehicle had already been stopped. Given that 23 Plaintiff’s speech occurred during a police seizure, the Court 24 does not find that she was engaged in protected activity and 25 GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this claim. 26 4. Denial of Medical Care 27 Plaintiff M.G. also pleads a denial of medical care claim 28 under the Fourth Amendment. See Compl. at 10. The Fourth 1 Amendment requires law enforcement officers to provide 2 objectively reasonable post-arrest care. Mejia v. City of San 3 Bernardino, 2012 WL 1079341, at *5 n. 12 (citing Tatum v. City & 4 County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d at 1099). “This means that 5 officers must ‘seek the necessary medical attention for a 6 detainee when he or she has been injured while being apprehended 7 by either promptly summoning the necessary medical help or by 8 taking the injured detainee to a hospital.’” Id. (quoting 9 Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 10 1986)). 11 Under the facts alleged in the Complaint, this claim is 12 factually and legally deficient. Plaintiff does not allege that 13 she requested medical care or that she suffered any injuries 14 necessitating medical treatment. The Complaint provides merely 15 that Plaintiff received a later diagnosis of “bruising.” Compl. 16 ¶ 18. Bruising is not the typical care that requires medical 17 attention and it is objectively reasonable for officers to not 18 have summoned medical help for a minor injury. Based on the 19 allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs has not plausibly 20 asserted a denial of medical care claim under the Fourth 21 Amendment’s reasonableness standard and Defendant’s motion to 22 dismiss this cause of action is GRANTED. 23 5. Monell Liability 24 Plaintiffs also raise a Monell claim in their Complaint. 25 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Monell claim fails because 26 Plaintiffs do not allege with any particularity the specific 27 City policies or practices claimed to support liability and 28 instead takes a “kitchen-sink approach” that provides conclusory 1 restatements of the law. See MTD at 17. The Court agrees. 2 Defendant cites to AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of 3 Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012), which holds that the 4 Starr standard requiring “sufficient allegations of underlying 5 facts” applies to pleading policy or custom for claims against 6 municipal entities. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th 7 Cir. 2011). Under the Starr standard, allegations in a 8 complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of 9 a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of 10 underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing 11 party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual 12 allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an 13 entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the 14 opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and 15 continued litigation. Id. 16 Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not meet the Starr standard 17 because it consists of only vague and conclusory statements. 18 See Compl. at ¶¶ 56-60. Although Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n 19 information and belief, [officers] were not disciplined for 20 their use of excessive force,” Plaintiffs do not allege that 21 they ever filed complaints with the City of Vallejo’s Police 22 Department or sought any other administrative remedies. 23 Plaintiffs also allege, without any particularity, that the City 24 “ha[s] and maintain[s] an unconstitutional policy, custom, and 25 practice of arresting individuals without probable cause or 26 reasonable suspicion, and using excessive force, which also is 27 demonstrated by inadequate training.” Compl. at ¶ 56. It is 28 not apparent from the Complaint what this specific policy is. 1 Plaintiffs also provide only conclusory statements about 2 the City’s liability, alleging that the City “inadequately 3 supervis[es]” officers, maintains “grossly inadequate procedures 4 for reporting, supervising, investigating, reviewing, 5 disciplining, and controlling” officers, and “fail[s] to 6 discipline” officers. Compl. at ¶ 56. These statements are 7 insufficient to plausibly allege that Defendant has acted 8 unlawfully and are simply bare restatements of the law. 9 After Iqbal, allegations of Monell liability are sufficient 10 for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) only where they: (1) identify the 11 challenged policy/custom; (2) explain how the policy/custom is 12 deficient; (3) explain how the policy/custom caused the 13 plaintiff harm; and (4) reflect how the policy/custom amounted 14 to deliberate indifference, i.e., show how the deficiency 15 involved was obvious and the constitutional injury was likely to 16 occur. See Herd v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 311 F. Supp. 3d 17 1157, 1166–67 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Young v. City of Visalia, 18 687 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2009)); see also Harvey v. 19 City of S. Lake Tahoe, No. CIV S-10-1653 KJM EFB PS, 2011 WL 20 3501687, *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011). Plaintiffs’ Complaint 21 does not fulfill any of these four metrics: the allegations do 22 not specify what the City policy is, how the City policy is 23 deficient, or how the training and hiring practices caused 24 Plaintiffs’ constitutional injury. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ 25 opposition is devoid of factual reasoning because it merely 26 lists other cases against the City of Vallejo that contain 27 materially dissimilar facts and are not relevant to the incident 28 at issue. See Opp’n at 6-13. 1 Iqbal has made clear that conclusory, “threadbare” 2 allegations that merely recite the elements of a cause of action 3 will not survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 4 1949–50. Thus, without more, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim does not 5 survive Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and must be dismissed. 6 6. Bane Act California Civil Code Section 52.1 7 Plaintiffs assert a state cause of action under the Bane 8 Act. “The Bane Act civilly protects individuals from conduct 9 aimed at interfering with rights that are secured by federal or 10 state law, where the interference is carried out by threats, 11 intimidation or coercion.” Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 12 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation 13 marks omitted). The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the 14 defendant, by improper means, “tried to or did prevent the 15 plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do 16 under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he 17 or she was not required to do under the law.” Austin B. v. 18 Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883, 57 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 454 (2007). 20 Defendant correctly contends that the Bane Act requires 21 defendants act with “specific intent” to deprive plaintiffs of 22 their constitutional rights and cite to Reese v. Cnty. of 23 Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing 24 Cornell v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal.App.5th 766 25 (2017)). See Reply at 9. While the Ninth Circuit recognized in 26 Reese that “the elements of the excessive force claim under 27 § 52.1 are the same as under § 1983,” [the Ninth Circuit] did 28 not read those cases as contradicting the intent requirement” 1 previously established by California state courts. 888 F.3d at 2 1044 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While 3 Plaintiff M.G. has sufficiently plead a Fourth Amendment 4 excessive force violation, she has not sufficiently alleged that 5 officers possessed specific intent to interfere with her rights 6 as required under the Bane Act. See Compl. ¶ 62. 7 Because the Ninth Circuit has instructed that jurors must 8 find that the defendants “intended not only the force, but its 9 unreasonableness, its character as ‘more than necessary under 10 the circumstances’” to prevail on a Bane Act claim predicated on 11 excessive force, Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 12 1045 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court finds that allegations about 13 underlying intent are necessary to properly assert a Bane Act 14 cause of action. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to plead all 15 elements of the Bane Act and Defendant’s motion to dismiss this 16 claim is GRANTED. 17 7. Tort Causes of Action 18 Plaintiffs plead a series of tort allegations including 19 assault/battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 20 negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 21 Plaintiffs also allege a false arrest/false imprisonment claim. 22 Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently 23 plead these claims. See Mot. at 18-19. The Court finds that 24 Plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead the elements for the 25 alleged tort actions because the claims lack specificity as to 26 who the tortfeasors are and what specific duties are owed. 27 Presently, Plaintiffs group the fictitiously-named police 28 officers and municipal entity together and then conclude that 1 tort liability exists. However, group pleading does not provide 2 defendants fair notice of the claims against them under Fed. R. 3 Civ. P. 8. See Gen–Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., Inc., 926 F. 4 Supp. 948, 960–62 (S.D. Cal. 1996); see also, Smith v. City of 5 Marina, 709 F. Supp.3d 926, 937-38 9 (N.D. Cal. 2024) 6 (dismissing tort claims in a § 1983 action for lack of 7 specificity and disaggregation). Accordingly, these tort claims 8 are dismissed and Defendant’s motion is GRANTED because 9 Plaintiffs fail to specify particular defendant officers or 10 identify the duties owed and breaching conduct for each 11 individual defendant. 12 As for Plaintiffs’ false arrest/false imprisonment claim, 13 this claim stands on the same footing as the federal Fourth 14 Amendment seizure claim and Plaintiffs have failed to allege 15 sufficient facts establishing an unreasonable arrest. Thus, 16 Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED on this claim as well. 17 8. Leave to Amend 18 Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend. See Opp’n at 17. 19 A court granting a motion to dismiss a claim must decide whether 20 to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely 21 given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 22 motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the 23 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] 24 futility of [the] amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 25 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 26 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those 27 to be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). 28 Because Plaintiffs may cure the defects in their Complaint by em EE INE IERIE RII EEO IE EIDE SIL OSE IED

1 adding more specificity and identifying which officers were 2 involved in the incident, the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to 3 amend. 4 Til. ORDER 5 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 6 | Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to the Fourth Amendment seizure 7 claim (First Cause of Action), First Amendment retaliation claim 8 (Third Cause of Action), Fourth Amendment denial of medical care 9 | claim (Fourth Cause of Action), Monell liability claim (Fifth 10 Cause of Action), Bane Act claim (Sixth Cause of Action), the 11 tort liability claims (Seventh through Tenth Causes of Action), 12 and the false imprisonment claim (Eleventh Cause of Action) with 13 leave to amend. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to dismiss 14 as to the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim (Second Cause of 15 || Action). 16 Plaintiffs shall file their Amended Complaint no later than 17 twenty (20) days from the date of this Order. Defendant shall 18 file its responsive pleading to the Amended Complaint no later 19 than twenty (20) days thereafter. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: December 16, 2024 22 : cp, JOHN A. MENDEZ 24 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28 16